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"Myth: a belief given uncritical acceptance ...."t
"When liberty is mentioned, we must always be careful to observe whether it is not
really the assertion of private interests which is thereby designated."tt
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970 Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act, Title
IX of which is known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act, or RICO.1 Congress enacted the 1970 Act to "strengthen[]
the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, [to] establish[] new
penal prohibitions, and [to] provid[e] enhanced sanctions and new rem-
t WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1497 (1981).
tt G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY pt. 4, § 3, ch. 2, at 430 (1900).
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat.
922, 941 (1970) [hereinafter RICO] (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)). The law review and
related commentary on RICO is extensive. The Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479, 481 n.2 (1985) termed the bibliography in Milner, A Civil RICO Bibliography, 21
CAL. W.L. REv. 409 (1985), "thorough." For the best general treatments of the statute from a vari-
ety of perspectives, see generally CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND
CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (2d rev. ed. 1988); CRIMI-
NAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIvIL RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (1988); Blakey,
The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE.DAME L. REV.
237 (1982); Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Tech-
nology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526 (1987); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980); Blakey &
Goldstock, On the Waterfront: RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 341 (1980);
Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837 (1980);
Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165 (1980);
Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291 (1983); see also Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a
Criminal (pts. 1-4), 87 COLUM. L. REv. 661 (1987); Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A
Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 774 (1988); Lynch, A Reply to Michael Gold-
smith, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 802 (1988). For the most consistently thoughtful student works, see Note,
"Mother of Mercy-Is This the End of RICO?"--Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void for
Vagueness Challenge to RICO Pattern, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 1990); Note, Who
Should Pay When Federally Insured Pension Funds Go Broke?-A Strategy for Recovering from
Wrongdoers, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 310 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Who Should Pay]; Note, Func-
tions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 646 (1989) [hereinafter Note,
Functions]; Note, Innocence by Association: Entities and the Person-Enterprise *Rule Under
RICO, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 179 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Innocence by Association]; Note,
Attorney Fee Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: If It Works, Don't Fix
It, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 535 (1988); Note, Reconsideration of Pattern in Civil RICO Offenses,
62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 83 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Reconsideration of Pattern]; Note, Treble
Damages Under RICO: Characterization and Computation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526 (1986)
[hereinafter Note, Treble Damages]; Note, A Uniform Limitations Period for Civil RICO, 61 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 495 (1986); Note, Civil RICO: Prior Criminal Conviction and Burden of Proof,
60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 566 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Burden of Proof]; Note, The Availability of
Equitable Relief in Civil Causes of Action in RICO, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 945 (1984); Note,
RICO and the Predicate Offenses: An Analysis of Double Jeopardy and Verdict Consistency
Problems, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 382 (1982); Note, Conspiracy to Violate RICO: Expanding
Traditional Conspiracy Law, 58 NOTRE DAMS L. REV. 587 (1983).
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edies . ,,2 RICO covers violence, the provision of illegal goods and
services, corruption in labor or management relations, corruption in
government, and commercial fraud.3 Congress found in 1970 that the
sanctions and remedies available to combat these crimes under the law
then in force were unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.4 Conse-
quently, it provided a wide range of new criminal and civil sanctions to
control these offenses, including imprisonment, forfeiture, injunctions,
and treble damage relief for persons injured in their business or prop-
erty by violations of the statute.' At the time, the President,6 the Presi-
2. RICO, supra note 1, 84 Stat. at 923.
3. See generally Blakey, supra note 1, at 300-06.
4. RICO, supra note 1, 84 Stat. at 923.
5. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964 (1988).
6. See Message from the President of the United States Relative to the Fight Against Or-
ganized Crime [hereinafter President's Message], reprinted in Measures Relating to Organized
Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 444 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. That support, at
least for private civil RICO sanctions, no longer exists. The change in position of the Department
of Justice, reflecting the views of the Administration, is traced and criticized in 133 CONG. REC.
H9050-57 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1987) (statement of Rep. John Conyers). Rep. Conyers remarked that
"[t]he best explanation lies in a change of personalities-the substitution at the position of the
Deputy Attorney General in the Department [of Justice] for J.D. Lowell Jensen, a widely exper-
ienced Federal and State prosecutor, of Arnold I. Burns, a prominent New York corporations and
securities lawyer." Id. at 9051; see also Hearings on S. 438 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter S. 438 Hearings] (hearings not officially printed as
of current date) (testimony of John C. Keeny, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Divi-
sion, U.S. Department of Justice) (stating that "S.438 ... represents the general approach to
RICO reform that we have come to prefer .. .").
The Judicial Conference of the United States also supported RICO in 1970. That support, too,
no longer exists. In 1986 the Judicial Conference changed its position on RICO. Noting a "veritable
'explosion' of civil RICO suits," the Conference indicated that federal jurisdiction was granted
under RICO for "every case in which two or more instances of mail or wire fraud are alleged. ... "
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES 11 (1986). As such, it recommended that "Congress ... seriously consider
narrowing the reach of [the] statute." Id. at 12. In 1987 the Conference further justified its support
for RICO reform by rejecting testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice that the number of civil RICO cases was not as large as thought and indicating its belief
that the number was "substantially larger than [could] be statistically documented given the judi-
ciary's statistical practices and ...require[d] a disproportionately large amount of time to re-
solve." JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 76 (1987). The Conference reaffirmed its position in 1988. See
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES 23 (1988) (stating that curtailing RICO would have a "positive impact on the
federal civil RICO caseload").
Chief Justice William Rehnquist is also in favor of RICO reform. See Rehnquist, Reforming
Diversity Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 5, 11-13 (1989) (originally presented at
the Brookings Institution's Eleventh Seminar on the Administration of Justice, Apr. 7, 1989). Not-
ing that most of the civil RICO filings are "garden-variety civil fraud cases of the type traditionally
litigated in state courts," id. at 9, the Chief Justice faulted RICO's inclusion of a civil counterpart
to criminal mail and wire fraud prosecutions, suggesting that the criminal side of these two of-
fenses is kept in check by prosecutorial discretion. "[T]here is no such thing as prosecutorial dis-
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dent's Commission on Crime and Administration of Justice,7 and the
American Bar Association" called for the private civil remedies of
RICO. In response, the Senate passed the Bill seventy-three to one.
The House passed an amended Bill three hundred forty-one to twenty-
six.10 The Senate passed the amended House Bill without objection,
and the President signed the legislation on October 14, 1970.1"
At first, the Department of Justice moved slowly to use RICO in
criminal prosecutions. Today, RICO is the prosecutor's tool of choice in
organized crime, political corruption, white-collar crime, terrorism, and
neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic hate group prosecutions. 2 The Department
cretion," he noted, "to limit the use of civil RICO by plaintiffs' attorneys." Id. at 10. Nevertheless,
he acknowledged that RICO specifically avoided mentioning "organized crime." He noted that
"the statute was intentionally written in general terms so as to permit flexible application." Id. at
11; see also W. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice at the American Bar Association Mid-
Year Meeting in Denver, Colo. 11-12 (Feb. 6, 1989) (source on file with Author) (stating that "[a]
sharp curtailment of the basis for civil RICO actions. . . would. . . help to cut down on the work
of the federal courts").
7. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SociETY 208 (1967) [hereinafter COMM'N REPORT] (recommending "[clivil proceed-
ings . . . to stop unfair trade practices . . . by organized crime businesses").
8. See Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 259-72 (testimony of Rufus King, Chair, Special
Committee on Organized Crime, Criminal Law Section, American Bar Association); Organized
Crime Control: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 537-94 (1970) [hereinafter House Hearings] (testimony of Edward L. Wright, Pres-
ident-Elect, American Bar Association). American Bar Association support no longer exists. See
generally Blakey & Cessar, supra note 1, at 572-77 (stating that "[t]he turn around of the Associa-
tion's official policy ... is a classic study in special interest pleading, in which lawyers move from
a broad-based public policy analysis to a narrow-focused position reflecting the views of their
clients").
9. 116 CONG. REC. 972 (1970).
10. Id. at 35,363.
11. Id. at 36,296, 37,264. Since 1970, 29 states enacted similar state legislation. For a chart
analyzing the statutes of the various states, see App. A, infra p. 988. See generally STATE CIVIL
RICO: DRUG ENFORCEMENT NEWSLETTER, Dec. 1989 (describing the implementation of state RICO
legislation in Arizona, Oregon, Washington, Colorado, and Tennessee); Strasser, State Racketeer-
ing Laws Are Giving Prosecutors a New Weapon Against Crime, GOVERNING, Apr. 1988, at 42, 44
(describing state RICO efforts in Florida, Washington, Arizona, and New Jersey). Fred Strasser
states:
With a growing number of exceptions, states have let little RICOs sit on the books like well-
sheathed swords.
' * .[O]bserves John G. McKenzie, who tracked state RICO developments for the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General in 1985 . . . "[t]he reason is that for the most part,
you just don't have a strong prosecutorial body in the states."
- . . "It's like brain surgery, [says G. Robert Blakey]. The legislature has authorized it,
but until you get brain surgeons, there's no one around to do the operation."
Id.
12. See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-11 (1985) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings] (statement of Assistant
Attorney General Stephen S. Trott); see also United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1526-28,
1540, 1546 (9th Cir. 1988) (RICO prosecution of the Bruders Schweigh, a white-hate group, for
robbery, murder, and other crimes, including the murder of Alan Berg), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 171
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:851
(1989); United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1988) (RICO prosecution of a Boston or-
ganized crime family); United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) (RICO
prosecution of a Japanese corporation for mail fraud and bribery); United States v. Mandel, 431 F.
Supp. 90 (D. Md. 1977) (conviction of the Governor of Maryland for RICO mail fraud and brib-
ery), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.) (en banc), aff'd per
curiam by equally divided court en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 461
(1986), conviction vacated, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988) (vacating the conviction in light of 18
U.S.C. § 1346 (1988), which set aside United States v. McNally, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)). See gener-
ally B. JACOBs, THIMBLE RIGGERS: THE LAW v. GOVERNOR MARVIN MANDEL (1984) (recounting the
story of the Mandel investigation and prosecution); G. O'NEILL & D. LEHR, THE UNDERBOSS: THE
RisE AND FALL OF A MAFIA FAmILY (1989) (recounting the story of the Angiulo investigation and
prosecution); S. SINGULAR, TALKED TO DEATH: THE MURDER OF ALAN BERG AND THE RISE OF THE
NEo-NAZIS (1987) (recounting the story of the investigation and prosecution of the Bruders
Schweigh).
Following McNally, Mandel was readmitted to the Maryland Bar. Barringer, When Good
Standing Has Different Meanings, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1989, at B10, col. 3. He is now a lobbyist
in the state capitol. NCNB's Legal Staff in Texas Mushrooms, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1989, at B6,
col. 4.
Independent studies also conclude that RICO is effective against sophisticated forms of crime.
The President's Commission on Organized Crime praised RICO highly and recommended that
states adopt similar legislation. President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, The Edge: Organized
Crime, Business, and Labor Unions: Report to the President and the Attorney General 251 (1986)
(describing the statute as "effective"). The General Accounting Office, in its study of federal organ-
ized crime prosecutions, concluded:
Prior to the passage of [RICO], attacking an organized criminal group was an awkward affair.
RICO facilitated the prosecution of a criminal group involved in superficially unrelated crimi-
nal ventures and enterprises connected only at the usually well-insulated upper levels of the
organization's bureaucracy.
Before the Act, the government's efforts were necessarily piecemeal, attacking isolated
segments of the organization as they engaged in single criminal acts. The leaders, when
caught, were only penalized for what seemed to be unimportant crimes. The larger meaning of
these crimes was lost because the big picture could not be presented in a single criminal
prosecution. With the passage of RICO, the entire picture of the organization's criminal be-
havior and the involvement of its leaders in directing that behavior could be captured and
presented.
Organized Crime: 25 Years After Valachi: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investi-
gations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 505 (1988) (state-
ment of David C. Williams, Director, Office of Special Investigations, General Accounting Office);
see also McFadden, The Mafia of 1980's: Divided and Under Siege, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at
1, col. 1; Busting the Mob, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 3, 1986, at 24; The Mob on Trial,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 7, 1986, at 4.
Significant prosecutions continue. See Butterfield, 21 Indicted in New England As Core of
Organized Crime, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1990, at A8, col. 1. The New York Times article reported a
racketeering indictment quoting tapes of an organized crime initiation ceremony that included the
following oath: "I want to enter into this organization to protect my family and to protect all my
friends. I swear not to divulge this secret and to obey, with love and omerta." Id. The indictment
also quoted instructions to new members: "concerning the rules of the La Cosa Nostra and agreed
to kill any individual who posed a threat to the organization and its members." Id.
Forfeitures under RICO and similar drug statutes increasingly are having a significant impact
on criminal enterprises. Belkin, The Booty of Drugs Enriches Agencies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1990,
§ 1, at 18, col. 1 (reporting that the Department of Justice seized $580 million in 1989, $207 million
in 1988, and $94 million in 1986).
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of Justice also is implementing the civil provisions of the Act.13 The
private bar did not begin to bring civil RICO suits until about 1975.
When it did, a firestorm of controversy broke out, and today RICO is
endangered from a variety of quarters.14 The arguments against RICO
13. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 116-17 (reviewing litigation against mob-con-
trolled unions); see also Tumulty, U.S. Files Suit to Oust Mob from N.Y. Waterfront, L.A. Times,
Feb. 15, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (reporting a civil RICO suit by the Justice Department against the
International Longshoremen's Association, alleging extortion, embezzlement, bribes, mail fraud,
assault, and murder, concluding that a "hidden tax of payments to organized crime" was imposed
that cost consumers millions of dollars, and noting the opposition by more than 250 members of
Congress as well as former presidential candidate Gov. Michael S. Dukakis to the use of civil RICO
against unions); Hagedorn, U.S. Is Said to Plan RICO Suit Against Longshoremen's Union, Wall
St. J., July 19, 1989, at B10, col. 1 (stating that the Justice Department is planning a civil RICO
suit against the International Longshoremen's Association, one of four unions identified as corrupt
by the President's Commission on Organized Crime). See generally Federal Government's Use of
Trusteeships Under the RICO Statute: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Compare
Teamster Denies Fighting U.S. Through His Union, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, § 1, at 37, col. 1
(reporting litigation brought to challenge settlement of civil RICO suit between the Government
and the Teamsters Union in which the Government charged that the Union was under the influ-
ence of organized crime) with U.S. and Teamsters Reach Accord That Avoids a Racketeering
Trial, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1989, at Al, col. 4 (reporting that the Justice Department and the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters reached a tentative settlement of a civil RICO suit in
which the Government originally accused the Teamsters of having made a "devil's pact with La
Cosa Nostra") and Teamster Accord: Each Side Finds Some Different Meanings, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 16, 1989, at A27, col. 1 (reporting that the Teamsters and the Government continue to work
on the settlement of a civil RICO suit over criminal influence in the Union demonstrated by 340
convictions over 20 years in more than 200 separate prosecutions and lawsuits).
14. Compare Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 1986
B.Y.U. L, R v. 55 and Note, Congress Responds to Sedima: Is There a Contract Out on Civil
RICO?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 851 (1986) with Lacovara & Aronow, The Legal Shakedown of Legiti-
mate Business People: The Runaway Provisions of Private Civil RICO, 21 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1
(1985-1986). The principal players supporting RICO include Public Citizen, a consumer group; the
United States Public Interest Research Group, a state consumer group; the National Conference of
State Legislatures; the National Association of Insurance Commissioners; the National Association
of Attorney Generals; and the National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys, a
plaintiff's lawyers group. Those seeking reform include the National Association of Manufacturers;
the AFL-CIO; the American Civil Liberties Union; the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants; the American Bar Association; the American Bankers Association; the Securities Indus-
try Association; the Future Industries Association; and the American Life League, an antiabortion
group. See Advocates of RICO Revision Gird for Third Try, CONG. Q., Feb. 18, 1989, at 322
(describing the groups involved and the history of unsuccessful efforts since 1985 to secure reform);
Abramson, High-Powered Bid to Gut RICO Law Is Derailed by Unrelated Scandals, Backers'
Seeming Greed, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1989, at A18, col.1.
RICO stimulates wide-ranging commentary. Several papers and magazines wrote basically
favorable editorials. See, e.g., Refine RICO, Don't "Reform" It (editorial), N.Y. Times, Aug. 27,
1989, § 4, at 18, col. 1. The editorial stated, "Industry groups . . . haven't proved that [RICO]
needs more than fine-tuning. . . [The reform legislation] would selectively spare particular groups
... for proven fraud. Worse, it would apply the relief retroactively .... [T]he law doesn't de-
serve to be overthrown by a mislabeled [reform] bill." Id.; see also "Fixing" RICO: Beware of
Solutions to Nonexistent Problems (editorial), Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 1, 1989, at 18-A, col. 1.
This editorial stated that "[tihis is an odd time to be weakening a law that lets victims of white-
collar crime fight for compensation .... By gutting the civil provisions of [RICO], lawmakers
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are fueled by a series of myths that are not supported by a careful anal-
would be pulling their biggest con job in years." Id.; see also Don't Dull This Sword (editorial),
Miami Herald, Aug. 29, 1989, at 15A, col. 1. "Sadly, as the Justice Department begins to wield...
[the] sword [of RICO] on Wall Street, Chicago's commodities pits and the savings-and-loan indus-
try, Congress seems ready to yield [to reform requests]. . . It must not happen. [The] alleged
danger to legitimate business. . appears vastly overstated. . .RICO . . .must be wielded with
discretion. It does not need to be reforged." Id.; see also The Wrong Way to Reform RICO (edito-
rial), Bus. Wic, Aug. 28, 1989, at 102. "RICO's function as an adjunct of law enforcement is valua-
ble and deserves to be preserved. Congress should think twice before undermining this critical
device for policing the business community." Id.; see also Which Room for RICO? (editorial),
Phoenix Gazette, Jan. 22, 1990, at A8, col. 1. "RICO is in pretty good shape ..... But over in [the]
[o]perating [r]oom. . .Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz., and Rep. Frederick Boucher, D-Va.. .
[are] twirling a meat ax . .. and firing up a chain saw. Their surgical procedure is clearly designed
to eviscerate RICO". Id. Other papers wrote basically unfavorable editorials. See, e.g., RICO
Overkill (editorial), Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1989, at A26, col. 1 (arguing that "[t]he explosion of
RICO suits is an abuse that must be addressed by Congress"); Wounding the RICO Beast (edito-
rial), Wash. Times, Nov. 27, 1989, at F2, col. 1. "The RICO . .. monster lives. . .. This guaran-
tees that businesses, protesters and other non-mobsters will continue to get Edward G. Robinson
treatment from political foes and ambitious prosecutors. That's a disgrace." Id.; see also Hold
RICO up to the Light. . .(editorial), Chicago Tribune, Feb. 5, 1988, at C2, col. 1. "If we think the
RICO treatment for mob and drug suspects is OK, but are worried that the threat of assets seizure
or triple damages ... could unfairly destroy a legitimate business . . . we should press for more
specific legislation .... The unintended effects of RICO can be as dangerous as a trip-mine." Id.;
see also RICO: Only Repeal Will Do (editorial), L.A. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at B6, col. 1 ("be-
liev[ing] that the statute's flaws are so fundamental that nothing less than Congressional repeal
will suffice"). One paper, the Wall Street Journal, makes advocating the rewriting of RICO a major
project. As one commentator noted, "The Wall Street Journal's editorial page has been preoccu-
pied with RICO reform, putting more passion and more column inches into the issue than almost
any other in the past two years." Vise, The Time Is Ripe to Rewrite RICO, WASH. PosT NAT'L
WEEKLY ED., Nov. 20, 1989, at 31 (describing more than 40 Wall Street Journal editorials). See,
e.g., RICO, First Blood? (editorial), Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1989, at A26, col. 1. "RICO is a hor-
ror... Repealing RICO is a key test of Congressional seriousness about public policy .... RICO
has become Frankenstein's monster." Id.; see also Changing of the Prosecutors (editorial), Wall
St. J., Sept. 11, 1989, at A18, col. 1 (reporting that Drexel "decided to plead guilty ... because
prosecutors . . . threatened to RICO Drexel out of business before any trial"); RICO v. RICO
(editorial), Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1989, at A22, col. 1 (reporting that "[t]he sole intent of the statute
[was] getting the Mafia"); Ham-Sandwich RICO (editorial), Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1989, at A12, col.
1. "We have. . . been long complaining about . . . apply[ing] RICO to non-Mafia individuals and
businesses [, because] ... juries have little choice but to convict if prosecutors simply yell racke-
teers! . . .How ... [long] before someone finally drives a stake through the heart of the most
abusive legal invention since the Alien and Sedition Laws?" Id. Most of the editorials are un-
signed, but occasionally their principal draftsman, L. Gordon Crovitz, writes under his own name.
See, e.g., Crovitz, RICO Needs No Stinkin' Badges, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1989, at A30, col. 3. Crovitz
and his legal vision occasionally attract the attention of the press. See generally Taylor, Daily
Diatribe of the American Right, Am. Law., Jan./Feb. 1989, at 170. Stuart Taylor stated:
L. Gordon Crovitz [is] a mild-spoken law graduate of both Oxford (on a Rhodes Scholarship)
and Yale of alternately brooding and cherubic appearance, who has become at the age of 30
the voice of the editorial page [of the Wall Street Journal] on legal issues .... He ... [is]
... [one of] the most conspicuous polemicist[s] for [a] hard-edged neoconservative approach
to law .... He is an articulate and vitriolic scourge of liberals, "judicial activists," Congress,
"vigilante" special prosecutors, plaintiffs lawyers, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, and others. His causes include a quasi-monarchical vision
of presidential power, getting the judiciary out of the constables' hair and into the deregula-
tion of business ,. . .turning back the clock of the common law about 30 years [, and RICO].
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ysis of the statute, its legislative history, or the facts. The myths, how-
ever, have a debilitating impact on the interpretation and application of
the statute. Chiefly, these myths undermine RICO's basic legitimacy.
When the statute's legitimacy is undermined, efforts are facilitated to
get the judiciary 15 or Congress 16 to rewrite the statute. If these efforts
succeed, victims of sophisticated forms of crime everywhere will be
harmed. Accordingly, these myths need to be thoroughly examined
before any RICO reform goes forward.
Id. at 171
15. When the private bar began to bring RICO suits, the district courts reacted with hostility
and undertook judicially to redraft the statute in an effort to dismiss civil suits in all possible
ways. See Jost, The Fraudulent Case Against RICO, CAL. LAW., May 1989, at 49. "In addition to
the accustomed difficulties of complex litigation, plaintiffs' lawyers who allege RICO violations
expect one additional roadblock: a hostile judge. . . . The point is acknowledged by lawyers on
both sides of the issue and by judges themselves." Id. at 51; see also Horn, Judicial Plague Sweeps
U.S., NAT'L L.J., May 23, 1983, at 13, col. 1. Indeed, between 1975 and 1984, 61% of the reported
decisions dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on various motions of the defendants. Oversight
Hearings, supra note 12, at 126-27 (statement of Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott).
Since Sedima the dismissal rate is 58.6%. Blakey & Cessar, supra note 1, app. B, at 619.
16. For a comparison of reform proposals and current law, see App. B, infra p. 1012.
Until the recent investigation and indictment of Michael Milken, former head of Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert Inc.'s junk bond operation, on 98 counts of RICO and criminal securities fraud for
cheating his clients, the public controversy over RICO largely focused on its private civil enforce-
ment mechanism. The furor now, however, includes RICO's criminal sanctions.
The Milken indictment seeks $1.8 billion in forfeitures from Milken and his codefendants.
"Junk Bond" Leader Is Indicted by U.S. in Criminal Action, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1989, at Al,
col. 6. If found guilty, Milken's illegal earnings will be exceeded only by those of Al Capone.
Swartz, Why Mike Milken Stands to Qualify for Guinness Book, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1989, at 1,
col. 4. Milken agreed to post a bond to secure his portion of the forfeiture of $700 million in cash
and other assets and to post as bail a $1 million bond and his Encino, California residence. Milken
Will Put up $700 Million Guarantee, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1989, at 35, col. 4. Drexel itself agreed
to plead guilty to securities fraud and pay $650 million in fines and sanctions. Cohen, With Signed
Checks, Formal Guilty Plea, Drexel Ends Ordeal, Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1989, at A3, col. 4. While
Drexel publicly protests that it was unfairly forced to plead guilty because it feared that pretrial
restraints would put it out of business, the company privately told its employees that, if indicted
under RICO, it would "have the opportunity to post a bond to forestall any pretrial restraints,
[which] will permit us to continue operations." Adler, Heated Argument: Are RICO Seizures a
Violation of Rights, As Critics Contend?, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1989, at Al, col. 1. Drexel also
informed the United States District Court that its plea would be "voluntary." Cohen, Drexel's
Supportive Words on Milken Raise Federal Ire, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1989, at A6, col. 3 (stating
that the plea agreement was made "voluntarily and without coercion").
Newspaper columnists decry RICO's pretrial restraints as an unconstitutional interference
with the presumption of innocence. See, e.g., Adler, supra, at Al, col. 1 (analyzing the commentary
of William Safire and others). In fact, defendants, on a proper showing, may be detained in jail
before trial consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987). It is doubtful that greater pretrial rights ought to be afforded to property than liberty.
Nevertheless, those who seek to reform RICO are not moving to alter its criminal provisions. See
Criminal RICO Unlikely to Change, CONG. Q., Feb. 18, 1989, at 324 (statement of Rep. Rick
Boucher) (stating that "I don't think there is a lot of 'poor Drexel' sentiment"); Boucher, Trying
to Fix a Statute Run Amok, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, § 3, at 2, col. 3 (stating that "there is no
sentiment to limit RICO on the criminal side").
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II. MYTHS THAT BOLSTER EFFORTS TO REWRITE RICO
A. The Organized Crime Myth
17
1.1 Myth: RICO Was Designed to Deal Only with Organized Crime.
1.2 Fact: RICO Was Designed Not Only to Deal with Organized
Crime, but Also with Other Forms of Enterprise Criminality.
Many myths about RICO bolster the various arguments for its ju-
dicial or legislative reform. But the first and the most powerful
myth-and the underlying basis of many of the other charges against
the statute-is that RICO was designed to deal only with organized
crime.'8 Accordingly, any application of the statute beyond organized
17. "It would be time-saving," Judge Jerome Frank once observed, "if [courts] had a descrip-
tive catalogue of recurrent types of fallacies encountered in arguments addressed to [them]."
United Shipyards v. Hoey, 131 F.2d 525, 526 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 791 (1943).
Judge Frank echoed Arthur Schopenhauer, who said, "It would be a very good thing if every trick
could receive some short and obviously appropriate name, so that when a man used this or that
particular trick, he could be at once reproached for it." C. OGDEN & I. RICHARDs, THE MEANING OF
MEANING 132 (1956) (quoting Arthur Schopenhauer). This effort to catalogue and name the RICO
myths follows these valuable suggestions.
18. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 241 (testimony of a panel, including Ray J.
Groves, Chair, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants). Groves stated:
[Tihe legislative history of civil RICO confirms that Congress intended to create a weapon in
the war against organized crime, but at no time did Congress envision that it was creating a
powerful new weapon to be used against legitimate business people in ordinary commercial
disputes having nothing whatsoever to do with organized crime.
Id. On the contrary, although the "legislative history [of RICO] clearly demonstrates that [it] was
intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and
its economic roots," Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983), and "the major purpose of
[RICO was] to address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime," United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981), Congress wanted to reach both "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
enterprises. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590. Additionally, the "notion [that RICO] applies only to or-
ganized crime in the classic 'mobster' sense" also is rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Grande, 620
F.2d 1026, 1030 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980). As the Supreme
Court observed in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., the notion that RICO is limited to
organized crime "finds no support in the Act's text, and is at odds with the tenor of its legislative
history." 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2903 (1989). "Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general
statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to
organized crime." Id. at 2905; see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1984)
(holding that RICO applies to all persons, "not just mobsters"); Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams
Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir.) (noting that "courts and . .. commentators have
persuasively and exhaustively explained why . . .RICO . . . [is not limited to] organized crime
." (citing Blakey, supra note 1)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
The legislative history of the 1970 statute is replete with statements by the Bill's sponsors
that fully demonstrate that they intended it to apply beyond organized crime. See, e.g., 116 CONG.
REc. 35,204 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Robert McClory, a House floor manager of RICO) (stating
that "every effort was made [in drafting RICO] to produce a strong and effective tool with which
to combat organized crime-and at the same time deal fairly with all who might be affected by this
legislation-whether part of the crime syndicate or not"). Legitimate businesses, in short, "enjoy
neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences." Sedima,
473 U.S. at 499.
It is suggested forcefully that the modern definition of organized crime ought to include fi-
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crime is illegitimate and abusive. Implicitly, the point is made that it
would not be improper, despite the limitations of separation of powers,
for a court to return the statute to its original design.1 9 This myth gave
nance. See Stein, The New Organized Crime, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1990, § 3, at 13, col. 2. Benja-
min J. Stein wrote:
John Gotti, you poor, obsolete loser. You've missed the boat. You forgot Willie Sutton's
lesson - go where the money is.
The real organized crime, the riskless kind that pays off in the hundreds of millions
and billions, is ...in lower Manhattan, on Broad Street, on Wall Street. It's across the
continent, in a gleaming marble cube on Rodeo Drive.
The only truly meaningful kind of taking of other people's property, the kind that adds
up to enough to support an army-of lawyers-is being done by the American financial estab-
lishment, at least the tawdriest part of it .... It's so big, so perfectly safe, that it has rede-
fined "organization" and "crime' in the Western world.
Example: the sale of fraudulent bonds. This has been done in a small way in the whole
history of the Republic. But in the last decade, it has been lifted to unheard-of levels.
What, after all, were the bonds of Campeau, issued for hundreds of millions of dollars
within the last two years, with many of them now close to worthless? What were the hundreds
of millions of Merv Griffin and Resorts International bonds that were issued within the last
12 months and are already in default? Or the bonds for Seaman Furniture or SCI Television
or Gillett Holdings?
John Gotti, you poor devil, those savings and loan guys . . . know the score ...
Why bother to sell numbers or drugs or prostitution?...
The old-style organized criminal had at least to deliver gin or prostitution. But the
new way, the Wall Street way, means you don't deliver a thing.... You sell a worthless
bond, and nobody lays a hand on you.
It is a lesson for you, John Gotti. If you have young relatives, don't teach them the fish
wholesaling business, and forget linen supply. If you want to do someone a favor, try corpo-
rate finance at a big-name school. Try calling in some favors in Vegas to get them started in
mergers and acquisitions at a big firm in Beverly Hills or New York. The world has changed.
Be in finance.. .. They learned from you and now you can learn from them.
Id.
As a statute aimed at the specific goal of eliminating organized crime that also allows a more
general application, RICO fits easily into a consistent pattern of federal legislation enacted over
the past half century or more aimed at a specific target, but drafted without limiting it to the
specific target. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988) (extortion) (held not limited to racketeering in
United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373-74 (1978)); id. § 1952 (Travel Act) (held not limited to
organized crime bribery of public officials but included organized crime bribery of private individu-
als in Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 41-45 (1979)); id. § 1953 (lottery tickets) (held not
limited to organized crime in United States v. Fabrizio, 385 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1966)); id. § 2113(b)
(bank robbery) (held not limited to gangsters in Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1983));
id. § 2421 (white slave traffic) (held not limited to commercial prostitution in Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-90 (1917)). See generally Blakey & Cessar, supra note 1, at 529 n.13
(collecting similar cases); Greenhouse, 1871 Rights Law Now Used for Many Causes, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 26, 1988, at B6, col. 3 (stating that the Civil Rights Act of 1871, passed to protect former
slaves but not so limited, was a "powerful tool for challenging a widening array of official actions
that have nothing to do with race" and that constitute "by far the biggest category of civil cases").
19. But see H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2905 (holding that "rewriting [RICO] is a job for Con-
gress, if it is so inclined, and not for [a] [c]ourt"); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (finding that "it is a
form of statutory amendment [in]appropriately undertaken by the courts"); United States v. Ian-
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:851
rise to several judicial attempts to read limitations into the statute's
plain language.
In their first effort to redraft civil RICO, the federal district courts
read an organized crime limitation into the statute.2 0 Because the limi-
tation had no support in the text of the statute, and it was specifically
rejected in the legislative debates, the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits quickly rejected it.2 The next judicial effort involved
reading an antitrust-like competitive injury limitation into the stat-
ute.22 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits quickly turned this effort
aside .2  Then, the district courts hit upon the racketeering injury24 and
the criminal conviction 25  limitations. Both limitations, which were
shamefully adopted by a sharply divided Second Circuit, were squarely
repudiated by the Supreme Court in its Sedima decision.26 It also was
necessary for the Supreme Court to repeat its Sedima teaching that
RICO is not limited to "mobsters" in its H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co." decision.2 8 After H.J. Inc., this myth should be dead. It
is doubtful, however, that the myth will ever die as long as media cover-
niello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 n.15 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "any further narrowing of RICO, however
appropriate that may be, is a job for Congress, not the courts"); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804
F.2d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that "[tihe sweep of RICO is admittedly broad, and our
function is to apply the language of the statute as drafted by Congress, not to rewrite the statute
as we might prefer it to be"); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial
Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1101 (1982).
20. See, e.g., Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
21. For a list of cases rejecting this limitation, see Alcorn County v. United States Interstate
Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1167 n.10 (5th Cir. 1984).
22. See, e.g., North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
23. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002
(1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1982), afl'd on rehearing en bane, 710
F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Landmark Sav.& Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
25. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Pacific Loan, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 137, 140 (D. Haw. 1984).
26. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479. The Second Circuit suggested that civil RICO suits against
"respected and legitimate enterprises" were "extraordinary, if not outrageous." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). E.F. Hutton & Co. was
included among the cited legitimate enterprises. But see M. STEVENS, SUDDEN DEATH: THE RISE
AND FALL OF E.F. HuroN (1989); Welles, Case Not Closed, Bus. WK., Feb. 24, 1986, at 98 (report-
ing that E.F. Hutton pleaded guilty to 2000 counts of mail fraud in a multimillion dollar bank
scam); see also Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 395 n.14 (7th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (stating that "the white collar crime alleged in some RICO com-
plaints against 'legitimate' businesses is in some ways at least as disturbing . . ."). Those who
oppose the application of RICO to legitimate business are apparently unaware of the substantial
body of literature on white-collar crime by so-called respected businesses. See, e.g., Ross, How
Lawless Are Big Companies, FORTUNE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 57 (noting that among 1043 major corpora-
tions between 1970-1980, there were 188 citations for 163 separate offenses: 98 antitrust violations;
28 kickbacks, briberies, or illegal rebates; 21 illegal political contributions; 11 frauds; and 5 tax
evasions).
27. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
28. See H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2902-05; see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495.
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age of RICO continues to reflect the myth in virtually every piece writ-
ten on the statute. 9
29. The typical newspaper editorial or article on RICO will contain parenthetical background
language that purports to describe the statute. See, e.g., RICO Still Drives a Hard Bargain,
CRAIN'S CHICAGO Bus., Feb. 26, 1990, at 8 (describing RICO as "passed by Congress in 1970 to fight
organized crime"); Regulating the Financiers (editorial), Financial Times, Mar. 13, 1990, at 18, col.
1 (describing RICO as "designed to fight organised crime"); Mansnerus, As Racketeering Law Ex-
pands, So Does Pressure to Rein It in, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, at E4, col. 1 (describing RICO
as a "federal racketeering law, passed in 1970 as a weapon against mobsters"). The editorial or
article then will go on to deal with whatever aspect of the statute on which it wishes to focus. This
kind of world-wide coverage makes the Organized Crime Myth a part of the common understand-
ing of most literate people.
Judges, too, continue to develop theories, which are sometimes superficially appealing, that
threaten to eviscerate the statute, particularly as it applies to white-collar crime. The handiwork of
United States District Court Judge Milton I. Shadur is illustrative. He was one of the first to adopt
the rule that an "enterprise" could not be a "person," that is, also a defendant under 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c) (1933). Compare Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
with Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982). His
reasoning helped convince his court of appeals, the Seventh Circuit. See Haroco, Inc. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 400 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606
(1985). The Seventh Circuit, however, carefully qualified its adoption of the rule by promising
recovery under § 1962(a). Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401-02. Judge Shadur promptly broke this promise
in P.M.F. Servs., Inc. v. Grady, 681 F. Supp. 549, 555-56 (N.D. Ill. 1988). But see Haroco, Inc. v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 647 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (on remand). The court
stated that "[t]he Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Section 1962(a) in Haroco . . . supports
plaintiffs' [right to recovery]." So as not to "shield deep corporate pockets from RICO liability...
when the fruits of racketeering come to rest in a corporate-enterprise, that enterprise is within
RICO's intended reach. Section 1962(a) is designed to recover these proceeds." Id. at 1033. Judge
Shadur's analysis, nevertheless, helped persuade two circuit courts to his view. See Grider v. Texas
Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1149 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1989); Rose v. Bartle,
871 F.2d 331, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1989). It did not persuade the Fourth Circuit. Busby v. Crown Sup-
ply, Inc., 896 F.2d 836-40 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Blakey & Cessar, supra note 1). Judge Shadur's
reading of the text and legislative history of the statute was considered persuasive. See Rose, 871
F.2d at 358 (holding that "requiring the allegation of income use or investment injury 'is consistent
with . . . the literal language [of section 1692(a)]'" (quoting P.M.F. Servs., 681 F. Supp. at 555));
Grider, 868 F.2d at 1150 (restricting its interpretation to RICO's "own language" (citing P.M.F.
Servs., 681 F. Supp. at 555)). In fact, it is woefully inadequate.
Analytically, injury in § 1962(a) litigation may flow from the racketeering acts or the invest-
ment (or use of the income or its proceeds) in an enterprise, or both. It is, of course, possible to be
injured by a racketeering act that does not produce income (unsuccessful fraud) that is part of a
pattern of racketeering acts that, as a whole, does produce income (successful frauds). Nothing in
the statute, however, says injury by the first kind of act is not injury within the statute. See
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495-99 (finding that damage is not limited to racketeering or competitive
injury). The investment only rule, however, would preclude recovery for such acts.
When racketeering acts produce income and that income (or its proceeds) is invested (or used)
in an enterprise, injury may be of at least three types: (1) to the enterprise into which it is invested
(or in which it is used), (2) to another entity or individual, who suffers competitive disadvantage,
and (3) to the entity or individual from whom it was obtained by the racketeering acts, or all three.
Little doubt exists, although the decisions have not discussed the concept in detail, that direct
investment or competitive injury is within the statute. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 n.15 (stating
that direct or competitive injury is included). Nevertheless, the decisions adopting the use or in-
vest rule assume, largely without detailed analysis, that the victim of a racketeering act is not
separately injured by the use or investment of the income or its proceeds. This view is mistaken.
Property, including money, taken by theft or fraud is converted. The victim may sue for fraud or
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To assert that an offender's treatment should be determined by the
conversion. See, e.g., Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Custom Cycle Delight, Inc., 664 F.2d 1371,
1372 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying California law). Any distinct act of dominion over the property,
however, is a separate conversion. See, e.g., Gowin v. Heider, 237 Or. 266, 319, 391 P.2d 630, 636
(1964) (holding that "the plaintiff [has] his election to make either the original conversion or the
later one the basis of [his] action . . ."). Unauthorized use of money may be a distinct act of
dominion under this reasoning. See, e.g., Borrello v. Perera Co., 381 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd per curiam, 512 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying New York law). Accordingly, even
the investment only rule ought not to prevent a victim of a racketeering act that produces income
from bringing suit for its investment or use in the enterprise. See, e.g., Newmyer v. Philatelic
Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 398 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that it is "[not] impossible for the plain-
tiffs to show that they had been injured"); Management Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash,
Baptie & Co., 883 F.2d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that multiple use "go[es] to the issue of
damages").
Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. suggests that a distinction must be made under § 1962(a)
between "received" and "receive." Grider, 868 F.2d at 1149. The court, however, confuses surface
syntax with deep structure semantics. See generally G. LEECH, SEMANTICS 178-201 (1974) (discuss-
ing semantics and syntax); id. at 263-90 (discussing semantic equivalence and "deep semantics").
No difference in meaning, in short, is represented by these three syntactically alternative ways of
expressing the same semantic idea: (1) If he receives and uses money, then . . .; (2) If he received
and used money, then. . .; (3) If he has received money and then uses it. . . . The court's con-
trary construction of RICO is bad semantics and worse law.
Just as importantly, the court ignores other crucial aspects of the text. Section 1962(a) not
only requires "use or invest," but also requires that the person be a principal in the racketeering
activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988) (referring to activity "in which such person has partici-
pated as a principal"). As such, it requires both "racketeering activity" and "use or invest." Injury
by either would, therefore, be injury "by reason of a violation of section 1962.. . ." Id. § 1964(c).
If text were not enough, the use or invest rule is inconsistent with Sedima and Haroco. See
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495, 497-98; Haroco, 473 U.S. at 608-09; see also Ocean Energy II, Inc. v.
Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 742-48 (5th Cir. 1989). The issue is not settled in the
Seventh Circuit. See Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 877 F.2d 1333, 1340 n.1 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Ripple, J., concurring) (pointing out that use injury was not decided).
Judge Shadur's analysis of the legislative history of RICO stands on no better footing. See
P.M.F. Servs., 681 F. Supp. at 555 (stating that § 1964 was a "late edition, spot-welded to an
already fully-structured criminal statute"). His views, first expressed in Kaushal v. State Bank of
India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 581-84 (N.D. Ill. 1983), were followed by the Second Circuit in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 488-90 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Their
precedential value, however, is now in considerable doubt because of the Supreme Court's total
rejection in Sedima of the conclusions drawn from Judge Shadur's historical analysis of RICO. See
Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1103 (1987). They are also plainly wrong. See generally Blakey, supra note 1, at 249-80.
In 1968 the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice rec-
ommended the adoption of antitrust type remedies to control sophisticated forms of crime.
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 7, at 483. Bills were introduced in the Senate and House that included
private enforcement provisions. See, e.g., S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), 113 CONG. REC.
17,999 (1967). The American Bar Association testified before the Senate in favor of the treble
damages remedy. See Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 259 (testimony of Rufus King, Chair,
Special Committee on Organized Crime, Criminal Law Section, American Bar Association); id. at
556 (report of the antitrust section of the American Bar Association). The President, at that time,
also favored the treble damages remedy. President's Message, supra note 6, reprinted in Senate
Hearings, supra note 6, at 449. The Senate passed the bill, of course, with only express govern-
ment criminal and civil relief and without any private enforcement mechanism, but a private claim
for relief for actual damages was implied in the statute, at least based on 1970 jurisprudence.
Compare J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (implying private remedy under § 27 of
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color of a collar is contrary not only to the text and legislative history of
the statute, but also to the most basic premise of our jurisprudence:
equal justice under law.30 The victim of a RICO violation needs redress,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353, 378 (1982) (holding that the jurisprudence at the time of the legislation, not later, gov-
erns implications). Nevertheless, when the Bar Association testified before the House that the pri-
vate enforcement mechanism should be reinserted, it was restored to the Bill. The Senate then
accepted the Bill and the President signed it. See House Hearings, supra note 8, at 543-44 (testi-
mony of Edward L. Wright, President-Elect, American Bar Association). Contrary to Judge
Shadur's conclusion in P.M.F. Servs., RICO is not, in short, a criminal statute with an ill-designed
treble damages afterthought. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 786-89 (1975) (describing
RICO as "a carefully crafted piece of legislation"); 116 CONG. REc. 35,204 (1970) (statement of Rep.
Robert McClory) (noting that "no single measure has received more thorough consideration. ..").
From the beginning, Senator Roman Hruska, one of RICO's principal sponsors, recognized that
RICO's "criminal provision ... [was] intended primarily as an adjunct to the civil provision,"
which he "consider[ed] ... [one of] the more important features" of the Bill. 115 id. at 6993-94;
see also id. at 602 (statement of Sen. Roman Hruska) (arguing that "the principal value of this
legislation may well be found to exist in its civil provisions . . ."). See generally Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (stating that "'private attorneys general'
[are for] a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inade-
quate"); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 (1987) (finding that the
drafters viewed private attorneys general as "vigorous incentives for plaintiffs to pursue RICO
claims"); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493 (holding that "private attorney general provisions ... are in
part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps").
Judge Shadur's views on other aspects of RICO often are reversed or rejected by the Seventh
Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Yonan, 623 F. Supp. 881, 883-86 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (providing a
construction of "associated with"), rev'd, 800 F.2d 164, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1055 (1987); Northern Trust Banks/O'Hare v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (holding that a single scheme did not constitute a "pattern"), rev'd by Morgan v. Bank of
Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 973-77 (7th Cir. 1986). Judge Shadur's single scheme decision on "pat-
tern" was rejected unanimously by the Supreme Court in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
The policy objections to the invest or use rule are equally strong. Only the Supreme Court's
decision in Sedima prevented § 1962(c) from being confined to indirect or competitive injury as a
result of a misguided effort to secure legal immunity for "legitimate" enterprises. Congress did not
intend to confine RICO to organized crime or to preclude its application to white-collar crime.
That limitation, however, might be the effect of the adoption of the person-enterprise rule under §
1962(c) and a narrowly defined use or invest rule under § 1962(a). The courts would have in two
steps adopted a policy that Congress specifically declined to adopt when RICO was enacted in
1970. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-98.
More than 100 years ago, the Supreme Court noted, "It is easy, by very ingenious and astute
construction, to evade the force of almost any statute, where a court is so disposed . . . .Such a
construction [makes it possible to] annul[] [it] and render[] it superfluous and useless." Pillow v.
Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472, 476 (1851). Such an approach to statutory construction, however,
carries with it a heavy price. After a lifetime of study of the law, Dean Roscoe Pound concluded
that such construction: (1) "tend[ed] to bring law into disrespect; (2) . . .subject[ed] the courts to
political pressure; [and] (3) ... invite[d] an arbitrary personal element in judicial administra-
tion." 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENcE 488 (1959). Spurious judicial construction threatened, he found,
to make "laws . . .worth little" and to "break down" the law. Id. at 490.
30. Few would doubt that the Magna Carta is "rightly revered as . . . the symbol of...
supremacy of law . . . which [is] the proudest possession of Englishmen and their descendants
everywhere." R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 22 (1957).
Among other things, it called for "one measure of wine throughout ... [the] Kingdom." R.
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and he should be able to obtain it regardless of the social status of the
offender. In fact, RICO was designed to deal with organized crime. As
such, the organized crime myth is particularly powerful because it is a
half truth, and its refutation requires conceding the correctness of the
myth maker's basic proposition, but then explaining why it is false, be-
cause it is not the whole truth. Too often, the listener never gets be-
yond the concession.
RICO was designed to deal with organized crime, but it also was
crafted more broadly to deal with all forms of "enterprise criminal-
ity."'81 Indeed, in 1968 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, whose studies led to RICO, addressed
not only organized crime, but also white-collar crime.2 The text and
STRINGHAM, MAGNA CARTA: FOUNTAINHEAD OF FREEDOM 235 (1966) (text of Magna Carta cl. 35).
Equality, in short, is one of the key "watchwords" of a "matured legal system." R. POUND, THE
SPIrr OF THE COMMON LAW 142 (1921).
31. RICO's purpose is "the imposition of enhanced criminal penalties and new civil sanctions
to provide new legal remedies for all types of organized criminal behavior, that is, enterprise crimi-
nality-from simple political corruption to sophisticated white-collar schemes to traditional Mafia-
type endeavors." Blakey & Gettings, supra note 1, at 1013-14, cited in United States v. Cauble,
706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
Properly, state RICO legislation also is not limited to organized crime or its infiltration of
legitimate business. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 815 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 765
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988) (holding that a "nexus to organized crime" is not required for a Utah RICO
action); Banderas v. Banco Central del Ecuador, 461 So. 2d 265, 269-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(stating that a Florida RICO action is not limited to organized crime and that no "garden variety"
fraud exclusion exists); Commonwealth v. Yacoubian, 339 Pa. Super. 413, 420, 489 A.2d 228, 231
(1985) (holding that a Pennsylvania RICO action is not limited by the preamble to infiltration of
legitimate business).
While RICO was aimed at organized crime, its use "as a weapon against 'white collar crime'
• . is not contrary to the intent of Congress but is in fact one of the 'benefits' Congress saw the
Act as providing." Papai v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp 1402, 1411 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Judge George Pratt
in Furman v. Cirrito put it well:
[Congress] provided no exception for businessmen, for white collar workers, for bankers, or
for stockbrokers. If the conduct of such people can sometimes fairly be characterized as "gar-
den variety fraud", we can only conclude that by the RICO statute Congress has provided an
additional means to weed that "garden" of its fraud.
It seems almost too obvious to require statement, but fraud is fraud, whether it is com-
mitted by a hit man for organized crime or by the president of a Wall Street brokerage firm.
741 F.2d 524, 529 (2d Cir. 1984).
32. See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 7, at 155-58. The Commission found that "white-collar
crime" is "now commonly used to designate those occupational crimes committed in the course of
their work by persons of high status and social repute." Id. at 155. These crimes "are only rarely
dealt with through the full force of criminal sanctions." Id. at 156. The Commission concluded:
During the last few centuries economic life has become vastly more complex. Individual
families or groups of families are not self-sufficient; they rely for the basic necessities of life
on thousands or even millions of different people, each with a specialized function, many of
whom live hundreds or thousands of miles away.
Id. The Commission further noted that "[s]erious erosion of morals accompanies [the white-collar
offender's violation]. [Those who so] flout the law set an example for other businesses and influ-
ence individuals, particularly young people, to commit other kinds of crime on the ground that
everyone is taking what he can get." Id. at 158.
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legislative history of the statute, therefore, demonstrate beyond serious
doubt that RICO is properly applied to white-collar crime.33 If the Su-
preme Court's decision in Sedima left any doubt, the Court's H.J. Inc.
decision eliminated it, when it squarely refused to read an organized
crime limitation into the statute. 4 First, the Court recognized that an
organized crime limitation would imply that only those acts committed
by a group, instead of any individual, would fall within RICO's scope.3 5
The Court observed, however, that "RICO's language supplies no
grounds to believe that Congress meant to impose such a limit on the
Act's scope."3  Second, "no such restriction is explicitly stated.
'3 7
Third, Congress specifically limited other titles of the Organized Crime
Control Act to organized crime, which demonstrates that if Congress
wanted such a limitation in title IX, Congress knew how to create it.38
The legislative history, too, demonstrates that RICO's principal spon-
sors expressly rejected the limitation." Thus, based on the wording of
33. See Blakey, supra note 1, at 280. In the article, this Author stated:
[A] review of the legislative history of S. 30 [the Organized Crime Control Act] in general,
and Title IX [RICO] in particular, establishes the following points beyond serious question:
(1) Congress fully intended, after specific debate, to have RICO apply beyond any limit-
ing concept like "organized crime" or "racketeering";
(2) Congress deliberately redrafted RICO outside of the antitrust statutes, so that it
would not be limited by antitrust concepts like "competitive," "commercial," or "direct or
indirect" injury;
(3) Both immediate victims of racketeering activity and competing organizations were
contemplated as civil plaintiffs for injunction, damage, and other relief;
(4) Over specific objections raising issues of federal-state relations and crowded court
dockets, Congress deliberately extended RICO to the general field of commercial and other
fraud; and
(5) Congress was well aware that it was creating important new federal criminal and civil
remedies in a field traditionally occupied by common law fraud.
Id. (emphasis in original). The article's review of the legislative history of RICO was cited with
approval in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983).
34, H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
35, Id. at 2903.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Court recognized that the title of the Act, its stated purpose, and its legislative
history might lend themselves to a narrow view of the Act, but it recognized that the text was not
so limited. Id. The general rule is that a restrictive title or preamble may not be used to restrict a
clear text. See, e.g., United States v. Briggs, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 351, 355 (1850); People v. Burns, 197
Colo. 284, 288, 593 P.2d 351, 354 (1979); Roush v. State, 413 So. 2d 15, 18-19 (Fla. 1982); Dorsey v.
State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1180-81 (Fla. 1981) (citing Yazzo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Thomas, 132
U.S. 174, 188 (1889)); see also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (holding that
"the name given to an act by way of designation or description, or the report which accompanies it,
cannot change the plain import of its words").
39. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1969) (individual views of Sen. Philip
Hart and Sen. Edward Kennedy) (complaining that the Organized Crime Control bill "goes beyond
organized criminal activity"); 116 CONG. REC. 18,913-14 (1970) (statement of Sen. John L. McClel-
lan). Senator McClellan stated:
The danger posed by organized crime-type offenses to our society has, of course, provided the
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the statute and its legislative history, the Supreme Court unequivocally
rejected the organized crime limitation. Legally, at least, the Organized
Crime Myth ought to be left in its coffin with a stake driven through its
heart.
B. The Legitimate Business Myth
2.1 Myth: RICO Was Designed to Deal Only with the Infiltration of
Legitimate Business.
2.2 Fact: RICO Was Designed Not Only to Deal with the Infiltra-
tion of Legitimate Business, but Also Other Forms of Enterprise
Criminality.
While legitimate businesses attempted to confine RICO to organ-
ized crime, illegitimate businesses tried to confine RICO to legitimate
occasion for our examination of the working of our system of criminal justice. But should it
follow. . . that any proposals for action stemming from that examination be limited to organ-
ized crime?
• . . [T]his line of analysis . . . is seriously defective in several regards. Initially, it con-
fuses the occasion for reexamining an aspect of our system of criminal justice with the proper
scope of any new principle or lesson derived from that reexamination .
In addition, the objection confuses the role of the Congress with the role of a court. Out
of a proper sense of their limited lawmaking function, courts ought to confine their judgments
to the facts of the cases before them. But the Congress in fulfilling its proper legislative role
must examine not only individual instances, but whole problems. In that connection, it has a
duty not to engage in piecemeal legislation. Whatever the limited occasion for the identifica-
tion of a problem, the Congress has the duty of enacting a principled solution to the entire
problem. Comprehensive solutions to identified problems must be translated into well inte-
grated legislative programs.
The objection, moreover, has practical as well as theoretical defects. Even as to titles of
[the Organized Crime Control bill] needed primarily in organized crime cases, there are very
real limits on the degree to which such provisions can be strictly confined to organized crime
cases . . . . On the other hand, each title . . . which is justified primarily in organized crime
prosecutions has been confined to such cases to the maximum degree possible, while preserv-
ing the ability to administer the act and its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool.
Id.; see also id. at 35,204 (statement of Rep. Richard Poff). Rep. Poff argued:
It is true that there is no organized crime definition in many parts of the bill. This is, in part,
because it is probably impossible precisely and definitively to define organized crime. But if it
were possible, I ask my friend, would he not be the first to object that in criminal law we
establish procedures which would be applicable only to a certain type of defendant?
Id.; see also H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2904-05. The Supreme Court noted that "[o]pponents [of
RICO] criticized [the Organized Crime Control Act] precisely because it failed to limit the stat-
ute's reach to organized crime. In response, the statute's sponsors made evident that the omission
of this limit was no accident, but a reflection of OCCA's intended breadth." Id. at 2904 (citations
omitted). The Court concluded:
The thrust of these explanations seems to us reasonably clear. The occasion for Congress'
action was the perceived need to combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons
chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus,
was not limited in application to organized crime.
Id. at 2905.
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business. 40 This myth, too, is a half truth. In fact, RICO was designed
to deal with organized crime's infiltration of legitimate business,41 but it
was also designed to deal with organized crime itself.4  In short, RICO
was designed to deal with a variety of forms of enterprise criminality in
the upperworld and the underworld. The Supreme Court rejected the
Legitimate Business Myth in Turkette.4 1 This myth also should be con-
fined to its crypt.
C. The Litigation Floodgate Myth
3.1 Myth: The Courts Are Being Inundated with New Litigation
Under Civil RICO.
3.2 Fact: Civil RICO Litigation Is Neither Wholly New nor of
Floodgate Proportions.
Along with the attacks on the application of RICO beyond organ-
ized crime and its infiltration of legitimate business, RICO's opponents
underscore their efforts to confine its scope by asserting that including
other types of cases within the statute would inundate federal courts
with new litigation, particularly under RICO's civil provisions.4 In fact,
civil RICO litigation is neither wholly new nor of floodgate proportions.
40. The issue was first raised in a panel opinion of the Sixth Circuit. See United States v.
Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 262-63 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981). The First Circuit followed suit in United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d
896 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). While Turkette was sub judice before the Supreme
Court, a Mafia chieftain and his lieutenant conversed:
Mr. Angiulo: "Our argument is we're illegitimate business."
Mr. Zannino: "We're a shylock."
Mr. Angiulo: "We are a bookmaker. We're selling marijuana. We are illegal here, illegal there.
Arsonists. We are everything."
Mr. Zannino: "Pimps."
Mr. Angiulo: "So what?"
Mr. Zannino: "Prostitutes."
Mr. Angiulo: "The law does not cover us, is that right?"
Mr. Zannino: "That's the argument."
Note, Functions, supra note 1, at 662 n.64. See generally G. O'NEILL & D. LEHR, supra note 12, at
233; Butterfield, Jury Hears Tape on Gang Wars in Boston Trial, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, § 1,
at 26, col. 1. Angiulo also commented, "[I]f they don't prove that a legitimate business was infil-
trated we're off the hook... . We can do anything we want. They can stick RICO .... I wouldn't
be in a legitimate business for all the fuckin' money in the world to begin with." G. O'NEILL & D.
LEHR, supra note 12, at 233.
41. The Supreme Court observed that "the major purpose of Title IX [was] to address the
infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591.
42. The Court concluded that it was "unpersuaded[, however,] that Congress ... confined
[RICO] to ... only the infiltration of legitimate business." Id. at 590 (emphasis in original).
43. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
44. See 132 CONG. REc. H9371 (dally ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Rick Boucher) (stat-
ing that "the federalization of thousands of mere commercial disputes, irrespective of the amount
in controversy or the diversity of citizenship of the parties threatens to swamp a Federal judiciary
that was never designed to handle this kind of case").
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For the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1988, 239,634 civil
cases were filed in the United States district courts. 45 RICO litigation is,
of course, included in that number. Data of the Administrative Office of
the United States District Court indicate, however, that RICO civil fil-
ings occur only at the rate of approximately 82 out of 20,000 general
filings each month.46 Nonetheless, it is argued that these data under-
state the actual number of filings because litigants are required only to
designate one "box," or claim for relief, when filling out filing cards. As
such, the real number of civil RICO filings is hidden in other catego-
ries. 4' Estimates of the real RICO figure vary according to who is esti-
mating and what evidence is being cited. The worst-case scenario
suggested by Representative Rick Boucher, an advocate of reform, is
that up to one-sixth, or seventeen percent, of the cases in the district
courts deal with RICO.48 Accordingly, the real number would be, not
around 1000, but around 40,000. This number is simply incredible be-
cause it may be tested and rejected in light of other known figures.
Of the total number of civil cases filed in 1986, 3059 involved secur-
ities violations.49 That same year, 28.8 percent of the reported RICO
cases dealt with securities violations.50 From these data, an estimate
45. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT table S-8, at 114
(1988) [hereinafter 1988 ANNUAL REPORT].
46. For data on RICO filings, see App. C, infra p. 1018.
47. See, e.g., S. 438 Hearings, supra note 6, (statement of Philip A. Lacovara, Senior Counsel
for Litigation and Legal Policy, General Electric Co., and Chair, Business/Labor Coalition for Civil
RICO Reform) [hereinafter Lacovara Statement]. Mr. Lacovara stated:
[T]he opponents of civil RICO reform claim that civil RICO lawsuits make up only a small
fraction of the civil suits actually. . . filed .... [The data reported], in fact, vastly underes-
timates the true number of private civil RICO claims filed in the federal district courts.
• . . [T]he Civil Cover Sheet specifically states that the party filling out the form should
"place an X in one box only," when categorizing the nature of the action. In addition, the
instructions on the reverse side of the Civil Cover Sheet state that "if the cause fits more than
one nature of suit, select the most definitive.". . .
• . . [Tihere is every reason to believe that many, many cases that include RICO claims
are counted in some other category in the Administrative Office's statistics..
. . . Perhaps as many as ten times the number of civil cases than the Administrative
Office statistics reflect include a civil RICO claim as part of the complaint.
Id. One of the biggest beneficiaries of the RICO reform legislation, if it is made retroactive, would
be General Electric Co., which has been sued under RICO for $1 billion by the Washington Public
Power Supply System over the construction of a nuclear containment unit. See Dwyer, Business
May Have Found a Way to Defang RICO, Bus. WK., Aug. 28, 1989, at 26.
48. Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (hearings not officially printed as of current date) [hereinafter
H.R. 1046 Hearings] (comment of Rep. Rick Boucher).
49. 1988 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 45, table C-2A, at 186. This figure also includes com-
modities litigation.
50. Blakey & Cessar, supra note 1, app. B, at 621.
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that defines the outer limits of how many RICO cases were filed may be
reached with a fairly high degree of confidence. While a significant pro-
portion of RICO filings may involve securities violations, not all securi-
ties cases filed involve RICO violations. Nevertheless, it is possible to
calculate how many RICO cases would be in the system if all securities
cases did involve RICO. Thus, if 3059 securities cases comprise 28.8
percent of all RICO cases filed in 1986, then the total would have been,
in fact, 10,622 RICO filings. This estimate amounts to 4.2 percent of all
civil cases in the federal district courts in 1986, a considerable differ-
ence from the seventeen percent alleged by those fearful of RICO's
scope and who promote the Floodgate Myth.
It is also enlightening to contrast the number of civil RICO cases in
the federal courts pre- and post-Sedima. If, as alleged, many RICO
cases are not categorized as RICO cases but are classified as securities
cases, concealing the actual number of civil RICO filings during any
given year, then a huge increase in the number of securities cases be-
tween 1985 and 1988 would be expected to correspond to the "opening
of the floodgates" by the Supreme Court's 1985 Sedima decision that
RICO should be read to mean what it says. The data contradict this
allegation. In 1985, 3266 securities cases were filed in the federal district
courts.51 In 1988 the number actually dropped to 2638 or nineteen per-
cent."' This statistic hardly indicates an increase of federal cases due to
civil RICO litigation disguised as securities cases.53
It also is enlightening to estimate the real number of RICO filings
based on subject matter jurisdiction. Because the cases involving securi-
ties violations have grounds for federal jurisdiction independent of the
RICO claims, they cannot be said to be clogging up the federal courts;
they would be in a federal forum even without the RICO claim. As for
RICO claims as a whole, 62.4 percent of the reported decisions in 1986
51. 1988 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 45, table C-2A, at 186.
52. Id.
53. The Business/Labor Coalition for Civil RICO Reform argued:
Every survey of civil RICO cases . . . indicate [sic] that somewhere around forty percent of
all the civil RICO cases arise from securities transactions. This is not surprising, since the
plaintiffs' securities bar is among the most sophisticated, and therefore was both one of the
first to recognize the value of appending a RICO count to its cases and also among the most
adept at meeting whatever pleading requirements the law and judicial interpretation estab-
lished. In addition, given the nature of securities transactions, the number of documents usu-
ally involved, and the wide dissemination they receive, it is an easy task to plead the typical
securities case, which already usually includes an allegation of fraud, as a civil RICO case.
Lacovara Statement, supra note 47. Even if the higher percentage (40%) is used to calculate the
outside figure, the number of civil RICO filings would not exceed 6595, which would, at worst,
make that category 2.7%, not 17%, of the total civil filings in 1988. An undercount of "as many as
ten times," id., is absurd. The Administrative Office's data, therefore, hardly "vastly underesti-
mate[] the true number." Id.
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had grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction independent of the
RICO claim. 4 As such, the outside figure for civil RICO cases for 1986,
assuming that none of the reported filings had an independent basis for
jurisdiction, would be 2660 or 1.04 percent, not seventeen percent of the
district court docket.
More recently, data from the Administrative Office indicate that in
the calendar year 1989, the latest complete period for which full infor-
mation is available, only 989 civil RICO cases were filed, not
thousands.5   Docket congestion also is not a problem everywhere.5 6
While the absolute number of general filings increased by roughly half,
the average number of cases per federal judge from 1960 to 1980 stayed
about the same. 7 Indeed, from 1900 to 1980, the length of civil cases
fell by over one-half.58 The literature complaining about the litigation
explosion, in short, shows "a strong admixture of naive speculation and
undocumented assertion. '5 9 In fact, of all the major categories of civil
54. Blakey & Cessar, supra note 1, app. B, at 619.
55. See App. C, infra p. 1018. As such, "the perceived problem of civil RICO case load is
exaggerated. ... The RICO caseload is now "calmed down" and "actually presents no greater
problems than antitrust or complicated securities cases." Problems "Exaggerated," but Suits Must
Be Limited, Civ. RICO REP., Feb. 4, 1987, at 23 (remarks of Judge Pamela A. Rymer).
56. See, e.g., Penwest Dev. Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 667 F. Supp. 436, 441 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
(finding that the courts are "not tremendously overburdened"); see also Bok, A Flawed System of
Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDuc. 570, 571 (1983) (stating that "[tihe number of
disputes actually litigated . . .does not appear to be rising much faster than the population"
(emphasis in original)).
57. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts
in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 81-85 (1981).
58. Id.
59. Galanter, Reading the Legal Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV.
4, 62 (1983). Compare TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP
ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABIL-
ITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986) (finding that product liability cases in federal courts present a crisis
and that the causes of this crisis include the movement toward no fault liability, the imposition of
liability on others than who caused injury, the large size of jury awards, and excessive litigation
costs) with GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: EXTENT OF "LITIGATION EXPLOSION" IN
FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED (1988). The GAO publication found that the causes of the explosion
are not legal. One product, asbestos, accounts for 60% of the growth from 1976-1986 and 75% of
the growth since 1981. The growth unrelated to asbestos is neither accelerating nor explosive. De-
termining whether society is excessively litigious is complex and requires more information than
the number of suits filed. The number of filings alone does not speak to equitable outcomes, deter-
ring wrongdoing, or the effect of reforms on the current system. Id. at 1-3; see also Labaton, Busi-
ness and the Law: Product Liability's "Quiet Revolution," N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1989, at D2, col. 1
(reporting that a General Accounting Office study concludes damage awards are "neither erratic
nor excessive, but in general are consistent with the kind of injury suffered").
Additionally, more may be involved in the "litigation explosion crisis" than facts. For a dis-
turbing, but enlightening analysis of the crisis, see Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitu-
tional Restraint and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 (1989).
Professor Nancy Levit stated:
[T]he combination of judicial overload and injudicious federalism is operating to shunt cer-
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litigation, RICO would outrank only one of the thirteen categories. ° Fi-
nally, dire predictions of an explosion of new federal litigation need to
be put into perspective. Litigation itself, as the Supreme Court recog-
nized in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio,"' is not an evil.62  Accordingly, the mere fact of RICO
suits is not a matter to be decried or deplored.
6 3
tain classes of litigants away from federal courts.. . . Federal courts are increasingly using
the doctrines of preclusion, preemption, abstention and remand to shuttle cases or decision-
making authority back to state courts. Complementing this procedural routing of cases is an
expansion of summary procedures and a dramatic reduction in the scope of substantive con-
stitutional rights.
Federal docket-clearing practices are eliminating the possibility of substantive relief and
the protection of a federal forum for a spectrum of politically underrepresented and powerless
classes. Equally important, this manipulation of jurisdiction is unprincipled and inconsistent.
While conservative judges urge judicial restraint, they often practice selective activism. At
times caseload concerns seem paramount to federal courts, while at other times courts ignore
the access-expansive effects of their decisions. Indeed, the malleability of the overload issue
suggests it is being used as an instrument to further other goals. The selective use of caseload
as a justification for restricting Article III jurisdiction leads to a decrease in the uniformity
and predictability of decisions, and it blurs the boundaries of already ill-defined theories of
federal jurisdiction.
* ' * While court efficiency appears to be a deserving goal, the current method of its im-
plementation is through a reduction of court access to particular classes of litigants ...
[T]he concept of administrability and . . . administrative efficiency is actually a value-laden
argument for selecting which litigants should be permitted access to federal courts.
[ * ' T]he adjustment of jurisdictional theories by the judiciary is neither an effective
docket-clearing mechanism nor a desirable institutional practice. Analysis of the political and
ideological assumptions underlying jurisdictional manipulation and the implications of judi-
cial molding of Article III jurisdiction raises serious separation of powers and fairness con-
cerns regarding the quest for administrative efficiency.
.. . Federal courts should adopt jurisdictional rules that offer the greatest chance of mer-
its determinations.
Id. at 321-22 (footnote omitted).
60. These categories are: contracts, 62,811; real property, 12,209; personal injury, 41,148;
other personal injury, 24,982; personal property damage, 3813; antitrust, 682; bankruptcy, 5558;
civil rights, 19,323; prisoner petitions, 38,839; forfeitures, 3873; labor law, 12,688; protected prop-
erty rights, 6059; social security, 15,152. 1988 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 45, table C-2, at 180-83.
61. 471 U.S. 626, 643 (1985).
62. The Court noted:
Over the course of centuries, our society has settled upon civil litigation as a means for re-
dressing grievances, resolving disputes, and vindicating rights when other means fail ...
That our citizens have access to their civil courts, is not an evil to be regretted; rather, it is an
attribute of our system of justice in which we ought take pride.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 643.
63. Any examination of the dockets of federal and state courts, however, should include a
consideration of the present and future impact of the drug traffic. Drug prosecutions increasingly
are crowding out all civil litigation in federal and state courts in a number of areas of the United
States. See generally Chief Justice Makes Plea for More Federal Judgeships to Help in Fight
Against Drugs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1990, at 10, col. 1 (remarks of Chief Justice William Rehnquist)
(stating that "the war on drugs will fail if the judiciary is not given the judgeships necessary to do
the job"); Labaton, New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 29, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (providing a detailed statement of facts of the increased re-
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D. The Two Letters Myth
4.1 Myth: RICO Applies to Every Business Transaction That Uses
the Mails or Phones.
4.2 Fact: RICO Applies Only to Patterns of Unlawful Behavior, Not
to the Mere Multiple Use of the Mails or Phones.
A variation of the Litigation Floodgate Myth is the parade of hor-
ribles that claims that even if no increase in litigation has occurred (a
point not conceded by RICO's opponents), the increase is coming be-
cause RICO potentially applies to every business transaction that uses
the mails or phones. 64 How, reform supporters cry, could anyone con-
sources for federal and state investigation and prosecution of drug offenses, the rising number of
drug prosecutions, the falling number of civil filings, and the increasing delay in civil cases, but the
relatively stable judicial resources).
More, however, is required than merely authorizing additional judicial resources. Careful at-
tention must be given to the entire caseload of the federal courts and to its management. Modifica-
tions of RICO that targeted the Act more narrowly on a more limited class of organized crime,
white-collar crime, and other serious offenders rather than eviscerated it would be justifiable if
reform were occasioned by other systemic caseload and management reforms. See generally Wiehl,
Drastic Moves Urged to Ease U.S. Courts' Load, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1990, at B10, col. 3 (report-
ing on recommendations of a committee appointed by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to re-
view the court system to transfer to state courts and federal administrative agencies many
commercial cases, state law disputes, social security appeals, federal tax appeals, and labor quar-
rels that would result in an 37% reduction in district courts and a 17% reduction in circuit courts
of appeals); Wermiel, Panel Studying Federal Courts Proposes Broad Changes in Operation of
System, Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1989, at A16, col. 1 (discussing the draft report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee, which recommends various reforms, including the elimination of diversity juris-
diction); BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND
DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 6, 10, 22, 35, 37 (1989) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL] (stating that the
causes of delay, which give unfair advantage to "large interests," include "horse-and-buggy" prac-
tices of the judiciary, failure to rule on fully briefed motions that might in fact streamline litiga-
tion, as well as discovery practices of litigants that could be curtailed by better judicial
supervision). While the American Bar Association opposes RICO on a variety of grounds, a princi-
pal objection is that it "inappropriately federalized many areas of state common law" claims.
A.B.A. RICO COORDINATING COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 5 (1987) [hereinafter
COORDINATING COMMITTEE REPORT]. At the same time, the Bar Association remains adamant about
retaining diversity jurisdiction. Labaton, Business and the Law: Panel Urges End of Diversity
Rule, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at D2, col. 1 (reporting that "[tihe American Bar Association .. .
prefers the [diversity] rule because of the flexibility it affords strategists in choosing courts .. .");
Greenhouse, Burger Declares Congress Ignores Burden of Courts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1983, at Al,
col. 5 (stating that the Bar Association is one of the "strongest lobbies against eliminating ...
diversity jurisdiction"); see A.B.A., ABA Policy and Procedures Handbook: 1989-1990, at 157 (stat-
ing that the Association "[o]ppose[s] legislation that would either abolish diversity jurisdiction
S.. or curtail it .. ."). The Bar Association's positions are difficult to square with any general
conception of the public interest.
64. See 132 CONG. REc. H9371 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Rick Boucher). Rep.
Boucher stated:
[Firaud allegations are commonly made in contract situations, and all that is needed under
the current law to convert a simple contract dispute into a civil RICO case is the allegation
that there was a contract and the additional allegation that either the mails or the telephones
were used more than once in either forming or breaching the contract.
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duct business without the threat of a RICO suit: all business transac-
tions make multiple use of the mails or phones. In fact, RICO applies
only to a pattern of unlawful behavior, not multiple uses of the mails or
phones. Indeed, before H.J. Inc., the courts of appeals, with two excep-
tions, made it abundantly clear that RICO did not apply to the mere
multiple use of the mails.6 5 The Supreme Court confirmed these hold-
ings in its H.J. Inc. decision and specifically rejected the exceptions. 6
E. The Contract Dispute Myth
5.1 Myth: RICO Applies to Mere Contract Disputes.
5.2 Fact: RICO Requires a Showing of Bad Faith; a Good Faith
Dispute Is Not Within the Scope of RICO.
Another variation of the Two Letters Myth is the Mere Contracts
Dispute Myth. Critics suggest that RICO applies to mere contract dis-
putes. 7 In fact, RICO requires a showing of bad faith. Good faith dis-
putes are not within the scope of RICO.68 None of RICO's predicate
offenses apply on a showing of strict liability. Each requires a showing
of mens rea or criminal state of mind. 9 As such, RICO does not apply
to mere contract disputes.
F. The Racketeer Label Myth
6.1 Myth: The Racketeer Label Leads Legitimate Business People
to Settle Garden Variety Fraud Claims for Extortionate Amounts.
6.2 Fact: The Racketeer Label Inhibits, Not Facilitates, Settlement.
Those hostile to RICO allege that the statute's racketeer label leads
legitimate business people to settle garden variety fraud claims for ex-
65. See, e.g., Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a single
bribe in three installments is not a "pattern" despite several communications); see also H.J. Inc.,
109 S. Ct. at 2898 n.2 (collecting the various court of appeals decisions). The Fifth and Sixth
Circuits are the exceptions. See United States v. Jennings, 842 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1988);
R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 744 F.2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1985).
66. See H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2899 (expressly rejecting Jennings, 842 F.2d at 159).
67. See 132 CONG. REc. H9371 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Rick Boucher). Rep.
Boucher stated that "RICO is so broad-based that virtually any party that has become embroiled
in a commercial dispute becomes a candidate for a civil RICO case. . . . [Vjirtually every type of
contract dispute has been turned into a RICO case." Id.
68. See, e.g., Union Nat'l Bank v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 860 F.2d 847, 856-57 (8th
Cir. 1988) (holding that good faith exercise of contract claims is not RICO extortion).
69. See, e.g., Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896) (mail fraud) (holding that if
the evidence had shown that the defendant acted in good faith, "no conviction could be sus-
tained"); Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205, 1216 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that RICO mail
fraud requires intent to defraud); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing that "[c]riminal intent is . . . necessary in either mail fraud or securities fraud [under
RICO]").
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tortionate amounts. ° Suits with no merit, which may force a legitimate
business to face ruin, are settled unjustly for large sums. In fact, the
racketeer label inhibits, rather than facilitates, settlement. Generally,
businesses wrongfully accused of racketeering will not settle suits, even
those that should be compromised, as long as the racketeer label is in
the litigation. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how one could believe
that a suit with no merit faces a defendant with ruinous exposure. If
the plaintiff's suit has no merit, the chance of success is zero, and zero
multiplied by three (or any other number) is still zero. Before anyone
uncritically accepts this claim, he ought to ask for the name of the case
and then find out what the plaintiff's evidence was. It is doubtful that
the litigation will be meritless. Responsible corporate or other defend-
ants generally do not pay off strike suits in the RICO-or any
other-area at more than their settlement value, no matter what the
theory of the complaint. Neither the racketeer label nor the threat of
treble damages will convince prudent managers to surrender lightly
scarce resources merely because another files a suit. No matter how col-
orfully phrased, the claim that such managers act against their own eco-
nomic interest is not credible.
70. See 132 CONG. REC. E3531 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Rick Boucher). Rep.
Boucher stated:
[RICO] allows plaintiffs to raise the stakes significantly in [commercial disputes] because a
civil RICO claim carries with it the threat of treble damages, attorney's fees, and the op-
probium of being labeled a "racketeer." As Justice Marshall concluded in examining the cur-
rent situation created by civil RICO:
"Many a prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will decide to settle even a case with no
merit. It is thus not surprising that civil RICO has been used for extortive purposes, giving
rise to the very evils that it was designed to combat."
Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 506 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
Justice Thurgood Marshall cites as authority for his extraordinary proposition A.B.A. SECTION OF
CORP., BANKING & BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 69 (1985) [here-
inafter ABA RICO REPORT]; see Sedima, 473 U.S. at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Ad Hoc
Task Force, in turn, conducted a survey of 3200 corporate litigation lawyers, of whom only 350
responded. Two factors, however, undermine the scientific credibility of the general results of the
survey: (1) the population questioned was unrepresentative of the bar, and (2) the response rate
was insufficient to warrant broad generalizations. More to the point here, the survey did not ask
each of the respondents a carefully phrased question calling for their opinion or experience with
RICO as a settlement weapon. Instead, the opinion relied upon by Justice Marshall was volun-
teered by only two of the 350 respondents as grounds for repealing RICO. In fact, it is the experi-
ence of a majority of seasoned litigators in the RICO area that adding a RICO claim to a suit does
not facilitate, but inhibits settlement, particularly when a legitimate business is involved. See
A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, A COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RICO
LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION: A REPORT OF THE RICO CASES COMMITTEE 121-23 (1985) [hereinafter
RICO CASES COMMITTEE REPORT].
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G. The Litigation Abuse Myth
7.1 Myth: Private Plaintiffs Are Bringing a Substantial Number of
Abusive Civil Suits.
7.2 Fact: No Evidence Has Been Produced That Civil RICO Suits
Are Being Abused in a Fashion Peculiar to RICO That Warrants Its
Substantial Rewriting.
The charge that the right to file civil RICO suits is being abused
was, until recently, just that: a charge. Now, however, the coalition of
those seeking to undermine RICO, the Business/Labor Coalition for
Civil RICO Reform, has produced a list of cases that it terms "abu-
sive.' 71 Because the coalition has been in existence for almost four years
and is richly financed, it is fair to assume that these cases represent the
most egregious examples of litigation abuse under RICO that time and
money could find. The coalition's overall position against civil RICO
fairly may be said to stand or fall on the basis of this list. Nevertheless,
when carefully analyzed and researched, the list does not warrant the
substantial rewriting of RICO. In fact, the list indicates that little rela-
71. For a detailed description of each of the cases, including the Business/Labor Coalition for
Civil RICO Reform's comment and an analysis of each case, see App. D, infra p. 1021. The coali-
tion's definition of "abusive" is artful. It extends not only to frivolous suits but also to any claim
for relief that is broader than its limited understanding of the purpose of RICO. Lacovara State-
ment, supra note 47. Lacovara stated:
The RICO Reform Coalition. . .often refer[s] to the type of case we hope this legislation
will discourage as an "abusive" civil RICO case. The Members of the Committee should not
think that the term "abusive" is the equivalent of "frivolous" as lawyers generally use that
term. Rather, any civil RICO suit that uses the statute's broad language to litigate in federal
courts claims long-established under well-recognized state law causes of action, or to evade
more directly applicable existing federal statutory regimes is "abusive" because it uses the
statute in inappropriate ways[, for example, securities fraud].
Id.
But see RICO, supra note 1, § 902, 84 Stat. at 947 (stating that "[n]othing in [RICO] shall
supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording
civil remedies in addition to those provided for" in RICO); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 392 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that "Congress enacted RICO in order to
supplement, not supplant, the available remedies since it thought those remedies offered too little
protection for the victims"), afl'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). Some overlap between statutes "is neither
unusual nor unfortunate." SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969). Indeed, the securi-
ties acts themselves envision it. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 28(a), 48 Stat.
881, 903 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78bb(a) (1988)) (stating that the "rights and remedies provided by
this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist ...").
Such cumulative remedies further remedial purposes. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 386 (1983). Federal statutes typically overlap, but Congress generally preserves multiple reme-
dies. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 514, 88
Stat. 829, 897 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982)) (stating that "[n]othing in this subchapter
shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United
States. . ."); Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 23, 86 Stat. 1207, 1226
(codified at 15 U.S.C. 2072(c) (1988)) (stating that "[tihe remedies provided for in this section
shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other remedies provided by common law or under
Federal or State law").
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tionship exists between the allegations of abuse and suggested reforms
of the statute. The allegations of abuse are merely a smoke screen be-
hind which special interests are seeking to enact laws for their private
benefit.
The coalition has produced a list of fifty-three cases it terms "abu-
sive." The first case was filed in December 1979. The last case was filed
in January 1988. Between December 1979 and January 1988, approxi-
mately 2,151,640 criminal and civil matters were filed in the federal dis-
trict courts. Of these actions, 1,861,788 were civil. Of that number,
approximately 2902 cases involved civil RICO filings.72 The RICO fil-
72. The number of matters filed in federal district courts in the years 1980-1988 is listed in:
1988 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 45, table C, at 172; id. table D, at 237; DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT table C, at 169 (1987); id. table D, at 234; DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT table C, at 169 (1986); id. table D, at 230;
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT table C-1, at 276 (1985); id.
table D-1, at 336; DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT table C-1,
at 249 (1984); id. table D-1, at 310; DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT table C-1, at 241 (1983); id. table D-1, at 302; DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT table C-1, at 211 (1982); id. table D-1, at 272; DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT table C-1, at 363 (1981); id. table D-1, at 410; DIREc-
TOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT table C-i, at 370 (1980); id. table
D-1, at 415.
Civil and Criminal Matters 1980-1988
Total Civil Matters Total Criminal Matters Total Matters filed
filed filed
1988 239,634 (119,817) 43,503 283,137 (141,569)
1987 238,982 42,156 281,138
1986 254,828 40,427 295,255
1985 273,670 38,546 312,216
1984 261,485 35,911 297,396
1983 241,842 34,927 276,769
1982 206,193 31,765 237,958
1981 180,576 30,413 210,989
1980 168,789 (84,395) 27,910 196,699 (98,350)
Total 2,065,999 (1,861,788) 325,588 2,391,557 (23,9919)
Because the Administrative Office keeps its figures on a fiscal year basis, appropriate adjust-
ments were applied to estimate annual figures for the relevant periods.
The civil RICO filings between December 1979 and January 1988 were estimated by adding
the total number of pre-Sedima filings to the total number of post-Sedima filings through January
1988. There were 500 pre-Sedima filings. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 126. There
were 2162 filings between November 1985 and January 1988 for an average of 80 per month. See
App. C, infra p. 1018. Assuming that 80 per month were filed between August and October 1985,
the total civil RICO filings were approximately 2902.
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ings represent .135 percent of all filings and .156 percent of the civil
filings. The "abusive" filings represent .00246 percent of all filings and
.00248 percent of the civil filings; they represent 1.8 percent of the civil
RICO filings.
Of these fifty-three cases, fifty-three percent had an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction. These cases, as well as the general data, do
not establish that RICO filings are of floodgate proportions or are
wholly new. Of the fifty-three "abusive" cases, none represented a judg-
ment for money damages. None was brought by government-related en-
tities. Only two were brought by charitable organizations. Only two
were against accountants, one of the professions that is a moving force
in the coalition. Only four included securities allegations. None was a
commodities case. Eighty-seven percent of the coalition's "abusive"
cases were dismissed in whole or in part on one or more grounds. As
such, the existing system is weeding out inappropriate cases. Thirty-two
percent were properly dismissed on "pattern" grounds in such a fashion
that they will not be refiled and similar cases should not appear in the
future. Motions for sanctions were made in only nineteen percent of the
cases; they were granted in eight percent (or forty percent of the mo-
tions). Accordingly, the defendants themselves apparently did not al-
ways believe the cases were frivolous. Many times, the early decisions
did not grant the sanctions requested because the courts expressed
doubt about the proper construction of the statute. Later cases, how-
ever, tend to grant sanctions when they are requested. Ironically, the
list of "abusive" cases actually includes a suit against an organized
crime figure.73 In addition, the list includes a suit against an individual
who had been charged and convicted for criminal behavior.74 The cases,
moreover, include clear instances of judicial, rather than litigant, abuse
of the statute.75 The case for RICO abuse, in short, has not been made.
Instead, a close analysis of the cases produced to justify rewriting RICO
shows that the existing system works well.
H. The Litigation Abuse Remedies Myth
8.1 Myth: The General Remedies Against Litigation Abuse Are
Inadequate.
8.2 Fact: The General Remedies Against Litigation Abuse Are
Adequate.
Closely related to the Litigation Abuse Myth is the allegation that
the general remedies for litigation abuse are inadequate and do not ap-
73. See App. D, infra p. 1046-47.
74. Id. at p. 1043-44.
75. Id. at p. 1032.
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propriately restrict frivolous RICO claims.7 6 In fact, the general reme-
dies against litigation abuse are adequate.
77
The charge of litigation abuse ignores the presence in current law
of powerful remedies against litigation abuse, not only under RICO, but
also under other federal statutes and related claims for relief. Indeed,
the failure to evaluate the remedies for litigation abuse is one of the
most telling points against the civil RICO critics' argument that litiga-
tion abuse is a ground to rewrite the statute substantively.
Critics who would rewrite RICO based on allegations of litigation
abuse must show: (1) that a substantial number of frivolous or other-
wise abusive RICO suits are being filed; (2) that existing safeguards
against such suits are not adequate to remedy them; (3) that new safe-
guards adequate against such suits cannot be designed; and (4) that the
detriment from these suits outweighs the benefit from legitimate suits.
None of these burdens has been met.
76. See RICO Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 177 (1985-1986) [hereinafter RICO
Reform Hearings] (statement of Newton N. Minow, Chair, Public Review Board, Arthur Andersen
& Co.) (asserting that no effective means exist for controlling frivolous litigation under RICO).
77. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 56 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 PROCEEDINGS]. The Proceedings
stated:
Judge Hunter stated that the Subcommittee on Judicial Improvements, at the request of
Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, had explored ways and means to reduce frivolous or meritless liti-
gation in the courts and had canvassed the various courts for ideas and suggestions. After
consideration of the suggestions received, the Subcommittee concluded, as did many judges,
that the existing tools are sufficient, but perhaps not fully understood or utilized.
Id.; see, e.g., Ferguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1986) (imposing rule
11 monetary sanctions and an injunction against further litigation under RICO); Spiegel v. Conti-
nental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 650-51 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying rule 38 sanctions to RICO);
Gordon v. Heimann, 715 F.2d 531, 533 (11th Cir. 1983) (awarding bad faith attorney's fees based
on the court's inherent power, rule 11, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982)); WSB Elec. Co. v. Rank & File
Comm. to Stop the 2-Gate Sys., 103 F.R.D. 417, 420-21 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that RICO is not
applicable to a labor dispute and imposing.rule 11 sanctions); Financial Fed'n, Inc. v. Ashkenazy,
[1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,489 (D.C. Cal. 1983) (awarding rule 11 sanc-
tions of $150,000 in attorney's fees in a frivolous RICO claim), vacated and remanded, 742 F.2d
1461 (9th Cir. 1984), reinstated in unpublished opinion; King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1385
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that a dispute over a will was a frivolous RICO claim and awarding attor-
ney's fees under rule 11); Barringer, Giving Law Teeth (and Using Them on Lawyers), N.Y. Times,
Mar. 17, 1989, at B4, col. 3 (assessing $1 million in sanctions against the Christic Institute for
bringing a frivolous RICO lawsuit); see also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 601 (1984) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice John Paul Stevens stated:
Frivolous cases should be treated as exactly that, and not as occasions for fundamental
shifts in legal doctrine. Our legal system has developed procedures for speedily disposing of
unfound claims; if they are inadequate to protect [individuals] from vexatious litigation, then
there is something wrong with those procedures, not with the law. ..
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Myers v. Bethlehem Ship Building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1938)
(stating that "[l]awsuits . . . often prove to [be] groundless; but no way has been discovered of
relieving a defendant from the necessity of a trial to establish the fact").
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The existing tools to address frivolous litigation are sufficient, even
though they may be misunderstood or underutilized. 78 Ethical stan-
dards, for example, prohibit a lawyer from asserting a frivolous litiga-
tion position.79 Such litigation abuse is tortious.8° It is also subject to
sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.81 Indeed, the high
cost of litigation itself erects a substantial barrier not only to frivolous
litigation, but also for meritorious pleas. To be sure, contingent fee ar-
rangements mitigate the issue of cost to the poor but wronged individ-
ual. Contingent fees also act, however, as a screening device employed
by counsel, who risk their own funds, to weed out cases in which liabil-
ity is not sure and damages are not high.
L The Garden Variety Fraud Myth
9.1 Myth: Fraud Is a Garden Variety Problem.
9.2 Fact: Fraud Is Not a Garden Variety Problem.
The usual punch line in most objections to civil RICO suits is that
if some certain set of circumstances were the case, then RICO would
apply to garden variety frauds.82 The unexamined major premise to this
78. See 1983 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 77, at 56.
79. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (1980).
80. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
ToRTs §§ 119-121 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the tort actions of malicious prosecution, wrongful
civil proceedings, and abuse of process).
81. FED. R. Clv. P. 9(b) (requiring that fraud be pleaded with particularity); FED. R. Cxv. P. 11
(permitting sanctions for failure to investigate facts or law); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (authorizing
courts to strike scandalous matter); FED. R. CIv. P. 56 (providing for summary judgment); see also
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978) (permitting an award of fees to
defendant for actions that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation).
82. Commissioner Philip A. Feigin aptly observed:
Euphemisms like "commercial disputes," "commercial frauds," "garden variety frauds" and
"technical violations" . . . are sanitized phrases often used by "legitimate businesses and in-
dividuals" to distinguish their frauds from the "real" frauds perpetrated by the "real" crooks.
Yet all willful fraudulent conduct has in common the elements of premeditation, planning,
motivation, execution over time and injury to victims and commerce. And it is all crime.
Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 535 (statement of Philip A. Feigin, Assistant Securities
Commissioner, Colorado Division of Securities, and Chair, Special Projects Committee, Enforce-
ment Section, North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.). For a discussion of the
role of euphemisms in encouraging public and official reluctance to enforce the law and providing
rationalizations for the violators themselves in the white-collar crime area, see D. CRESSEY, OTHER
PEOPLES' MONEY 102 (1953) (stating that the tendency of embezzlers to rationalize their conduct as
different from theft is an important fact in behavior pattern); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPOR' CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT
104-08 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; see also id. at 107 (stating that "most white-collar
crime is not at all morally neutral"). Indeed, it was argued persuasively in 1934 before the Cope-
land Committee that it was in part our failure as a society to bring white-collar crime to justice
that significantly contributed to the development during Prohibition of what all now concede to be
organized crime, a problem that did not end with Prohibition's repeal:
Both crime and racketeering of today have derived their ideals and methods from the
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conclusion is that fraud is a garden variety problem that does not need
RICO to weed it. In fact, fraud is no garden variety problem in the
United States today.
The current controversy over RICO does not center on its possible
civil application in the areas of violence, the provision of illicit goods
and services, or the corruption of unions and governmental entities. In-
stead, the controversy focuses almost exclusively on its application to
white-collar crime, particularly fraud. Nevertheless, in 1970, Congress
expressly targeted RICO on fraud. 3 It expressly found that traditional
sanctions were "unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. ' 84 Nothing
has occurred since 1970 that undermines Congress's judgment. Al-
though two decades have passed since RICO became law, the task of
confronting fraud remains formidable.8 5
In 1974 the Chamber of Commerce of the United States published
a comprehensive study of fraud. The total amount lost to fraud was
estimated at 41.78 billion dollars annually. 8 Given the inflation rate
business and financial practices of the last generation . . . .It is a law of social psychology
• ..that the socially inferior tend to ape the socially superior ....
...It was inevitable that, sooner or later, we would succeed in "Americanizing" the
"small fry"-especially the foreign small fry ....
• ..All was relatively safe, since the legal profession was already ethically impaired
through its affiliations with the reputable racketeers.
The idea that when prohibition is ended the racketeers . . . will meekly and contritely
turn back to blacking shoes. . is downright silly. They will apply the technique they have
mastered to the dope ring. ... They will find crafty lawyers all too willing to defend them
from the "strong arm" of the law for value received.
...So long as the lawless can get protection in return for keeping corrupt politicians in
office, we shall not be free from the crime millstone about our necks.
Investigation of So-Called "Rackets": Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 710-12 (1933) [hereinafter "Rackets" Hearings] (testimony of Professor
Harry Elmer Barnes).
83. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, preamble, 84 Stat. 922,
922 (1970).
84. Id., 84 Stat. at 923. Congress was well aware that existing law, state and federal, was
inadequate to address the problem. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1980).
85. Chief Justice William Rehnquist put it well when he observed that "[w]hite-collar crime
is 'the most serious and all-pervasive crime problem in America today.'" Braswell v. United States,
487 U.S. 99, 115 n.9 (1988) (quoting Conyers, Corporate and White-Collar Crime: A View by the
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 287, 288 (1980)). The Chief
Justice added, "Although this statement was made in 1980, there is no reason to think the problem
has diminished in the meantime." Id.
86. See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S., A HANDBOOK ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME: EVERY-
ONE'S PROBLEM, EVERYONE's Loss 6 (1974). The Chamber estimated the direct economic cost of
fraud as follows:
Billions of Dollars
1. Bankruptcy Fraud 0.08
2. Bribery, Kickbacks, & Payoffs 3.00
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since the 1974 study, fraud likely costs society more than four times
that amount today.8 7 That range-200 billion dollars-is similar in di-
mension to the impact of the illicit traffic in drugs.8"
The Chamber of Commerce study, moreover, did not account for
the entire impact of fraud on the Nation. By interacting with society's
other problems, such as poverty and discrimination, fraud has a serious
influence on the social structure and interferes with the freedom of
commercial and personal dealings. 89 Because white-collar offenders
often occupy positions of trust, the effects of their misdeeds extend be-
yond their immediate impact, which often falls most harshly on the
poor, aged, and uneducated.90 Savers, insurers and insurees, investors,
legitimate business people, consumers, and taxpayers are the victims of
white-collar fraud.
Since the work of the Chamber of Commerce in 1974, dramatic new
developments have occurred in the Nation's basic financial institutions.
A nationwide problem of bank and thrift failures caused by criminal
conduct is of epidemic proportions." Congress enacted special legisla-
3. Consumer Fraud 21.00
4. Embezzlement 7.00
5. Insurance Fraud 2.00
6. Receiving Stolen Property 3.50
7. Securities Theft and Fraud 4.00
8. Credit Card and Check Fraud 1.10
9. Computer-Related Crime 0.10
Id. Obviously, these estimates can only be ballpark figures, for the typical perpetrator of a fraud
does not file an honest annual report. It is noted accurately that "[tihere is little systematic data
available regarding the incidence of white-collar crime," and two estimates of its cost made at the
time RICO was processed: loss of taxes on $25 to $40 billion of unreported income annually and
$500 million to $1 billion annually in securities fraud. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 82, at
103. These figures no longer state the extent of the problem.
87. See 1985 ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 42 ($200 billion).
88. See Drug Enforcement: Hearings on H.R. 526 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) (remarks of Rep. William J. Hughes)
(stating that $110 billion is spent annually and that lost productivity and other costs equal $60
billion); see also The Cost of Drug Abuse, $60 Billion a Year, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1989, at D1, col.
1 (stating that the "cost of illicit drugs to American society [is] far more than $60 billion
annually").
89. H. EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 6-7
(1970).
90. Former FBI Director William H. Webster aptly commented in 1982: "[T]hrough use of
their position of trust, cunning and guile, white-collar criminals undermine professional and gov-
ernmental integrity to the dismay of all, and ultimately are responsible for the loss of billions of
dollars annually from the Nation's economy." Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm, on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1078 (1982).
91. For the best general treatment of the crisis, see Note, Insider Abuse and Criminal Mis-
conduct in Financial Institutions: A Crisis?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 222 (1989); see also J. ADAMS,
THE BIG Fix: INSIDE THE S&L SCANDAL (1990) (taking a broad view of the banking and thrift crisis
and examining in detail the collapse of the Butcher banks in Tennessee and the Ohio thrift crisis
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tion,92 estimated to cost 300 billion dollars over thirty years, 93 to rescue
more than 350 troubled thrifts.94 The President told the Nation that
as well as some of the Texas and California high fliers, who helped bankrupt the S&L insurance
fund and who kept regulators from shutting down the reckless bankers); S. Pizzo, M. FRICKER & P.
MUOLO, INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMERICA'S SAVINGS AND LOANS (1989) (presenting an intri-
cately woven account of fraud at dozens of S&Ls and banks, paying particular attention to a group
of deposit brokers, real estate developers, and thrift owners who had documented connections to
major organized crime figures and kept appearing on the books of failed thrifts).
The criminal misconduct that contributed to the failure of Penn Square Bank (the Bank) in
Oklahoma, until recently one of the largest bank failures in American history, resulted in charges
of misapplication of bank funds, false entries in bank records, conspiracy, and wire fraud. For
criminal prosecutions, see United States v. Patterson, 827 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Patterson, 782 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lytle, 677 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
and United States v. Lytle, 658 F. Supp. 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1987). For civil litigation on fidelity bonds,
see Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1989). For a description
of the circumstances leading to the Penn Square Bank failure, see M. SINGER, FUNNY MONEY
(1985), and P. ZwEIG, BELLY UP: THE COLLAPSE OF THE PENN SQUARE BANK (1985). The role, good
and bad, that accountants played in the collapse is instructive in any consideration of the efforts of
the accounting profession to limit its liability under RICO in the thrift crisis. Arthur Young and
Co. gave the Bank a qualified opinion in 1977, id. at 61, criticized the board in a management
report in 1978, gave the Bank another qualified opinion in 1981 accompanied by a "material ad-
verse letter," the worst possible opinion an auditing firm can give a client, id. at 174, and then was
fired, id. at 259. After lending Peat Marwick and Mitchell partners money to invest in an office
complex, id., the Bank hired the firm and got a clean opinion, id. at 304. Within four months the
Bank collapsed, and the firm ended up settling numerous multimillion dollar suits for undisclosed
sums. Wayne, Where Were the Accountants?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
Among the professionals, accountants were not alone. Regulators combing through the wreck-
age of failed thrifts discover that as many as 80% of the institutions' loans are backed by inade-
quate or fraudulent appraisals. In one of the most notorious prosecution so far, Larry Wayne
Hutson pleaded guilty to conspiring to falsify over 400 appraisals for defunct Empire Savings &
Loan; he was paid fees five times the norm as well as bonuses. See Allen, Wrong Numbers: Ap-
praisers, Culprits in S&L Crisis, Are Now Key to S&L Recovery, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1990, at Al,
col. 6.
92. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No: 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (amending scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). For a general description of the
Resolution Trust Corp., which replaced the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp., see
Thomas, Thrift Bailout, Lacking a Chief and Floundering As Officials Feud, Slows and Grows
More Costly, Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1989, at A20, col. 1 (stating that the law created "a structure so
sprawling and complex that it makes it difficult for anything to happen. . . . [which] appear[s] to
be raising the cost and slowing the pace of the bailout").
93. See WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 62 (1990) [hereinafter ALMANAC].
94. See id. at 83. But see Quint, New Estimate on Savings Bailout Says Cost Could Be $500
Billion, N.Y. Times, April 7, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (reporting estimate of General Accounting Office
over 30 year period); Nash, Policy Shift on Bailouts Is Explored, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1990, at C20,
col. 5 (reporting that regulators warn that the number of institutions will exceed 600, and may go
as high as 800, with assets approaching $500 billion). Indeed, losses continue to mount. See Nash,
Savings Industry Lost $19.2 Billion, a Record, in 1989, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 6
(reporting that 485 troubled institutions had fourth quarter losses of $2.6 billion or $29 million per
day, and that a huge deficit capped a year in which the Nation faced the problems of tax regula-
tion, bad real estate lending, fraud, and insider dealing); Nash, U.S. Has Trouble Coping with Its
Savings Empire, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (reporting 1991 "healthy" institutions
with $639 billion in assets, 400 "sick" institutions with $360 billion in assets, 157 "insolvent" insti-
tutions with $113 billion in assets, and 393 "seized" institutions with $193 billion in assets).
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"unconscionable risk-taking, fraud, and outright criminality [were] fac-
tors" that led to the crisis.9 5 Congressional and other studies support
the President's harsh judgment, indicating that at least one-third of
bank failures and three-quarters of thrift failures involve the criminal
activity of insiders."6 Consistent with the President's pledge that lost
funds would be restored and perpetrators punished, 7 the government is
bringing criminal RICO prosecutions, 8 and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation and the Federal Saving and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion (now the Resolution Trust Corporation) are using civil RICO to sue
banks and thrift fraud perpetrators.99 Banking associations, however,
95. Dowd, Bush Savings Plan Calls for Shaving the Cost Broadly, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1989,
at D9, col. 1.
96. See H.R. REP. No. 1088, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-13 (1988) (stating that criminal miscon-
duct by insiders is a major contributing factor in approximately one-third of all commercial bank
failures and three-fourths of all thrift failures and estimating loss from $31 to $80 billion); OFFICE
OF COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN EVALUATION OF THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING
TO THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKS 9 (1988) (finding that insider abuse is a significant factor in
35% of the bank failures); see also Savings Unit Fraud Cited, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1990, at C2,
col. 2 (reporting testimony of L. Wiliam Seidman, Chairperson of FDIC and RTC, that 60% of
savings and loan associations seized are tainted by fraud, which is more than triple the rate of
commercial banks, and 1200 possible criminal prosecutions have been referred to the Department
of Justice). Citations to other congressional hearings are collected in Note, supra note 91, at 223
n.5.
97. The President promised "every effort to recover assets diverted from these institutions
and to place behind bars those who had caused losses through criminal behavior." President's
News Conference on Savings Crisis and Nominees, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1989, at D8, col. 1.
98. See infra note 99.
99. See, e.g., Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson-American Express, Inc., 658 F.
Supp. 1331 (D.P.R. 1987); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hardin, 608 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Tenn.
1985). But see H.R. REP. No. 1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984). The House Report stated:
Despite such enormous losses, neither the banking nor the criminal justice systems im-
pose effective sanctions or punishment to deter white-collar bank fraud. The few insiders who
are singled out for civil sanctions by the banking agencies are usually either fined de minimis
amounts or simply urged to resign. The few who are criminally prosecuted usually serve little,
if any, time in prison for thefts that often cost millions of dollars.
Id. Rosemary Stewart, the Director of Enforcement at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board com-
mented that "[w]hen [judges] see nicely dressed bankers, it's difficult to send them away for very
long." Bartlett, Savings Fraud Losses Seen As Lost for Good, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1989, at D2,
col. 3; see also Harlan, Reinforcements for Bank-Fraud Group in Dallas May Arrive There Too
Late, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1990, at A16, col. 2 (reporting that the Dallas Bank Fraud Task Force has
won 46 jury convictions or guilty pleas of 58 indictments with 2 acquittals and that none of the
high-profile operators has been indicted, but indictments seem imminent); Texas's Biggest Thrift-
Fraud Case Ends in Mistrial, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1989, at B8, col. 4 (reporting that Texas's
biggest thrift fraud case involving a $166 million loss ended after a six-month trial with a hung
jury, and discussing other convictions for misapplying funds to reimburse employees for political
contributions to congressmen and to supply female companions to state savings and loan commis-
sioner); Washington Wire, Wall St. J., July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 5 (reporting that 40 convictions or
guilty please have been obtained out of 56 people charged; that 26 indictments have been brought
in the first seven months of this year compared to a total of 23 for all of last year; and that those
indicted include five presidents and three chairmen or vice chairmen of thrifts, but "the most
notorious owners of freewheeling thrifts" still are not indicted, and only $5 million in restitution
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are among those who would rewrite RICO. 00
The savings and loan crisis is best given concrete meaning by fo-
cusing on Charles Keating's scandalous handling of the Lincoln Savings
& Loan of Irvine, California. In 1984 Keating was allowed to buy Lin-
coln Savings despite earlier accusations of his involvement in fraud.101
and fines have been recovered compared with the $157 billion cost of the federal savings and loan
bailout); Pusey, Fast Money and Fraud, N.Y. TimEs MAG., Apr. 23, 1989, at 30 (analyzing the facts
of the prosecution and civil suits under RICO involving the Empire Savings & Loan Association in
Dallas, Texas); The Fraud Patrol: Flashy Federal Posse Pursuing S&L Abuses Bungles Effort in
Texas, Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (presenting a negative evaluation of the success of
the Dallas Bank Task Force). But see Texas Mistrial Is Said to Spark FBI Inquiry, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 25, 1989, at B5, col. 4 (discussing the mistrial in the thrift fraud trial, in which the jury
deadlocked 11-1, and which is under a jury tampering investigation).
Unfortunately, regulators are finding it hard under Texas debtor-creditor law to recover the
assets taken from the thrifts. Harlan, Elusive Money: Thrift Regulators Find It Is Tough to Re-
cover Much S&L Bad Debt, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1989, at Al, col. 6. Michael Rochell, a Dallas
bankruptcy lawyer, stated that "Texas was essentially founded by debtors.. . . It was populated
by people who had come from the East to escape their creditors. If you said someone had 'gone to
Texas,' that basically meant that someone had skipped town to avoid paying their bills." Id. at A8,
col. 2.
Unfortunately, the government also is being forced to make deals with many of those involved
to obtain testimony against others, which results in little or no criminal or civil sanction being
imposed on those who testify despite their substantial involvement. See Harris, The S&L Looters
Who May Get Away, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1990, at A12, col. 3. Byron Harris wrote:
The U.S. has achieved convictions in most of its cases against high ranking S&L officers.
But crimes in thrifts, where they did occur, often required the cooperation of groups of peo-
ple, in what might be called a "chain of greed."
At their worst, the chains included five kinds of professionals, in addition to the borrow-
ers who benefited from the questionable loans. At the beginning of a transaction, real estate
brokers masterminded the shady deals. Crooked appraisers then inflated real estate values to
make the deals work. Inside the institutions, an array of employees from loan officers hungry
for a loan commission to the executives themselves participated in the fraud. At the conclu-
sion of a deal, lawyers "papered" the bogus transactions by drawing up the contracts, and
accountants either looked the other way or neglected to scour the institutions' books too
carefully.
Some of these individuals, particularly the borrowers and the brokers, gained far more
than thrift executives. But for the most part, prosecutors have instead sought the convictions
of the executives, and have rewarded these less visible figures with probation or reduced
sentences in exchange for testimony against the men at the top.
Id. (emphasis in original).
100. Compare S. 438 Hearings, supra note 6 (testimony of James Harrison, Sr., president
and chief executive officer, First Community Bancshares, Inc., for the American Bankers Associa-
tion) (stating that "civil RICO was never intended to be used. . . to turn ordinary state common
law disputes into federal racketeering cases . . . [and that] [t]he American Bankers Association
will support any legislative initiative which will leave the remedy for garden variety commercial
disputes to state common law or to [other] applicable federal statutes. . .") with H.R. 1046 Hear-
ings, supra note 48 (statement of John L. Douglas, General Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp.) (stating that "the RICO statute can be an important instrument to deter ... improper
behavior [in banks and thrifts] and to facilitate recovery of lost funds").
101. Sleeping Watchdog: How Regulators, Error Led to the Disaster at Lincoln Savings,
Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 6. The Securities and Exchange Commission accused Keating
and an associate of making $14 million in preferential loans to insiders, who included Keating
himself. Many of these loans were made without collateral or credit checks. Keating settled by
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After the acquisition, Keating and his partners started to invest heavily
in high-risk investments, which ultimately led to Lincoln's failure and
the assumption by the taxpayers of an estimated 2.5 billion dollars in
damages. 10 Those who ran Lincoln under Keating apparently engaged
in fraudulent transactions that were contrived solely for the purpose of
siphoning off funds for its owners and officers. 03 Following Lincoln's
collapse, government regulators brought a civil suit against Keating and
other officers, 10 4 accusing them of RICO fraud and conspiracy for their
signing a consent decree without admitting or denying liability. Immediately after acquiring Lin-
coln, Keating dismissed conservative lending officers and internal auditors, even though he had
told federal regulators that he would keep them. Keating's son, who dropped out of Indiana Uni-
versity, worked as a country club busboy until just a few years before he was appointed to the
position of Chairman of the Board. Id.
102. Kammer & Hall, Lincoln's "Kamikaze Banking": Wallflower Thrift Became High
Roller, Ariz. Republic, Sept. 16, 1989, at A2, col. 1. The savings and loan crisis developed after
President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Garn-St. Germain Act,
which permitted S&Ls to branch out from home loans into risky and potentially high-profit
investments such as commercial real estate development. Entrepreneurs were soon lining up
to start S&Ls. As has now been widely documented, they made large, unsecured loans to
associates on overvalued land and used S&L funds to pay for their jets, Rolls-Royces, yachts
and French chefs.
* * ' Well-paid lobbyists for the S&L industry fought any proposed legislation that might
shut down S&Ls, even the sick ones.
Mob Ties to S&Ls Uncovered in Book on U.S. Thrift Crisis, Denver Post, Sept. 11, 1989, at 4G,
col. 1.
When Keating and his associates applied for permission to purchase Lincoln, they assured
government officials that they would continue to focus on the type of investments that previously
supported Lincoln's operations. Kammer & Hall, supra, at A2, col. 1. Before the deregulation,
developers financed risky projects personally. Once the institutions' funds were available for such
investments, however, the developers freely took chances on risky projects because the funds of the
S&Ls were federally insured, and the taxpayers ultimately would bear any losses. Id. Conse-
quently, thrift officials started practicing "kamikaze banking" and called the game "heads I win;
tails the taxpayers lose." Id. Such practices "privatized gain and socialized loss." Id. The Arizona
Republic reported:
Many of the sales involved undeveloped land in Estrella, Lincoln's 20,000-acre master-
planned community west of Phoenix. The deals were "devoid of economic substance,". . . [a
government civil racketeering suit charged] because "substantially all the funds" for the
purchases were provided by Lincoln.
As a result of the sales, the suit charge[d], Lincoln showed $82 million in profits. Then its
directors used a tax-allocation plan to "upstream" the money to the parent corporation,
which then diverted the dollars to corporate insiders in the form of high salaries and bonuses.
, * * When the executives came under pressure from federal regulators to limit such risky
investments, they devised a plan to camouflage their ownership, the suit claim[ed].
Id.
Lincoln also invested in junk bonds; the investments constituted a full 10% of Lincoln's port-
folio. Gonzalez Says New Round of Lincoln Hearings Will Follow Every Thread from the S&L's
Mess, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1989, at A16, col. 2. Those purchases of junk bonds resulted in millions
of dollars in profits to Michael Milken. Id.
103, U.S. Regulators Sue Owners in Big Savings Unit Failure, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1989, at
33, col. 3.
104. Id. Actual damages alone are $1.1 billion. Id. The suit alleges that Keating:
purchased Lincoln for the sole purpose of milking its funds and that hundreds of millions of
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personal misuse of the institution's funds. 0"
The events leading up to the collapse of Lincoln Savings & Loan
raise other troubling and as yet unresolved questions, particularly with
regard to the effort to rewrite RICO. Five United States Senators, now
known as the "Keating Five,"'' 0 were given substantial campaign con-
tributions at the same time that they intervened in the investigation of
Lincoln and Keating; some of them intervened more than once.10 7 One
of the Senators, Senator Dennis DeConcini, whose reputation for integ-
rity in Washington is one of the highest, is one of the principal sponsors
of RICO reform legislation that would directly benefit Keating.'
dollars were diverted from the savings association to Mr. Keating's real estate company, the
American Continental Corporation.
To accomplish the diversion, ... Lincoln officials broke Federal banking regulations,
backdated and forged documents, undertook "sham transactions," made illegal loans and cash
payments, paid "excessive compensation" to some of the owners and spent Lincoln's deposits
on "the personal, political and charitable convictions" of Mr. Keating.
Id. The suit lists several real estate transactions and insider stock sales that led to Lincoln's de-
mise. Id. Those transactions resulted in profits that were recorded improperly by methods that,
according to an independent audit released by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, "amounted to
'accounting gimmickry.'" Id.
105. Id. An example of one of Lincoln's sham transactions involved Amcor, a subsidiary of
Lincoln. Amcor bought an 8500-acre parcel of land for $3000 per acre. It then sold 1000 acres to a
newly formed limited partnership, for $14,000 per acre, and recorded an $11 million dollar profit.
Amcor then paid Lincoln $4.4 million in tax payments. The limited partnership, West Continental
Land, borrowed the amount needed for the purchase, $10.5 million, from Lincoln, and a further
$3.5 million from E.C. Garcia, who had just borrowed $20 million from Lincoln. West Continental
had assets of only $31,000. The interest payments alone on these loans were $1.4 million per year.
Such transactions were devised simply to bolster Lincoln's income statement, creating the appear-
ance of a financially sound institution. Nash, Takeover of Lincoln Defended, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8,
1989, at D1, col. 6.
106. These senators are Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Cal.), Sen.
Donald W. Riegle (D-Mich.), Sen. John H. Glenn (D-Ohio), and Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.). See
The Keating Five (editorial), Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1989, at A14, col. 1.
107. See Hall & Kammer, DeConcini Aides Tied to Keating S&L Loans, Ariz. Republic,
Sept. 14, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
108. See Hall & Kammer, DeConcini Bill May Offer Keating Help, Ariz. Republic, Sept. 15,
1989, at Al, col. 5. Sen. Dennis DeConcini initially told Arizona news people that the RICO Re-
form Act would not "affect government regulators or government cases." Id. He now concedes that
it would. Id. He now also is supporting changes to its retroactive provisions. See RICO-Reform Bill
Won't Be Retroactive, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1989, at B7, col. 1.
The three accounting firms implicated in the Lincoln scandal are Arthur Young & Co., Arthur
Andersen & Co., and Touche Ross & Co. See The Lapses by Lincoln's Auditors, N.Y. Times, Dec.
28, 1989, at D1, col. 4. "Arthur Young became an advocate of its client," according to Ronald Rus,
an attorney representing American Continental's bondholders. Id. at D6, col. 2. Arthur Andersen
resigned as American Continental's auditor at the same time that the examination of Lincoln by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board revealed questionable accounting practices. The accounting
firm of Kenneth Leventhal & Co. was hired by the government to investigate 15 land sales by
Lincoln, all of which resulted in the recording of huge profits for American Continental. Leventhal
found that the transactions should not be recorded as profits. Id. Touche's involvement comes
from its current status as American Continental's auditor. Id. at D1, col. 1. Bondholders claim that
American Continental sold as many bonds as it did because of Touche's involvement. Id.
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Whatever the Senators intended, Keating frankly acknowledges that he
sought to buy influence with the contributions.1 9 Senator DeConcini at
Arthur Andersen & Co. fraudulently backdated loan data, and "stuffed" files with loan docu-
mentation. Thomas, Regulators Cite Delays and Phone Bugs in Examination, Seizure of Lincoln
S&L, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1989, at A4, col. 2. The firm admits backdating the data, but claims that
it engaged in no improprieties. Id.
Ernst & Young, which at the time was still Arthur Young & Co., gave Lincoln and American
Continental unqualified auditing opinions at the time that examiners claimed that Lincoln was
insolvent. Nash, Auditors of Lincoln on the Spot, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1989, at D1, col. 3. The
accounting firm did not mention in its opinions the potential problems with Lincoln. Id.
Based on the firm's report that American's financial condition was accurately represented,
American sold more than $200 million of junk bonds to over 23,000 investors. Id. Following these
sales, the Arthur Young partner who handled Lincoln's account, accepted a $930,000 position with
Lincoln, earning much higher pay than he received at Arthur Young. Id. Senator Cranston, facing
a re-election battle for his fifth term in 1992, promised to help the 23,000 bond purchasers. Cran-
ston Decides to Fight in Effort to Overcome Image in Savings and Loan Failure, N.Y. Times, Jan.
21, 1990, § 1, at 24, col. 2 (remarks of Sen. Alan Cranston) (stating that "[t]hese bonds are now
worthless, and many widows and elderly people have lost their life savings"). Senator Cranston is
planning legislation that would allow the bondholders to pursue civil suits against the federal gov-
ernment for negligence in allowing sales to continue after doubts were raised about the financial
state of American Continental and Lincoln Savings. Id.
Similar collapses of Arthur Young clients occurred in Texas; Vernon Savings & Loan Associa-
tion ($1.1 billion) and Western Federal Savings & Loan Association ($1 billion) both failed. See
Spotlight on Arthur Young Is Likely to Intensify As Lincoln Hearings Resume, Wall St. J., Nov.
21, 1989, at A20, col. 2.
109. See Jackson, New Disclosures of Riegle's Lincoln Role Suggest He Was More Than a
Bystander, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1989, at A28, col. 1 (stating that Keating "arranged $1.4 million in
political donations for the five senators"). Keating said later that "he hoped his money had in-
duced elected officials to take up his case." Jackson, FBI Probe Focuses on Senators' Ties to Keat-
ing's S&L, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1989, at A7B, col. 2. What Keating thought he bought was
substantial; what he paid was substantial, too.
In April 1987 the five Senators met with Edwin Gray, who at that time was head of the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board. Stanton, House Orders Subpoenas in Keating Case, Ariz. Republic,
Oct. 13, 1989, at Al, col. 1. They convinced regulators to take steps to end a regulatory investiga-
tion of Lincoln. Id. Two of Senator DeConcini's top aides received more than $50 million in real
estate loans from Lincoln. Hall & Kammer, DeConcini Aides Got Keating S&L Loans, Ariz. Re-
public, Sept. 14, 1989, at Al, col. 1. Senator McCain received $112,000 in campaign money and
$13,433 in unreported airplane trips. Hall & Kammer, Kin's Deal, Trips Reveal Close McCain-
Keating Tie, Ariz. Republic, Oct. 8, 1989, at Al, col. 1. His wife and father-in-law invested
$359,100 in a shopping center partnership with Keating. Id. Senator Cranston received more than
$850,000 in contributions from Keating. Stanton, Ethics Review Urged of Keating, Senators, Ariz.
Republic, Oct. 14, 1989, at Al, col. 1. Senator Glenn received $200,000 from Keating for a political
committee controlled by the Senator, and $39,000 in direct contributions, which was probably a
violation of federal election law. Id.
Subsequently, when the regulators targeted the thrift for closer investigations, Keating used
his political influence to get the Senators to cut off the investigation, requiring the regulators to
start anew. See Kammer & Hall, supra note 102, at A2, col. 1. That provided Keating and his
friends opportunity to further their frauds, sinking Lincoln into an even deeper pit. Id. The five
Senators pressured the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to stop the investigation of Lincoln in
1987. See The Senate Five, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1989, at A18, col. 1. Senators Cranston and
DeConcini intervened again in March 1989. Id. At least $1 billion of damages were caused by the
delay. Id. Following the recommendation by the examiners that Lincoln be placed in receivership,
M. Danny Wall, the newly appointed chairman of the Office of Thrift Supervision (formerly the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board), transferred the case from San Francisco to Washington, where
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first denied that the legislation would help Keating.11 His efforts at
it sat for almost two years with no action. Id.
When William Robertson, chief of regulation and supervision at the San Francisco office of
enforcement, recommended to Wall that Lincoln be placed into receivership in 1987, Wall told
Robertson that he would be replaced. Sleeping Watchdog: How Regulators, Error Led to the Dis-
aster at Lincoln Savings, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1989, at A12, col. 4. Then Wall stripped the San
Francisco office of power to act over the case. Id.
One of the major concerns of the House Banking Committee investigating the Lincoln failure
and Wall's relation to it was why Wall did not heed the San Francisco office's warnings. Jackson &
Thomas, Wall Denies Any Politics in S&L Rulings As Keating Refuses to Testify at Hearing,
Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 1989, at A4, col. 2. Representative Toby Roth stated, "I, for the life of me,
can't see why you didn't listen to your people in San Francisco instead of Mr. Keating. When it
comes to Mr. Keating, you seem to be rather wimpish." Id.
The sentiment held by many of those present at the House hearings was reflected in the words
of Representative Jim Leach, who said, "If the allegations the committee has heard so far are true,
Charles Keating is a financio-path of obscene proportions-the Rev. Jim Bakker of American com-
merce-given license to steal by a bank board headed by the Neville Chamberlain of financial
regulation, a cheerleader who saw little evil and thus spoke little truth." Savings Executive Won't
Testify and Blames Regulators for Woes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1989, at B8, col. 2.
Edwin Gray, who was the head of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board at the time the investi-
gation began, commented on the intervention of the Senators; it is not necessary to agree with his
observations to recognize their force:
Sen. DeConcini apparently knows no shame. Like former House Speaker Jim Wright,
who resigned in shame, Sen. DeConcini continues to justify his actions to subvert the regula-
tory process-on behalf of Lincoln-as merely "doing [his] job" to "represent a constituent
... against rogue bureaucratic regulators."
... [A]lmost 29 months ago, senior thrift regulators warned Sen. DeConcini that he was
intervening on behalf of an S&L which was "a ticking time bomb." Nevertheless, he contin-
ued to intervene for, and serve as an apologist for, Lincoln Savings management. Having
hitched himself to the Lincoln Savings wagon in return for substantial political contributions,
Sen. DeConcini found it impossible to free himself, even as Lincoln plunged over the preci-
pice and into the abyss. Once bought, he stayed bought.
Lincoln's Charles H. Keating, Jr. has not been shy about his own intentions. Asked
whether his very substantial political contributions to DeConcini and other political figures
"in any way influenced [them] to take up [his] cause," Keating replied: "I want to say in the
most forceful way I can, I certainly hope so." Certainly, Keating's hopes were answered by
DeConcini.
Gray, Regulator Rebuts DeConcini, Ariz. Republic, Sept. 3, 1989, at C1, col. 1. It also is possible
that the fraud at Lincoln Savings was linked to the fraud at Drexel Burnham Lambert. See The
Lincoln Scandal May Lead to Drexel's Door, Bus. WL, Jan. 15, 1990, at 26, 27 (reporting that the
government is tracing ties between Keating and Milken, noting SEC Chairman Richard C.
Breeden's comment that if companies report profits on transactions that are not at "arm's length"
and are "arranged" by buyers and sellers, "that is financial fraud," and indicating that thrift regu-
lators are expected to file several suits soon).
110. Senator Dennis DeConcini told the Arizona papers: "If I had known what I know now
when I received these contributions, I would not have accepted them." Stanton, DeConcini to
Repay: Returning $48,000 Keating Donations, Ariz. Republic, Sept. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 1. Senator
DeConcini also acknowledged that such suits were not filed "unless you have at least enough to get
to a jury," a strong acknowledgment of wrongdoing. Senator DeConcini's promise to return the
contributions to him from Keating is also an acknowledgment of his own wrongdoing. Id.
For a story of the relationship between Keating and Senator Alan Cranston, see The Seduc-
tion of Senator Alan Cranston, Bus. Wy., Dec. 4, 1989, at 82, 84 (reporting how wealthy contribu-
tors gain access in Washington and forge alliances that transcend ideological lines, noting that
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RICO reform, however, go forward despite the effect such efforts will
have on cases like Lincoln's in the future.
The bank and thrift crises on the federal level are paralleled at the
state level by the collapse of insurance companies, many of which are
also fraud-based failures caused by insiders."' From 1969 through 1983,
Senator Cranston or a group affiliated with him received close to $1 million from Keating, and
quoting Keating, on whether his giving to Cranston and others went to buy influence, "I want to
say in the most forceful way I can, I certainly hope so").
The remarkable aspect of the thrift crisis is that the political fall-out is so small. See Rosen-
baum, S&L's: Big Money, Little Outcry, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1990, at El, col. 1. David E. Rosen-
baum stated:
Before the decade is out, the Federal bailout of the savings and loan industry is expected
to cost the Government more than $200 billion. That is much more than the Government will
spend on such critical social programs as preschool education, drug control and aid to the
homeless. It is more than will be spent on highways, air traffic control and pollution abate-
ment. It amounts to more than $1,300 for every American taxpayer, and it will not enhance
national security, promote economic growth or improve public welfare one bit.
It is, by any measure, the biggest debacle in public finance in the United States since the
Great Depression. One way or another, the public will pick up the tab, in the form of higher
taxes or reduced spending for other programs. A natural question is, why has it not become
one of the biggest political scandals as well?
To be sure, some elements of scandal are there. Lies, greed, graft, negligence, back-room
deals and outright corruption were behind a huge raid on the public till. Powerful politicians
and tycoons were largely responsible.
But it has not become a scandal like Watergate or Teapot Dome in part because too
many politicians have had their hands soiled by the savings and loan mess. So many are to
blame that few are left to blame them.
Id.
111. See Familiar Refrain: Texas Insurer's Demise Raises Fear of Reprise of State's S&L
Fiasco, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1988, at Al, col. 6. "Autopsies of several failed insurers across the
country have turned up evidence of frauds and inadequate regulation. . . .[T]he indirect cost to
taxpayers already is growing, because insurers deduct from state taxes their rising assessments
from the guaranty funds." Id. A special report by Arthur Andersen & Co. concluded that "a notice-
able number of insurance company insolvencies [would occur] over the next five to seven years."
Id.; see also Insurance Company Failures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and In-
vestigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 596 (1989)
(statement of Frederick D. Wolf, Assistant Comptroller General, Accounting and Financial Man-
agement Division); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INSURER FAILURES: PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURER IN-
SOLVENCIES AND STATE GUARANTY FUNDS 3-4 (1987). This report states that between 1969 and 1986,
140 insolvencies occurred, 42% of them since 1983. The number of companies with troubling finan-
cial conditions is also increasing, the causes of which include underpricing, underreserving, reinsur-
ance problems, and fraud. Id. Indeed, Pacific Standard Life Insurance, a carrier with $7 billion of
insurance in force, which invested heavily in junk bonds, is insolvent. Rosen, Your Money: Are the
Insurers Fiscally Strong?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1990, at 34, col. 1. The collapse raised concern about
whether it was an isolated event, as insurance companies own 30% of the junk bonds in the United
States (pension funds own another 15%). Id. Gerald Morlitz, a director of Arthur Andersen & Co.,
observed, "I think it's the savings and loans five years deferred without any bailout... . Junk
bonds were accurately named from the start." Id. See generally SUBCOMM. ON OVERIGHT AND INVES-
TIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., 2D SEss., FAILED
PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLENCIES (Comm. Print 1990). In transmitting the Report,
Chairman John D. Dingell observed:
The Subcommittee found that the present system for regulating the solvency of insur-
ance companies is seriously deficient. Consequently, the number of insolvent companies has
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state guarantee funds assessed healthy insurers only 454 million dollars
to cover claims of insolvent members.11 In 1987, however, 234 compa-
nies were in liquidation, and 74 companies were in reorganization.11"
State guaranty funds paid a record $909 million to bail out the failures
in 1987.1 4 The industry holds large portions of the junk bonds issued
by corporate America as well as large portfolios of real estate, both of
which are particularly vulnerable to an economic down turn, as in the
savings and loan crisis." 5 While the state insurance commissioners op-
increased dramatically, and the resulting costs to the public have skyrocketed due to the
changing nature of the insurance industry. With an accelerating international market and the
leverage provided by excessive reinsurance, the costs of liquidating failed companies is start-
ing to reach billions of dollars and take many years to resolve.
The parallels between the present situation in the insurance industry and the early stages
of the savings and loan debacle are both obvious and deeply disturbing. They encompass
scandalous mismanagement and rascality by certain persons entrusted with operating insur-
ance companies, along with an appalling lack of regulatory controls to detect, prevent, and
punish such activities. Because the ill effects of fraud and gross incompetence may be hidden
for 10 years or more after a policy is written, the problems observed by the Subcommittee
could quickly escalate into a real threat to the solvency of the insurance industry if reforms
are not implemented very soon.
Id. at iii.
112. Nash, As More Insurance Concerns Fail, Fears Mount of Industry Crisis, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 5, 1989, at Al, col. 2, D22, col. 5.
113. Getschow & Charlier, Woes Envelop Texas Insurance Industry, Wall St. J., Nov. 8,
1988, at A8, col. 1.
114. Familiar Refrain: Texas Insurer's Demise Raises Fear of Reprise of State's S&L Fi-
asco, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
115. See Nash, supra note 112, at Al, col. 2. Recent studies indicate that, over the next five
years, "[e]ven in the best-case scenario of an economic 'soft landing' . . . about one out of eight
issuers of high-risk, high-yield" bonds will default. Ricks, Even 'Soft Landing' May Jolt 1 of 8
Junk Bonds, Wall St. J., July 12, 1989, at C1, col. 2. See generally Garcia, Junk-Bond Portfolios of
Insurers Spark Fears over Adequacy of Regulatory Role, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1990, at A4, col. 1
(reporting that insurance company investments in the troubled junk bond market are raising con-
cern with the state of state systems of regulation); The Party's Over: Mounting Losses Are Water-
shed Event for Era of Junk Bonds, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (noting that the
mounting losses in junk bonds mark the end of an era).
As noted in the 1974 study of the Chamber of Commerce, fraud against insurance companies
by outsiders is also a major component of white-collar crime. It is estimated, for example, that
15% to 20% of all insurance claims are fraudulent for a total loss of over $15 billion annually, and
because an insurance company must generate approximately $1.25 in premiums for every $1 it
pays in claims, policy holders are paying an extra $18.75 billion in premiums annually because of
fraud. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, INSURANCE FRAUD 1 (1988). Arson, particularly arson-for-
profit, is a particularly disturbing facet of the insurance fraud problem. Fire losses in the United
States in 1987 hit a record $8.5 billion. INS. INFORMATION INST., INSURANCE FACTS: 1988-89 PRop-
ERTY/CASUALTY FACT BOOK 69 (1989). In 1986 arson was the cause of one in four fires in nonresi-
dential structures, including schools, restaurants, garages, and manufacturing plants. Id. at 70. Of
the losses, 26.9% were attributable to arson. Id. Overall, in 1987, 105,000 incendiary or suspicious
origin fires resulted in $1.59 billion in losses and 730 civilian deaths. Id. at 71. For a more complete
analysis, including the various motives for arson (revenge, vandalism, concealment of crime, and
insurance profit), see generally S. REP. No. 535, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); NAT'L INSTITUTE OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ARSON AND ARSON INVESTIGATION SURVEY AND ASSESSMENT
(1977).
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pose rewriting RICO, the insurance industry is behind it."'
The Nation's securities and commodities markets are also facing
scandals of the most disturbing dimensions. Not unexpectedly, the se-
curities and commodities industry supports the rewriting of RICO."'
Fraud by insurance companies is also part of the white-collar crime problem. The insurance
industry is, for example, facing "what may become the biggest financial scandal in the history of
Medicare: the misspending of as much as $10 billion in Medicare funds over the past six years."
Medical Mess: Has Medicare Paid out Billions Actually Owed by Private Insurers?, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 7, 1989, at Al, col. 6. The subjects of the developing investigation by the Department of
Justice include some of the Nation's biggest insurance companies. Losses may reach between $400
and $900 million. Gerth, Enforcement Lax, U.S. Auditors Say, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1989, at A21,
col. 1. During the same period, America's elderly saw their annual deductible in hospital care and
doctor care more than double. Id. Fraud, too, is widespread in the relationship between doctors
and hospitals, but medical fraud statutes seldo&a are enforced, which contributes to the growth of
medical costs in the Nation. See generally Warm Bodies: Hospitals That Need Patients Pay
Bounties for Doctors' Referrals, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (reporting that the Inspec-
tor General of the Department of Health and Human Services warns of "nation-wide proliferation"
of kickback allegations in medical testing and that federal and state laws are "weak or rarely en-
forced"); Waldholz & Bogdanich, Warm Bodies: Doctor-Owned Labs Earn Lavish Profits in a
Captive Market, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (terming the increasing practice of demand-
ing referral fees "'[s]tickup, extortion, bandit(ry)'" (quoting Terrance Gill, consultant)). Kick-
backs represent collusion. Often doctors also misrepresent the bills for the work they do, costing
patients, employers, and insurance companies millions of dollars a year. Rundle, Medical Ripoff:
How Doctors Boost Bills by Misrepresenting the Work They Do, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1989, at Al,
col. 1.
116. Compare H.R. 1046 Hearings, supra note 48 (statement of Hon. Jim Long, Commis-
sioner of Insurance, State of North Carolina, for the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners) (arguing that "RICO has proven to be an effective tool to state insurance regulators in
their battle against insurance fraud and is probably the single most effective deterrent which pres-
ently exists against national and international conspiracies to evade oversight by insurance regula-
tors and to defraud consumers of insurance products") with RICO Reform Hearings, supra note
76, at 189-92 (testimony of Irvin B. Nathan on behalf of the Alliance of American Insurers, the
American Insurance Association, the National Association of Independent Insurers, and the State
Farm Insurance Cos.). Mr. Nathan stated that "the [RICO] statute was enacted back in 1970 to
prevent the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime. . .. [FIrequently [civil] suits are
brought against insurance companies for allegedly engaging in racketeering. . .. [Tihe statute is
being grossly misused." Id. at 189-90. He further stated that "we believe there should be a private
remedy for true victims of organized crime - . . . We think, however, that there is no need for a
Federal treble damage remedy in . . . ordinary commercial disputes . . . ." Id. at 190-91.
117. See, e.g., RICO Reform Hearings, supra note 76, at 374 (testimony of Edward L.
O'Brien, Securities Industry Association) (stating that "[tihe private right of action of RICO is not
essential. . ."); see also H.R. 1046 Hearings, supra note 48 (statement of Philip A. Feigin, Securi-
ties Commissioner of Colorado, for the North American Securities Administrators Association).
Commissioner Feigin stated:
NASAA is opposed to . . . the RICO Reform Act of 1989. The number, size and scope of
investment frauds detected in just the last few years are well documented and staggering. At
the same time, prosecutorial and regulatory resources remain limited, with little realistic hope
of material improvement. These resource restrictions at the state and federal levels argue in
favor of broader private remedies, not the opposite . . ..
Id. But see H.R. 1046 Hearings, supra note 48 (statement of Daniel L. Goelzer, General Counsel,
Securities and Exchange Commission) (stating that "the Commission supports legislative efforts to
eliminate the overlap between private remedies under RICO and those available under the federal
securities laws"); id. (statement of Michael E. Don, Deputy General Counsel, Securities Investor
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Nevertheless, while the litany of big names proven or alleged to be in-
volved in fraud is long, it is best symbolized by Ivan F. Boesky" 8
Protection Corp.). Don stated:
RICO has been used by SIPC and its trustees. . . . In each. instance, RICO was a neces-
sary tool to redress the wrongs for which SIPC and its trustee seek reimbursement. * * *
SIPC opposed any changes in RICO that would curtail the ability of SIPC or its trustees to
use the statute. . . . SIPC, like the [other] federal corporations that [protect depositors]...
protect[s] the public in their investments.
Id. Individual securities firms, too, put their money where their financial interest rests. Drexel
Burnham contributed $250,000 to the anti-RICO campaign. Drexel's Best Investment, FORBES,
Oct. 17, 1988, at 12.
118. In 1986 the most scandalous year in Wall Street history ended with Ivan F. Boesky's
agreeing to plead guilty in connection with insider trading and pay a $100 million fine. ALMANAC,
supra note 93, at 454. See generally 133 CoNG. REc. H8841 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1987) (remarks of
Rep. John Conyers) (discussing securities fraud, including a detailed analysis of many of the merg-
ers and alleged insider trading involving Boesky); D. FRANTZ, LEVINE & Co.: WALL STREET'S INSIDER
TRADING SCANDAL (1987) (recounting the investigation and prosecution of Dennis Levine, Martin
Siegel, and Ivan F. Boesky); M. STEVENS, THE INSIDERS: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE SCANDAL ROCKING
WALL STREET (1987) (telling the story of the investigation and prosecution of Dennis Levine).
Other notable individuals in the unfolding scandals include Robert A. Freeman, a partner at
Goldman, Sachs & Co., see A Top Trader at Goldman, Sachs Pleads Guilty to Insider Charges,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (felony charge of insider trading); Boyd L. Jefferies, a
founder of Jefferies & Co., see Jefferies, Top Insider-Trading Witness, Draws Modest Fine, Is Put
on Probation, Wall St. J., July 7, 1989, at A2, col. 1 (felony charge of insider trading); Paul Bilzer-
lan, a corporateoraider, who took over Singer Co., see Hagedorn, Sew and Reap: How Paul Bilzer-
ian Fell, Taking Singer Co. for a Very Wild Ride, Wall St. J., June 28, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (felony
conviction of securities and tax laws in connection with takeover); Don Carter, a collector of share-
holder proxies in takeover battles, see Feron, Proxy Firm Founder Pleads Guilty to Theft and
Fraud, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1990, at C6, col. 1 (reporting Carter's felony charge of $1 million theft
and false New York State income tax); Burrough, Carter Faces up to 4 Years in State Prison,
Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1990, at A2, col. 3 (reporting that Carter's conduct reflected "a systematic
pattern of greed and fraud" (quoting Ronald Goldstock, Director, New York Organized Crime
Task Force)); and Salim B. Lewis, a take-over speculator, see Lewis Pleads Guilty to Three Felony
Counts, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1989, at A3, col. 1 (felony charge of manipulation of stock of Fire-
man's Fund Corp.). Not all of those indicted in the current insider trading scandals were of compa-
rable significance factually; their legal significance is, of course, a difficult matter. See Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); R. WINANS, TRADING SECRETS (1986).
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and Michael R. Milken.119 The most common offense is insider trading.
119. See generally C. BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM
AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS (1989) (telling the story of the investigation and indict-
ment of Michael Milken); Securities Markets Oversight and Drexel Burnham Lambert: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1988) [hereinafter Drexel Hearings] (remarks of Rep. John
Dingell) (stating that in 1986, $32 billion in junk bonds were issued, 40% of which were handled by
Drexel, and that Milken was the "most knowledgeable" and "most responsible"); id. at 15 (testi-
mony of Michael Milken) (stating that "based on my constitutional right under the fifth amend-
ment [I decline to answer] lest my answers be used in an attempt to incriminate me"); Greenwald,
Predator's Fall, TIME, Feb. 26, 1990, at 46; Dobrzynski, After Drexel, Bus. WK., Feb. 26, 1990, at
36; Galen, And Now, the Predator Is Preyed Upon, Bus. WK., Mar. 5, 1990, at 70; Dobrzynski,
Could Fred Joseph Have Saved Drexel?, Bus. WK., Mar. 5, 1990, at 72.
Editorial comment on the sudden bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. on
February 13, 1990, ravages widely. One theme, which appeared in several editorials, is that its
collapse is attributable to RICO. See, e.g., Fall of the House of Drexel (editorial), Wall St. J., Mar.
19, 1990, at A14, col. 1. This editorial stated that the argument "that Drexel was a government
victim stands on more than one leg. The most obvious is the half-billion capital drain in the settle-
ment of its RICO charges." Id.; see also Regulating the Financiers (editorial), Financial Times,
Mar. 13, 1990, at 18, col. 1. This editorial observed that "Drexel. . . arguably owes its demise to a
draconian fine of $650 m. Fear of. . . [RICO] encouraged the firm to plead guilty .... " Id. A
counter point often made is that Drexel's fall was Drexel's fault. Parallels sometimes are drawn in
the counter point commentary between the rise and fall of Michael Milken and the rise and fall of
Charles Ponzi, who gave his name to the so-called "Ponzi scheme." See Stein, The Biggest Scam
Ever?, BARRON'S, Feb. 19, 1990, at 8; see also 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 101 (2d ed.
1989) (from the name of: "A form of fraud in which belief in the success of a fictional enterprise is
fostered by payment of quick returns to first investors from money invested by others"). Firm
judgments, of course, will have to await careful analysis of the evidence that is brought out in the
bankruptcy proceedings and the congressional investigations and hearings, which are sure to fol-
low. It is appropriate, however, to conclude now that efforts to fix the blame for Drexel's fall on
RICO reflect more about preexisting attitudes toward the statute than any evidence about Drexel
in the public record. Nevertheless, the question merits at least preliminary analysis.
In 1899 Charles Ponzi, an Italian immigrant, sought fame and fortune in the United States; he
found both, at least temporarily. After unsuccessfully plotting several get-rich-quick schemes,
Ponzi hit upon a postal reply coupon arbitrage. Ponzi hoped he could purchase postal reply cou-
pons in depressed foreign markets and redeem them in the United States, where their market
value was as much as 50% higher, taking the spread as his profit. Ponzi's initial efforts failed
because of unforeseen transaction costs involved in redeeming the coupons. Nevertheless, Ponzi
took his fatally flawed idea public in December 1919 and used it to solicit money from naive inves-
tors, promising a 50% interest on each investment in 90 days or 100% of the principal if the
investment was redeemed before maturity. Because the underlying coupon redemption scheme did
not work, old investors had to be paid with the new investors' monies. But early returns were so
high-and came so quickly-that most investors stayed invested, and Ponzi did not have to return
their principal. In a period of merely eight months, Ponzi's Security Exchange Co., which was
located on School Street in the heart of Boston's financial district, took in at least $9,582,000.
Other sources place the figure as high as $20,000,000, of which at least $3,000,000 never was ac-
counted for. See J. NASH, BLOODLErrERS AND BADMEN 450-51 (1973); see also D. DUNN, PONzI, THE
BOSTON SWINDLER 247-48 (1975) (noting that the final bankruptcy report in 1931 indicated liabili-
ties of $3,986,179.77); C. SIFAKIS, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CRIME 582-83 (1982) (stating
that "[n]o one ever knew for sure"). Meanwhile, the 24 year old Ponzi lived the life of a young
1980s Wall Street investment banker; he bought: a $100,000 mansion; his former employer's busi-
ness; 200 suits; 100 pairs of shoes; four dozen canes with solid gold handles; two dozen diamond
stickpins; 100 neck-ties; and a $12,000 Locomobile, which needed, of course, a hired chauffeur.
The scheme collapsed when the Boston Post, which received a Pulitzer Prize in 1921 for its
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In 1988, 3637 mergers and acquisitions were completed, a slight rise
reporting on Ponzi, exposed the scheme and not enough new money came in to service old inves-
tors' interest or principal. Indeed, the run on Ponzi's company that followed the newspaper expos6
verged on a riot. At the time Ponzi had as much as $17,000,000 stuffed in shoeboxes and closets in
his office and in various banks in Boston. In an attempt to recoup his fortune, Ponzi took
$2,000,000 to the casinos in Saratoga Springs, New York, and promptly lost all of it, leaving only
$15,000,000 to be returned to more than 40,000 investors.
But Ponzi was more than bankrupt; he was also in deep trouble with the law, federal and
state. Arrested by United States Marshals, Ponzi plead guilty to a federal indictment for mail
fraud. Ponzi's lawyer told the court, "Wild and reckless though he was, he had no intent to de-
fraud. He wasn't the garden variety of criminal.. . . You ought not to deal with him as a man who
did this maliciously." D. DUNN, supra, at 248. The court replied that it was "impressed with much
that. . . [had] been said," but sentenced Ponzi to five years in the Plymouth Jail (Massachusetts
had no federal prison), from which Ponzi protested his innocence, claiming that jealous financiers
brought about his downfall. Id. at 249. Ponzi fought his way to the Supreme Court in an unsuc-
cessful effort to prevent being turned over to the state authorities, while he was serving his federal
term, to be tried on a series of 22 state indictments for larceny. See Ponzi v. Fesseaden, 258 U.S.
254 (1922). Tried in a state court, Ponzi was found not guilty on 12 of the 22 indictments. See
Commonwealth v. Ponzi, 256 Mass. 159, 160-61, 152 N.E. 307, 308-09 (1926). In a second trial of
five of the other indictments, Ponzi secured a directed verdict on one indictment and a hung jury
on the others; in a third trial, he was found guilty of the four indictments on which the jury hung,
adjudged a "common and notorious thief," and sentenced to not less than seven and not more than
nine years in prison. Id. When he was released from prison on parole in 1934, he was promptly
deported. See Ponzi v. Ward, 7 F. Supp. 736, 738 (D. Mass. 1934) (holding that a scheme to de-
fraud constitutes the crime of moral turpitude). Ponzi died in 1949 in a charity hospital in Rio do
Janeiro, Brazil.
The sophistication of the financial instruments, the dimensions of the relevant markets, and
the economic and social times are vastly different, but the resemblances between the rise and fall
of Michael Milken's junk bond empire and Charles Ponzi's postal arbitrage scheme are haunting.
Milken, as head of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.'s high-yield and convertible bond department,
promoted a diversified portfolio of junk bonds as the road to substantial profits. His theory was
that the market had under evaluated the bonds and that diversification would off-set losses and
ample profits would be provided over the long run by the interest rate difference between regular
bonds and the high-yield variety. See generally C. BRUCK, supra, at 27-28. Milken supported his
theory by reference to the classic work of W. Braddock Hickman, which he had encountered as a
student at the University of California at Berkeley. Id. at 27-28; see W. HICKMAN, STATISTICAL
MEASURES OF CORPORATE BOND FINANCING SINCE 1900 (1960); W. HICKMAN, CORPORATE BOND QUAL-
ITY AND INVESTOR EXPERIENCE (1958); W. HICKMAN, THE VOLUME OF CORPORATE BOND FINANCING
SINCE 1900 (1953). A brief and useful summary of part of Hickman's larger work is FIN. RESEARCH
PROGRAM, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC., CORPORATE BONDS: QUALITY AND INVESTMENT
PERFORMANCE, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 59 (1957) [hereinafter CORPORATE BONDS]. Hickman's impec-
cable conclusions that investors "paid lower prices for, and thus exacted higher promised yields on
the low-grade issues" is widely known in academic and other circles. Id. at 16. Less widely quoted
outside of academic circles are the substantial qualifications:
The major conclusion that investors obtained higher returns on low-grade issues than on
high grades should not be accepted without proper qualification. For it cannot be emphasized
too strongly that this finding emerges only when broad aggregates of corporate bonds are
considered over long investment periods, and given the price and yield relationships that ex-
isted during those periods. In effect, the aggregate results reflect the experience of all inves-
tors over long periods, rather than that of any particular investor over any given short period.
Another qualification is that realized yields and loss rates were not nearly so regularly
related to quality as were promised yields and default rates. Because of the disparity in the
performance of low-grade bonds, small investors (and many large investors that may have
been inhibited from practicing the broadest type of diversification) would frequently have
1990] RICO MYTHS 897
from 3565 mergers in 1987; the value of the deals was a record 311.4
fared best by holding only the highest grade obligations. This conclusion follows both from
the higher average default rate on low-grade securities and from the wider scatter of realized
yields obtained on them over given periods.
A third qualification is that realized yields were subject to extreme aberrations over time,
since they reflected not only the risks of the business cycle but the state of the capital market
as well. The average yields realized over selected periods of offering and extinguishment, or
over selected chronological periods during which the issues were outstanding, indicate that
the market usually overpriced low-grade issues (and underestimated default risks) at or near
peaks of major investment cycles. As a general rule, low grades fared better than high grades
when purchased near troughs and sold near peaks of investment cycle; but by the same token,
losses were heavy on low grades purchased near peaks and sold near troughs.
Id. at 16-17.
In the late 1970s Milken's aggressive marketing of junk bonds, in fact, supplied substantial
new capital to small companies, whose prior access to capital had been through private placements,
which included highly restrictive covenants that severely inhibited managerial flexibility. Tradi-
tional American entrepreneurship finally seemed to have a sympathetic banker. Later, Milken ex-
tended his theory and practice of junk bond financing to mergers and acquisitions, and he seemed
to create a new environment, in which few companies were too large to be taken over even by small
concerns. Eichenwald, Drexel, Symbol of a Wall St. Era, Starts Liquidating After a Default, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
Indeed, for a while, market demand for junk bonds appeared strong. In fact, it appears that
Milken forced the junk bond market beyond its natural boundaries. When companies and takeover
specialists sought out Milken, they wanted one thing: financing. To get that financing, they seem-
ingly were willing to pay large underwriting fees (as high as 4%; normal fees for triple A debt are
one-half to three-eighths) and to submit to special conditions, which included a proviso that each
new issuer of junk had to hold ,lp its share of Milken's junk bond market through the purchase of
junk issued by others, paid for with the money that came from the overfinancing that Milken
required. C. BRUCK, supra, at 290.
The whole scheme, however, rested on an inadequate appreciation-witting or unwitting-of
the data on rates of return and defaults and Milken's personal ability to make a market for the
issuance or redemption of the bonds for which he was responsible. Milken promoted the market on
a theory that the overall default rate on junk bonds generally was between 1% and 2% per year
over the life of the bonds. He also promised to make a market in his issuance. In fact, the default
rate was as high as 4%. Stein, supra, at 9; Asquith, Mullins & Wolff, Original Issue High Yield
Bonds, Aging Analyses of Defaults, Exchanges, and Calls, 44 J. FIN. 923 (1989) (noting that the
cumulative default rate of selected issues from 1977 to 1988 was 34%). A study by the Bond Inves-
tors Association, a not-for-profit bond research organization, that included more recent data, finds
a cumulative default rate of approximately 38%. See BOND INVESTORS ASS'N, DEFAULT RATE STUDY
OF THE CORPORATE JUNK BOND MARKEr 1980-1989, table 2 (1990). The Association also
commented:
The dominant role played by Drexel Burnham in managing the [junk bond] market lead to an
ever increasing confidence that there was no way, with a diversified portfolio, that one could
lose. In addition, Drexel's willingness to stand behind their deals and restructure those that
failed gave an ever increasing confidence that displaced good judgement. As a result, the buy-
ers of junk issues became willing to buy any deal that was offered. What followed was the
expanded use of junk bonds for buyouts and takeovers, a process that allowed individuals
with more nerve than money to run a business they may or may not know anything about,
using other peoples money....
While these bonds are legally a creditor instrument, to be so, there has to be someone
with an equity stake standing behind the bondholder against whom he can exercise his credi-
tor rights. Too many junk bond issues have nominal or fictional equity behind the bondhold-
ers but plenty of senior creditors ahead of them. This leaves junk bondholders de facto
shareholders. It is, in fact, a fool's bargain that is offered in many junk issues since the re-
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wards of success go to the nominal shareholders while the cost of failure falls squarely on the
junk bondholders....
One of the tragedies of junk bonds is the relentless pressure they can impose on a busi-
ness which causes erroneous decision making that often leads to hardship for suppliers and
employees. The financial assumptions that back many of the junk bond offerings are often
deal driven. By this we mean that, the financial result necessary to make the deal happen
drive the assumptions used for the projections ...
Unfortunately, it seems the investment bankers and others responsible for creating these
financial fictions receive the bulk of their rewards up front and suffer only in reputation from
their faulty handiwork.
Id. at 3-4. The Association also estimated that the current risk premium, the amount the junk
bond would have to pay over a treasury issue to justify the increased risk of default, may be twice
the historic mark (5.3% rather than 2.6%). Id. at 9. Further bad tidings in the junk bond default
picture are portended by the economic news that the average issue of junk is earning only 71% of
what it needs to service its debt. See Lowenstein, Junk Gets Junkier, and That May Explain
Bonds' Current Ills, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1984, at C1, col. 3.
Benjamin J. Stein adds:
[T]he whole concept of Drexel/Milkenism, namely that sub-investment-grade debt was under-
priced and that profits could be had above market rates by buying junk on an on-going basis,
had a huge theoretical flaw. If, in fact, junk were seriously underpriced, the market should
have bid up the price until it was no longer underpriced. If Milken had uncovered a major
market anomaly in the pricing of securities, and made his discovery known to anyone who
would listen, the market should have bid up the price of junk to eliminate that inefficiency. In
short order, if the inefficiency were real, market forces would correct it.
Stein, supra, at 9. He then sums up:
Milken . . . in fact discovered not. ., a market anomaly, but a way of fixing bond prices.
Buying and selling only issues under his control, he [could] in fact fix the price. . . . He and
his backers . . . [could] also reap monopoly rent, price fixed profits, at least for a time.
Yet how to sell truly heroic amounts of the Drexel/Milken junk without the bond mar-
kets getting a chance to work their will on it and test whether it was junk or not?
The answer . . . was [to have] Milken pals buy S&Ls, insurance companies, preferred-
stock mutual funds, junk mutual funds, and have them buy the Drexel/Milken junk directly,
without ever having to test the discipline of free financial markets. Use the leverage of der-
egulated financial institutions to keep the Ponzi going for a decade-with taxpayers' money.
Don't have your pals put up their money to buy the junk. Have them put up someone else's
money-savers, pensioners, insured people.
More than that. . . have every funding deal become the basis for the next. Use overfund-
ing, in which issuers are stocked with more money than they even asked for, and use the
Ponzi money for buying bonds of the next issuer.
Id. at 30-31. The rise and fall of Milken and Drexel was, in short, the to be expected rise and fall
of a vast Ponzi scheme. Id. at 32.
Without references to Ponzi, other reports in the financial press-not editorial col-
umns-concur that Drexel's fall was Drexel's fault.
[I]nterviews with numerous Drexel officials reveal the particularly debilitating effect that
questionable managerial moves, relentless infighting and high-level greed had upon Drexel's
health .... Among the events helping to bring Drexel Burnham down were these:
* The decision in late 1988 to plead guilty to felony counts and dismiss Michael Milken trig-
gered widespread discontent.
* Rancorous conflicts sprang up among senior officials as to who would get the biggest bo-
nuses. Rather than stand up to such bickering, Mr. Joseph (CEO of Drexel) placated his stars
by awarding giant compensation packages for last year, including $15 million for merger chief
Leon Black and more than $411 million for new junk-bond chief John Kissick. The firm itselt
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lost money for the year.
* An equally troublesome and lengthy battle ensued when some employees who personally
invested in partnerships formed by Mr. Milken-and had in many cases reaped stratospheric
returns-insisted Drexel indemnify them against any lawsuits stemming from possible impro-
prieties committed by the partnerships. Drexel gave in here as well.
* A series of deals executed by the corporate-finance department over the past year went
sour, leaving the firm with hundreds of millions of dollars in illiquid holdings that pushed
down its credit rating.
Cohen, The Final Days: Drexel Itself Made Firm's Sudden Demise All but Inevitable, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 26, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
In truth, Drexel's problems were attributable to many sources, only one of which is the fine it
paid to settle its fraud plea.
Drexel was hit by a rapid-fire series of catastrophes: The firm suffered losses of tens of mil-
lions of dollars in October from takeover-stock speculation after the planned takeover of UAL
Corp. collapsed. Standard & Poor's Corp. lowered its credit ratings on Drexel debt. Some
lenders cut the firm off. And the junk-bond prices plummeted, leading Drexel to take a huge
writedown on its $1 billion portfolio of the high-yield, high-risk securities in December.
Assets and liabilities were mismatched at the holding company level to a degree that
shocked some investment bankers at rival firms. The parent's highly illiquid assets-including
the privately held stock of its broker-dealer subsidiary, as well as equity and bridge loans the
firm had held in companies it helped take private in leveraged buy-outs-were financed with
short-term loans such as commercial paper. This setup made the firm extremely vulnerable to
any shortfall in liquidity-the ability to raise cash-since assets could not be easily sold.
Drexel's Unraveling Began Six Months Ago, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1990, at C9, col. 1. Further, as
top financial officials at other firms explained:
The way Drexel financed its operations was particularly perilous . . . . Specifically,
Drexel relied heavily on a technique called "double leverage" to finance its broker-dealer op-
erations. Double leverage means a firm borrows at the holding company level and lends those
funds to a subsidiary, which in turn can use the money as collateral with which to raise more
money. Essentially, the same funds can be put to work twice.. . . Double leverage is common
on Wall Street and in banking, but Drexel was twice as double leveraged as its competitors.
.. . What Drexel appears to have done was to borrow at the holding company level in the
short-term commerical paper market and use that money to finance its subsidiary's portfolio
of high-yield, high-risk "junk bonds." Those bonds became increasingly illiquid and did not
produce the required cash flow.. ..
"It was a very imprudent capital structure," said a financial executive at a large Wall
Street firm. "My guess is that it's not practiced by anyone who intends to live for a long
time."
Bartlett, No Epidemic Is Expected from Drexel's Killer Flu, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1990, at C6, col.
5.
The operation of Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., itself was also a significant contribu-
tor to its own collapse. Solvency was not the securities firm's immediate problem; it became the
parent's. Only when the parent began siphoning funds from the brokerage did federal regulators
become concerned and intervene:
The rapid collapse of Drexel was precipitated by financial dealings between the firm and
its corporate parent. The parent company-which had sizable holdings of junk bonds and
other securities that had declined sharply in value and could not be easily sold-last week
began to siphon some of the $500 million in capital that the investment bank held in excess of
the amount Federal law required.
Eichenwald, supra, at C4, col. 2.
While editorial critics of RICO accuse the government of ruining Drexel with a $650 million
fine, they forget that the fine was not completely paid. In fact, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission still is owed $150 million of the fine, which was earmarked for the victims of the frauds
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billion dollars, compared with 219 billion dollars in 1987.120 Few felt
confident that investors, stock holders, and employees were not cheated
by breaches of integrity in many of these transactions, and many felt
that the ongoing federal investigations would reveal only a small part of
these losses.12' Nevertheless, the data indicate that something far more
Drexel confessed to perpetrating. Eichenwald, For Drexel, Creditors Galore, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15,
1990, at C1, col. 6.
Following the parent's bankruptcy filing, the bonuses that the securities firm paid out to fa-
vored employees shortly before the parent sank came to the public's attention. These bonuses may
total as much as $350 million. Smith, Drexel Creditors Focus on Firm's Big Bonuses to Staff, Wall
St. J., Feb. 21, 1990, at C1, col. 2. While bonuses are a standard portion of income on Wall Street,
the parent's creditors may try to show that they are excessive, preferential, and must be returned.
See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 11 (1924) (requiring Ponzi's creditors to return funds when
they sought "a preference by . . . diligence"). An editorial in the New York Times put the ques-
tion best:
The firm needed $350 million to survive, executives reportedly said. What a striking figure.
It's the same amount the brokerage firm is said to have paid out in bonuses since the end of
December. . . . How can the exeuctives of Drexel Burnham Lambert sleep at night... ?
Drexel Eats the Golden Goose, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1990, at A26, col. 1.
120. ALMANAC, supra note 93, at 87. The largest corporate merger in history occurred in 1988:
R.J.R. Nabisco for $24.9 billion. See generally B. BURROUGH & J. HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE
GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (1990); H. LAMPERT, TRUE GREED: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE
BATTLE FOR RJR NABISCO (1990). It is argued, among other claims, that leveraged buyouts
strengthen the market by cutting corporate fat and building leaner companies, while shareholder
value is maximized; others disagree. Compare Tierney, Ethics and Takeover: A Debate (1): The
Ethos of Wall Street, in ETHICS AND THE INVESTMENT INDUSTRY 65 (G. Williams, F. Kelly & J.
Howek eds. 1989) with Hanson, Ethics and Takeover: A Debate (2): A Continuing Assessment of
Wall Street Ethics, in ETHICS AND THE INVESTMENT INDUSTRY, supra, at 77. See generally W. AD-
AMS & J. BROCK, DANGEROUS PURSUITS: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE AGE OF WALL STREET
(1989) (arguing that leveraged buyouts divert the Nation's resources from building new plants,
investing in research and development and job creation, lack economic purpose, and are stimulated
by investment bankers seeking fees). If these recent books on the merger are to be believed, the
chief immediate effects of the R.J.R. Nabisco takeover seem to have been the breakup, despite
assurances that it would not occur, of pieces of the company, not for economic reasons, but to meet
crushing interest payments; the use of "golden parachutes" by top executives (the chief executive's
was worth $53 million); the axing of 2600 employees (none of whom was so royally protected); and
a 30% rise in the cost of Ritz crackers. It now seems, too, that the junk bonds used to finance the
deal may not be strong. See Ruffenach & Smith, RJR Nabisco Gets Major Jolt in Debt Ratings,
Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1990, at A3, col. 1 (reporting that Standard & Poor's and Moody's assigned
speculative rate to the planned debt offering). This sort of activity hardly inspires confidence in
the working of our free enterprise system under the current rules. If it also is to be accompanied
by illicit profits and inadequate methods for legal redress, the fear must be well founded that the
goose that is laying the golden egg for us all is being killed by those in whose hands its care and
feeding are entrusted. See L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 17-18 (1914). Justice Louis Bran-
deis stated, "The goose that lays golden eggs has been considered a most valuable possession. But
even more profitable is the privilege of taking the golden eggs laid by somebody else's goose." Id.
121. It was believed that the ongoing federal investigations most likely would "vastly under-
state the total losses incurred by stock-market investors, as well as many target companies that no
longer exist and their acquirers, who doubtless paid too dearly for them." Metz, Trading Abuses
Run Deep on Wall Street, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1987, at 31, col. 1. See generally GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, SECURITIES REGULATION: EFFORTS TO DETECT, INVESTIGATE, AND DETER INSIDER TRADING
(1988) (reporting that federal investigation uncovers intricate insider trading schemes in which
individuals accummulate millions of dollars in a vulnerable securities market, but detection and
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serious is awry on Wall Street. No wonder the small investor has little
confidence in the basic integrity of the market.122
Having a blue-chip name is not enough.'2 Some of the most well-
known names in the financial industry are associated in the data of the
Central Registration Depository of the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers and the North American Securities Administration Associa-
tion with "forging customer signatures, mailing phony statements,
laundering money, selling bogus securities, stealing customer funds,
churning client accounts, and price-gouging."' 24 More typically, these
reputable firms sold new products that they did not understand to peo-
ple who had no business buying them."'5
Wall Street is not alone in its problems with fraud; LaSalle Street
is implicated as well. In 1982 it was estimated that various forms of
commodity investment fraud cost 200 million dollars each year.'26
While the Securities and Exchange Commission is generally thought to
be one of the most professional of the regulatory agencies, few have
similar confidence in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC).' 27 In 1982 the Senate Committee on Government Operations
proof of violations is usually difficult).
122. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
123. See generally Henriques, A Blue-Chip Name Is Not Enough, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1990,




126. See S. REP. No. 495, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at v (1982). One of the largest commodities
frauds in the history of the Nation was perpetrated by W. Herbert and Lamar Hunt, the Texas Oil
millionaires. In 1979 the Hunt brothers began buying large quantities of silver, driving up the price
on world markets from $9 an ounce in September 1979 to $50 in January 1980. Prices collapsed in
March 1980. The drop, which shook a number of financial institutions, cost the Hunts well over $1
billion. Minpeco, S.A., a Peruvian mineral company, won a $132.5 million civil RICO suit against
the brothers that prompted them to file for personal bankruptcy. See generally Minpeco, S.A. v.
Hunt, 724 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying motions for reargument and reconsideration);
Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 127 F.R.D. 460 (1989) (denying relief from judgment based upon settle-
ment agreement); Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168 (1989) (entering judgment and denying
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial); Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 693 F.
Supp. 58 (1988) (holding for the defendant); Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 686 F. Supp. 427 (1988) (de-
nying motion for summary judgment); Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 686 F. Supp. 420 (1988) (denying
motion to dismiss); Hunts' Assets Will Pay Creditors, Court Rules, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, § 1,
at 36, col. 5 (discussing the bankruptcy proceeding); 2 Hunts Fined and Banned from Trades,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1989, at D1, col. 6 (reporting that the CFTC suit was settled for a $10 million
fine and lifetime ban).
127. In 1986 the General Accounting Office and the Oversight and Investigations Subcom-
mittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee both conducted investigations. "[T]heir
inquiry ... [was focused on] the adequacy of surveillance systems at [the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the New York Stock Exchange,] the American Stock Exchange, the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers, the Chicago Board Options Exchange and other major markets." Nash,
G.A.O. in Insider Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1986, at D1, col. 6. In particular, however, the
CFTC was "criticized for a perceived lack of control over the futures markets, and reports of the
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termed the CFTC ineffective and expressed the sentiment that the in-
dustry was a scandal waiting to happen, as the CFTC was thoroughly
outgunned.128 The unfolding indictments and guilty pleas in Chicago
are that prophecy fulfilled. Forty-six traders and one clerk have been
indicted, principally through the efforts of a Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) sting operation and the United States Attorney's Office.1
29
A number of guilty pleas have been taken.1 0 The CFTC, however, did
not become aware of the trading abuses until it was informed of the
FBI investigation. 131 A majority of commodities brokers are properly
concerned that a perception that the game is fixed will erode investor
confidence when foreign competition is gearing up,13 2 particularly be-
fraud investigation have intensified the criticism." Commodity Case Seen Expanding, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 24, 1989, at D1, col. 6; see also C.F.T.C. Insists It Had Role All Along, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24,
1989, at Dl, col. 1 (reporting that the CFTC said it was participating for more than two years in
the investigation in Chicago, but knowledgeable insiders said that "[flundamentally, they did not
know what was happening"). See generally GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FUTURES MARKETS:
STRENGTHENING TRADE PRACTICE OVERSIGHT (1989) (giving background on federal investigations
and concluding that weakness in controls over futures trading provides dishonest floor participatns
with the opportunity to cheat customers).
128. S. REP. No. 495, supra note 126, at 10.
129. See 46 Commodities Traders Indicted After a 2-Year F.B.I. Investigation, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 3, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
130. See Drew & Crawford, Indictments Name 46 Traders, 14 to Enter Guilty Pleas, Coop-
erate, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 3, 1989, at 1, col. 6 (noting that 14 persons were to plead guilty and
cooperate). It is widely alleged that RICO was abused in the investigations. See, e.g., Siler, 2 Trad-
ing Practices Could Bring Prosecution, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at D8, col. 3. Only one of those
indicted under RICO, however, pleaded guilty. McMurray, Ex-Trader Enters Guilty Plea to
Charge of Racketeering in Chicago Futures Case, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1990, at C14, col. 3 (report-
ing that 15 of 48 individuals indicted in commodities fraud plead guilty, 1 under a RICO charge).
The scope of the problem and attitude of the traders toward their customers was indicated in trial
testimony and vividly reflected in conversations secretly taped by the FBI. See Crime at Merc
Widespread, FBI Testifies, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1990, at C1, col. 3 (reporting that an official at the
Chicago Mercantile Board of Trade states that abuses are not widespread, but FBI testimony calls
them "systemic and pervasive"); McMurray, Tapes Depict Traders Routinely Scheming, Wall St.
J., Jan. 9, 1990, at C1, col. 4 (reporting that in conversations taped by the government, traders
stated, "[Expletive] the customers ... [;] [w]e should have the advantage" and "I'll pay, but I'm
going to rip every Paine Webber order I get").
131. C.F.T.C. Insists It Had Role All Along, supra note 127, at Dl, col. 1.
132. The much beleaguered chairwoman of the CFTC put it succinctly that "if customers
feel they are being ripped off by an exchange or that the exchange is not vigilant against fraud,
they will leave the markets." Wayne, With Futures Under Fire, a Watchdog Feels the Heat, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 26, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 3. The Nation's positive investment climate encourages domes-
tically based multinational corporations to invest in the United States and attracts capital from
abroad. The ability to invest in the stock exchanges and then hedge the risk in a connected and
liquid market are key selling points for the American securities industry. Other countries, espe-
cially the United Kingdom, Japan, Singapore, and Australia, consider developing active commodi-
ties markets an important part of their economic strategy. As distrust of the integrity of the
markets erodes investor confidence, the volume on the exchanges could erode and damage the
prominence of the Nation's capital markets. See Chicago Case Spurs Tough Stance, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 23, 1989, at D5, col. 4.
The crisis's severity can be seen by looking at the percentages of the industry volume that are
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cause similar investigations are also pending in New York.1
3
1
Running through each of these tragic scandals is the general prob-
lem of fraudulent financial reporting. When fraudulent financial report-
ing occurs, widespread consequences result, sometimes causing a
devastating ripple effect.134 Government agencies are sharply critical of
affected by the current investigations. In 1988 the total number of contracts traded in the United
States was 246 million. The Chicago Board of Trade has 47.5% of this volume, the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange has 26.7%, the other exchanges under investigation together account for 22.9%.
Accordingly, the exchanges not under investigation have less than 3% of the market.
From a relatively quiet system of trading agricultural commodities, the futures markets have
become a major part of the world's financial system. Banks, pension funds and other institu-
tional investors trade billions of dollars worth of contracts on interest rates, stock indexes and
currencies daily, seeking to reduce their risk or to profit on volatility in the markets.
Norris, Old Habits Dominate in the Pits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1989, at D1, col. 3. See generally
Gilpin, A Painful Way to Be Noticed, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1989, at D1, col. 3 (giving market
statistics).
133. In addition to the ongoing FBI investigation at the two Chicago exchanges, other inves-
tigations of fraud are being conducted at the New York Mercantile Exchange; the Commodity
Exchange, Inc.; the Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange; and the Cotton Exchange (which includes
a separate market, Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange, Inc.). Accordingly, of the
eleven contract markets in the United States, seven, whose aggregate volume accounts for all but a
minuscule fraction of the total commodity contracts traded, are under sweeping criminal and civil
investigations. See Eichenwald, New York Commodity Inquiry, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1989, at D1,
col. 6; Gilpin, supra note 132, at D1, col. 3. But see E. LEFEVRE, REMINISCES OF A STOCK OPERATOR
(1985) (writings by stock speculators and commodities traders about the cliques, pools, insider
trading tips, and operators since the early 1900s).
134. NAT'L COMM'N ON FRAUDULENT FIN. REPORTING, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 4 (1987). Ohio's experience with the 1985 failure of E.S.M.
Government Securities, Inc., including a paid-for false audit report, and the repercussions it
caused in the savings and loan industry and on the gold market illustrates this problem. In addi-
tion to the collapse of E.S.M., the fraud led to the insolvency of Home State Savings Bank in Ohio
and the shutdown of 69 privately insured thrift institutions that cost at least $315 million. See
Prison Awaits 2 E.S.M. Figures As 3d Awaits Jury, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 26, 1987, at 3, Col. 6.
Home State alone lost $144 million in its dealings with E.S.M. Convictions Reversed in Ohio Bank
Failure, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1989, at D2, col. 5. Subsequently, the accounting firm of Grant
Thornton reached a $22.5 million settlement with the American Savings and Loan Association of
Miami, which lost $55.3 million; it also reached a $50 million settlement with 17 municipal govern-
ments, which sued under RICO. Nash, 10 Charged in Collapse of E.S.M., N.Y. Times, Sept. 17,
1986, at Dl, col. 6. Marvin L. Warner, the owner of Home State, was convicted in 1987 of securities
fraud and misrepresentation. The conviction, reversed by an appellate court, is now pending before
the Ohio Supreme Court. Convictions Reversed in Ohio Bank Failure, supra, at D2, col. 5. Warner
is in bankruptcy, attempting to avoid the $4 billion in claims pending against him. Id. See gener-
ally D. MAGGIN, BANKERS, BUILDERS, KNAVES AND THIEVES (1989) (telling the story of the collapse
of E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc. and its relationship to a crooked auditor, a lawyer who
formerly worked for the SEC, but committed suicide when the scandal broke, and Marvin Warner,
who transferred huge chunks of his fortune to family trusts to put it beyond the reach of creditors,
regulators, and litigants).
Other types of frauds abound. See, e.g., Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1989) (rein-
stating a civil RICO suit against James and Tammy Faye Bakker for fraudulently selling 55,000
"lifetime" partnerships in PTL); Gottschalk, Churchgoers Are the Prey As Scams Rise, Wall St.
J., Aug. 7, 1989, at C1, col. 3 (reporting that "[m]ore than 15,000 Americans lost a total of $450
million in the five years in bogus money-making schemes promoted by religious charlatans," ac-
cording to the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) and the Council of
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the accounting profession, also a participant in the effort to rewrite
RICO,35 for its failure to uncover the widespread fraud in the bank and
thrift crisis.136 Litigation is pending against at least ten firms that au-
Better Business Bureaus); see also The Penny Stock Scandal, Bus. WK., Jan. 23, 1989, at 74 (ana-
lyzing the penny stock market fraud). Binkley Short, portfolio manager of the Over-The-Counter
Securities Fund, stated, "Penny stock operators are damaging the public's pocket book much more
than Ivan Boesky or Mike Milken." Id.; see Steptoe, Big Broker Hurt by Clampdown on Penny
Stocks, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 1989, at C1, col. 5 (estimating that fraud and manipulation in the
penny stock market costs $2 billion annually); Ingersoll & Stricharchuk, Critical Condition: Ge-
neric-Drug Scandal at the FDA Is Linked to Deregulation Drive, Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1989, at
Al, col. 6 (trying to meet mounting demands with its shrinking staff, the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration is hit by a scandal involving acceptance of gratuities from generic drug makers); Convic-
tions for Fraud Against SBA Set a Record; Audit on Venture-Capital Liquidations Spurs Cash,
Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1989, at B2, col. 3 (reporting that fraud actions against the Small Business
Administration resulted in nearly twice as many convictions as last year, and that one-half in-
volved the agency's minority procurement program and one-third involved loan programs); Guilty
Plea by Ex-Officer of Beech-Nut, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1989, at D1, col. 6 (reporting that the
president of the Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp. pleaded guilty to selling sugar water as apple juice for
babies to consumers).
The NASAA Report on Fraud and Abuse in the Penny Stock Industry concluded:
Penny stock swindles are now the No. 1 threat of fraud and abuse facing small investors
in the United States. [It is] estimate[d] that Americans lose at least $2 billion each year as a
result of schemes involving penny stocks-the shadowy netherworld of the U.S. equity mar-
kets. The penny stock industry increasingly is dominated by utterly worthless or highly dubi-
ous securities offerings that are systematically manipulated by repeat offenders of state and
federal securities laws and other felons, some of whom have been identified as having ties to
organized crime. Since unmanipulated penny stock investors are believed to lose all or some
of their investment 70 percent of the time and the presence of fraud pushes up that figure to
90 percent, abusive promoters of these low-priced securities rely on sophisticated, high-pres-
sure telemarketing techniques to lure in hundreds of thousands of new, unsophisticated inves-
tors, a majority of whom appear to be first-time entrants to the market and are clearly
unsuitable candidates for risky penny stocks.
NORTH AM. SEC. ADM'RS ASS'N, THE NASAA REPORT ON FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE PENNY STOCK
INDUSTRY 1 (1989) (emphasis in original); see also Stern & Poole, "Like a Slaughterhouse for
Hogs," FORBES, Dec. 25, 1989, at 42 (reporting the major role played by the mafia in the manipula-
tion of penny stocks, laundering of money, and theft through boiler-room type sale operations
selling worthless stock of public companies).
Mylan Laboratories, Inc., a small Pittsburgh based generic drug company in the $3.5 billion
market, is largely responsible for uncovering the widespread fraud in the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration; it is now processing a $200 million civil RICO suit against four competitors because of
their fraudulent filings that resulted in delay of the consideration of Mylan's own filings.
Freudenheim, Exposing the F.D.A., N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
135. See RICO Reform Hearings, supra note 76, at 3, 4-6 (testimony of Ray J. Groves, Chair-
man of the Board, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants). Mr. Groves stated that
RICO's "private civil remedy was [not] intended for use against legitimate business people, corpo-
rations and licensed professional partners, or. .. in commercial disputes having nothing. . . to do
with . . .organized crime." Id. at 4. "[T]he need for reform is clear." Id. at 6.
136. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CPA AUDIT QUALITY: FAILURES OF CPA AUDITS TO IDENTIFY
AND REPORT SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS AND LOAN PROBLEMS 1 (1989). The GAO Report stated:
We concluded that for 6 of the 11 S&Ls, CPAs did not adequately audit and/or report
the S&Ls' financial or internal control problems in accordance with professional standards.
The CPAs' problems involved (1) inadequate audit work in evaluating loan collectibility and
(2) inadequate reporting on S&Ls' accounting practices, regulatory compliance, and internal
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dited failed thrifts.1 37 More generally, major accounting firms have paid
millions of dollars since 1980 to settle liability suits.13
controls. The nature of the audit and reporting problems was significant enough to warrant
our referring the CPA firms performing the audits to regulatory and professional bodies for
their review.
The latest audit reports for the 11 S&Ls before they failed showed combined positive net
worth totaling approximately $44 million. At the time of the S&Ls' failures, which ranged
from 5 to 17 months after the date of the last audit reports, the 11 S&Ls had combined
negative net worth totaling approximately $1.5 billion.
Id.
137. Wayne, Where Were the Accountants?, supra note 91, § 3, at 1, col. 2; see also Andrews,
U.S. Sues Ernst & Young on Savings Unit Audits, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1990, at 21, col. 5 (report-
ing an FDIC suit for $560 million against Ernst & Young in connection with Western Savings
Association of Dallas, Texas and noting other suits: Touche Ross for audits of Beverly Hills Sav-
ings Assocation in Mission Viejo, California ($2.9 billion in assets); Deloitte Haskins & Sells for
audits of Sunrise Savings of Boynton Beach, Florida ($1.5 billion in assets); Grant Thornton for
audits of Sunbelt Savings of Dallas and Rooks County Savings in Kansas; and Coopers & Lybrand
for First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Shawnee, Oklahoma); Arkansas Firm Pays $12
Million Over S&L Claims, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1989, at B7, col. 1 (reporting that an Arkansas law
firm paid $12 million to settle claims arising from its failure to provide adequate counseling to
FirstSouth, F.A., a $1.68 billion thrift that collapsed because of speculative loans to stock holders
and other borrowers, and that other settlements include $6.6 million from officers and directors of
the thrift and $9 million from a mortgage brokerage firm); Berton, Friendly Watchdog: An S&L in
California Dumped Peat Marwick for Congenial Auditor, Wall St. J., May 9, 1989, at Al, col. 6
(analyzing a fraud by an auditor in Ramona Savings & Loan Association, by which the federal
fund has lost $65.5 million). See generally Prosecuting Fraud in the Thrift Industry: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 73 (1989) (testimony of Gary L. Kepplinger, Associate General Counsel, General Accounting
Office) (stating that as of Mar. 30, 1989, in 16 of 26 failed thrifts studies, civil suits have been filed
against officers, directors, borrowers, attorneys, and related persons, six of which included civil
RICO counts requesting $638 million dollars); Berton, Big Accounting Firms Face Ban in S&L
Bailouts, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1990, at A3, col. 1 (reporting that six of the biggest accounting
firms-five of the top six (excluding Price Waterhouse)-were banned from doing new work for
thrifts by the Resolution Trust Corp. because of pending litigation for past faulty audits and doz-
ens of additional, impending civil suits against accountants).
138. See Russell, All Eyes on Accountants, TIME, Apr. 21, 1986, at 61. The accounting pro-
fession, once thought to play the role of an outside watchdog, is under heavy competitive pressure
to go along with questionable annual reports and increasingly is losing its independence, because it
also offers management consulting advice. See Klott, Accounting Role Seen in Jeopardy, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at D22, col. 1. "After a spectacular string of corporate failures and financial
scandals in recent years, the industry that is supposed to audit company books and sniff out chi-
canery" is itself coming under close scrutiny. Russell, supra, at 61. "Some auditors may have been
too close to their clients and allowed them to do things that they shouldn't have done. I'm not sure
the industry was as independent as it should have been," observes Arthur Bowman, the editor of
Bowman'z Accounting Report, an Atlanta based newsletter. Wayne, supra note 91, at 12, col. 1.
Indeed, the Big Eight, insiders say, are agreeing not to testify against one another. Id. No wonder
the accounting profession is a major contributor to the political campaigns of those in the forefront
of the effort to disembowel RICO. See Corrigan, Rolling Back RICO, 18 NAT'L J. 2114-15 (1986);
see also Campbell, U.S. Suing Lawyers to Recoup S&L Losses, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 20, 1989, at
1, col. 5 (stating that more than 24 lawsuits against attorneys and accountants for thrift losses are
pending, and that in 1988, more than $105 million was recovered in settlements and judgments
against professionals, returning $2.50 in recoveries for every $1 spent on the suits). Theodore C.
Barreaux, Vice President of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, attributes the
Department of Justice's switch in 1988 from opposition to support of the prior criminal conviction
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In addition to the savings and loan crisis and widespread securities
and commodities frauds, the 1974 study of the Chamber of Commerce
also did not focus on fraud against the government. Federal prosecutors
today are successfully using criminal RICO to attack a variety of forms
of governmental corruption at the federal8 9 and state40 level. Similarly,
governmental victims of such corruption are seeking civil relief.1
4 '
Only estimates exist of the full extent of fraud against the federal
government, but the numbers are "staggering. "142 If those estimates are
applied to state expenditures, the numbers become even larger.
143
limitation on RICO to a series of meetings between Accounting Institute lawyers and Department
officials. Corrigan, supra, at 2115. See generally Cowan, Rivalries, Responsibilities and Some New
Risks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1990, § 3, at 11, col. 1 (reporting that accounting firms, which most
state laws require to practice as private partnerships without the limited liability enjoyed by cor-
porations, are becoming more likely to face responsibility for clients' problems, no major firm is
close to insolvency but several face claims totaling hundreds of millions of dollars, and annual
insurance premiums and deductibles, which may be as high as $5 million on each claim and with a
$30 million worldwide annual deductible, can consume up to 5% of a firm's total fees or as much
as 25% of a partner's pretax profits).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11th Cir. 1982) (contract procure-
ment fraud), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778, 780 (6th Cir. 1985) (state liquor
commission).
141. See, e.g., Alcorn County v. United States Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1162-
63 (5th Cir. 1984); Oklahoma ex rel Dep't of Human Servs. v. Children's Shelter, Inc., 604 F. Supp.
867 (W.D. Okla. 1985); Pennsylvania v. Cianfrani, 600 F. Supp. 1364, 1368-69 (E.D. Pa. 1985);
Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 636-37 (D. Alaska 1982); Maryland v. Buzz
Berg Wrecking Co., 496 F. Supp. 245, 247 (D. Md. 1980).
142. In 1985 Senator Joseph Biden told the Senate:
A generally accepted estimate of fraud against the Government ... does not ... exist.
That the figure must be enormous is indicated by a variety of factors....
A general estimate of fraud in [nondefense] programs was put at 1 to 10 percent by
the U.S. Department of Justice ...
[I]f that estimate were to be applied to the defense budget, it would mean that
between $2.85 to $28.5 billion of fraud is worked on our national Government each year.
Applied to the domestic direct payments to individual sides of the ledger-a $259 billion
figure-it would mean that the range is between $2.99 and $29.9 billion. . . a staggering sum.
131 CONG. REC. S11,885 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1985).
The government's program to combat fraud, particularly procurement fraud is understaffed
and poorly managed. Shenon, Dept. of Justice Faulted on Drive to Combat Fraud, N.Y. Times,
July 3, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 6 (stating that the GAO finds that of 680 military fraud cases referred to
the Justice Department from October 1983 to May 1987, 286 still await action). Nevertheless, indi-
vidual investigations are impressive. See, e.g., Pasztor, Prosecutors Close in on Unisys, Other Con-
tractors As Arms-Procurement Inquiry Gains Momentum, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1990, at A14, col. 1
(providing a score card on Operation Ill Wind, a military fraud scam: Emerson Electric entered a
guilty plea and agreed to a $2 million settlement; Teledyne, Inc. entered a guilty plea and agreed
to an $8.3 million settlement; Whittaker Corp. entered a guilty plea and agreed to a $7 million
settlement; Loral Corp. entered a guilty plea and agreed to a $10.5 million settlement; and Unisys
Corp. is expected to enter a guilty plea soon and settle for $130 million).
143. In 1987 the states spent $455 billion. ALMANAC, supra note 93, at 92. If Senator Biden's
estimate of one to ten percent of this total is fraudulent, see supra note 142, between $4.55 and
$45.5 billion of fraud occurred in the states.
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Fraud against the government exists, moreover, not only on the expend-
itures side but also in the area of tax fraud. Estimating the size of the
underground economy that goes tax-free is difficult,'4 but the tax gap
may exceed 100 billion dollars a year. 45 Drug sales and gambling esti-
mates exist and reflect a measure of precision,' 46 but two other areas
within RICO's scope merit particular mention: cigarette smuggling and
gasoline tax evasion. Each carries overtones of organized crime's infil-
tration of legitimate business and implicates RICO's core concerns.
Estimates in 1978 of multimillion dollar tax losses in cigarette
smuggling led to the enactment of special federal legislation and its in-
clusion in RICO. 47 Heavy organized crime involvement-in the tradi-
tional sense-is present in cigarette smuggling. 48 Lower estimates since
1978 are attributable to the effective enforcement of the earlier
legislation.' 9
While systematic cigarette tax evasion is declining, gasoline sales
tax evasion is rising. Estimates place the loss of gasoline sales tax at
three billion dollars a year-one billion dollars federal and two billion
dollars state.150 Organized crime also is involved heavily in gasoline tax
evasion.' 5 ' Gasoline sales tax fraud increased after 1982, when the fed-
eral government increased the tax from four to five cents, which was
more than twice the normal retail profit margin. Since 1982 more than
144. See S. REP. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1983).
145. PRICE WATERHOUSE & Co., THE PRICE WATERHOUSE GUIDE TO THE NEW TAX LAW, at ix
(1986).
146. See, e.g., ABT Assocs., UNREPORTED TAXABLE INCOME FROM SELECTED ILLEGAL ACTIVI-
TIES 61, 108, 147 (1984) (estimating that the unreported taxable income in 1982 relating to drugs is
$22.15 billion, to gambling is $2.39 billion, and to prostitution is $11.58 billion).
147. See Contraband Cigarette Act, Pub. L. No. 95-575, 92 Stat. 2463 (1978) (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2341-2346 (1988)); H.R. REP. No. 1629, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978) (reporting that 34
states are losing $400 million each year).
148. H.R. REP. No. 1629, supra note 147, at 4 (stating that "organized crime involvement in
cigarette bootlegging. . . [is] a serious national problem which state law enforcement efforts have
failed to adequately deter").
149. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVTL. RELATIONS, CIGARETTE TAX EVASION: A SECOND LOOK
2-4 (1985).
150. Bootleg Gas and "Butt-Leg" Cigarettes (pt. 3), NEWSDAY, Sept. 8. 1986, at 7.
151. Id. (reporting that the Colombo, Luchese, and Genovese families are active). In particu-
lar, the involvement of organized crime in gasoline tax evasion has been documented in New York
City, New York State, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Florida. See Raab, Mafia-Aided Scheme
Evades Millions in Gas Taxes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1989, at Al, col. 2. By 1985 the estimated illicit
take was $300 million a year in the New York area alone. Id. Columbo family mobster Michael
Franzese's operations, however, extended beyond New York into New Jersey and Florida. He not
only defrauded New Jersey of gasoline taxes, but also robbed Mobil Oil Corp. of its gas revenue
monies. See Reputed Mobster, Floridian Indicted for Racketeering, Sarasota Herald-Tribune,
Dec. 20, 1985, at 1, col. 2; Corporations, Officers Charged with Tax Fraud, Tallahassee Democrat,
May 23, 1985, at 1, col. 1; see also Cook, Making Crime Pay, FORBES, July 27, 1987, at 56 (stating
that "[g]asoline bootlegging is one of organized crime's great growth businessfes] in the Eighties").
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forty states and countless municipalities boosted their levies. 5 2 The vic-
tims of such evasion include not only the state treasuries and honest
taxpayers, but also competing businesses.'53
While the cost of vexatious litigation is generally spread through-
out society by director's and officer's liability insurance,"'5 too often the
152. Cook, supra note 151. In 1989 fuel taxes went up in 23 states, cigarette taxes went up in
13 states, and sales taxes went up in 14 states. Study Says Prison Spending Is Fastest-Growing
Part of State Budgets, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1989, at A16, col. 3.
153. Retailers that have to compete with tax cheating competitors are put at a substantial
and often disabling competitive disadvantage. This problem also implicates RICO's core concerns.
Unfair competition, rooted in the profits of illegal behavior, goes to RICO's basic rationale. "When
a gas station on one corner decides to cheat," New York Attorney Robert Abrams rightly observes,
"the gas stations on the other three corners have to cheat or lose money and in some cases go out
of business." Cook, supra note 151, at 59. Enforcement in this area seeks to achieve, as New York
State Tax Department Chief Enforcement Officer Frank Munoz put it so well, a "level playing
field." Wexler, Tax Enforcers Try to Keep Ahead of More Wily Cheats, CAP. DISTRICT Bus. REV.,
Jan. 4, 1988, at 1. Far from objecting to vigorous enforcement in this area, the legitimate business
community applauds it. The New York State Petroleum Council, for example, fully supports New
York's efforts. Id. It is difficult to understand, therefore, the objection some have to the use of
RICO in such prosecutions as United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir. 1989). See, e.g.,
RICO's Taxing Problem, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1989, at A14, col. 4 (opinion editorial of former
Representative Harold Sawyer and defense attorney in civil RICO litigation involving tax fraud)
(arguing that civil RICO "created a dangerous situation for legitimate businessmen and women").
Compare Porcelli, 865 F.2d at 1355 (holding that "prosecution of a state sales tax evader for a
RICO violation pushes that law to its outer limits, especially when that tax evasion was not made
criminal by the state itself at the time that the fraudulent returns were filed") with N.Y. Penal
Law §§ 460.10-.80 (McKinney 1989) (enterprise corruption effective date Nov. 1, 1986) and id. §§
190.60-.65 (McKinney 1988) (dealing with a scheme to defraud more than one person) (effective
date Jan. 1, 1977) and id. § 10.00 (stating that "person" includes "government") and People v.
Block & Kleaver, Inc., 103 Misc. 2d 758, 759, 427 N.Y.S.2d 133, 136 (County Ct. 1980) (holding
that N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.65 was derived from the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1988)) and Abramson & Marcus, Buchwald Wins Battle with Paramount, Wall St. J., Jan. 9,
1990, at B6, col. 4 (reporting that former senior vice president for finance of Drexel Burnam Lam-
bert, 11 individuals, and 14 corporations were indicted for enterprise corruption for use of $10
million stolen from Drexel to set up network to evade motor fuel taxes and sales taxes).
Numerous successful federal and state prosecutions, including federal RICO indictments, are
brought in this area. The Porcelli prosecution itself was one of the largest tax fraud prosecutions
in the history of New York. It grew out of a joint New York, United States Attorney, FBI, and
Internal Revenue Service investigation. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on John Doe, 889
F.2d 384, 385 (2d Cir. 1989) (describing the task force as created in 1982 and "charged with inves-
tigating the influence of organized crime on the distribution of fuel oil and gasoline on Long Is-
land"). The criminal forfeiture was transferred by the federal government to New York State. The
impact of the prosecution was noted by the New York Commissioner of Taxation and Finance,
Roderick Chu, who stated, "This is the first time that the state and the taxpayers will make a
profit from the commission of a crime." State Gets Gas Stations in Fraud Case, N.Y. Times, Dec.
18, 1986, at B3, col. 1. The prosecutor, in fact, was an Assistant Attorney General of New York
specially deputized as an United States Attorney. See generally 4-Million Fraud Trial Begins in
U.S. Court, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1987, at B4, col. 1. Far from illustrating the misuse of RICO by
invading a matter of exclusive local concern, the Porcelli prosecution illustrates the best in tradi-
tional federalism, a federalism not seen in terms of autonomous entities acting independently in
criminal or civil matters, but a close working relationship or a partnership using federal and state
criminal and civil sanctions in tandem to achieve a measure of justice for the Nation's people.
154. See Green, Directors' Insurance: How Good a Shield?, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1989, at B1,
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cost of fraud is not shared through various kinds of insurance, but rests
instead on the shoulders of victims, who can ill afford it. No one ought
to contend, therefore, that fraud is a garden variety problem that can
be weeded without special tools like RICO.155
J. The Adequacy of State Law Myth
10.1 Myth: State Common-Law Jurisprudence Alone Is Adequate
to Deal with Fraud.
10.2 Fact: State Common-Law Jurisprudence Alone Is Not Ade-
quate to Deal with Sophisticated Forms of Fraud.
As part of the general effort to undermine the statute, RICO's an-
tagonists typically assert, without supporting analysis, that state com-
mon-law jurisprudence is adequate to deal with fraud."' 6 In fact, state
col. 3 (reviewing current issues in the dramatic growth from 52 director and officer suits per 100
companies in 1978 to 88 per 100 companies in 1988); see also Note, supra note 91, at 233-34
(discussing regulator suits under fidelity bonds and director and officer policies).
155. The crises in banking, insurance, securities, and commodities are making the headlines.
Equally disturbing are prospects for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which
insures 31 million workers and retirees in 110,000 single employer pension funds and 8.2 million
workers in 2300 multiemployer plans. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS: FISCAL YEAR 1987 [hereinafter PBGC REPORT]. In 1987, $1.5 trillion were held in pension
plan assets. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY Acm. 1986 REPORT TO CONGRESS, at i (1986). Yet 1987 also marked "the largest
deficit ... and the most threatening crisis [in the] 13-year history" of the PBGC. PBGC REPORT,
supra, at 3 (stating that "[b]y mid-January 1987, the PBGC faced ... [a] deficit ... [of] almost
$4 billion"); see OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SEMIANNUAL REPORT 3 (1989)
(predicting that "today's S&L bail-out may become tomorrow's ERISA nightmare"); Drew &
Tackett, Pension Insurer Struggles to Stay Solvent, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 8, 1989, at 1, col. 2
(claiming that the PBGC is struggling under a multibillion dollar deficit that experts fear might
slide into a crisis similar to that faced by the savings and loan industry); U.S. Agency Warns of
Financial Crisis That Could Develop Over Worker Funds, Wall St. J., June 5, 1989, at B6, col. 1
(reporting that the Labor Department warned that a major financial crisis involving pension funds
could develop because of inadequate governmental attention to those funds and, "[n]oting that
auditors have been criticized for failing to report properly on S&L's, [the Department] said inde-
pendent public accountants' reporting on pension and other employee plans is similarly inade-
quate"); see also 134 CONG. REC. H1072 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988) (remarks of Rep. John Conyers).
Rep. Conyers stated that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) "alone is
not able effectively to protect the plans from fraud and misuse and ... much hard-earned money
is at substantial risk .... [A] national tragedy is in the making." Id.; see also Thornton v. Evans,
692 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1982) (observing in a pension plan fraud case that the "[e]vidence
... traces a pattern which seems distressingly prevalent today: the savings of working men and
women are pilfered, embezzled, parlayed, mismanaged and outright stolen by unscrupulous per-
sons occupying positions of trust and confidence"). See generally Note, Who Should Pay, supra
note 1.
156. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 634-35 (remarks of Edward I. O'Brien, Secur-
ities Industry Association) (stating that "hundreds of years of common law interpretation of state
law fraud is completely subverted to RICO," and that "the nation [ought not]... abandon well
over 200 years of common law development by the states of what fraudulent practices are. .. ").
Id.; see also id. at 590-91 (remarks of Richard P. Swanson, New York State Bar Association).
Swanson concluded that "[t]here are, and there have always been, remedies for common law fraud
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common-law jurisprudence is not adequate to deal with sophisticated
forms of fraud.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, state common-law
fraud jurisprudence developed in the context of the then prevailing phi-
losophies of laissez faire and caveat emptor.157 Writing in 1967, the
President's Commission on Crime and Administration of Justice, whose
studies led to RICO, commented on the nature and effects of fraud in
modern society. 5, Congress specifically found in 1970 that the current
law was inadequate when it have enacted RICO."5 9 Since 1970, twenty-
and securities fraud. There is no evidence whatsoever that those remedies are inadequate. There is
no evidence of an epidemic of fraud in the last 20 years that would necessitate the broad, new
remedies which RICO provides." Id.
157. For many Americans, faith in private enterprise was restored in the 1980s. By promot-
ing individual initiative, governmental institutions supported those aspects of our national life that
many believed contributed most clearly to our national prosperity. Yet individual initiative in ex-
cess is greed, and fraud in corporate finance, in particular, flourished during the decade. Capital-
ism showed both virtue and vice. An historical analysis of the development of common-law fraud,
which culminated in the 1930s with the federal securities acts, also reveals a long-standing and still
present tension between managerial autonomy and market dynamics and investor protection and
market integrity. Traditionally, the balance was struck in favor of financial interests. The early
English history of common-law fraud between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries occurred at a
time when the English courts and Parliament adjusted medieval doctrines to promote, yet disci-
pline, an emerging capitalist socio-economic order. Unfortunately, as some commentators note, the
rules that developed were "colored to a considerable extent by the ethics of bargaining between
distrustful adversaries," see PROSSER & KEOrON, supra note 80, § 105, at 726, and "reflected...
dubious business ethics. ... Id. at 737. In short, the rules tended to favor the entrepreneur
capitalist, who raised capital or ran an enterprise and to disfavor those who invested in, worked in,
or competed with him. Managerial autonomy was thought crucial to the governance of enterprises
and was promoted at the expense of investor protection and other interests. Illustrations are multi-
ple. To establish common-law fraud, for example, clear and convincing evidence was required, as
opposed to a preponderance of the evidence. Whatever the rationale offered, the rule "expresse[d]
a preference for one side's interest." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-91
(1983) (holding that civil securities fraud need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence,
not clear and convincing evidence). "[U]nder the influence of the prevalent doctrine of 'caveat
emptor' . . . great stress, [moreover, was laid] upon the plaintiff's 'duty' to protect himself and
distrust his antagonist. . . ." The doctrine was called "justifiable reliance." PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 80, § 108, at 751. Because a modern market differs, however, "from the face to face
transactions contemplated by early fraud cases," newer concepts obtain today. Basic Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 241-45 (1988) (establishing the fraud-on-the-market theory); see also PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 80, § 80, at 571-72 (explaining the fellow servant rule of Chief Justice Shaw in
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Ry., 45 Mass. (Mete.) 494 (1842), by the "highly individualistic
viewpoint of common law courts and their desire to encourage industrial undertakings"). Not until
the stock market crash of 1929 did an imperfect shift away from the nineteenth century balance
take place. In calling for securities reform in 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt suggested that
to caveat emptor should be added, "[L]et the seller also beware." Drexel Hearings, supra note
119, at 1 (statement of Rep. John Dingell (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt)). The task of adapting
the law of the nineteenth century to twentieth century life is still unfinished business. See gener-
ally S. Barber, Civil RICO: Preserving the Promise of Investor Protection (1989) (unpublished
Harvard Law School senior essay) (source on file with Author).
158. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
159. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, preamble, 84 Stat. 922,
1990] RICO MYTHS
nine states enacted RICO-type legislation; twenty-one of these statutes
include the private multiple damages claim for relief.' As such, the
law of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries clearly can be character-
ized as simply not "adequate."
Similarly, Congress enacted legislation in the 1930s to deal with se-
curities fraud, precisely because state fraud law was inadequate to deal
with "racketeering" on Wall Street.16 1 Just as critics seek to reform
RICO today, critics in the 1930s sought to repeal or modify the Securi-
ties Act of 1933. They suggested that the legislation was so "draconian"
that it would "dry up the nation's underwriting business and that 'grass
would grow on Wall Street.' "162 History repeats itself. Santayana sug-
923.
160. See App. A., infra p. 988.
161. See, e.g., 77 CONG. REC. 3801 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Duncan Fletcher, leading sponsor
of the Securities Act of 1933) (stating that the Securities Act is "designed to protect the public
from financial racketeering of. . .investment bankers. ..").
162. D. RATHER, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL § 11, at 80 (2d ed. 1982). Justice
Felix Frankfurter, then a professor and one of the leading spokesmen for the securities acts, put it
well:
The leading financial law firms who have been systematically carrying on a campaign against
[the Securities Act of 1933] have been seeking-now that they and their financial clients have
come out of their storm cellar of fear-not to improve but to chloroform the Act. They evi-
dently assume that the public is unaware of the sources of the issues that represent the
boldest abuses'of fiduciary responsibility. . ..
J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 79 (1983) (quoting Letter from Felix Frank-
furter to Henry Stimson (Dec. 19, 1933)). See generally Landis, The Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959). Mr. James Landis stated:
The act naturally had its beginnings in the high financing of the Twenties that was fol-
lowed by the market crash of 1929. Even before the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt as
President of the United States, a spectacularly illuminating investigation of the nature of this
financing was being undertaken by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee under the
direction of its able counsel, Ferdinand D. Pecora. That Committee spread on the record
more than the peccadillos of groups of men involved in the issuance and marketing of securi-
ties. It indicted a system as a whole that had failed miserably in imposing those essential
fiduciary standards that should govern persons whose function it was to handle other people's
money. Investment bankers, brokers and dealers, corporate directors, accountants, all found
themselves the object of criticism so severe that the American public lost much of its faith in
professions that had theretofore been regarded with respect that had approached awe.
Id. The Securities Act of 1933 encountered both open and undercover resistance fron brokers and
investment bankers. Richard Whitney, president of the New York Stock Exchange, led the well-
supported fight against securities regulation by the federal government. He viewed such legislation
as indirectly constituting a nationalization of business, which might result in a freezing of the stock
exchange. J. SELIGMAN, supra, at 90. In addition, George 0. May of Price Waterhouse & Co. was
"opposed to. . .requirements for independent accountants." Landis, supra, at 35 n.12. Business-
men and wire houses across the country rallied to Whitney's leadership. The Investment Bankers
Association issued a statement decrying the Act and asserting that its "practical results ...
[would] be to suspend the underwriting or distribution of many capital issues . . . ." Id. at 40
n.18. The 1933 Act then, like RICO today, was subject to "misinterpretation, deliberate to a great
degree, by the widely publicized utterances of persons prominent in the financial world together
with their lawyers." Id. In the end, Congress passed the President's legislation, including not only
the Securities Act of 1933, but also the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which entrusted much
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gested that those "who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it.'1 63 The more melancholy truth may be, as Hegel notes, what
experience and history teach is "that peoples and governments never
learn anything from history.
164
K. The Adequacy of Law Enforcement Myth
11.1 Myth: Because Law Enforcement Agencies Can Be Depended
upon to Prosecute the Real Malefactors, Private Enforcement Mecha-
nisms Are Not Needed.
11.2 Fact: Law Enforcement Cannot Do the Whole Job.
As part of the general effort to undermine the statute, RICO's an-
tagonists also assert that private enforcement mechanisms are not
needed because law enforcement agencies can be depended upon to
prosecute the real malefactors. 16 5 In fact, law enforcement cannot do
the whole job. Indeed, if this myth were supported by the facts, it
would justify the repeal of the antitrust statutes, which also contain a
private multiple damages claim for relief. Yet the antitrust acts, includ-
ing their private enforcement mechanisms, are termed "the Magna
Carta of free enterprise."' 6
authority over the market to the Securities and Exchange Commission. See generally A. SCHLES-
INGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 456-57 (1958). Early decisions by
the pre-New Deal Supreme Court, however, reflected a similar hostility. See, e.g., Jones v. SEC,
298 U.S. 1 (1935); see also R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 146-53 (1941).
"The majority used the occasion to write an opinion which did all that a court's opinion could do
to discredit the Commission .... Every tricky knave in the investment business hailed the opin-
ion. ... Id. at 153-54.
163. G. SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (2d ed. 1922).
164. G. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 6 (J. Sibree trans. rev. ed. 1900).
165. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 310 (appendix to statement of Ray J. Groves,
Chair, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) (stating that "[i]t is baseless to assert
that the targets of the private Civil RICO cases that private lawyers have brought in the absence of
prior convictions would have been prosecuted if only federal and state prosecutors had more re-
sources"). Comptroller General Charles Bowsher testified that past governmental losses amounted
to $200 billion and projected losses to $150 billion. "The seemingly never-ending disclosures of
fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement in federal programs continue to paint the picture of a
government unable to manage its programs, protect its assets, or provide taxpayers with effective
and economical services they expect and deserve." Id.; see also Gerth, Regulators Say 80's Budget
Cuts May Cost U.S. Billions in 1990's, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 5 (reporting that
budget cuts in enforcement personnel in the 1980s may cost billions in the 1990s).
166. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). Like the antitrust laws, RICO
creates a "private enforcement mechanism that . . . deter[s] violators and . . . provide[s] ample
compensation to the victims . . . ." Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982)
(interpreting § 4 of the Clayton Act); Alcorn County v. United States Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731
F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that Congress intended RICO's treble damages action to
"provide strong incentives to civil litigants. . . in deterring racketeering"). RICO's treble damages
provisions were "intended by Congress. . . to encourage private enforcement of the laws on which
RICO is predicated." Id. Accordingly, RICO and the antitrust statutes are well integrated. "There
are three possible kinds of force which a firm can resort to: violence (or threat of it), deception, or
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RICO is needed to maintain integrity in the market place-fiscal
and physical. Public enforcement with its principal reliance on the
criminal law, cannot be relied upon to do the whole job of policing
fraud. 167 Candor is required about the substantial limitations of the
criminal justice system in the white-collar crime area. Resources availa-
ble for investigation and prosecution are scarce. The common-law crim-
inal trial is ponderous. The cases are complex. Offenders most often will
be treated as "first offenders" even if they actually had engaged in a
pattern of behavior over a substantial period of time. A few convictions
will yield only a minimal deterrent effect. 6 '
It is doubtful that public agencies ever will be funded at adequate
levels. The Securities and Exchange Commission's annual budget is
market power." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 17 (1959). RICO focuses on the first
two; antitrust law focuses on the third. Just as the antitrust laws seek to maintain economic free-
dom in the market place, RICO seeks to promote integrity in the market place.
Then Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott, now Judge, stated before the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, describing RICO's private enforcement mechanism:
[In gauging the overall deterrent value of auxiliary enforcement by private plaintiffs, the
deterrence provided by the mere threat of private suits must be added to the deterrence
supplied by the suits that are actually filed. Furthermore, as the federal government's en-
forcement efforts continue to weaken organized crime and dispel the myth of invulnerability
that has long surrounded and protected its members, private plaintiffs may become more
willing to pursue RICO's attractive civil remedies in organized crime contexts. It should be
remembered, tbo, that civil RICO has significant deterrent potential when used by institu-
tional plaintiffs, such as units of state and local governments, which are not likely to be intim-
idated at the prospect of suing organized crime members. Finally, civil RICO's utility against
continuous large-scale criminality not involving traditional organized crime elements should
be kept in mind. These considerations suggest that private civil RICO enforcement in the
area of the organized criminality may have had a greater deterrent impact than is commonly
recognized, and that both the threat and the actuality of private enforcement might be ex-
pected to produce even greater deterrence in the future.
Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 140-141.
167. As Justice Robert Jackson observed, the criminal law has "long proved futile to reach
the subtler kinds of fraud at all, and [is] able to reach grosser fraud, only rarely." R. JACKSON,
supra note 162, at 152.
168. See J. CONKLIN, "ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL": BUSINESS CRIME IN AMERICA 129 (1977).
Mr. John E. Conklin rightly concluded:
[T]he criminal justice system treats business offenders with leniency. Prosecution is uncom-
mon, conviction is rare, and harsh sentences almost nonexistent. At most, a businessman or
corporation is fined; few individuals are imprisoned and those who are serve very short
sentences. Many reasons exist for this leniency. The wealth and prestige of businessmen, their
influence over the media, the trend toward more lenient punishment for all offenders, the
complexity and invisibility of many business crimes, the existence of regulatory agencies and
inspectors who seek compliance with the law rather than punishment of violators all help
explain why the criminal justice system rarely deals harshly with businessmen. This failure to
punish business offenders may encourage "feelings of mistrust, lower community morality,
and general social disorganization" in the general population. Discriminatory justice may also
provide lower-class and working-class individuals with justifications for their own violation of
the law, and it may provide political radicals with a desire to replace a corrupt system in
which equal justice is little more than a spoken ideal.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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only 135 million dollars."6 9 More resources are needed to address the
169. The SEC requested an increase from the $135,221,000 appropriated in 1988 and the
$142,640,000 estimated in 1989 to $168,707,000 for 1990. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1990: Hearings Before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, at 173 (1989) (statement of
David S. Ruder, Chair, Securities and Exchange Commission). Justification for the increases rested
on the increased complexity of investigations:
The Commission's enforcement staff has become increasingly involved in larger investiga-
tions for which resource requirements tend to increase exponentially. In addition, the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 signed in November 1988 contains a
number of provisions that may have a substantial impact on the staff. Insider trading, market
manipulation, accounting fraud, and broker-dealer cases are among the most demanding to
investigate, requiring the analysis of large numbers of documents and of market trading activ-
ity and the taking of extensive testimony. Many of these cases also involve trading in
U[nited] S[tates] securities through foreign financial institutions. Such investigations not only
involve more documents and witnesses, but concern more complex issues of fact and law, thus
requiring greater resource allocations. While investigations were formerly conducted by one or
two staff attorneys, current insider trading, manipulation and financial fraud cases often re-
quire several attorneys and financial analysts or accountants.
Id. at 205. The general securities environment itself was thought to mandate increases in resources:
The securities industry has undergone unprecedented change and growth in virtually
every area under the Commission's jurisdiction. The number of broker-dealers, investment
advisers and other regulated entities has grown significantly, and banks and other financial
institutions have extended the range of their securities activities....
The trading markets have experienced notable increases in volatility and trading volume.
At one end of the spectrum, abuses in the offering and trading of low priced or penny stocks
continue to be a serious problem. At the other end, the markets continue to witness the intro-
duction of new and complex financial instruments and intermarket trading strategies. Trading
markets are becoming increasingly internationalized, as both foreign trading in U.S. securities
and U.S. trading in foreign securities continue to increase.
Such change and growth in the size and complexity of the securities industry have in-
creased the already heavy demands placed on the Commission's enforcement program. The
proliferation of new trading products and the increased volume of trading have significantly
affected the resources which must be committed to investigating trading and manipulation
schemes....
The litigation burden on the staff has intensified significantly. There has been an increase
in Commission actions for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. Efforts
to secure disgorgement and other ancillary relief may require world-wide searches for assets,
and increasingly result in protracted negotiations, preparation of detailed plans for disposi-
tion of proceeds, and contested motions for freeze orders. ...
Continuing vigilance is necessary to detect potential frauds on investors. Investor com-
plaints, which have increased significantly in recent years, especially following the October
1987 market break, are a traditional indicator of potential fraud. In 1987, the Commission
received over 40,000 complaints and inquiries from investors, over 230% the number received
in 1982. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) reported receiving over 5,000
additional complaints, approximately 340% greater than the number it received in 1982.
Id. at 208-09. From 1980 to 1987 alone,
annual exchange share volume increased from 15.5 billion to 63.9 billion, exchange option
turnover grew from 96.8 million to 305.1 million contracts, and over-the-counter share volume
in securities quoted on the National Association of Securities Dealers' automated quotations
system (NASDAQ) increased from 6.7 billion to 37.9 billion. Moreover, the trend toward
global securities markets continued to accelerate. Between 1980 and 1987, the value of foreign
trading in U.S. stocks grew from $75 billion to $482 billion, a 543% increase, and U.S. trading
in foreign stocks expanded from $18 billion to $189 billion, a 950% increase.
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growing problem of securities fraud. 7 ° Similarly, the futures industry in
the United States is growing tremendously. Nevertheless, the resources
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission are remaining rela-
tively constant. Its annual budget is only 35 million dollars.17 The need
During the 1980s, the size of the regulated population has grown significantly. The num-
ber of registered broker-dealer firms, currently 12,140, has grown 80% since 1980. These firms
have approximately 21,400 branch offices and 460,000 registered representatives, amounting
to increases of 190% and 135%, respectively, since 1980. Also, the scope of the SEC's regula-
tory concerns has broadened because many financial institutions, such as banks and savings
and loan associations, have recently extended the range of their securities activities. More-
over, the 1986 amendments to the Exchange Act gave the Commission additional oversight
responsibility for approximately 50 government securities brokers and dealers-mostly large
firms-and three clearing agencies that are registering with the Commission for the first time.
Id. at 220-21. Such growth is not isolated. In fact, the growth of investment company assets from
1983 to 1988 was from $315 billion to $1.13 trillion, a 257% increase. Id. at 233.
Staffing has not kept pace with such huge increases in needs. In 1983 there was one staff year
to 66 registrants and $6 billion in assets. In 1988, however, the ratios were one staff year to 113
registrants and $28 billion of assets. Id. at 235. While the number of investment companies rose
97% from 1983 to 1990, the value of their assets rose 281%. The number of investment company
shareholders increased 124%, and the number of investment advisers escalated 166%. Their assets
jumped 587%. The SEC staffing for these areas only marginally increased by 26%. Id. at 247.
170. See generally GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATISTICS ON SEC's ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
(1985); Salwen, Enforcement Chief Charts SEC Course on Pending Cases, Wall St. J., Jan. 10,
1990, at C15, col. 1 (reporting that the new SEC enforcement chief says the Commission has a
hefty backlog of pending cases, many focusing on financial fraud and accounting problems, and
that new investigations are expected to shift from insider trading to "fraud on Main Street and
improper conduct by Wall Street brokers who sell inappropriate investments to clients"); Power &
Salwen, SEC Prods Wall Street to Police Its Own Neighborhood, Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1989, at C1,
col. 3 (stating that the overworked SEC seeks to have a self regulating Wall Street take on more
policing duties); Labaton, The S.E.C.'s Top Cop Moves On, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1989, § 3, at 1,
col. 2 (reporting the resignation of Gary Lynch, the enforcement director, and evaluating the ef-
forts of the SEC: of a $45 million budget and 650 people in Washington and 9 regional offices, 15%
of the resources are devoted to insider trading, 15% to 20% to market manipulation, 25% to im-
proper disclosure, and the rest on other problems); Sontag, "Desperate" SEC Seeks More Aid,
NAT'L L.J., May 1, 1989, at 1, col. 4 (analyzing the size of the market, the number of transactions,
dealers, and staff resources over the past 10 years and stating that the "agency [is] becom[ing]
dangerously unable to keep pace").
171. The 1989 appropriation for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission was
$34,723,000. The 1990 budget estimate is $37,984,000. See Rural Development, Agriculture, and
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1990: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, at 4, 20 (1989) (testimony of Dr. Wendy L. Gramm,
Chair, CFTC). The CFTC requested an increase of 20 staff years to raise the total staff level to
555. Seventeen of the 20 will be used for increased market surveillance and enforcement in the
trading and contract market surveillance area. The remaining three will be used for support. Id. at
69.
Data in recent years reflect a significant increase in the number and volume of futures con-
tracts traded worldwide, an increase in the number of market participants operating, and an in-
creasing economic interdependence among world financial markets. The internationalization
process in the United States in recent years includes linkages between United States and foreign
exchanges, the development of domestic futures contracts based on foreign debt securities and
equity indices, expanded trading hours to attract more foreign trading in domestic futures con-
tracts, and the recent approval for firms in certain foreign jurisdictions to offer and sell foreign
futures contracts in the United States. As the process of globalization of the futures markets and
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for a more effective deterrent to fraud in the world of legitimate busi-
ness is, therefore, manifest.
L. The Multiple Damages Myth
12.1 Myth: Multiple Damage Suits Are Not Needed.
12.2 Fact: Multiple Damage Suits Are the Heart of the Necessary
Private Enforcement Mechanism.
Closely related to the State Law Is Adequate and the Law Enforce-
ment Is Adequate myths is the allegation that multiple damages suits
are not needed."' In fact, multiple damages suits are the heart of the
necessary private enforcement mechanism.
It is, of course, true that not all federal claims for relief provide for
multiple damages, but it hardly can be contended seriously that they
work as an adequate compensatory scheme or mechanism for the deter-
rence of systematic fraudulent practices. 173 The need for a strengthened
market participants continues, cooperative enforcement efforts with foreign futures authorities in-
creasingly will become part of the Commission's enforcement responsibilities under the Act. Ac-
cording to Jamie L. Whitten, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, concern is
widespread that the commodity industry's self-regulation procedures and the CFTC's oversight are
not adequate to prevent abuses. Id. at 22. He also stated, "The volume of futures trading has
doubled every three to five years between 1975 and 1987," and asked, "What has happened in the
futures market since the October 1987 market crash and the recent FBI investigation?" Id. at 27.
Dr. Wendy L. Gramm responded with an analysis of recent trading activity:
Futures trading volume has continued to increase, although at a somewhat slower rate,
since the October 1987 market crash. Volume for all of 1988 increased by about 7 percent over
that for 1987. Annual volume had increased by 24 percent in 1987, and by 16 percent in 1986.
...The volume of futures trading during February and March 1989 was about 11 per-
cent greater than the average monthly volume during 1988.
Id. at 27. The data presented in the hearings was charted:
Total Volume of Trading in Futures and Options from 1984 to 1988






See id. at 46.
172. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 12, at 177-78 (statement of Charles L. Marinaccio,
Securities and Exchange Commissioner). Commissioner Marinaccio stated:
The RICO civil remedy may substantially alter the balance of private and public rights
and remedies under the securities laws that Congress and the courts have carefully crafted
over the last 50 years. . . . [I]t enables plaintiffs to claim treble damages even in cases where
Congress has expressly limited recovery under the securities laws to actual damages.
• . . [The Securities Acts' private claims for relief] have served well [with only actual
damages] as supplements to other enforcement mechanisms. . ..
Id.
173. See Metz, supra note 121, at 31, col. 1 (stating that "the abuse of inside information in
the takeovers game is endemic and has grown systematically over the past half-decade ...").
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private enforcement mechanism in the securities market, for example,
is manifest. 174 The stock market and the futures market operate well
only when people have confidence in their integrity.75 Small investors
174. When Michael Milken was indicted, acting United States Attorney Benito Romano ob-
served that "[t]he three-year investigation has uncovered substantial fraud in a very significant
segment of the American financial community. A serious criminal problem has infected Wall
Street." "Junk Bond" Leader Is Indicted by U.S. in Criminal Action, supra note 16, at Al, col. 6;
see also Stein, Betrayer of Capitalism: That Is the Essence of the Government's Charges Against
Milken, BARRoN's, Apr. 3, 1989, at 7. Mr. Benjamin J. Stein summed up the charges against
Milken:
Michael Milken has been charged with a variety of crimes. But almost all of them had a
common theme-the perversion and betrayal of principals by agents, the abuse of those who
placed their trust by those in whom they placed their trust.
* * * The capitalist system, which has done so well for most Americans, is based on the
notion that principals can trust their agents .... If that trust is a joke, then the whole
system is handicapped, not least by investor reluctance to invest.
But according to the indictments ... Milken and his co-indictees took advantage of the
trust placed in them as agents by their corporate principals. . . . [C]orporate officers brought
him plans for acquisitions and restructurings, all on promise of confidence. Over and over
again, Milken bought stock and tipped friends to buy stock in the targets, according to the
indictments.
Those buy orders moved the stock price upwards, often raising the takeover price to his
own clients by tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. Conversely, those trades made millions
for Milken and his pals... Milken made money personally by violating his clients' trust and
thereby cost his clients, his principals, large bucks ....
Milken. .'. made himself the principal in a great many cases in which he had been hired
to be the agent. This is a basic attack on the credibility of the system which cannot function
without trust between principals and agents, especially at that exalted level.
Id. at 24.
175. Trust is an important ingredient in a free enterprise system. It should be, but appar-
ently is not, deeply disturbing to some of those who lobby against RICO that their own areas of
activity are those that have the least consumer confidence: insurance (27%), banks (23%), and
stockbrokers (22%). See Schwadel, Consumer Trust: An Elusive Quarry, Wall St. J., Sept. 20,
1989, at B1, col. 3. This article expressed the percentage of people expressing the "least" confi-
dence in a particular industry, when the option was given to select four. Only the airlines industry
(43%) and the oil and gas industry (22%) did as bad or worse among all other industries. Id.
Indeed, it is likely that the individual investors, who are effectively missing in the 1988-1989 bull
market, "may not return until stockbrokers demonstrate more honesty," among other virtues.
Putka, People Invest Little Faith in Wall Street, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1989, at B1, col. 3. Cur-
rently, institutional investors-insurance companies, banks, foundations, investment firms, and
pension funds-account for at least 60% of the trades on the New York Stock Exclange. White,
The Decade of Phenomenal Growth for Institutions, Wall St. J., Dec. 26, 1989, at C1, col. 3. Since
the October 1987 crash, "nothing less than a redistribution of the individual investors' assets away
from stocks and into a variety of other investments" occurred "and shows few signs of ceasing."
Wallace, How the Little Guy Is Playing the Market, Wall St. J., Sept. 3, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2. "In
1989, while the markets reached record highs, individuals, who own $3.6 trillion worth of equities,
continued as net sellers, liquidating 3.5 million shares of stock a day. . . ." Id. Institutional inves-
tors now hold $6 trillion, almost twice the stake of the individual. White, supra, at C1, col. 3.
Unfortunately, the "Ivan Boesky-greed-is-good stereotype is well entrenched . . . ." Putka, supra,
at B1, col. 3. Public trust in Congress also is gone. Toner, A Jittery Senate Confronts Its Ethics,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1990, at A14, col. 1 (alleging that 18% of Americans say that "most" members
of the House and Senate are "financially corrupt," while 22% say about 50% are). Nothing that is
happening in the RICO reform debate so far undermines those tragic stereotypes or promises to
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today are avoiding the market.176 Investor confidence must be restored.
The notion that the game is fixed against the small investor ultimately
will dry up a major portion of the Nation's capital pool. An effective
fraud remedy will contribute to restoration of that trust. The use of
multiple damages is essential to that remedy.
The idea of multiple damages for certain kinds of unlawful prac-
tices goes far back in history. The earliest provision in English law was
the Statute of Gloucester. 177 Modern antitrust statutes are rooted in the
Statute Against Monopolies. 78 Multiple damages provisions also were
found in early colonial laws. 1'9 Further, the idea of multiple damages
for various kinds of wrongs was a characteristic feature of Roman
law. 80 Greek law provided for double damages if stolen property was
recovered and for tenfold damages otherwise.'8 ' Biblical law, too, re-
flected multiple damages recovery. 82
Modern economic analysis supports the wisdom of this history.18 3
restore that badly needed trust.
176. DeMaria, Market Place: Low-Risk Tactics for Investors, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1989, at
D6, col. 3. Individual households today own 58.5% of United States stocks compared with 82.2%
in 1968. Power, Small Investors Are Punier Than Many Think, Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1989, at C1,
col. 3. Little people seldom have golden parachutes. The first people hurt when the small investor
left the market were the little people in the securities industry, because when the individual inves-
tor is not in the market, employment in the securities industry sharply declines. See Power, Wall
Street Wields Ax Again As Woes Deepen, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1990, at C1, col. 3 (reporting that
17,000 Wall Streeters have been cut since 1987 and 10,000 more are expected to lose jobs as a
consequence of individual investors deserting the market).
177. 6 Edw. 1, ch. 5 (1278) (authorizing treble damages for waste).
178. 21 Jac. 1, ch. 3, § 4 (1624) (authorizing treble damages for those injured by unlawful
monopolies). Parliament recognized that it was "one thing to pass statutes and ... quite another
thing to ensure that [they were] actually enforced." 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
355 (3d ed. 1945). Accordingly, "it was a common expedient [in the Middle Ages and beyond] to
give the public at large an interest in seeing that a statute was enforced ... ." Id.
179. See, e.g., THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 5 (1648 & photo. reprint 1929)
(authorizing treble damages for pilfering and theft); id. at 24 (authorizing treble damages for
gaming).
180. The offense of theft ran back at least to the Twelve Tables (450 B.C.E.). THE INSTITUTES
OF GAIUs, pt. 1, at 217 (F. de Zulueta trans. 1958). "[T]he penalty ... [was] four times the value of
the thing stolen" when the offender was caught in the act; otherwise it was double. A. WATSON,
THE LAW OF THE ANCIENT ROMANS 76 (1970). Extortion was remedied by four times the loss. Id. at
80. Possession of stolen property was remedied by three times the value of the property. Id. at 77.
181. 5 C. KENNEDY, THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES app. 6, at 187 (1909) (quoting a law of
Solon), quoted in J. WIGMORE, PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 343 (1936).
182. See Exodus 22:1 (requiring for the theft of ox or sheep, if killed, restoration of five for
ox and four for sheep); Exodus 22:9 (requiring double damages for trespass to property); 2 Samuel
12:1-6 (requiring fourfold restoration for taking a lamb).
183. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.2 (3d ed. 1986). As the Seventh
Circuit in Mosler v. S/P Enters., Inc. observed of treble damages in RICO fraud:
Because [such] frauds are concealable, trebling is important to produce proper incentives. If
perpetrators pay what they took when they get caught, and keep the proceeds the rest of the
time, then fraud is profitable. If victims recoup only what they lost, and face the burdens and
uncertainties of the legal process plus the costs of their own counsel, then victory will not
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Indeed, a number of other federal statutes, particularly in the commer-
cial area, contain treble damages provisions.184 Professor (now Judge)
Richard Posner argues for private enforcement mechanisms of more
than actual damages against deliberate antisocial conduct, particularly
when the factor of concealment is present.' 85 Concealment is a necessity
for successful fraud.'88 If society authorizes the recovery of only actual
damages for deliberate antisocial conduct engaged in for profit, it lets
perpetrators know that if they are caught, they must return the misap-
propriated sums. If they are not caught, they may keep the money.
Even if they are caught and sued, they may be able to defeat part of the
damage claim or at least compromise it. In short, recovery provides lit-
tle economic disincentive to those who would engage in such conduct.'
87
Studies under the antitrust statute show that most treble damages suits
are now settled at close to, although less than, actual damages.8 8 No
reason exists to believe that a similar pattern will not develop under
RICO, at least in the fraud area. Ironically, it may be necessary to au-
thorize treble damages to assure that deserving victims receive actual
damages. '
make them whole, and the shortfall may mean that victims will not vigorously investigate and
litigate. Trebling [under RICO] addresses both halves of this equation.
Mosler, 888 F.2d at 1143-44 (citation omitted).
184. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988) (Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933); id. § 1975 (Bank
Holding Company Act); hi. § 2607 (Real Estate Settlement Act of 1974); 15 id. § 15 (Clayton Act:
antitrust); id. § 72 (Revenue Act of 1916: restraints on import trade); id. § 1117 (Trademark Act of
1946); id. § 1693f (Electronic Fund Transfer Act); id. § 1989 (Motor Vehicle Information and Cost
Savings Act); 22 id. § 4209 (consular officers: penalty for exacting excessive fees); 30 id. § 689
(1982) (Lead and Zinc Stabilization Program); 35 id. § 284 (patents); 42 id. § 9607 (CERCLA); 45
id. § 83 (government aided railroads); 46 id. § 1227 (Merchant Marine Act of 1970).
185. See R. POSNER, supra note 183, at 560 (private enforcement); id. at 293 (concealment).
186. See 1 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE: FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: How EXTENSIVE Is
IT?-How CAN IT BE CONTROLLED? cover page (1980). The GAO publication states that "[m]ost
fraud is undetected. For those ... committing fraud, the chances of being prosecuted and eventu-
ally going to jail are slim .... The sad truth is that crime against the Government often does
pay." Id.
187. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 223 (1976) (stating that "[ilf,
because of concealability, the probability of being punished for a particular ... violation is less
than unity, the prospective violator will discount (i.e., multiply) the punishment cost by that
probability in determining the expected punishment cost for the violation"). As the Seventh Cir-
cuit observed:
[It is also true that t]he delays, expense and uncertainties of litigation often compel plaintiffs
to settle completely valid claims for a mere fraction of their value. By adding to the settle-
ment value of such valid claims in certain cases clearly involving criminal conduct, RICO may
arguably promote more complete satisfaction of plaintiffs' claims without facilitating indefen-
sible windfalls.
Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399 n.16 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on
other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
188. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., SERIAL No. 8, STUDY
OF THE ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY 15 (Comm. Print 1984).
189. See generally Note, Treble Damages, supra note 1. The commentator stated:
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M. The Federalism Myth
13.1 Myth: RICO Suits Are Inconsistent with Federalism.
13.2 Fact: RICO Suits Implement Federalism.
Treble damages have unique characteristics that can be creatively used to address the
problems of sophisticated crime. Treble damages can be used to (1) encourage private citizens
to bring RICO actions, (2) deter future violators, and (3) compensate victims for all accumula-
tive harm. These multiple and convergent purposes make the treble damage provision a pow-
erful mechanism in the effort to vindicate the interests of those victimized by crime.
Id. at 533-34 (footnotes omitted).
Representative Rick Boucher, however, makes another point. Apart from the "new" or "flood-
gate" proportions of the civil RICO filings, he argues that the possibility as well as the fact of a
RICO suit gives a plaintiff an opportunity to "leverage" settlements, particularly in the commer-
cial fraud area, for more than "they are worth." H.R. 1046 Hearings, supra note 48 (comment of
Rep. Rick Boucher). Representative Boucher's argument warrants analysis.
It is well to turn to the economics of litigation strategy and basic notions of justice. See gener-
ally R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONoMics 477-505 (1988). If a person is defrauded of
$100,000, the scale of justice would be even if the perpetrator returned the $100,000 plus "i," the
value of the victim's money during the period of time the perpetrator deprived him of it. The
victim's recovery ought also to include "c," that is, any transaction costs or opportunity costs asso-
ciated with the victim having to sue the perpetrator to obtain the legal redress. Otherwise, the
victim would not be made whole, and justice would not be done. The law, however, does not work
that way. Actual damages are not actual, and they are never worth their face value. The victim's
case is not worth $100,000 plus (i) plus (c). In fact, the case will usually fall, roughly, into one of
three categories: (1) clear winner (85-15), (2) clear loser (15-85), or (3) middle area (50-50) litiga-
tion. The clear winner is worth $85,000 minus the cost of litigation, etc. Neither i nor c may be
recovered in the usual case. The law, in short, does not do justice; it does not make victims whole.
Moreover, if the perpetrator has more resources than the victim does, he can raise the cost of
litigation for the victim by pursuing a "scorched earth" defense policy. See JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra
note 63, at 6 (stating that the "high costs of litigating . . . give[] an unfair advantage to 'large
interests' . . ."). The perpetrator's dollars are also worth less than the victim's dollars are to the
victim because money always must be evaluated in terms of its marginal utility. The perpetrator
also may be able to insure against legal costs, particularly in commercial contexts, spreading them
out over a larger pool of similarly situated entities and passing them on to others. Individual vic-
tims, however, seldom carry insurance against fraud, and they have little opportunity to pass losses
on to others. Contingent fee arrangements, of course, may operate as a method by which individual
victims are able to pool attorney's fee costs, but contingent fees also place a discipline on the
litigation instituted. Plaintiffs' attorneys do not lightly expend their own resources to litigate mar-
ginal cases. As such, contingent fee arrangements act as a valuable screening device that tends to
keep marginal cases out of litigation.
The law assumes that those who come before it are equal; this assumption, however, is only
formally true. It is a sad fact that the relatively wealthy perpetrator is usually able to buy the
claim of the relatively poor victim at a substantial discount of any figure that approaches justice.
Id. at 5 (noting that victims are "often compelled by high costs and delay to settle early for less
than satisfactory amounts"). Apparently, most victims are willing to settle when they are made
whole and do not want to litigate for the premium. Edward F. Mannino, a prominent RICO de-
fense attorney and a moving force in the ABA Coordinating Committee on RICO, frankly concedes
that few defendants actually pay out more than actual damages. "'You tend to get closer to the
untrebled amount because of the [potential] trebling.' " Jost, supra note 15, at 51 (quoting Edward
F. Mannino). Ironically, it may be necessary to authorize treble damages recovery merely to assure
that deserving victims of patterns of unlawful behavior under RICO receive something close to
actual damages. Accordingly, Representative Boucher is correct that RICO settlements are higher,
but his frame of reference for determining "worth" is a system that does not, in fact, do justice.
Clearly, authorizing treble damages and attorney's fees changes the litigation equation. Appro-
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A variation of the State Law Is Adequate myth is the contention
that federal litigation under RICO is inconsistent with federalism. 9 ° In
priately, it raises the price of settlements. Clear winners will be settled quickly and for more than
they would be otherwise. Trial time and other judicial resources will be saved. Clear losers may be
worth more than nothing, but because they will always remain high risk ventures, they seldom will
be brought. Middle area litigation is more apt to be brought, and will be worth more, but the issue,
in both cases, remains whether a higher settlement is unjust. Susan Getzendanner, a former federal
judge who, at one time, had the distinction of having decided more RICO cases than any other
single district court judge and now a defense counsel, although favoring the elimination of trebling
"says that in her tenure on the bench she never saw a settlement she considered unjust-nor a
settlement by an innocent party." Id.; see also Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Va-
riety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV.
673 (1990). Representative Boucher cites none.
Representative Boucher, moreover, seemingly forgets that RICO has more than a compensa-
tory goal. The conduct that falls within its terms-systemic patterns of violence and provision of
illegal goods and services, for instance-is conduct that should be unconditionally deterred. RICO
is not, like some aspects of antitrust, a "regulatory offense." It also does not include strict liability,
as the predicate offenses are all fault-based. Society has a general stake in seeing that this sort of
illicit conduct is sanctioned. From an economic point of view, it is a detail that is sanctioned in
private civil litigation, rather than criminal prosecutions. Accordingly, private civil RICO litigation
plays an important public law function. The private enforcement that Representative Boucher so
vociferously decries is, in fact, enforcement in the public interest. For contrasting views of the
economics of civil RICO, compare Rubin & Zwirb, Opinion (editorial), 6 RICO L. REP. 795 (1987)
with Blakey, Opinion (editorial), 7 RICO L. REP. 1 (1988).
190. This Nation is justly proud of its federalism tradition. Our form of federalism is a model
widely copied throughout the world. See generally Elazar, Federalism, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF THE SocIAL SCIENCES 353 (D. Sills ed. 1968). The Founders transformed and organized
the philosophical principles of federalism that they knew into a practical system of government.
Their idea of federalism, while it had ancient roots, owed its origins to covenant theories of the
Bible. See generally Y. KAUFMANN, THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL (1960). The term "federal," derived
from the Latin feodus, or "covenant," was coined in the seventeenth century to describe the rela-
tion between God and humanity, which was at the bottom of British and New England theological
world views. See generally P. MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: FROM COLONY TO PROVINCE (1953).
The federal system reflected a desire to build a society on the basis of coordinate rather than
subordinate relationships. The emphasis was on partnership, with each partner having equal rights
to cultivate his or her diverse interests within a commonwealth.
The Great Compromise of 1789, rationalized in The Federalist Papers, the classic essays on
our form of federalism, is the prototype of modern federal systems. It often is thought that the
measure of the maintenance of that kind of federalism, however, is the degree of separation of
governmental activity between the federal and state levels. In fact, the American experience from
the first was characterized by extensive intergovernmental functional collaboration within the
framework of a federal republic. This experience currently is modified, of course, by extensive
democratic elements. See generally D. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A Vmw FROM THE STATES
(1966).
When the delegates met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1786, they represented sovereign
states, whose preindustrial economics were focused inwardly, but in which a substantial element of
international trade existed. A key element of the Constitution was the attempt to create a "com-
mon market" throughout the new Nation, a notion that the European democracies took 200 years
to see the benefit of and which they will not realize until at least 1992. The Constitution that the
Founders designed, and the people ratified, was not, however, an example of pure federalism. It
was, as James Madison put it in The Federalist No. 39, "in strictness, neither a national nor a
federal Constitution, but a composition of both." THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961). Plenary powers were granted to the federal government, which would operate
directly to achieve the ends desired. Other powers were reserved to the states or to the people.
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fact, RICO implements, not frustrates, federalism. Over the years, Con-
gress has enacted various laws to preserve, strengthen, or modify the
Among the plenary powers granted to the federal government was the power to regulate commerce.
It was hoped that the new Constitution would, through its commerce clause, facilitate "intercourse
throughout the Union. . .by new improvements," that is, "[r]oads,. . . accommodations for trav-
elers, . . . interior navigation," among others. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 102-03 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961). The grant of a "commerce power" to the federal government was, moreover, not
intended to be narrowly construed. Alexander Hamilton expressly spelled it out in The Federalist
No. 16:
[I]f it be possible . . . to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common
concerns and preserving the general tranquillity, . . . [it] must be able to address itself imme-
diately to the hopes and fears of individuals; and to attract to its support those passions
which have the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all the
means, and have a right to resort to all the methods, of executing the powers with which it is
entrusted, that are possessed and exercised by the governments of the particular States.
THE FEDERALIST No. 16, at 116 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (holding that commerce is a "general power").
The delegates at Philadelphia also sought to guarantee to the states a republican form of
government, one duty of which would be protecting the states from foreign or domestic corruption.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See generally 133
CONG. REC. H10,656 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1987) (statement of Rep. John Conyers) (discussing the
republican form of government clause and the federal anticorruption program).
The hopes of the Founders for a common market free of old-world style corruption were real-
ized beyond their highest expectations. At all levels of government, efforts were made to develop
the Nation's economy. See, e.g., J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSErTS, 1774-1861 (1947). Today,
consumers everywhere realize the benefits of our common market. Its economies of scale, which
come from its nationwide breadth, help keep prices down and make diverse choices by consumers
possible.
But if the dreams of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are realized today largely in
our free enterprise system, the twentieth century has its own problems. National and state laws
make possible our free enterprise system with its common market and other advantages. These
laws must now maintain it. Economically, the Nation aspires to "allocative efficiency," that is, each
consumer, exercising "sovereignty," makes individual choices, the aggregate of which controls the
allocation of goods and services and marshals the forces of production. When that individual
choice is maximized, economic "efficiency" is realized. But "allocative efficiency. . .[is] consistent
with the poor starving and the economy's productive activity channelled into the manufacture of
• .. luxury items." Veljanovski, The New Law-and-Economics: A Research Review, in READINGS
IN THE ECONOMICS OF LAW AND REGULATION 22 (A. Ogus & C. Veljanovski eds. 1984). Justice also
has its demands. Professor Lawrence Friedman makes the point:
Legal decisions are by their very nature economic. They allocate scarce goods and ser-
vices. The legal system is in this sense a rationing system. What it does and what it is reflects
the distribution of power in society-who is on top and who is on the bottom; law also sees to
it that this social structure stays stable or changes only in approved and patterned ways. The
system issues commands, extends benefits, and tells people what they can or cannot do; in
each case, the rule of law, if followed, has made some choice about who has or keeps or gets
what good. Rules of law reflect past decisions about allocations. Some conflicts or disputes
occurred or threatened to occur between people or groups. Inconsistent wants were expressed.
Two men fought over one piece of land. Farmers wanted high prices, consumers wanted low.
The resulting legal act (rule or decision) chose among possible alternatives. Very likely it was
some kind of compromise, but it was surely an allocation. Every function of the law, general
or specific, is allocative.
L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 20 (1975).
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national economy, providing for their enforcement through criminal,
civil, and regulatory means. These laws include the antitrust statutes,
the money and banking statutes, labor legislation (including statutes
dealing variously with wages, hours, working conditions, health and
safety, and welfare and pension funds), food and drug laws, securities
statutes, and environmental legislation. RICO fits well into this pattern
of twentieth century economic and social legislation.
Our national marketplace not only must be free, but also must be
characterized by integrity. Street crime is, and will remain, a problem
principally of the legal systems of state and local governments. Organ-
ized and white-collar crime-each an inevitable incident of our free en-
terprise system-are, and will remain, problems addressed principally
by the legal systems of the federal and state governments.
While no one can deny that criminal and civil RICO litigation is
controversial, the statute's two-track system of public and private en-
forcement, which was modeled on the antitrust statutes, is today, after
an uncertain start, beginning to operate as it was originally designed.
Its impact on organized and white-collar crime promises to be substan-
tial. Federal and state officials and private parties, using alternative
criminal and civil sanctions, are forging partnerships to work toward a
more just society. Nothing in these developments is inconsistent with
federalism.
Elements in the business community fought the antitrust statutes
in 1890 and 1914.191 Elements of our securities industry and the ac-
counting profession fought the securities statutes in the 1930s.'9 2 Both
of these communities, now fighting RICO on federalism grounds, at the
same time are supporting tort reform, which is seen as a national prob-
lem, requiring national legislation, 93 and which would, unlike RICO,
preempt state law.194 Similarly, a witness, representing Bristol-Myers
Co. and testifying on antitrust legislation in the 96th Congress, stated
that retroactivity was unconstitutional and unfair. 9 5 Now, the same
witness testifying on behalf of other interests, says that such legislation
191. See generally G. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, 1900-1912, at 130-33
(1958).
192. See generally J. SELIGMAN, supra note 162, at 79.
193. McQueen, Bush Administration Strongly Backs Overhaul of U.S. Product-Liability
Laws, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1989, at A6, col. 1.
194. See, e.g., S. 2760, § 103, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (stating that "[tihis Act supersedes
only state law"); Product Liability Reform Act: Hearings on S. 2760 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
195. Restoring Effective Enforcement of the Anti-Trust Laws: Hearings on H.R. 2060 and
H.R. 2204 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 384-96 (1979) (testimony of Philip A. Lacovara).
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is constitutional and fair.196 Apparently, perspective is powerfully influ-
enced by the table at which one eats. 97
Federalism in this argument looks like a matter of principal, not
principle. When elements opposed to RICO suggest that its subject
matter be returned to the states, they really mean that it be enforced
inadequately or not at all, as most state and local agencies lack the in-
terest or expertise to do sophisticated organized or white-collar crime
investigations or prosecutions, and state legal systems were primarily
designed to deal with nineteenth century type crimes and torts. Simi-
larly, when elements opposed to RICO suggest that its subject matter
be enforced only or mainly criminally, they really mean that it be en-
forced inadequately or not at all. If our markets are free, it is not be-
cause of the work of public agencies enforcing the antitrust statutes, as
important as they are. Private enforcement is, in fact, the linchpin of
the antitrust statutes.198 When civil rights legislation was under consid-
eration in the 1960s, many critics emphasized states' rights, which were
then, at least for some, only a smoke screen behind which to hide a
rotten system of segregation.'99 Criticism of RICO based on federalism
also looks like a smoke screen behind which the swindlers and others
seek to hide. Accordingly, those who are opposed to RICO are working,
wittingly or unwittingly, to free those who engage in organized or white-
collar crime from the appropriate legal accountability.
II. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
On February 23, 1989, Senator Dennis DeConcini and Representa-
tive Rick Boucher introduced "The RICO Reform Act of 1989," Senate
Bill 438/House Bill 1046.00 Senator DeConcini and Representative
196. See Lacovara Statement, supra note 47.
197. See id. Lacovara stated:
[T]he opponents of RICO reform claim that it is special interest legislation.. I submit that
it is the effort to scuttle RICO reform to protect the particular interests of a few lobbying
groups, private attorneys, and law professors that have developed a lucrative practice bringing
civil RICO lawsuits that smacks more of protecting special interest in the face of demands of
national public policy.
Id.
198. See Block, Nold & Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 89 J. PoL.
ECON. 429, 440 (1981). These commentators argue that "[n]either imprisonment nor monetary pen-
alties posed a credible threat to colluding firms .... [Tihe deterrent effect [comes] . . .from the
... likelihood of an award of private treble damages. . . ." Id.
199. See generally Miller, Constitutional Law and the Rhetoric of Race, in LAw IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 147, 147 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971) (stating that "[i]n law and typically in polit-
ics . . [a]n examination of how and why particular words are used, and with what effects, .
illuminate[s] substantial areas in the political and legal culture").
200. S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S1653 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989); H.R. 1046,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); id. at H368 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989).
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Boucher offered the bill ostensibly to end alleged "litigation abuse" by
private civil plaintiffs. In fact, the proposed legislation largely would set
aside the right of victims injured by sophisticated white-collar
criminals, organized criminals, and other offenders to obtain adequate
civil redress. Senator DeConcini and Representative Boucher drafted
the proposed legislation principally at the request of representatives of
the securities and commodities industries and the accounting profes-
sion. The proposed legislation, in most civil litigation under RICO,
would: (1) reduce the measure of damages from treble to actual dam-
ages; (2) eliminate the provision for prevailing party attorney's fees; (3)
specifically exclude securities and commodities offenders from the scope
of the 1970 Act; and (4) apply its provisions retroactively to pending
litigation.
Congress failed to pass similar, but less restrictive, legislation in
the 100th Congress, because members of Congress widely perceived it to
be special interest legislation. Representative John Conyers, a principal
spokesman for those who opposed the legislation, aptly observed:
[I]n light of the current scandals on Wall Street, I believe that it is wholly unjustifi-
able to treat securities or commodities fraud in any fashion different from, say,
insurance or bank fraud. I see no valid reason why aggravated patterns of criminal
behavior in the securities or commodities industries do not merit RICO's enhanced
sanctions. I see no ground, in short, for a double standard.
Similarly, I believe that it would be profoundly unwise, wholly inappropriate,
and constitute both a troubling and unseemly precedent to make RICO reform ret-
roactive so as to restrict the measure of recovery in pending cases.
I see no reason to give the likes of Boesky or Butcher in their stock fraud or
bank fraud activities a special bill of relief. Congress sits to legislate, not settle
pending litigation.
20 1
A need exists both to fine-tune and strengthen RICO, but as the
New York Times editorially observed: "Reducing damages would re-
duce deterrence. It makes no sense to exempt commodities and securi-
ties frauds when these seem rampant. Above all, retroactive relief is
unfair. By going along with it, Congress would turn itself into a partial
substitute for impartial courts.110 2 Congress should not pass the "RICO
Reform Act of 1989" unless it is substantially amended. Suggested
changes will be discussed below.
The most telling objection to the provisions of the proposed legisla-
tion is that little or no relation exists between the allegations of abuse
and the provisions supposedly designed to remedy them. Time after
time, the baby of RICO's basic design to vindicate the rights of crime
victims is being thrown out with the bath water of supposed litigation
abuses.
201. 134 CONG. REc. E3720 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (remarks of Rep. John Conyers).
202. Save Rico from "Reform" (editorial), N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1988, at A30, col. 1.
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A. Title 03
Several provisions in the bill20 4 reflect legitimate efforts to reform
RICO. Thus, the bill's proposed title, "The RICO Reform Act of 1989,"
is not entirely inappropriate. But the central thrust of the proposed leg-
islation-both retroactively and prospectively-will tilt RICO litigation
sharply in favor of defendants and inhibit the ability of victims of
crime, particularly victims of fraud, to vindicate their rights. Accord-
ingly, the bill might more appropriately be re-entitled, "The RICO Re-
form, Defendant's Protection, and Swindler's Relief Act of 1990."
B. Predicate Offenses
20 5
RICO was enacted in 1970. Since 1970 Congress has passed signifi-
cant criminal legislation creating new offenses. Congress did not always
203. H.R. 1046 states:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "RICO Reform Act of 1989".
204. This analysis focuses on the Boucher bill, H.R. 1046. Nevertheless, only slight stylistic
differences are present in the texts of the Boucher bill and the DeConcini bill, S. 438. For an
alternative proposal, see App. E, infra p. 1049.
205. H.R. 1046 provides:
SEC. 2. ADDITION OF PREDICATE OFFENSES.
Section 1961(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting "prostitution involving minors," after "extortion,";
(2) in subparagraph (B) -
(A) by inserting before "section 201 relating to bribery)," the following: "section 32 (re-
lating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities), section 81 (relating to arson), section
112(a), (c)-(f) (relating to protection of foreign officials and other persons), section 115 (relat-
ing to acts against Federal officials and other persons),";
(B) by inserting after "sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting)", the follow-
ing: "section 510 (relating to forging of Treasury or other securities), section 513 (relating to
forgery of State and other securities),";
(C) by inserting after "section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds)," the following: "section 875(a) (relating to threats and extortion),";
(D) by inserting after "section 1029 (relating to fraud and other activity in connection
with access devices)," the following: "section 1030 (relating to fraud in connection with
computers),";
(E) by inserting after "section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling informa-
tion)," the following: "sections 1111-1112, 1114, 1116-1117 (relating to homicide), section 1203
(relating to hostage taking),";
(F) by striking out "section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating
to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or
local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an in-
formant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant)," and
inserting in lieu thereof the following: "sections 1501-1506, 1508-1513, and 1515 (relating to
obstruction of justice)";
(G) by inserting after "sections 2251-2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of minors)," the
following: "section 2277 (relating to vessels),";
926
1990] RICO MYTHS
include the new offenses in RICO."' Similarly, Congress did not include
in RICO certain relevant offenses that were in existence in 1970. These
crimes-those in existence in 1970 and those enacted since-should be
added as predicate offenses. 0 7 In particular, Congress should add haz-
ardous waste offenses. Traditional organized crime groups increasingly
are engaging in these offenses. 08 The National Association of Attorneys
General recommends this step.20 9 Care should be taken, however, to as-
sure that only substantial, not technical, violations of the relevant stat-
utes are incorporated. 10
Congress also should incorporate into the proposed legislation the
(H) by inserting after "sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of
stolen property)", the following: "section 2318 (relating to counterfeit materials)"; and
(I) by inserting after "section 2320 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or
motor vehicle parts)," the following: "section 2331 (relating to terrorist acts abroad),";
(3) by striking out "or" at the end of subparagraph (D);
(4) by striking out the semicolon at the end of subparagraph (E) and inserting in lieu
thereof "(F) any offense under section 134 of the Truth in Lending Act, or (G) section
5861(b)-(k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to firearms controls);".
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 2.
206. The following general offenses were included in the proposed bill: (1) prostitution in-
volving minors under state law; (2) chapter 51 of title 18 (relating to homicide); (3) chapter 73 of
title 18 (relating to obstruction of justice); (4) chapter 110 of title 18 (relating to sexual exploita-
tion of children); (5) chapter 113A of title 18 (relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorists
acts); (6) section 32 of title 18 (relating to destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities); (7) section
81 of title 18 (relating to arson); (8) section 112 of title 18 (relating to protection of foreign officials
and other persons); (9) section 115 of title 18 (relating to assaults and other acts against Federal
and other persons). The following offenses should be included in RICO but are not in the proposed
legislation: (10) 18 U.S.C. § 215 (1988) (relating to bank bribes); (11) id. § 373 (relating to solicita-
tion to commit a crime of violence); (12) id. § 666 (relating to theft or bribery in benefit programs);
(13) id. § 831 (relating to prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials); (14) id. § 844 (relat-
ing to explosive materials); (15) id. § 875 (relating to interstate communications); (16) id. § 876
(relating to the mailing of threatening communications); (17) id. § 877 (relating to threatening
communication from foreign country); (18) id. § 878 (relating to threats); (19) id. § 929 (relating to
restricted ammunition); (20) id. § 1203 (involving the taking of hostages); (21) id. § 1362 (relating
to communications); (22) id. § 1363 (relating to buildings); (23) id. § 1364 (relating to foreign
commerce); (24) id. § 1366 (relating to energy); (25) id. § 1958 (relating to murder-for-hire); (26)
id. § 1959 (relating to violent crime in aid of racketeering); (27) id. § 1992 (relating to trains); (28)
id. § 2277 (relating to vessels); (29) id. §§ 2318, 2320 (relating to counterfeit and other materials).
The following fraud-related offenses should be included in RICO: (1) id. § 510 (relating to the
forging of Treasury or other securities); (2) id. § 513 (relating to forgery of state and other securi-
ties); (3) id. § 1030 (relating to fraud in connection with computers); (4) id. § 1344 (relating to
bank fraud); (5) section 134 of the Truth in Lending Act (id. § 1644) (relating to credit card fraud)
(included in the proposed legislation). See App. E, infra pp. 1056-60.
207. The relevant offenses are those in the areas of: (1) violence, (2) provision of illegal goods
and services, (3) government corruption, (4) union corruption, and (5) criminal fraud.
208. See 134 CONG. REc. H6788 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1988) (statement of Rep. John Conyers).
209. 133 CONG. REc. E3362 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987) (statement of Rep. John Conyers).
210. The following hazardous waste offenses should be added: (1) Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and (2) an offense under a similar provision
of a state hazardous waste program that is authorized by the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency under id. § 6926).
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existing securities offenses specifically and not generically. 211 Because
some confusion exists about whether RICO incorporates the "civil" or
the "criminal" provisions of the securities statutes, 212 Congress should
clarify that RICO includes only the criminal provisions.
C. Burden of Proof
213
The proposed reform provision codifies present law and represents
sound policy.2 1 4 It requires neither criticism nor change.
D. Government Suits
21 5
Significantly, these provisions recognize the utility of treble dam-
ages litigation coupled with court costs and attorney's fees as a mecha-
211. The appropriate securities and commodities offenses are as follows: (1) the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1988); (2) the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. § 78ff; (3) the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, id. § 79z-3; (4) the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, id. §
77yyy; (5) the Investment Company Act of 1940, id. §§ 80a-49, 80b-17; and (6) the Commodity
Exchange Act, 7 id. § 13.
212. See, e.g., Frota v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(holding that it must be criminal); Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (holding that it must be willful).
213. SEC. 3. BURDEN OF PROOF.
Section 1964(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after "of this chapter
by issuing" the following: ", upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence,". H.R. 1046, supra
note 200, § 3.
214. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974) (governmental suit),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1303 (7th Cir. 1987)
(private suit); Note, Burden of Proof, supra note 1.
215. SEC. 4. CIVIL RECOVERY.
"Subsection (c) of section 1964 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as
follows:
"(c)(1)(A) A governmental entity (excluding a unit of local government other than a unit
of general local government), whose business or property is injured by conduct in violation of
section 1962 of this title may bring, in any appropriate United States district court, a civil
action therefor and, upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence, shall recover threefold
the actual damages to the business or property of the governmental entity sustained by rea-
son of such violation, and shall recover the costs of the civil action, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
"(B) A civil action under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph must be brought by-
"(i) the Attorney General, or other legal officer authorized to sue, if the injury is to the
business or property of a governmental entity of the United States;
"(ii) the chief legal officer of a State, or other legal officer authorized to sue, if the injury
is to the business or property of a governmental entity of the State;
"(iii) the chief legal officer, or other legal officer authorized to sue, of a unit of general
local government of a State, if the injury is to the business or property of the unit of general
local government; or
"(iv) a court-appointed trustee, if the injury is to the business or property of an enter-
prise for which the trustee has been appointed by a United States district court under section
1964(a) of this title."
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 4.
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nism to vindicate important public interests.216 They are, however,
defective in two ways: (1) their exclusion of key governmental entities,
and (2) their exclusion of key types of governmental damages.
1. Exclusion of Key Governmental Entities
First, the provisions do not include Indian tribes and tribal organi-
zations as governmental entities entitled to sue for treble damages.2 17
The sovereignty of Indian tribes is, of course, as fundamental as the
sovereignty of states and local units of government. The history of this
Nation's treatment of Indian tribes, however, is characterized by per-
fidy, mismanagement of solemn trust, and outright fraud.218 Sadly, the
216. See generally Note, Treble Damages, supra note 1, at 533-34 (discussing the three func-
tions of treble damages: (1) to encourage enforcement, (2) to deter violators, and (3) to compensate
for accumulative harm beyond actual damages).
217. See H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 9 (defining "governmental entity").
218. See generally S. REP. No. 216, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1989) [hereinafter INDIAN RE-
PORT]. The Senate Report stated:
At the birth of our constitutional democracy, our Founding Fathers chose to recognize
the original inhabitants of America as independent, self-governing nations which long pre-
dated European settlement. In calling for agreements by treaty with Indians, President Wash-
ington and the founders pledged that the United States would deal with the continent's
native people with consistency, fairness and honor.
In the century follow;ng 1789, however, frontier settlement unleashed economic and po-
litical forces that undermiped Washington's call for stability and mutual respect in Indian
affairs. Hounded by Western expansionists, and thrown on the defensive by the outspoken
enemies of American Indians, Congress abandoned the Founding Fathers' commitment to fair
and honorable agreements with Indian peoples. Throughout the 19th century, the federal gov-
ernment conducted brutal wars to subjugate resistant tribes. The military campaigns often
led to conquest and forced removal of Indians from their native territory.
In exchange for the vast lands that now comprise most of the United States, the federal
government promised the tribes permanent, self-governing reservations, along with federal
goods and services. Instead, government administrators, many of whom were corrupt, tried to
substitute federal power for the Indians' own institutions by imposing changes in every aspect
of native life. At its height, there seemed no limit to the government's paternalistic ambitions.
It severed ties between parents and children by confining students in government boarding
schools; it shattered the authority of religious leaders by prohibiting traditional rituals and
jailing those who resisted; and it destroyed indigenous economies by seizing tribal territories
and reneging on the promises it made for land, federal support and financial assistance. Fi-
nally, while the government offered Indians equal membership in the United States, it failed
to grant them the basic freedom enjoyed by all other Americans: the right to choose their own
form of government and live free from tyranny.
Id.; see also id. at 27-67 (discussing the history of congressional investigations and American In-
dian affairs from 1789 to 1989); Federal Government's Relationship with American Indians: Hear-
ings Before the Special Comm. on Investigations of the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); G. NAMMOCK, FRAUD, POLITICS, AND THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE INDIANS
(1969); M. WAX, SOLVING "THE INDIAN PROBLEM": THE WHITE MAN'S BURDENSOME BUSINESS (1975);
WHO'S THE SAVAGE? (D. Wrone & R. Nelson eds. 1982) (describing the mistreatment of the Native
North Americans from the days of the Vikings to the present).
No record in American history is more sad than that of the treatment of the State of Georgia
and President Andrew Jackson of the Cherokee Nation. It produced two major Supreme Court
decisions by Chief Justice John Marshall. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 594-96
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contemporary story is not different from that of the late nineteenth
century or early twentieth century.219 Accordingly, Congress should add
Indian tribes and tribal organizations to the list of governmental enti-
ties entitled to sue in the future for treble damages. Moreover, in light
of the retroactive features of the reform legislation, Congress's failure to
add these entities will adversely affect important pending tribal RICO
litigation.22 °
Second, the provisions exclude state insurance commissioners, who
serve at the state level much like governmental insurance entities at the
federal level. Accordingly, Congress should add state insurance commis-
(1832) (ordering the release of two missionaries illegally held by Georgia); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-30 (1831) (holding that the tribe was a nation, but not a foreign
nation under the Constitution). The Cherokees were removed forcibly from their lands in Georgia
and made to migrate to an area now located in Oklahoma. See generally C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 329-79 (rev. ed. 1926). The tragic story is vividly told in J. EHLE,
TRAIL OF TEARS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CHEROKEE NATION (1988). The impact of the seizure
and the long journey is summarized by John Ehle:
There are various estimates and several arguments about the social, cultural, and physi-
cal damage caused by the 1838 removal. The main portions of all five tribes were uprooted
and the people became socially disoriented, their town and clan organizations disrupted. Fam-
ilies dwindled and were divided; many people died. It was sometimes true that those too
feeble to travel were left with a kinswoman in the Qualla Cherokee band in North Carolina,
but only a few of these handicapped, aged individuals were protected that way. Most elders
had been sent along and, weakened by the traveling, assaulted by a different diet of meal and
pork, had fallen into illnesses unknown by name to doctors of the time. Traveling five to ten
miles daily was not of itself deadly, but the diet, the filth of the camps, the flies feeding at the
slit trenches and visiting the food and hands of the people proved to be. Then, too, there was
the mosquito, carrying malaria, which struck in summer seasons. And there was smallpox,
which struck the Choctaws and became an epidemic among them. There was gonorrhea, a
complication for many. And finally, there was the old reaper, who could be relied on to make
everyday, standard visits, selecting travelers for that other western journey.
Many of the deaths were of infants whose nursing mothers were ill with intestinal dis-
eases. The sick infants bawled until too weak to cry. One mother carried the corpse of her
infant for two days, keeping it company.
How many Cherokees and their slaves died? The answer is a mystery, enhanced, compli-
cated by decades. In the detention camps, from three hundred to two thousand died, depend-
ing on the authority accepted; on the trail, from five hundred to two thousand. In other
words, the answer is a combined total of between eight hundred and four thousand.
Id. at 389-90. Chief Justice Marshall said of the Indians, "If courts were permitted to indulge their
sympathies, a case better calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined." Id. at 244 (quoting
Chief Justice John Marshall). President Jackson's attitude toward the Indians and the laws is
summed up in his comment on Marshall's decision in Worcester, "John Marshall has made his
decision: let him enforce it now if he can." Id. at 255 (quoting President Andrew Jackson).
219. INDIAN REPORT, supra note 218, at 69-212 (presenting the findings of Select Committee's
investigation).
220. See, e.g., Navajo Members Level RICO Charges Against Interior Dep't, Corporations,
Clv. RICO REP., June 13, 1989, at 6 (discussing a RICO suit over the purchase at an inflated price
(more than $10 million) of Big Boquillas Ranch); see also Navajo Leader Faces Fraud Suit in
Arizona Court, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1990, § 1, at 23, col. 1 (reporting that an Arizona civil racke-
teering suit has been filed in a Navajo corruption scandal, but that state jurisdiction has been
challenged).
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sioners to the list of governmental entities entitled to sue in the future
for treble damages. Moreover, in light of the retroactive features of the
reform legislation, the failure to add state insurance commissioners will
adversely affect important pending RICO litigation in several states.22'
Finally, the "court-appointed trustee" language of proposed provi-
sion section 4 may be too narrow. It also is not implemented in the
proposed provision's definition of "government entity" in 9(a). Either in
the text or the legislative history, Congress should clarify that "court-
appointed trustee" includes other similar court-appointed officers who
are working to clean up racketeer dominated unions or other organiza-
tions.222 Congress should add appropriate language to the definition of
"governmental entity" to ensure that union trustees may sue.
2. Exclusion of Key Kinds of Governmental Damages
Today, this Nation is plagued by fraud in financial institu-
tions-banks, thrifts, welfare and pension funds, securities dealers, and
other similar institutions. These failures are attributable in major part
not to bad management or poor economic conditions but to outright
fraud. Swindlers have inflicted untold harm upon these financial insti-
tutions. Various governmental insurance programs, including the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union
Administration, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and the Se-
curities Investor Protection Corporation, insure these institutions.223
Nevertheless, when these governmental corporations sue for injury to
their funds, they sue derivatively, not directly. 24 Accordingly, unless
221. Compare Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983)
(upholding a suit by a commissioner) with Corcoran v. American Plan Corp., 886 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.
1989) (refusing to uphold a suit by a commissioner).
Language also should be added to guarantee that the Securities Investor Protection Corp.
(SIPC), which is not a government corporation, is treated like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
and other government corporations that insure financial institutions.
In 1970 the same Congress that enacted RICO created the SIPC as a nonprofit membership
corporation in response to the collapse of numerous brokerage houses to provide greater protection
for customers of registered brokers, dealers, and members of national exchanges. See S. REP. No.
1218, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1613, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); In re Applica-
tion of Executive Sec. Corp., 702 F.2d 406, 410 (2d Cir. 1983) (observing that "[a]Ithough not
formally part of the federal government, SIPC and its trustees vindicate important public inter-
ests"). In almost 20 years of existence, SIPC paid out more than $180 million to investors with
accounts at brokerage firms that went bust and helped more than 200,000 investors recover more
than $1 billion. See generally Jasen, If Your Broker Goes Belly Up, There Is a Safety Net, Wall
St. J., Mar. 9, 1990, at C1, col. 2. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile, & Composition Roofers, 871 F.2d
401 (3d Cir. 1989) ("decreeship").
223. See also Barrett, HUD Mortgage-Fraud Losses Estimated to Total Hundreds of Mil-
lions of Dollars, Wall St. J., June 19, 1989, at A5, col. 1.
224. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 803 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1986).
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Congress clarifies the language of the proposed legislation to assure that
"direct or indirect" injury is within the scope of the authorized suits,
little of the cost of these financial failures, which ultimately is borne by
taxpayers, will be recoverable by the government under RICO's treble
damages provisions. Accordingly, Congress must unequivocally author-
ize suits in corporate and liquidator capacity for injury to the fund and
to the failed entity. Moreover, in light of the retroactive features of the
reform legislation, the failure to add these clarifying provisions ad-
versely will affect pending RICO litigation.22 5
E. General Private Suits for Multiple Damages
2 6
Currently, RICO authorizes "any person" injured in his "business
or property" by reason of "a violation" of its provisions to sue for treble
225. See, e.g., Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 658 F.
Supp. 1331 (D.P.R. 1987); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hardin, 608 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Tenn.
1985).
226. The legislation provides:
"(2) A person whose business or property is injured by conduct in violation of section
1962 of this title may bring, in any appropriate United States district court, a civil action
therefor and, upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence, shall recover-
"(A) the actual damages to the person's business or property sustained by reason of such
violation;
"(B) the costs of the civil action, including a reasonable attorney's fee, if the person
whose business or property is injured is-
"(i) a unit of local government other than a unit of general local government; or
"(ii)(I) a natural person, or an organization meeting the definition of exempt organization
under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or an organization meeting the
definition of an indenture trustee under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, or an organization
meeting the definition of a pension fund under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, or an organization meeting the definition of an investment company under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940; and
"(II) the person is injured by conduct proscribed by section 21(d)(2)(A) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; or
"(iii)(I) a natural person and the injury occurred in connection with a purchase or lease,
for personal or noncommercial use or investment, of a product, investment, service, or other
property, or a contract for personal or noncommercial use or investment, including a deposit
in a bank, thrift, credit union,or other savings institution; and
"(II) neither State nor Federal securities or commodities laws make available an express
or implied remedy for the type of behavior on which the claim of the plaintiff is based; and
"(C) punitive damages up to twice the actual damages if the plaintiff may collect costs
under the provisions of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, and the plaintiff proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions were consciously malicious, or so egre-
gious and deliberate that malice may be implied: Provided, however, That in actions in which
the plaintiff may collect costs under the provisions of subparagraph (B)(ii) of this paragraph,
the calculation of punitive damages also shall be consistent with section 21(d)(2)(C) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the assessment of punitive damages against a person
employing another person who is liable under this clause shall be consistent with section
21(d)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 4.
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damages and attorney's fees. 2  The proposed provisions, however, only
preserve multiple damages recovery for a limited class of suits under a
limited set of circumstances against a limited class of perpetrators for a
limited range of remedies.
1. Who Can Sue
Under the provisions of the proposed legislation, only the following
limited classes may sue: (1) units of local government, (2) natural per-
sons, (3) charities, (4) indenture trustees, (5) pension funds, and (6) in-
vestment companies. Ostensibly, the proposed legislation's purpose is to
curtail general commercial fraud litigation under RICO. As such, it
would make more sense for Congress directly to limit-subject to care-
fully drafted exceptions-such litigation between commercial entities.
The proposed legislation's general limitation of RICO litigation, there-
fore, goes well beyond the rationale of the allegations of misuse.
If RICO's limitation is to proceed by circumscribing the class who
may sue, sound policy reasons may be offered for redrafting the class.
The class should include individuals and entities in our society who are
in need of special protection, either because of their relative vulnerabil-
ity or because they institutionally represent others who fall into that
class.
228
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
228. The list would include at least the following:
(1) A defense contractor (including a subcontractor or prospective contractor or subcontractor)
meeting (or that would meet) the definition of defense contractor under § 702(f) of the Defense
Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(f) (1982); (2) an organization meeting the definition
of exempt organizations under § 501(c) or (d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. §
501(c), (d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); (3) an organization meeting the definition of an indenture
trustee under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj (1988); (4) an organization meet-
ing the definition of a welfare plan, pension plan, or plan under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2)(A), (3) (1982); (5) an organization meeting the defini-
tion of an investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)
(1988); (6) an organization meeting the criteria for a small business concern under § 3 of the Small
Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1988); (7) a financial institution meeting the definition of finan-
cial institution under 31 U.S.C. § 5312(2)(A) (insured bank); id. § 5312(2)(B) (commercial bank or
trust company); id. § 5312(2)(C) (private banker); id. § 5312(2)(D) (agency or branch of a foreign
bank); id. § 5312(2)(E) (insured institution); id. § 5312(2)(F) (thrift institution); id. § 5312(2)(L)
(operator of credit card system); id. § 5312(2)(M) (insurance company); or id. § 5312(2) (T)
(agency of government), when such agency is acting for an institution within this subparagraph; (8)
a federally chartered or insured financial institution meeting the definition of federally chartered
or insured financial institution under 18 id. § 1344(b); and (9) a person whose business or property
is injured who is a natural person and whose injury occurred in connection with the purchase or
lease, for personal or noncommercial use or investment, of a product, service, investment, or other
property, or a contract for personal or noncommercial use or investment, including a deposit in a
bank, thrift, credit union, or other savings institution.
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2. Conduct for Which Suit May Be Brought
Under the provisions of the proposed legislation, only the following
limited classes of conduct will remain subject to multiple damages suits:
(1) undefined insider trading suits, and (2) defined consumer suits. In-
sider trading suits may be brought by units of local government, but
only natural persons can bring consumer suits.
a. Insider Trading
Under present law, insider trading is undefined by statute. Con-
gress considerably clarified its scope, however, with the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.229 Accordingly, Congress
must modify the draft of the insider trading provisions of the proposed
legislation. Paragraph (2)(A) was struck by the 1988 Act. The new ref-
erence should be section 21A.' 30
The insider trading exception contained in the proposed legislation,
moreover, appears to be more political than principled. Only the insider
trading stock market scandal involving Ivan Boesky and others appear
to account for the exception.23' Insider trading, however, is hardly the
only securities-related violation characteristic of Wall Street's recent
lawless actions. For example, a central allegation against Michael
Milken and others in their ninety-eight count criminal RICO indict-
ment is "parking. '232 Congress, therefore, should either generalize or
229. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) [hereinafter ITSFEA].
230. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(v)(1) (1988). The new provisions clarified original congressional in-
tent and set aside the unfortunate result in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). See H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-88
(1988); see also 133 CONG. REC. H8835 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1987) (remarks of Rep. John Conyers).
231. See Rushford, RICO Reform Foes Make Boesky Their Bogeyman, Legal Times, Apr. 25,
1988, at 1, col. 4, at 14, col. 7 (reporting that when critics call the former version of RICO reform
legislation, "the Boesky bail-out bill," Rep. Rick Boucher responds, "Our intention was not to
provide an escape for a person such as Ivan Boesky").
232. Parking is selling stock under a secret agreement to repurchase it at a prearranged time
and price.
Apparently, an impression is widespread in the securities industry today that RICO overlaps
all securities fraud. Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissent in Sedima expressed a similar concern.
See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 505 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding that
RICO "virtually eliminates decades of legislative and judicial development of private civil remedies
under the federal securities laws"). RICO, however, states that any offense involving "fraud in the
sale of securities ... [is] punishable under any law of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D)
(1988). An "offense" under RICO means a criminal offense. Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 718 F.2d
26, 29 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that RICO "obviously refers to criminal punishment"); Dan River,
Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that "[clriminal intent is ... necessary to
either mail fraud or securities fraud [under RICO]"); Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1391, 1395-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that RICO securities violations
must be criminal); Frota v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(stating that RICO securities violations must be criminal); Kronfeld v. First Jersey Nat'l Bank, 638
F. Supp. 1454, 1471 (D.N.J. 1986) (concluding that RICO securities violations must be willful); In
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abandon the exception for certain kinds of securities fraud. Congress
re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool, 636 F. Supp. 1138, 1157 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding
that recklessness suffices for criminal violation); Pandick, Inc. v. Rooney, 632 F. Supp. 1430, 1434
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that RICO securities violations must be willful). Accordingly, only the
criminal fraud provisions of the securities acts fall within RICO. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77x (1988) ("willfully"); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1988)
("willfully"). Mere negligent conduct or a transaction that operates only as a fraud does not fall
within the statute. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding that intent to defraud
rather than negligence in § 10(b) of the 1934 Act or § 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act is actionable under
RICO, but not untrue statements or admissions or transactions that operate as a fraud in §
17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act).
The interrelationship between RICO and the securities statutes also is misconstrued on an-
other score. Courts are split on the issue of applying the "purchaser-seller" standing to sue limita-
tions contained in securities law jurisprudence to RICO. Compare International Data Bank, Ltd. v.
Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that securities fraud under RICO is limited by
purchaser-seller requirements for standing to sue) and Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041, 1046-
47 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that standing for securities identical to standing for mail fraud) with
Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528, 1530 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that standing to
sue for RICO is not limited by purchaser-seller requirements). Warner, not Zepkin or Eisenstein,
correctly analyzes the issue.
Section 1962 is enforced by private suits through § 1964(c), which provides that "[a]ny person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962" may sue. 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c) (1988). The definition of "person" includes "any individual or entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property." Id. § 1961(3). The plain text of RICO, therefore, does not
impose "purchaser or seller" limitations on "any person." See Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859
F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1642 (1989) (holding that there is "no
special limitation on standing"). If Congress wanted to narrow the class of persons entitled to sue
to enforce RICO's remedial provisions, narrowing the definition of "person" in this section was all
it took to achieve that objective; Congress could have "narrowed the sweep of the definition by
inserting a single word." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981) (discussing the defini-
tion of "enterprise"). "'The short answer [to the contention that RICO is limited by purchaser-
seller limitations] is that Congress did not write the statute that way.'" United States v. Mon-
santo, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2664 (1989) (holding that "any property" does not exclude funds for legal
fees) (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773 (1979)). See also H.J. Inc. v. Northwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2902-05 (1989) (holding that "pattern" is not limited to organ-
ized-crime-type perpetrators); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495 (stating that "any person" is not limited to
"mobsters"); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21-22 (1983) (concluding that "any interest" is
not limited to "interest in enterprise"); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81 (holding that "any enter-
prise" is not limited to "illegal enterprise").
Congress explicitly set out the only limitations on civil recovery under RICO: The "person"
must show that "his business or property" was "injured." First Pac. Bancorp. Inc. v. Bro, 847 F.2d
542, 547 (9th Cir. 1988). "In addition, the plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the
extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the viola-
tion .... But the statute requires no more than this." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496-97; see also Mar-
shall & Isley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that it is wrong to
require a plaintiff to show more).
Because the judiciary implied a private claim for relief in rule 10b-5, circumscribing it with an
implied standing rule may be appropriate. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 749 (1975). The private right of action under civil RICO, however, is express, and a judicial
limitation on its scope with implied standing rules is improper. To require civil RICO plaintiffs to
be purchasers or sellers ignores the Supreme Court's clear injunction in Blue Chip Stamps: The
"j]udiciary may not circumscribe [an express claim for relief] ...because of any disagreement it
might have with Congress about the wisdom of creating so expansive a liability." Id. at 748. The
decisions in H.J. Inc. and Monsanto also are relevant: "RICO's language supplies no grounds to
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should treat securities fraud, as well as other kinds of swindling, in a
believe that Congress meant to impose such a limit on the Act's scope." H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at
2903 (holding that "pattern" is not limited by organized crime). "[Tihe statute, as presently writ-
ten, cannot be read any other way." Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665 (stating that "any property"
does not exclude funds for legal fees). The Supreme Court also was unequivocal in Sedima. The
judiciary must not limit liability under RICO; "it is a form of statutory amendment
[in]appropriately undertaken by the courts." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (holding that injury is not
limited to racketeering-type injury). "[C]orrection must lie with Congress," if there is "a defect."
Id. at 499. "[R]ewriting [RICO] is a job for Congress, if it is so inclined, and not for [a court]."
H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2905.
Nevertheless, courts impose artificial standing requirements on parties who sue under RICO.
The Fourth Circuit in Zepkin conceded that Congress did not expressly limit RICO by "purchaser
or seller" limitations, and noted the absence not only of "purchaser-seller" language but also of §
10(b)'s "in connection with" causation standard. Yet the Zepkin court argued that RICO required
explicit statutory language to overcome judicially imposed limitations on private actions under rule
10b-5. Zepkin, 812 F.2d at 152.
Zepkin is fundamentally misguided, misreads the statutory scheme of RICO, and reflects bad
policy. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). The Supreme Court held that it was
"'not at liberty to imply a condition which is opposed to the explicit terms of the statute. . . . To
[so] hold. . . is not to construe the Act but to amend it.'" Id. at 513 (quoting Detroit Trust Co. v.
The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 38 (1934)). First, Tafflin, H.J. Inc., Monsanto, and Sedima
squarely hold that RICO's express text structure and legislative history, not its silence in the text
or legislative history, control the interpretation of RICO. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792, 795-
97 (1990); H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2899-900; Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2662-64; Sedima, 473 U.S. at
495 n.13. RICO must be construed liberally, and its remedial purpose is to be enhanced, not re-
tarded. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-98. The court in Zepkin ignores the Supreme Court's instruction
that RICO should be construed liberally and narrowly interprets the statute. Indeed, the court in
Zepkin does not even address § 1964, the civil provision that expressly deals with standing, injury,
and causation. As the Supreme Court in Sedima noted, the legislation was enacted outside of the
antitrust statutes in order to avoid such narrow standing limitations on RICO's remedies. Id. at
498. The Fourth Circuit "create[s] exactly the problems Congress sought to avoid" by reading such
limitations back into RICO. Id. at 499.
Rule 10b-5 standing limitations are inapplicable to RICO on another more fundamental
ground. By itself, the implied claim for relief of rule 10b-5 seeks only private civil redress. RICO,
however, seeks to make effective the substantive standards of the statute through both criminal
and civil sanctions. The substantive standards of RICO reflect the substantive elements of its
predicate acts, each of which is a crime. RICO fills this objective civilly through a private attorney
general enforcement mechanism. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S.
143, 151 (1987); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241-42 (1987);
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493. The purchaser/seller limitation of rule 10b-5 is imposed only for private
civil actions. The violation of rule 10b-5 that constitutes a predicate act under RICO, however, is a
criminal securities fraud. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1988)
("willfully violates"). The standards of § 32(a) are not limited by "purchaser-seller" limitations.
See United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 349 n.11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976)
(holding that "[i]n a criminal prosecution, the standing problem is, of course, not present and Rule
10b-5 is applicable if the conduct charged falls within the Rule's prohibitions"); see also United
States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774 n.6 (1979) (finding that Blue Chip Stamps does not limit
criminal prosecutions); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983) (holding that "[i]t is only because the judiciary has created a private cause of
action . . .that standing . . . has become a pivotal issue").
Plaintiffs under RICO act as private prosecutors. Had Congress wanted to impose "purchaser-
seller" standing limitations on this civil enforcement mechanism, it could have done so with appro-
priate language. Congress was aware of the overlap between RICO and the securities statutes, be-
cause the point specifically was drawn to its attention. Blakey, supra note 1, at 272-73. Forcing
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defensible and evenhanded fashion.
b. Consumer Fraud
The proposed legislation grants certain kinds of consumer fraud
special status because only natural persons can bring consumer suits.
This limitation, however, ignores the fact that consumer fraud is not
limited to natural persons. For example, much of the cost of consumer
fraud is borne by nonprofit organizations, including churches, schools,
and hospitals. While the cost of insurance fraud is carried initially by
commercial organizations, it, too, usually is passed on to consumers.
civil RICO into a purely private law model, as the Fourth Circuit does in Zepkin, misconceives
civil RICO's important public law functions. See generally Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981
Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4-5 (1982) (con-
trasting the classic model of private dispute resolution with the contemporary model of public
grievances against aggregates of power); id. at 8-26 (analyzing inappropriate private law standing
limitations); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
No language in the mail or wire fraud statutes, moreover, warrants reading into them "pur-
chaser or seller" limitations. The purpose of the two statutes, taken together, is to prohibit
schemes to defraud that utilize, in varying circumstances, the mails or interstate wire communica-
tions. See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389 (1960); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d
1167, 1171 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980) (reading the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes together). The statutes say nothing about "purchasers or sellers."
Only two elements need come together: a scheme to defraud and the use of the mails or inter-
state wires to execute it. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954); Sun Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 195 (9th Cir. 1987). A "scheme to defraud" is not limited to common-law
concepts of fraud. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896). See generally Dennis v.
United States, 384 U.S. 855, 860-61 (1966); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188
(1924); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 478-80 (1910); Bohonus, 628 F.2d at 1171 (applying a "non-
technical standard") (citing United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978)); Blakey & Cessar, supra note 1, at 587-88 n.237; Rakoff, The Federal
Mail Fraud Statute, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 771 (1980) (discussing the general treatment of the develop-
ment of mail fraud).
Conceptual difficulties may arise, however, when parties or courts "confus[e] mail fraud with
common law fraud," Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 481 (5th Cir.
1986), because neither (1) "purchaser or seller" standing limitations, (2) materiality or justifiable
and detrimental reliance, nor (3) misrepresentation or omission are elements that circumscribe the
substantive definition of a "scheme to defraud" in the mail and wire fraud statutes incorporated
into RICO. Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1187 (4th Cir. 1988) (requiiing no detrimental
reliance for mail or wire fraud); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1129 (5th Cir. 1988)
(requiring no materiality or reliance for mail or wire fraud); Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828
F.2d 1528, 1530 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding no purchaser or seller standing limitations); Armco In-
dus., 782 F.2d at 481-82 (requiring no justifiable or detrimental reliance for mail fraud); McLendon
v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1506-10 (D.N.J. 1985) (noting the inapplicability of
misrepresentation or omission in "scheme to defraud"); cf. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Ore-
gon, N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 531 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that it need not decide if elements of
common-law fraud and RICO mail fraud are identical); United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000,
1007-09 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that no misrepresentation is required, but that if it is alleged,
materiality, but not reliance, is necessary). Accordingly, neither mail nor wire fraud's concept of
"scheme to defraud" under RICO is limited by "purchaser or seller" standing or similar common-
law requirements.
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The inconsistency between recognizing that a variety of nonnatural per-
sons are victimized by insider trading fraud, but not recognizing that a
similar variety are victimized by consumer fraud cannot convincingly be
defended. If the consumer fraud provision is included to serve the best
interests of consumers, it is a half measure because the provision is too
limited in scope to benefit the group it ostensibly was designed to help.
Even more troubling is the provision's securities and commodities
exception to consumer fraud. First, the exception is unprincipled. Why
exclude securities or commodities fraud from consumer fraud? The ac-
tivities on Wall Street in New York2 33 and on LaSalle Street in Chicago
do not warrant the exception.23 4 Second, if it is suggested that current
securities and commodities statutes adequately deal with widespread
patterns of fraud, the current scandals themselves surely refute the ar-
gument. Third, if it is suggested that RICO-type remedies are inappro-
priate in routine securities or commodities frauds, a tighter definition of
"pattern" will meet that objection. Indeed, the Supreme Court in H.J.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.235 already provided for a
tighter definition.23 6 In fact, when a systematic pattern of criminal mis-
conduct is present, heightened remedies are appropriate.237 Fourth, if
every other industry or profession will be subject to a RICO claim for
relief, how can the exclusion of the securities and commodities indus-
tries be justified? The proposed legislation is neither defensible nor
evenhanded in this area.
Even if the provision's securities and commodities exception to
consumer fraud is justifiable, it is poorly drafted. Thousands of hours of
legal research and judicial time will be required to determine its scope
because the provision incorporates generically all federal and state law,
either express or implied. Similarly, the provision is fatally flawed by a
fundamental ambiguity: the meaning of "type of behavior." The phrase
is a "loophole for wrongdoers of Carl Sagan proportions-billions of
dollars of fraudulent stolen money may well safely pass through it.
'238
Is the phrase designed to ensure that if a defrauded consumer possesses
233. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
235. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
236. For a detailed analysis of "pattern," see infra notes 338-48 and accompanying text.
237. In drafting RICO, Congress
acknowledge[d] the breakdown of the traditional conception of organized crime, and re-
spond[ed] to a new situation in which persons engaged in long-term criminal activity often
operate wholly within legitimate enterprises. Congress drafted RICO broadly enough to en-
compass a wide range of criminal activity, taking many different forms and likely to attract a
broad array of perpetrators operating in many different ways.
H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2905 (emphasis in original). This judgment is not undermined by anything
that occurred since 1970.
238. 133 CONG. REC. H8841 (dally ed. Oct. 20, 1987) (remarks of Rep. John Conyers).
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a remedy under the securities or commodities statutes, it is the con-
sumer's exclusive remedy; that is, the consumer can bring a cause of
action under the securities or commodities statutes, or under RICO, but
not under both? Or is it intended that if a transaction involves "the
type of behavior" regulated by the securities or commodities statutes,
but, even though a defrauded consumer does not have a remedy under
these statutes,"' that consumer will be precluded from suing under
RICO, although the suit otherwise fully qualifies under RICO; that is,
will a gap of "unremedied fraud" exist between the coverage of the se-
curities and commodities statutes and the coverage of RICO? Cur-
rently, the proposal's text is ambiguous, and the legislative history on
the point is in conflict.24 0 If Congress does not clarify this issue before
the legislation is enacted, it will be unconscionable. It is difficult to en-
vision, moreover, how the "gap" position can be convincingly defended.
The retroactive impact of this potential loophole also will be severe
on thousands of bank depositors, who lose their life savings through
fraud, who are not covered by FDIC or FSLIC insurance programs, and
who are not able to collect from failed state insurance programs in Ma-
ryland, Nebraska, Tennessee, Ohio, and Colorado. Tafflin v. Levitt
241
illustrates this point. In Tafflin, litigation that grew out of Old Court
Savings & Loan, Inc.'s failure in Maryland, depositors sued for massive
fraud under the securities statutes and civil RICO.2 42 The Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, held that the "certificates of deposit" at issue were not
"securities" within the meaning of Marine Bank v. Weaver; 43 it then
"abstained" on the civil RICO claim and remanded it to state court. 44
It could, of course, be contended plausibly that while the "certifi-
cates of deposit" were not "securities," the transactions were the "type
of behavior" that the securities acts regulate. If this argument were ac-
239. For example, the transaction did not involve a "security," the customer was not a "pur-
chaser or seller," or the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
240. Compare 132 CONG. REC. S16,701 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (remarks of Sen. Patrick
Leahy) (stating that the gap is present) with id. S16,698 (remarks of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum)
(stating that the gap is not present).
241. 865 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1989), af'd, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990). Like counterparts in Texas,
Oklahoma, and Colorado, the Maryland collapse was the "product of lax regulation, poorly trained
examiners, high-risk investments, mismanagement and outright fraud." Nash, Savings Fugitive
Indicted; U.S. Offers $200,000 Reward, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1990, at D1, col. 1. Its cost may be as
high as $370 million. Id. A central figure in the Maryland scandal, Tom J. Billman, former chair-
man of Bethesda's Community Savings & Loan Association, who is a fugitive in Europe, appar-
ently with no more than $20 million of Community's depositors' money, is under a RICO
indictment with a $200,000 reward for information leading to his arrest and successful extradition.
Lambert & Abramson, Judges Join Forces on Asbestos Litigation, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1990, at B6,
col. 3.
242. Tafflin, 865 F.2d at 595.
243. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
244. Taffliin, 865 F.2d at 599-60.
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cepted, victims in Tafflin-type litigation could end up losing both their
securities and RICO claims. This result is not easily justified, particu-
larly because the text of (iii)(I) expressly includes within consumer
fraud "a deposit in a bank." In light of the retroactive features of the
reform legislation, this result might be obtained in the Tafflin litigation
itself and in similar litigation now underway elsewhere. 245
c. Against Whom Suit May Be Brought
RICO may be violated by "any person," that is defined expressly as
any "individual or entity. '246 Similarly, "whoever," which expressly in-
cludes individuals, corporations, etc., defines the class who may be in-
dicted.247 Liability under criminal and civil RICO is, therefore, not only
direct, but derivative, although technical rules limit the fact patterns in
which derivative liability may be imposed.24 1 The rationale of vicarious
responsibility is "in accord with the general common law notion that
one who is in a position to exercise some general control over the situa-
tion must exercise it or bear the loss. ' '249 It is a mark of the securities
industry's legislative influence that, at least until recently, the industry
was successful in narrowing its vicarious liability for multiple damages
for insider trading under the securities statutes, and that, at least so
far, the industry is succeeding in writing similar limitations into the
proposed legislation. How it can be justified as a matter of principle is a
different matter.
Under the provisions of the proposed legislation, punitive damages
for insider trading must be calculated and assessed consistent with sec-
tion 21(d)(2)(C) and section 21(d)(2)(B). Section 21(d)(2)(C) formerly
defined "profit gained" and "loss avoided" in terms of the stock's trad-
ing price during a reasonable period of time after public dissemination
of the nonpublic information. Previously, section 21(d)(2)(B) elimi-
nated: (1) aiding and abetting liability, (2) controlling person liability,
and (3) respondeat superior liability. As such, the notion that the pre-
sent draft of the legislation includes an effective remedy for insider
trading is a half-truth. In fact, liability is personal or not at all; deep
pocket defendants practically are excluded from the bill. As such, all
that the bill affords insider trading victims in most situations is a right
245. See, e.g., Weimer v. Amen, 870 F.2d 1400 (8th Cir. 1989).
246. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3), 1962 (1988).
247. Id. § 1963; 1 id. § 1.
248. See generally Note, Innocence by Association, supra note 1.
249. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 80, § 69 (5th ed. 1984); see also Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S.
399, 406 (1906) (Holmes, J.) (noting that "lw]hen a man is carrying on business in his private
interest and entrusts a part of the work to another, the world has agreed to make him answer for
that other as if he had done the work himself").
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without a meaningful remedy. These insider trading provisions, how-
ever, were struck from current law by the Insider Trading and Securi-
ties Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) 5 ° Under the new
provisions, "profit gained" and "loss avoided" are defined in section
21A(f) 51 Accordingly, if these concepts are to be retained, modifica-
tions to the proposed legislation will have to reflect the 1988 Act. Under
ITSFEA's new provisions, moreover, controlling person liability is im-
posed, not eliminated, by section 21A(a)(3) and (b). "Controlling per-
son" liability is defined as reckless disregard, failure to take appropriate
steps to prevent, or knowingly or recklessly failing to establish, main-
tain, or enforce policies that substantially contributed to the viola-
tion.2 5 2 In addition, and in sharp contrast to prior law, ITSFEA does
not restrict aiding and abetting liability. Finally, ITSFEA expressly
equates respondeat superior liability with controlling person liability.
2 53
These new authorizations and restrictions on vicarious liability for
insider trading are not as objectionable as former law. Nevertheless, the
changes illustrate the special interest character of the proposed legisla-
tion: Swindlers in the securities industry are to be afforded special vica-
rious liability rules for multiple damages suits that will not apply to
other kinds of swindlers. Treble damages, for example, are vicariously
applicable under the usual rules for violations of those antitrust provi-
sions that protect freedom in the marketplace. 5 Why should different
rules be applicable to the securities industry when integrity in the mar-
ketplace is at issue under RICO? If multiple damages are a special
problem when imposed vicariously, they are a special problem for ev-
eryone under all statutes, and not just for one industry under RICO.
Accounting firms, for instance, are deeply concerned about the ef-
fect of treble damages liability under RICO. In particular, because ac-
countants practice under a partnership form, they do not obtain the
benefit of limited liability. The E.S.M. Government Securities, Inc. liti-
gation illustrates the point.25I E.S.M. Government Securities' insolvency
was hidden fraudulently by a bribed accountant, who worked for Grant
Thornton, an accounting firm. When the insolvency was discovered, the
entire savings and loan industry in Ohio virtually collapsed. Was it fair
250. See supra note 229.
251. ITSFEA, supra note 229, § 21A(f), 102 Stat. at 4679 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(f)
(1988)).
252. ITSFEA, supra note 229, § 21A(b), 102 Stat. at 4678 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(b)
(1988)).
253. See generally H.R. REP. No. 901, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-20 (1988).
254. See, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
573-74 (1982).
255. See In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 110 F.R.D. 528, 530-31, 539-43 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (providing the text of the indictment).
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for Grant Thornton's innocent partners to be held vicariously and per-
sonally liable for multiple damages arising from the corrupt conduct of
the bribed partner? The accountants' argument that the result is unfair
is persuasive. Nevertheless, under the proposed legislation, accountants
will be subject to punitive damages under the usual rule of vicarious
liability for consumer fraud not involving securities. Why exclude the
securities industry, but include the accounting profession? No convinc-
ing rationale may be offered for this anomalous result. The bill, in
short, is neither principled nor evenhanded.
Actual damages, of course, play primarily a compensatory role, al-
though they are, in fact, not "actual." In truth, actual damages should
be called "legal" damages because they do not actually compensate.
They exclude, for example, "transaction" and "opportunity" costs, as
those terms are used in economic analysis.258 Multiple damages, of
course, play a variety of other roles, whether they are punitive or treble.
Accordingly, it might make sense for Congress to consider restricting
the application of RICO's multiple damages-punitive or treble-along
the lines that the Model Penal Code 7 restricts corporate criminal lia-
bility. The issues are similar; similar approaches would be preferable to
the unjustifiable approach of the proposed legislation. Treble damages
could be generally authorized. Nevertheless, individuals or entities
could be given an affirmative defense that would reduce multiple dam-
ages liability to actual damages. The individual or entity would have to
show that he or it did not at least recklessly tolerate the conduct consti-
tuting the RICO violation. Under this alternative, the public interest
might be better served. 258 Congress, therefore, should reject the current
provisions and adopt a more justifiable and evenhanded reform.
d. Remedy Authorized
Currently, RICO authorizes automatic treble damages and attor-
ney's fees. If the matter is settled, even though a plaintiff "substantially
prevails," attorney's fees may not be awarded.259 Courts are split on the
availability of equity-type relief under RICO.260 Under the provisions of
256. See R. POSNER, supra note 183, § 1.1 (fundamental concepts); id. § 21.4 (transaction
costs in settlements).
257. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2:07(1)(c) (1962) (providing that high managerial agents at least
recklessly tolerated).
258. Because the individual or entity would be in the best position to prove that he or it did
not act recklessly, the exception should be an affirmative defense. See generally J. THAYER, PRE-
LIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE ch. 9 (1898).
259. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Liebowitz, 730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984).
260. Compare Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1080-89 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that equitable relief must be denied as a matter of legislative intent, despite sound
policy reasons in support), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987) with Chambers Dev. Co. v. Brown-
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the proposed legislation, the remedies authorized are actual damages
and attorney's fees, and, upon a showing of clear and convincing evi-
dence, up to double punitive damages.
Because treble damages are superior to punitive damages, they
should be retained. Treble damages are mandatory, not discretionary,
so they contain an appropriate balance of swift, sure, and severe deter-
rence. They are related to the damage done to the victim, not to the
defendant's conduct or wealth, so they avoid prejudice to the defend-
ant. They also are not penal in character, but compensate for accumula-
tive harm, so they carry an appropriate measure of compensation for
the victim.2 1' As such, treble damages serve the public interest better
than punitive damages.
Indefensible anomalies will be created if Congress eliminates treble
damages in private claims for relief, circumscribes the authorization of
punitive damages by a unique substantive standard ("consciously mali-
cious, etc."), and heightens the plaintiff's burden of proof ("clear and
convincing, etc."). Treble damages, for example, are awarded in private
antitrust litigation without any additional showing or a heightened bur-
den of proof.262 Why should Congress treat violence or corruption in the
marketplace under RICO differently than freedom under the antitrust
statutes? No convincing rationale for this sort of anomaly can be
offered.
Federal courts generally award punitive damages, moreover, based
on no greater showing than "reckless or callous indifference."26 Why
treat punitive damages under RICO differently? Nor must a special
burden of proof be met to obtain punitive damages under general fed-
eral law.264 To be sure, the matter no longer is well settled under state
law, under which, by statute or decision, jurisdictions have moved to
the clear and convincing evidence standard as part of general and ill-
fated tort reform.265 Nevertheless, the better reasoned judicial opinions
ing-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1540-41 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that equity relief may be
granted under RICO). See generally Blakey & Cessar, supra note 1 (analyzing and rejecting the
reasoning in Religious Technology Center).
261. See generally Note, Treble Damages, supra note 1, at 527-28.
262. See Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302, 307-11 (1971) (holding the prepon-
derance of the evidence rule applicable in antitrust actions against labor unions).
263. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (civil rights).
264. See, e.g., Central Armature Works, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 520 F. Supp.
283, 293 (D.D.C. 1981) (holding that the "contention that entitlement to punitive damages must be
proven by 'clear and convincing' evidence. . . [is without] support").
265. See Hilder, Tort Wars: Insurers' Push to Limit Civil Damage Awards Begins to Slow
Down, Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1986 at 1, col. 6 (summarizing state law changes and reporting that
"[w]hile 32 states have made changes in the way civil lawsuits are tried and damages awarded, the
moves aren't expected to yield broad benefits for insurers or their customers").
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still maintain the traditional rule.266 Finally, under state RICO legisla-
tion, the preponderance of the evidence standard usually is specifically
retained.267
The rationale for retaining the traditional burden of proof standard
is persuasive.268 When a person is injured by a pattern of unlawful con-
duct that would, if prosecuted by the government, amount to a crime, it
is difficult to envision how Congress justifiably could put its thumb on
the side of the scale of the perpetrator.26 9
Reforms also should be made to the attorney's fee provisions of
RICO and the proposed legislation. Attorney's fees should be awarded
in all RICO litigation. More than 119 federal statutes authorize the
grant of attorney's fees to a prevailing party.270 Attorney's fees also
should be recoverable not only on an award of damages, but also if the
injured party "substantially prevails." A failure to award attorney's fees
to those injured by violations of RICO would be grossly invidious.
Finally, a provision ought to be added to the proposed legislation
that would guarantee that a victim of a RICO violation would be able to
obtain full justice. No court should be limited to the award of only legal
relief; all courts also should be able to grant equity relief.271 Unless such
relief is available, private parties will not be able to secure full justice
under RICO under a uniform rule. The failure to authorize equity relief
under RICO, moreover, would promote forum shopping. The victim
would have to depend on the federal court's pendent jurisdiction to ob-
tain equity relief under state law, but because the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction is discretionary, it is not dependable.272 A party should not
have to rely on shopping around for a state that grants appropriate eq-
uity relief in which to file a RICO claim and then hope that the district
court will exercise such relief. Pretrial equity relief is particularly neces-
266. Compare United Nuclear Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 480, 709 P.2d 649
(1985) (retaining the traditional rule) with Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326,
723 P.2d 675 (1986) (adopting the clear and convincing standard). See generally Annotation, Stan-
dard of Proof As to Conduct Underlying Punitive Damage Awards-Modern Status, 58 A.L.R.4th
878 (1987).
267. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314J (1989) ("preponderance") with Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 946.86(5) (West Supp. 1989) ("reasonable certainty").
268. "[A] standard of proof 'serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants.
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). "Any . . . standard [other than preponderance] expresses a preference for
one side's interest." Id. at 390 (holding that the burden of proof for securities fraud, like antitrust
and civil rights, is preponderance of the evidence).
269. See generally Note, Burden of Proof, supra note 1, at 580-88.
270. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
271. See generally Blakey & Cessar, supra note 1.
272. See, e.g., Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 732-34 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissing a state claim
under pendent jurisdiction as a matter of discretion and holding that the basis for equity jurisdic-
tion was lost).
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sary to prevent defendants from dissipating their assets prior to judg-
ment.27 s Unless a court can preserve the assets of organized crime or
fly-by-night white-collar offenders during the litigation, it is doubtful
that RICO actions even will be brought against them. Ironically, this
failure may mean that RICO actions only will be brought against white-
collar offenders who have substantial assets in the community.
F. Personal Injury Private Suits for Multiple Damages27 "4
Currently, RICO does not authorize recovery for personal inju-
ries.2  The proposed legislation would afford a natural person, who suf-
273. See, e.g., Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding
under California law an injunction to prevent the dissipation of assets of the former dictator), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1933 (1989); Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. Antonio, 843 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1988)
(upholding under Colorado RICO law an injunction to prevent the dissipation of assets of bank
swindlers); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.) (upholding under the
securities statutes an injunction to prevent the dissipation of corrupt financier assets, including a
Boeing 707 and a yacht), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974). In fact, such injunctions are granted
routinely in securities fraud matters. See, e.g., Accounts Are Frozen in Inside-Trading Case of
Rorer Group Stock, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1990, at C15, col. 3 (reporting on the granting of a prelimi-
nary injunction and an order freezing brokerage accounts at the request of the SEC).
In 1975 English law began to move away from an older view that was unsympathetic to injunc-
tions to preserve assets. Traditionally, injunctions against persons to restrain the removal of assets
were not permitted in English law under Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, 45 Ch. D. 1 (1890). The historical
materials are reviewed in Rasu Maritima v. Pertambangan, [1977] 3 All E.R. 324, 331-32. Mareva
Compania Naviera SA v. International Bulkcarriers S.A., [1975] 2 Lloyds Rep. 509, marked a dra-
matic turn, because it upheld the issuance of injunctions to freeze assets. The English court formu-
lated a new test in Third Chandris Shipping v. Unimarine, SA, [1979] 2 All E.R. 972, 984-85.
While at first the new test appeared to be applicable only to international litigation, in Barclay-
Johnson v. Yuill [19801 3 All E.R. 190, 194 the court determined that the test rested solely on the
"risk of the defendant removing... assets." See also Prince Abdul Al Sudairy v. Abu-Taha [19801
3 All E.R. 409, 412. The present state of English law, in which such injunctions are obtained fairly
easily, is reflected in Bayer A.G. v. Winter, [1986] 1 All E.R. 733, 737. See generally HOWARD
LEAGUE FOR PENAL REFORM, PROFITS OF CRIME AND THEIR RECOVERY 104-11 (1984) (discussing the
Mareva injunctions). For an alternative proposal, see App. E, infra pp.1061-63, 1069-70.
274. The legislation provides:
"(3) A natural person who suffers serious bodily injury by reason of a crime of violence
that is racketeering activity and that is an element of a violation of section 1962 of this title
may bring a civil action in an appropriate United States district court, and, upon proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, shall recover-
"(A) the costs of the civil action, including a reasonable attorneys' fee;
"(B) the actual damages to the person's business or property sustained by reason of such
violation;
"(C) the actual damages sustained by the natural person by reason of such violation, as
allowed under applicable State law (excluding pain and suffering); and
"(D) if the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions
were consciously malicious, or so egregious and deliberate that malice may be implied, puni-
tive damages of up to twice the actual damages.
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 4.
275. See, e.g., Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844 (11th Cir.) (holding that "property" within
RICO does not include economic aspects of murder of FBI agents), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 531
(1988); Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 782 F.2d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that RICO does not
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fers serious bodily injury by reason of a crime of violence that is
racketeering activity and that is an element of a violation of RICO, a
claim for relief. Recovery is limited to the immediate person. "Serious
bodily injury" is not defined. "Crime of violence," however, is given a
special definition in (11)(c), which is narrower than 18 U.S.C. section
16, which includes the use, alleged use, or threatened use of physical
force against a person or property or a felony that involves a substantial
risk of the use of physical force against a person or property.1 6 Under
the proposed legislation, recovery is authorized for: (1) attorney's fees,
(2) actual damages to business or property, (3) actual damages to per-
son (excluding pain and suffering) allowed under applicable state law,
and (4) up to two times punitive damages if the plaintiff proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the conduct is consciously malicious or so
egregious and deliberate that malice may be implied.
These provisions are seriously defective. The rationale for limiting
RICO by the proposed legislation is RICO's alleged abuse in commer-
cial fraud litigation. Objection is not voiced to RICO's use against other
types of offenders. It is difficult to justify, therefore, the proposed sharp
limitations on the extension of RICO to suits involving personal injury
based on crimes of violence.
1. Limitation to Immediate Serious Bodily Injury
Why limit the recovery of damages to the immediate person? What
of his family? If an individual is injured, why limit his right to recover
damages to "serious" bodily injury? A plaintiff possibly could recover
damages for less than serious bodily injury under a pendent state claim,
but because a federal court has discretion to dismiss pendent state
claims, they may not be retained in the litigation. It is also possible that
a legitimate dispute over "seriousness" might be resolved by the jury
against the plaintiff after discovery and trial. If this result occurs, the
plaintiff may obtain no recovery, even though the case had gone to trial
and the jury concluded that the plaintiff's basic claim was meritorious.
This limitation, therefore, invites the waste of federal judicial resources
and multiple proceedings without substantial countervailing gains for
the administration of justice. It also mistreats victims of crimes of
violence.
include toxic chemical personal injury); Campbell v. A.H. Robins Co., 615 F. Supp. 496, 500-01
(W.D. Wis. 1985) (holding that RICO does not include personal injury in a products liability
claim).
276. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1988).
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2. Limitation to Crimes of Violence Narrowly Defined
Section 9(c) defines "crime of violence" to mean the state law of-
fenses of murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery, and dealing in narcotics;
it also defines it to include a host of similar or related federal statutory
crimes. 77 The definition is, however, narrower than the general defini-
tion of "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. section 16. The provision also
excludes crimes of violence now expressly within RICO: extortion under
state law, and robbery (section 1951) and crimes of violence, extortion,
arson, and drugs (section 1952) under federal law. These omissions do
not reflect any easily discernible rationale. Given the rationale of the
proposed legislation to limit RICO's misuse in commercial litigation, it
is difficult to understand why the crabbed approach of the proposed
legislation was adopted. The provision promises little gain and much
loss. The general definition of "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. section
16 should be followed.
3. Limitation to Elements of Violation
Under the provisions of the proposed legislation, a natural person
who suffers serious bodily injury by reason of a crime of violence would
have to show: (1) that the defendant's action was racketeering activity,
and (2) that the activity is an element of a RICO violation. These two
limitations will produce irrational results. United States v. Zemek178
and a subsequent civil suit illustrate the point. In Zemek various de-
fendants were convicted under RICO for attempting to gain a monopoly
277. The statute lists the following offenses:
(1) state law: the offenses of murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs; and
(2) federal law: the offenses under title 18 when accompanied by serious bodily injury of-
(i) section 32 (destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities);
(ii) section 81 (arson);
(iii) section 112 (a) (violence to foreign officials and other persons) and section 112(c)-(f) (defini-
tions and limitations);
(iv) section 115 (acts against United States officials and other persons);
(v) section 878 (threats and extortion to foreign officials and other persons);
(vi) sections 891-894 (extortionate credit transactions);
(vii) sections 1111-1112 (murder and manslaughter), section 1114 (killing or attempted killing),
sections 1116-1117 (killing or attempted killing or conspiracy to kill);
(viii) section 1203 (hostage taking);
(ix) sections 1501-1506, 1508-1513, 1515 (obstruction of justice);
(x) section 1951 (extortion);
(xi) section 1958 (murder-for-hire);
(xii) sections 2251-2252 (sexual exploitation of children), section 2256 (definitions);
(xiii) section 2278 (explosives and dangerous weapons on vessels);
(xiv) section 2331 (terrorist acts abroad); or
(xv) felonious drug offenses under federal law.
278. 634 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
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over the tavern and topless bar business in Pierce County, Washington,
by engaging in a pattern of offenses, including murder, arson, and ex-
tortion.2 79 It is difficult to imagine a more appropriate RICO criminal
prosecution. In Rice v. Janovich a janitor and night watchman of a tav-
ern that was fire bombed sued for lost wages resulting from an assault
that occurred during the RICO violation prosecuted in Zemek.2 80 It is
difficult to imagine a more appropriate civil RICO suit. While assault
was not a racketeering activity, the janitor was able to recover because
the assault was an overt act engaged in during the RICO conspiracy
under 18 U.S.C. section 1962(d).28 l The proposed legislation, at least in
theory, is designed to extend to natural persons, like the janitor in Rice,
the right to recover damages not only for property injury, but also for
serious bodily injury resulting from crimes of violence. The proposed
legislation, however, would not permit the janitor to recover damages
for his bodily injury, even though it might be serious and even though it
occurred during the course of and in furtherance of a RICO violation,
because the assault, although an overt act pursuant to a RICO conspir-
acy, is neither a racketeering activity nor an element of a RICO viola-
tion. This result is indefensible. As such, these limitations should be
removed from the proposed legislation. Any injury caused by any crime
of violence engaged in during the course of and in furtherance of a
RICO violation should be the basis for a claim for relief. Any other re-
sult would be unjust.
279. Id. at 1162-65.
280. 109 Wash. 2d 48, 742 P.2d 1230 (1987) (en banc).
281. Rice is correctly decided, and is consistent with the well-reasoned decision of the Third
Circuit in Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1168-70 (3d Cir. 1989) and the deci-
sion in Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 642-44 (E.D. Ky. 1988). It is apparently inconsistent
with the Tenth Circuit's cryptic decision in Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1989). The Grider decision is hard to square with the com-
mon-law rule or the rule under other federal statutes. Compare Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 182
(1913) (holding that "the well-settled rule is that no civil action lies for a conspiracy unless there
be an overt act that results in damage to the plaintiff") and Hoods v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944
(6th Cir. 1985) and Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1983) with Griffin v. Breck-
enridge, 403 U.S. 88, 103 (1971) (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). See also Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740
F.2d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 1984) (antitrust), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985); Lenard v. Argento,
699 F.2d 874, 883 (7th Cir.) (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Lawrence v.
Acree, 665 F.2d 1319, 1323-24 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (42 U.S.C. § 1985); Donahue v. Pendleton Woolen
Mills, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1423, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (antitrust); United States v. Excellair, Inc., 637




4. Limitation to Damage Excluding Pain and Suffering Allowable
Under Applicable State Law
No reason exists to exclude pain and suffering if a plaintiff's recov-
ery is to be limited to actual damages. If the actual damages were treb-
led automatically, this limitation might be justifiable. Nevertheless,
situations are easily imagined in which such a limited recovery would be
unjust. Indeed, pain and suffering may be the most significant aspect of
a bodily injury. A disfiguring injury, for example, inflicted as part of an
extortion or of the intimidation of a witness may well result principally
in mental pain and suffering.
The provisions also limit damages to those "allowed under applica-
ble state law." This provision assumes that state law will be applicable.
This assumption is not always true. For example, the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103 in December 1988 took place over Scotland, not the
United States; it killed 270 persons, including 189 Americans.2 82 It is
generally thought that this incident is one of a series of international
terrorist acts directed toward Americans. 283 Nevertheless, because the
attack took place over Scotland, United States state law is not applica-
ble and Americans injured in this sort of incident would not be able to
recover damages for personal injury under RICO. The amendment of
RICO to include new violent predicates and to include more than injury
to business or property ought to reflect a less parochial imagination.284
Why it is necessary to circumscribe the right of violent crime victims to
protect securities dealers and accountants from fraud suits is difficult to
justify.
5. Limitation of Punitive Damages by a Special Standard and
Burden of Proof
Congress should retain treble damages for crimes of violence. If,
however, punitive damages are substituted for treble damages, Congress
should not impose on the plaintiff the extra burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions met a "special
standard."28 5 Treble damages provide an appropriate measure of swift,
sure, and severe deterrence. No convincing reason can be offered for
282. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1988, at 1 (1989) [hereinafter
GLOBAL TERRORISM].
283. Id.
284. See Carley, Legacy of Terror: Lockerbie Bombing on Pan Am Flight 103 Bred Anger
and Fear, Wall St. J., July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (reporting the story on how the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103 affected the lives of the families of the victims). Children of John Cummock, one of
the dead, asked their mother, "Where are the terrorists? Are they going to come here and kill you,
Mommy? Will they kill us, too?" Id.
285. See supra note 157.
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abandoning treble damages in favor of specially circumscribed punitive
damages when crimes of violence are at issue.
G. Limitation on Order of Proof2"6
Federal courts, like all courts, possess ample discretion to vary the
order in which a party introduces evidence.287 Only mischief will result
if Congress attempts to micro-manage the time in the trial when plain-
tiffs introduce evidence relevant only to the amount of punitive dam-
ages. As a practical matter, the provision will result in bifurcated trials,
hardly a justifiable result in legislation that is designed ostensibly to
conserve judicial resources. The "good cause" and "undue prejudice"
standards found in this section are concepts that will invite appeals and
reversals on issues that should be dealt with more flexibly by trial
courts. 288 Accordingly, Congress should strike this provision from the
proposed legislation. The matter should be left to the good sense and
sound discretion of trial judges.
286. The legislation provides:
"(4) In an action under this subsection, evidence relevant only to the amount of punitive
damages shall not be introduced until after a finding of liability, except the court may permit,
for good cause shown and in the absence of any undue prejudice to the defendant, introduc-
tion of such evidence prior to a finding of liability on motion of a party or in the exercise of
its discretion.
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 4.
287. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. Co. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 448, 463
(1840).
288. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1867, at 660 (Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1976). Professor John Henry Wigmore aptly observed:
[E]rror in the allowance of. . .a variation [in the order of proof] should rarely be treated as
sufficient ground for a new trial.. .. [T]he trial court can better be trusted to understand the
situation.
• .. [N]o opportunity should be lost to lament the abuse by which. . . rules of custom-
ary order are sought to be turned into inflexible dictates of absolute justice. . .Courts often
lend ear to such appeals and thereby partake in the abuse of such a practice. To purport to
preside over the investigation of truth, and then, at an inordinate expense of time, labor, and
money, to insist on reopening the entire investigation. . .is to furnish a spectacle fit to make
Olympus merry over the serious follies of mortals.
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H. Treble Damages for Injury to Business or Property After
Criminal Conviction
289
The Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 290 rejected
the criminal conviction limitation.29' The Court followed not only the
language of RICO, but the amply supported traditional rule.292 The pro-
posed provisions, which would alter the Supreme Court's holding in
Sedima, are not as objectionable as the position of the Second Circuit
because the provisions do not circumscribe all claims for relief. Never-
theless, the central strictures of the Court's analysis remain.
The provisions are ill-advised, unfair, and ill-drafted. They are ill-
advised principally because they adversely will affect plea bargaining in
criminal prosecutions, cross examination in criminal trials, and the de-
cision to bring criminal charges. No prosecutor ought to be able to af-
fect the measure of civil damages a party will receive in a RICO action
by his decision to bring a particular charge against a defendant. The
prosecutor's stick is big enough now. Nor should prosecutors be subject
to pressure to bring a case so that a private litigant can recover a higher
289. The legislation provides:
"(5) A person whose business or property is injured by conduct in violation of section
1962 of this title may bring, in any appropriate United States district court, a civil action
therefor and, upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence of such violation, shall recover
threefold the actual damages to the person's business or property sustained by reason of such
conduct, and the costs of the civil action, including a reasonable attorney's fee, from any
defendant convicted of a Federal or State offense based upon the same conduct upon which
the plaintiff's civil action is based: Provided, however, That such offense shall include a show-
ing of a state of mind as a material element of the offense and is punishable by death or
imprisonment for a term of more than one year.
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 4.
290. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
291. The Court in Sedima aptly observed:
[The criminal conviction limitation] arbitrarily restricts the availability of private ac-
tions, for lawbreakers are often not apprehended and convicted. Even if a conviction has been
obtained, it is unlikely that a private plaintiff will be able to recover for all of the acts consti-
tuting an extensive "pattern," or that multiple victims will all be able to obtain redress. This
is because criminal convictions are often limited to a small portion of the actual or possible
charges. The decision below [imposing a criminal conviction limitation] would also create pe-
culiar incentives for plea bargaining to non-predicate-act offenses so as to ensure immunity
for a later civil suit. If nothing else, a criminal defendant might plead to a tiny fraction of
counts, so as to limit future civil liability. In addition, the dependence of potential civil liti-
gants on the initiation and success of a criminal prosecution could lead to unhealthy private
pressures on prosecutors and to self-serving trial testimony, or at least accusations thereof.
Problems would also arise if some or all of the convictions were reversed on appeal. Finally,
the compelled wait for the completion of criminal proceedings would result in pursuit of stale
claims, complex statute of limitations problems, or the wasteful splitting of actions, with re-
sultant claim and issue preclusion complications.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 490 n.9. The matter is considered at greater length in 133 CONG. REc. H9050
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1987) (remarks of Rep. John Conyers) (stating the position of the Department of
Justice in support of a criminal conviction limitation).
292. See generally Note, Burden of Proof, supra note 1.
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measure of damages. The credibility of witnesses, moreover, should not
be judged on the basis of what they might receive if the defendant is
convicted.
The provisions are unfair because they do not extend the treble
damages liability to those equally culpable-aiders and abettors, con-
spirators, and others responsible for the defendant's conduct. Similarly
situated perpetrators should be treated similarly; justice requires no
less. No adequate reason, moreover, exists why a plaintiff may recover
only treble measure damages for injury to business or property. Why
not include all injury a plaintiff sustains? Nor should the provision be
limited to federal or state offenses. Why not include foreign offenses
that would be a federal or state offense if prosecuted in the United
States? Many countries refuse to extradite terrorists but are willing to
try them in their own courts.29 It makes little sense not to include
these kinds of convictions.
Finally, the provisions are ill-drafted. If the drafters intended to
exclude strict liability offenses, the present language in the provision
does not accomplish that objective. Paragraph (B)(ii) of the proposed
legislation should read "include a showing of a state of mind [as a] for
each material element of the offense.
' '2 94
L Statute of Limitations"5
Currently, the common-law period of limitations for private civil
RICO is four years.29 The period of limitations for general federal gov-
ernment suits varies.297 Arguably, the provisions of the proposed legisla-
293. See GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 282, at 35 (discussing the trial of a Lebanese for air
piracy and the murder of Navy diver, Robert Stethem, during the June 1985 hijacking of TWA
Flight 847).
294. See H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 4. The emphasized language should be inserted into
this portion of the statute and the bracketed language omitted.
295. The legislation provides:
"(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a civil action or proceeding under this
subsection may not be commenced after the latest of-
"(i) four years after the date the cause of action accrues; or
"(ii) two years after the date of the criminal conviction required for an action or proceed-
ing under paragraph (5) of this subsection.
"(B) A civil action brought pursuant to subsection (c)(1)(B)(i), (ii), or (iii) may not be
commenced more than six years after the date the cause of action accrues.
"(C) The period of limitation provided in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph on
the commencement of a cause of action does not run during the pendency of a government
civil action or proceeding or criminal case relating to the conduct upon which such cause of
action is based.
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 4. See App. E, infra pp. 1073-74.
296. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987).
297. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (providing that with a contract, ex-
press or implied, the statute of limitations is six years); id. § 2416 (providing that for tort actions,
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tion do little more than codify present law. They ought to do more. Of
the twenty-one state RICO statutes that provide for multiple damages,
fifteen include special statutes of limitations.""8 The usual period of
limitations in these statutes is five years, although others are longer.
The general federal criminal period of limitations is five years. 9  Con-
gress should make every effort, when possible, to parallel federal and
state criminal and civil RICO statutes to avoid unseemly results and
forum shopping. Congress should, therefore, extend the civil period of
limitations for private suits to five years.
J. Affirmative Defense for Good Faith and Limitation on
Discovery0 °
Currently, good faith is a defense to a charge which includes "in-
tent to defraud." 01 A defendant may establish a good faith defense by
showing that he relied on the advice of counsel.30 2 The good faith de-
fense provision of the proposed legislation, however, is unnecessary, ill-
advised, and poorly drafted. 3  To the degree that the provision codifies
traditional rules about good faith defenses, it is unnecessary. To the
degree that the provision makes the good faith defense an "affirmative"
defense, the result of its impact is unclear. Is it intended that the provi-
sion shift the burden of coming forward with evidence and persuasion
to the defendant? It is doubtful that the drafters intended this result, if
their single-minded pursuit of defendants' interests elsewhere in the
proposed legislation is any guide. Why, then, did they use the "affirma-
tive defense" language? Does this language limit the present defense of
advice of counsel? It is doubtful that the drafters intended this limita-
tion. Nevertheless, by setting out the elements of a new affirmative de-
the period is three years, except it is six years for diversion of money paid or conversion). It is not
clear if Malley-Duff applies to government suits. See United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime
Family, 683 F. Supp. 1411, 1457-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (declining to decide the issue).
298. See generally App. A, infra p. 988.
299. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988).
300. The legislation provides:
"(7) It shall be an affirmative defense to an action brought under this subsection that a
defendant acted in good faith and in reliance upon an official, directly applicable regulatory
action, approval, or interpretation of law by an authorized Federal or State agency in writing
or by operation of law. Before the commencement of full discovery on and consideration of
the plaintiff's claim, the court shall determine, upon defendant's motion, the availability of
any affirmative defense asserted under this paragraph. However, the discovery of such defense
shall be allowed, as provided by law or rule of procedure, before the court's determination.
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 4.
301. See, e.g., Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896) (mail fraud).
302. See, e.g., Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1969) (securities
statutes).
303. See supra note 300.
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fense, it is likely that such a limitation will result, because the general
rule is "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." 04 While current law gen-
erally affords an "advice of counsel" defense to fraud or similar of-
fenses, the proposed language is not so limited. Is it really intended to
extend the defense to crimes of violence and other offenses? What justi-
fies this radical change?
Finally, like the issue of the order in which evidence is introduced
at trial, the issues of discovery and summary judgment on affirmative
defenses are best left to the sound discretion of trial judges. It is unwise
for Congress to attempt to micro-manage trial procedure, especially in a
bill ostensibly designed to conserve judicial resources.
K. Pleading With Particularity3°5
Currently, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires a party to
plead fraud with particularity.308 Rule 9(b) applies to the fraud ele-
ments of RICO. °7 Case law applies a similar requirement to allegations
of conspiracy.30 To the degree that these provisions codify present law,
they are unnecessary. To the degree that they will extend particularity
pleading beyond present law, they are profoundly unwise.0 In short,
"[t]he circumstances in which. . . [merit] decisions are possible on the
pleadings . . . are distressingly limited." 310 It ought to be frankly recog-
nized that this sort of throwback to fact pleading will make RICO liti-
gation more complex, time consuming, and reflective of the defendant's
interest on issues that do not go to the merits of the litigation. 1' RICO
304. H. BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 658 (7th Am. ed. 1874).
305. The legislation provides, "'(8) In an action under this subsection, facts supporting the
claim against each defendant shall be averred with particularity." H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 4.
306. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) provides that "[iln all averments of fraud or mistake, the circum-
stances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
307. Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1362-63 (10th
Cir. 1989) (collecting the cases that have applied rule 9(b) to RICO).
308. See, e.g., Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163, 165 (1st Cir. 1980).
309. See generally Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 436 (1986). After a comprehensive study of pleading and prac-
tice under the Federal Rules, Professor Richard Marcus rightly observed:
[More specific pleading] does not provide a reliable method for determining whether a de-
fendant has violated the plaintiff's rights because it requires the plaintiff to marshall evidence
before conducting discovery. Neither can it be justified as a special way of handling certain
"specious" claims or as a step toward discretionary dismissals. Instead, the preferable route
for probing plaintiff's factual conclusions should be to rely on more flexible use of summary
judgment.
Id.
310. Id. at 493.
311. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 619 (1908) (observing that
"[e]very time a party goes out of court on a mere point of practice, substantive law suffers an
injury"). "Important as it [is] that people should get justice, it [is] even more important that they
should be made to feel and see that they [are] getting it." Id. at 606 n.4 (quoting Lord Herschell).
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plaintiffs, if they have meritorious claims, are victims of patterns of
criminal conduct. No sound public policy reason can be offered for
favoring defendants at the pleading stage before the question of merit
is fairly put in issue. Only the guilty will profit by such a policy. If
Congress makes other appropriate reforms to RICO, it safely may strike
this proposal from the bill.
L. Abatement and Survival 12
This provision codifies the results, if not the rationales, of State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton31 3 and Summers v. Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corp.'" It is a valuable provision.
M. Racketeer Label
1 5
Under this provision of the proposed legislation, use of the terms
"racketeer" or "organized crime" in civil litigation will be restricted to
proceedings in which the pattern of unlawful behavior involved a
"crime of violence." The term "racketeer," however, is wholly appropri-
ate to describe the sort of conduct RICO makes unlawful.31 6 Neverthe-
312. The legislation provides:
"(9)(A) An action or proceeding under this subsection shall not abate on the death of the
plaintiff or defendant, but shall survive and be enforceable by and against his estate and by
and against surviving plaintiffs or defendants.
"(B) An action or proceeding under this subsection shall survive and be enforceable
against a receiver in bankruptcy but only to the extent of actual damages.
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 4.
313. 540 F. Supp. 673, 683-85 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
314. 592 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
315. The legislation provides:
"(10) In a civil action or proceeding under this subsection in which the complaint does
not allege a crime of violence-
"(A) the term 'racketeer' or the term 'organized crime' shall not be used by any party in
any pleading or other written document submitted in the action, or in any argument, hearing,
trial, or other oral presentations before the court; and
"(B) the terms used to define conduct in violation of section 1962 of this title shall be
referred to as follows:
"(i) 'racketeering activity,' as defined in section 1961(1) of this title, shall be referred to
as 'unlawful activity'; and
"(ii) 'pattern of racketeering activity,' as defined in section 1961(5) of this title, shall be
referred to as 'pattern of unlawful activity.'
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 4.
316. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (W. Morris ed. 1969)
(defining racket as a "business that obtains money through fraud or extortion"); Gurfein, Racke-
teering, in 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 45, 45 (E. Seligman & A. Johnson eds. 1934)
(stating that" '[r]acketeering' . . . applies to the operation of an illegal business as well as to the
illegal operation of a legal business"); see also United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 375 (1978)
(holding that racketeering is "'used loosely to designate ... activity [that is] . . . questionable,
unmoral, fraudulent ... whether criminal or not'" (quoting S. REP. No. 1189, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1937))). Nevertheless, it must be conceded that "racketeer" is a "fighting word." See Chaplinsky
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less, its curtailment in civil litigation may result in the settlement of
litigation that otherwise would be prolonged unnecessarily. 1 As such,
the provision may do more good than harm.
N. Definitions"'5
The interaction of these definitions with the other provisions of the
proposed legislation is analyzed under the other provisions of this
Article.
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (defining fighting words as those "likely to provoke
the average person to retaliation").
317. RICO CASES COmmIrrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 121-23 (stating that contrary to a
popular misconception, experience shows that the label inhibits, not facilitates, settlement).
318. SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.
(a) For purposes of subsection (c) of section 1964 of title 18, United States Code, the
term "governmental entity" means the United States or a State, and includes any depart-
ment, agency, or government corporation of the United States or a State, or any political
subdivision of a State which has the power (1) to levy taxes and spend funds, and (2) to
exercise general corporate and police powers.
(b) For purposes of subsection (c) of section 1964 of title 18, United States Code, the
term "unit of general local government" means any political subdivision of a State which has
the power (1) to levy taxes and spend funds, and (2) to exercise general corporate and police
powers.
(c) For purposes of subsection (c) of section 1964 of title 18, United States Code, the term
"crime of violence" means an offense involving-
(1) when chargeable under State law the following: murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery,
or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs;
(2) when indictable under title 18 of the United States Code, and when accompanied by
serious bodily injury the following: destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities as defined by
section 32; arson as defined by section 81; acts against foreign officials and other persons as
defined by section 112(a), (c)-(f); acts against Federal officials and other persons as defined by
section 115; threats and extortion as defined by section 878; loansharking and other extortion-
ate credit transactions as defined by sections 891-894; homicide as defined by sections 1111-
1112, 1114, 1116-1117; hostage taking as defined in section 1203; obstruction of justice as
defined in sections 1501-1506, 1508-1513, and 1515; extortion as defined by section 1951; mur-
der-for-hire as defined by section 1958; sexual exploitation of children as defined in sections
2251-2252 and 2256; explosives or dangerous weapons aboard vessels as defined in section
2277; terrorist acts abroad as defined in section 2331; or
"(3) the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the
United States.
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 9.
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0. International Service of Process319
Currently, RICO provides for nationwide, but not international,
service of process.32 0 International service of process, however, is essen-
tial for dealing with criminal groups whose often violent activities ex-
tend across international boundaries. 21 International service of process
is provided for in the securities statutes because securities violations
always do not occur in the United States.322 This provision is also valu-
able here. Although it is probably unnecessary, it also might be wise for
Congress expressly to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction for RICO.2
P. Exclusive Jurisdiction24
While courts initially were split on the issue of exclusive or concur-
rent federal jurisdiction,3 25 the Supreme Court in Tafflin v. Levitt
26
held that federal jurisdiction was concurrent with state jurisdiction.
The prosecution of federal offenses, however, is exclusive in the federal
courts,327 as are actions dealing with forfeitures.2 s Uniformity in the
application of federal offenses would be promoted best by guaranteeing
319. SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL SERVICE OF PROCESS.
Section 1965 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in subsection (b), by striking "residing in any other district";
(2) in subsection (b), by striking "in any judicial district of the United States by the
marshal thereof." and inserting "anywhere the party may be found";
(3) in subsection (c), by striking "in any other judicial district" and inserting "anywhere
the witness is found";
(4) in subsection (c), by striking "in another district"; and
(5) in subsection (d), by striking "in any judicial district in which" and inserting "where".
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 5.
320. See, e.g., Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 564-65, 569 n.30
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
321. See generally GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 282, app. B, at 55-83 (providing a world-
wide overview of organizations that engage in terrorism).
322. See, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.) (stating that the United States must
not be permitted to become a "Barbary Coast" for fraud), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
323. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1751(k) (1988). See generally United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S.
94, 97-98 (1922) (holding that extraterritoriality, when the statute is silent, may be inferred from
the nature of the offense).
324. SEC. 6. EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL JURISDICTION.
Chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code, shall not be construed to confer jurisdiction to
hear a criminal or civil proceeding or action under its provisions on a judicial or other forum
of a State or local unit of government.
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 6.
325. Compare Cianci v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375 (1985) (finding
concurrent federal jurisdiction) with Main Rusk Assocs. v. Interior Space Constr., Inc., 699 S.W.2d
305 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (finding exclusive federal jurisdiction).
326. 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990).
327. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988).
328. See 28 id. § 1355 (1982).
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that they be applied only by federal courts. 2 The countervailing policy
consideration is that federal judges are hostile to new litigation, espe-
cially civil RICO litigation. As such, RICO might receive better treat-
ment in state courts. While the issue is close, the better policy would be
to make jurisdiction exclusive.
329. The Supreme Court in Tafflin thought differently:
We perceive no "clear incompatibility" between state court jurisdiction over civil RICO
actions and federal interests.
* * * [O]ur decision today creates no significant danger of inconsistent application of fed-
eral criminal law. Although petitioners' concern with the need for uniformity and consistency
of federal criminal law is well-taken, federal courts, pursuant to § 3231, would retain full
authority and responsibility for the interpretation and application of federal criminal laws, for
they would not be bound by state court interpretations of the federal offenses constituting
RICO's predicate acts. State courts adjudicating civil RICO claims will, in addition, be guided
by federal court interpretations of the relevant federal criminal statutes, just as federal courts
sitting in diversity are guided by state court interpretations of state law. State court judg-
ments misinterpreting federal criminal law would, of course, also be subject to direct review
by this Court. Thus, we think that state court adjudication of civil RICO actions will, in
practice, have at most a negligible effect on the uniform interpretation and application of
federal criminal law.
* . . [Wie have full faith in the ability of state courts to handle the complexities of civil
RICO actions, particularly since many RICO cases involve asserted violations of state law,
such as state fraud claims, over which state courts presumably have greater expertise. To hold
otherwise would not only denigrate the respect accorded co-equal sovereigns, but would also
ignore our "consistent history of hospitable acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction."
Tafflin, 110 S. Ct. at 798-99 (citations omitted). The Court's reasoning, as far as it goes, may be
accepted, but it ignores the problem of a mistake of law defense. A number of RICO's predicate
offenses, particularly in the white-collar crime area, require a showing of intent to defraud, which
may be negated by advice of counsel, even though it was based on an erroneous state decision. See
Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 453 (1908); United States v. Poludniak, 657 F.2d 948,
958-59 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982); Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d
1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970). The possibility of such defenses is not
easily corrected by the Supreme Court, because it does not have time to resolve all conflicts in the
circuits, much less other pressing matters. See Greenhouse, Justices' Rulings Have a Ripple Effect
on the Law, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1989, at 14, col. 1 (stating that the Supreme Court hears only 160
out of 5000 general appeals brought to it). Thus, the problem is not so much uniformity of legal
decision as it is uniformity of factual outcome. Finally, the Court's faith in the ability of state
courts to handle sophisticated RICO questions is not borne out by the initial efforts under RICO.
See, e.g., Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 450, 455, 530 N.E.2d 860, 865 (1988)
(adopting a single scheme limitation on pattern). The wisdom, if not the legal reasoning, of the
Court's decision that jurisdiction is concurrent may be questioned. It may turn out to be ill-
starred, as the current RICO reform will make each the jurisdiction exclusive. See also JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 24 (1988) (stating that exclusive jurisdiction is appropriate for civil RICO, "since
many of the predicate acts involve violation of federal criminal statutes exclusively enforced by
federal courts").
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Q. Stylistic Amendments"°
No analysis is required.
R. Retroactivity3 '
Under this provision of the proposed legislation, the reduction from
treble to actual damages would be retroactive in most cases. The issue
would be left for judicial resolution, however, under a "clearly unjust"
standard. Court costs, including attorney's fees and litigation expenses,
still could be recovered.
Approximately 1549 civil RICO cases were pending as of Septem-
ber 30, 1989.32 Most of those cases were filtered through a judicial pro-
cess that is basically hostile to civil RICO litigation.33 3 Thus, most of
the litigation still pending before the courts is in all likelihood meritori-
ous. The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co. 334 ought to lay to rest any serious argument
that the use of RICO outside of the organized crime area is beyond
original congressional intent or somehow abusive.33 5 As such, these pro-
visions will give retroactive relief to undeserving defendants. The issue
330. SEC. 7. STYLISTIC AMENDMENT.
The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 96, title 18, United States Code, is amended
by striking out the item relating to section 1962 and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "1962.
Prohibited activities.". H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 7.
331. SEC. 8. JUDICIAL STANDARD TO DETERMINE REMEDY.
(a) The amendments made by this Act shall apply to any civil action or proceeding com-
menced one day after the date of enactment; except that in any pending action under section
1964(c) of title 18, United States Code, in which a person would be eligible to recover only
under paragraph (2)(A) of section 1964(c) as amended by this Act because the action does not
meet the requirements of paragraph (2)(B) of section 1964(c), if this Act has been enacted
before the commencement of that action, the recovery of that person shall be limited to the
recovery provided under paragraph (2)(A), unless in the pending action-
(1) there has been a jury verdict or district court judgment, establishing the defendant's
liability, or settlement has occurred; or
(2) the judge determines that, in light of all the circumstances, such limitation of recov-
ery would be clearly unjust.
(b) For purposes of this subsection, in any action in which a person would be eligible, by
operation of subsection (a) of this section, to recover only under paragraph (2)(A) of section
1964(c) of title 18, United States Code, as amended by this Act, the person shall also recover
the cost of the civil action, which includes, in addition to a reasonable attorneys' fee, reasona-
ble litigation expenses.
H.R. 1046, supra note 200, § 8.
332. Letter from Ellyn L. Vail, Chief, Non-Criminal Branch, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, to Professor G. Robert Blakey (Jan. 18, 1990); Telephone interview with
Ellyn L. Vail (Jan. 31, 1990).
333. See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 1, app. B, at 630 (noting that 51% of post-Sedima
published opinions were dismissed and that 40% were dismissed on lack of pattern grounds).
334. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
335. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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is not a matter of power, but of wisdom. 36 Congress sits to legislate, not
adjudicate. Cynics will believe that monies of potential RICO defend-
ants bought this legislation through political contributions. Americans,
however, do not conduct their affairs that way. Their elected represent-
atives ought not legislate that way. Congress should not do anything on
the civil RICO reform that will contribute to a further decline in the
opinion that the American people hold of their legislators.
3 7
336. Representative John Conyers put it well:
The Constitution only prohibits without qualifications ex post facto criminal legislation. Nev-
ertheless, not everything that is constitutional is wise. Justice Frankfurter-then a professor
of law-put it well in 1925: "[P]reoccupationiwith the constitutionality of legislation rather
than its wisdom . . . [is] a false value." Making legislation retroactive-whatever its naked
constitutionality-is, in the words of Justice Doe, one of the giants of American jurispru-
dence, in Kent v. Gray "irreconcilable with the spirit of our institutions." Justice Doe
elaborated:
[I]t is most manifestly injurious, oppressive, and unjust, that, after an individual has,
upon the faith of existing laws, brought his action ... [that] the legislature should step in,
and, without any examination of the circumstances of the cause, arbitrarily repeal the law
upon which the action . . . has been rested. . . . [S]uch an exercise of power is irreconcilable
• . . with the great principles of freedom upon which [our institutions] are founded ....
RICO, in short, did not make anything unlawful that was not already unlawful before its
passage under its predicate offenses. No question is present here of a sudden or unexpected
new liability. When we passed RICO, we held out to victims of sophisticated forms of crime
the promise of treble damages to encourage the private enforcement of the law. Litigation has
now been instituted in a trusting reliance on that promise. It is a promise, therefore, that we
ought not lightly break, particularly when the character of the conduct that it will insulate
from its just desserts is noted: the principal beneficiaries of the retroactive elimination of the
treble damage remedy will be the perpetrators of the recent bank fraud and insider trading
scandals. Can such a result, which protects the Butchers and Boeskys of the world, be justi-
fied in the clear light of day?
133 CONG. REC. E3353 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987) (remarks of Rep. John Conyers) (citations omitted).
337. Ultimately, government depends on the consent of the governed. Too many people to-
day are turned off by politics-as-usual in Washington. Andrew Kohut of Gallup put it well when he
discussed the current Washington scandals such as the one in the S&L institutions. These scandals
"reinforc[e] a value that runs through American politics: there are only limited amounts of trust
you can put into politicians and Washington." Oreskes, Is Anybody Watching?, N.Y. Times, July
30, 1989, § 4, at 1, col. 1. In 1964, 64% of the voters believed that the American government was
"run for the benefit of all," while only 29% said that it was "pretty much run by a few big interests
looking out for themselves." Yang, Sudden Sanctimony: Congress Gets Ethical, Shuns Any Hint
It Is in Debt to Big Givers, Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1989, at Al, col. 1. Last year, the proportion was
reversed: 63% believed that the American government is run by the few for the few, while only
31% thought that the government was run for the greater good of all. Id. Congress should not do
anything in processing RICO reform legislation that will contribute further to that rising tide of
cynicism.
Much is made of the federalism implications of civil RICO. It is appropriate here to quote one
of federalism's fathers. James Madison, a principal architect of the Constitution, argued in The
Federalist No. 44, that retroactive legislation was "contrary to the first principles of the social
compact and to every principle of sound legislation." THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282-83 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). He added:
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public
councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative in-
terferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of the enterprising
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S. Pattern
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 3 3 8 the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed the Eighth Circuit's multischeme test for
"pattern." The Court recognized that the "pattern" concept played a
key role in each of RICO's substantive provisions, sections 1962(a), (b),
and (c). Beginning with the ordinary meaning of the word, the Court
paraphrased it as an "arrangement or order of things or activity.
3 3 9
Turning to the legislative history of the statute, the Court determined
that Congress used "pattern" with a "fairly flexible concept of a pattern
in mind."340 The Court concluded that the "order or arrangement"
should reflect "continuity [or its threat] plus relationship. 3 41 The
Court then recognized that continuity, a "temporal concept," meant a
"substantial period of time," more than a "few weeks or months. 3 42 A
finding of a threat of continuity also was dependent "on the specific
facts of each case. 3 43 The development of the concept would have to
and influential speculators, and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the
community. They have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the first link of a long
chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of
the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which
will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and industry, and give
a regular course to the business of society.
Id.
Finally, the danger that people, not without justification, will believe the worst, even if untrue,
about the motivation behind the sponsors of RICO reform is well-borne out by Benjamin J. Stein:
[P]owerful people who are accustomed to stealing in peace ... are now trying to buy retroac-
tive immunity for their wrongs through powerful efforts spear headed by Sen. Dennis DeCon-
cini of Arizona, who is a beneficiary of contributions from Charles Keating and his friends
and who helped keep Keating's wildly mismanaged Lincoln S & L alive longer so that it could
buy more Milken junk, speculate more in real estate, cost the taxpayers more, and lose hun-
dreds of millions of dollars of debenture holder's money.. . . The Congress, like a Dark Ages
pope, will grant retroactive indulgences, plenary and eternal, for fraud, bribery, looting, inside
trading, cheating the government, and stock manipulation- with no countervailing gain at all
except to the treasuries of individual legislators.
Stein, Don't Mess with RICO-Congress Should Spurn Effort to Curb It, BARRON'S, July 3, 1989,
at 15, col. 4.
338. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
339. Id. at 2900 (quoting 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DiCTIONARY 357 (2d ed. 1989)).
340. Id.
341. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 158 (1960)).
342. Id. at 2902.
343. Id. As such, the Court developed a fairly precise six-step process that can be used for
determining if a "pattern" is present within the meaning of RICO. Two goals must be realized:
relationship and continuity (or a threat of continuity). To see if these two goals are met up to six
questions must be asked and answered: (1) is the series of acts (at least two) related to one an-
other, for example, are they part of a single scheme? (2) if not, are they related to an external
organizing principle, for example, to the affairs of the enterprise? If both questions are answered in
the negative, relationship is not present, one prong of the two-prong test is not met, and it is not
necessary to proceed further. If either question is ansered in the affirmative, up to three additional
questions must be asked: (3) is the series of acts open-ended, that is, do the acts have no obvious
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await, the Court concluded, on "future cases, absent a decision by Con-
gress to revisit RICO to provide clearer guidance. '344 The question
termination point? (4) if not, did the closed-ended series of acts go on for a substantial period of
time, that is, more than a few weeks or months? If either question is answered in the affirmative,
continuity is present. If both questions are answered in the negative, up to two additional ques-
tions must be asked: (5) may a threat of continuity be inferred from the character of the illegal
enterprise? (6) if not, may a threat of continuity be inferred because the acts represent the regular
way of doing business or a lawful enterprise? If either question is answered in the affirmative, a
threat of continuity is present.
344. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia-joined by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy-expressed considerable
dissatisfaction with the majority's decision on the meaning of "pattern." Id. at 2906-09 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia's concurring opinion is filled with sarcastic remarks, which are ex-
tremely out of character for usual Supreme Court discourse. The explanation in the legislative
history relied upon by the majority that "pattern" requires a showing of "continuity plus relation-
ship" was, he suggested, as helpful as the phrase "life is a fountain." Id. at 2907. "Relationship"
defined in terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) was "utterly uninformative." Id. He added that the phrase
"closed period of repeated conduct" communicates "no idea [of] what [it] means." Id. The Court's
discussion was, in short, "murky" and "vague." Id. at 2907-08. What "pattern" requires beyond
"two acts" was, for him, simply "beyond" understanding. Id. at 2908. But see Jones v. SEC, 298
U.S. 1, 33 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (stating that "[h]istorians may find hyperbole in the
sanguinary simile"); Supremely Surly (editorial), N.Y. Times, July 9, 1989, § 4, at 26, col. 1. The
New York Times stated that "[w]hat's [not] acceptable [in Supreme Court opinions] is the raucous
tone and unruly language. . . . [Tlhe cases are hard enough, mid maintaining public respect for
the Court difficult enough, without the added burden of inflammatory, surly argumentation." Id.
The speculation that Justice Scalia originally was assigned to write H.J. Inc., took too long to
do it, and lost the five votes necessary to produce a majority opinion to Justice William Brennan
may account for his intemperate language. See Greenhouse, Broad Use of RICO Is Upheld, N.Y.
Times, June 27, 1989, at D1, col. 6. "[T]he case appeared to have been unusually troublesome....
There was some evidence that Justice Scalia had initially been assigned to write the opinion but
was either unable to finish the job or was unable to hold four Justices to his view." Id. at D23, col.
3. More difficult to understand is his not too veiled suggestion that "pattern" is unconstitutionally
vague. H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2909 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that it "bodes ill for the day
when [it is] challenge[d]").
The Court's present jurisprudence on vagueness is hardly inconsistent with the statute. See
generally Blakey, Is "Pattern" Void for Vagueness?, Civ. RICO REP., Dec. 12, 1989, at 6. To be
sure, "ascertainable standards of guilt" are required. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515
(1948). But vagueness is a question of degree. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
"Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language."
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). The Constitution "does not require impossi-
ble standards." United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947). A statute is not vague merely
because it is difficult to determine if "marginal" cases fall within it. United States v. Powell, 423
U.S. 87, 93 (1975). Apart from first amendment considerations, statutes are judged in light of the
conduct of the defendant. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 501 (1982). Additionally, less clear notice is required when a person engages in commercial
activity, see Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8 (1983), or when state of mind is required,
see United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 523-24 (1942); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266
U.S. 497, 502 (1925). Moreover, vagueness is not present when two statutes-each with a different
penalty-apply, because the defendant knows the maximum, and no more doubt is present than
when a statute permits alternative punishments. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124-25
(1979). Finally, any possible unusual complexity in RICO is mitigated substantially by its use of
predicate offenses. It is not possible to violate RICO without first violating one of its predicate
offenses, not once, but at least twice. The line between guilt and innocence, which is at the heart of
the void-for-vagueness doctrine, is drawn under RICO at the point of the predicate offense. S. REP.
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raised is whether Congress should try to make "pattern" more definite.
No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) (stating that there is "no due process constitutional bar-
rier . . . [because] any proscribed act in the pattern must violate an independent statute"). No
persons seeking to keep their conduct within the law need fear the statute. All they must do is not
violate the predicate offenses. Public officials cannot use RICO impermissibly against the innocent,
because only those who independently violate the predicate offense are subject to RICO prosecu-
tions. Persons convicted of RICO lose their innocence when they violate the predicate offense.
Accordingly, those persons get their vagueness "bite" at that point. Complaining about RICO itself
is asking for "two bites" at the "vagueness apple." Accordingly, the issue of vagueness must be
faced at the point of the predicate offense, and if the predicate offense is "not unconstitutionally
vague, [then RICO] cannot be vague either." Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 109 S. Ct. 916,
925 (1989); see also United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding RICO
not vague because the predicate offenses are clearly defined), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); Blakey & Gettings, supra note 1, at 1031-33 (stating that "RICO
. . . [does] not draw a line between criminal and innocent conduct . . . [but] authorize[s] the
imposition of different criminal or civil remedies on conduct already criminal when performed in a
specific fashion").
Indeed, Fort Wayne should be read as settling the issue of the facial constitutionality of
RICO-type legislation. In Fort Wayne the defendant attacked Indiana's RICO statute on first
amendment grounds, which is the most stringent constitutional standard of vagueness, and which
permits its most searching possible attack, that is, "facial validity." Fort Wayne, 109 S. Ct. at 924.
The Court aptly observed:
[B]ecause the scope of the Indiana RICO law is more limited than the scope of the State's
obscenity statute-with obscenity-related RICO prosecutions possible only where one is guilty
of a "pattern" of obscenity violations-it would seem that the RICO statute is inherently less
vague than any state obscenity law; a prosecution under the RICO law will be possible only
where all the elements of an obscenity offense are present, and then some.
Id. at 925 n.7 (emphasis in original). The Court also rejected a challenge to the statute based on
the "draconian" character of the criminal sanctions. Id. at 925 (concluding that there is no "consti-
tutionally significant difference between the two potential punishments[, because they] . . . func-
tion quite similarly to an enhanced sentencing scheme for multiple obscenity violations").
What is not explained is how, as a matter of principled jurisprudence, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy could, along with Justice
Antonin Scalia, join in the Fort Wayne majority and Justice Scalia's H.J. Inc. concurrence. Apart
from ire at losing his opinion to Justice William Brennan, Justice Scalia appears to forget that a
major source of the difficulty with "pattern" under RICO may not be with semantics, but politics.
See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 190, at 33. Professor Lawrence Friedman stated that "uncertainty
exists not because but in spite of the text. What unsettles . . . rules is social contro-
versy-challenge, social demand." Id. Apparently, RICO is not hard to read, but hard to accept.
So far, the circuit courts of appeals generally have declined to face vagueness challenges to
RICO in the appeals already on their dockets. See, e.g., Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833,
836 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that "[o]n remand there will be ample opportunity to raise any ques-
tion about the constitutionality of RICO and to litigate the issue in the normal course of events").
The First Circuit, however, in United States v. Angiulo, in upholding the statute against a vague-
ness challenge by several organized crime figures, observed:
We begin by acknowledging that potential uncertainty exists regarding the precise reach
of RICO's "pattern of racketeering" element. The Court itself in H.J. Inc. acknowledged that
defining "pattern" has not proven to be an easy task and that the exact scope of the meaning
of "continuity plus relationship" cannot be fixed in advance with precise clarity. This admis-
sion, however, does not mean that defendants' vagueness challenge necessarily succeeds. The
statute is not rendered unconstitutionally vague simply because potential uncertainty exists
regarding the precise reach of the statute in marginal fact situations not currently before us.
Rather, in the absence of first amendment considerations, vagueness challenges must be ex-
amined in light of a case's particular facts. Thus, for defendants' vagueness challenge to suc-
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Wittgenstein 345 aptly observed: "For a large class of cases-though
not for all-in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined
thus: the meaning of the word is its use in the language. 3 46 Before an
effort is made to draft a more concrete definition of "pattern," it is nec-
essary to determine how the word is used in the statute. Any definition
of "pattern" also must meet two tests. First, the definition must work
in both criminal and civil litigation. Second, it must work in all sections
of the statute.3 47 Finally, careful attention must be given to the setting
in which the word appears in the statute. 48
ceed, they must demonstrate that the meaning and scope of RICO's "pattern" element was
unclear and vague as to their conduct at issue here. Phrased another way, they must show
that persons of ordinary intelligence in their situation would not have had adequate notice
that the gambling, loansharking and conspiracy offenses at issue here constituted a "pattern
of racketeering activity" under RICO.
Defendants have not even come close to making this showing, for if anything is clear
about RICO, it is that "a pattern of racketeering activity" is intended to encompass the activ-
ities of organized crime families. In H.J. Inc., the Court explicitly noted that in drafting
RICO to target "patterns" of racketeering activity, Congress' main focus was the eradication
of organized crime. Given the history behind RICO, we have no doubt that the murder con-
spiracies and the gambling and loansharking operations for which defendants were charged
and convicted here are precisely the type of activity that Congress intended to reach through
RICO. Thus, although RICO's "pattern" element may be vague in some contexts, a matter on
which we express no opinion, it is not vague in the context before us. A person of ordinary
intelligence could not help but realize that illegal activities of an organized crime family fall
within the ambit of RICO's pattern of racketeering activity.
Nos. 86-1331, 89-1212, 89-1800 (1st Cir. Mar. 8, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, US app file) (cita-
tion omitted) (upholding Mafia family member prosecution for conspiracy and substantive RICO
for gambling, loansharking, and murder). How cases outside of the organized crime area will be
handled remains an open question.
The courts do not experience such difficulties with similar concepts in other areas. See, e.g.,
Gregory v. Home Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 602, 604-06 (7th Cir. 1989) (interpreting an insurance policy
limitation of coverage, with the definition of "claim" being two or more of which arise out of
"single act . . . or series of related acts"); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1237
(7th Cir. 1986) (discussing municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) and holding that "a
plaintiff must allege a specific pattern or series of incidents that support the general allegation of a
custom or policy. . ."); Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 293 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (concluding that sexual
harassment cannot be occasional, isolated, or sporadic, but must be repeated, routine, or pat-
terned); United States v. Iron Workers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551-52 (9th Cir.) (defining the
"pattern or practice" prerequisite for an attorney general suit under Title VII as "'more than an
isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated routine of a generalized nature'" (quoting 110 Cong.
Rec. 14,270 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey))), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
345. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHIOSOPmCAL INVESTGATIONS 20e (2d ed. 1953).
346. Id. (emphasis in original).
347. A definition of "pattern" will be crucial for at least the following issues: (1) definition of
criminality (when an indictment may be returned); (2) statement of a claim for relief (when an
action may be brought); (3) principle of issue or claim preclusion (when an element may be liti-
gated or an action must be brought either criminally (double jeopardy) or civilly); (4) application
of statute of limitations (when, in whole or in part, it is too late to bring an action); (5) the scope
of discovery before trial; and (6) the admissibility of evidence at trial.
348. See Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HA4v. L. REv. 417, 417 (1898-1899)
(stating that "[y]ou have to consider the sentence in which [a word] stands to decide . . . [its]
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Under RICO, "enterprise" includes four basic types of organiza-
tions. 34 9 It includes commercial entities such as domestics5" and for-
eign 351 corporations, partnerships, 352  and sole proprietorships;
353  it
includes benevolent organizations such as unions,3 5 4 benefit funds, 55
and cooperatives; 35 it includes governmental entities such as the office
of a governor357 or legislator,358  a court 359 or a prosecutor,360 and po-
lice36 1 and general governmental agencies;3 62 and it also includes lawful
and unlawful associations-in-fact.3 63 Under RICO, "racketeering activ-
ity" includes five basic types of offenses.3 64 It includes violence, 65 the
provision of illegal goods and services, 66 corruption in the labor move-
ment,3 67 corruption among public officials, 68 and commercial and other
meaning[]"); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum, 339 U.S. 667, 678 (1950) (holding that "[tihe
same words in different settings, may not mean the same thing").
349. Blakey, supra note 1, at 291-99.
350. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871
(1980).
351. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-41 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1105 (1975).
352. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1185-86 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds and conviction reinstated, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
353. McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that a sole proprietor is
an enterprise if it has employees or associates); United States v. Benny, 559 F. Supp. 264, 266-71
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (holding that a personal real estate business operated by fraud is an enterprise),
afl'd, 786 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.) (following McCullough), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986); State v.
Bowen, 413 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (convicting a sole proprietorship dealing in stolen
property).
354. United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 199-200 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071
(1982).
355. United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 978 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439
U.S. 810 (1978), reinstated in relevant part, 591 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864
(1979).
356. United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040
(1982).
357. United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 994-95 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072
(1982).
358. United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981).
359. United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 (5th Cir. 1981).
360. United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir. 1980).
361. United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 685-87 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
935 (1980).
362. United States v. Hocking, 860 F.2d 769, 778 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Dozier, 672
F.2d 531, 543 & n.8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
363. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (holding that there is "no restriction
upon the associations embraced"); United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 221-24 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981).
364. Blakey, supra note 1, at 300-06.
365. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) (including murder, arson, and robbery).
366. Id. (including gambling, narcotics, and prostitution).
367. Id. (including kickbacks under 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1988)).
368. Id. (including extortion and bribery).
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forms of criminal fraud. 69 Accordingly, RICO makes unlawful four ba-
sic forms of "racketeering activity" by, through, or against an "enter-
prise": (1) receiving and using proceeds, (2) taking over, (3) operating,
and (4) conspiring to use, take over, or operate. Under RICO, the
"enterprise," therefore, plays four separate but not necessarily mutually
exclusive roles: perpetrator, victim, instrument, or prize.3 7 ' As such,
under RICO, "pattern" is used in its various violations in at least 240
different but related contexts.37 2 While the uses in each context may be
different, they reflect a "family of meanings.
' '
137
As the Supreme Court recognized in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co., the notion of "relationship" in "pattern" is not difficult
to apply.374 Acts may be related among themselves or by reason of a
369. Id. (including mail, wire, and securities fraud).
370. Section 1962 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in
which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18,
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and with-
out the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting
another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer
held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in
any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase
do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class,
and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the
issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any inter-
est in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id. § 1962.
371. Blakey, supra note 1, at 290-325, cited in Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 747 F.2d 384, 401 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)); G. DILLON,
INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS 68-82 (1977) (surveying the semantic role
literature).
372. Four kinds of enterprises times five kinds of predicate offenses times three sections
times four roles equals 240 contexts.
373. L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 345, at 36e (stating that "we see a complicated network of
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of
detail"); id. at 32e ("family resemblances"). See generally Goldsmith, RICO and "Pattern": The
Search For "Continuity Plus Relationship", 73 CORNELL L. REv. 971 (1988); Note, Reconsidera-
tion of Pattern, supra note 1.
374. 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2900-01 (1989).
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connection to an enterprise. 75 The principal tension in the use of "pat-
tern" comes from the concept of "continuity or its threat" and its con-
trasting uses in section 1962(a) (receive and use), section 1962(b)
(takeover), and section 1962(c) (operation). Emphasis on "continuity"
in subsections (a) and (c) appropriately focuses the statute so that it
does not apply to a single episode-the area of greatest alleged abuse in
the commercial field-but it tends to read subsection (b) out of the
statute, if the word is given the same inflexible meaning in each sec-
tion 70 In fact, some courts wrongfully follow that direction. 7 7 One way
to break this tension would be to eliminate the requirement of "pat-
tern" in subsection (b) for takeovers. It is not the provision most often
used in the commercial fraud area; its elimination in subsection (b)
would pave the way for a more rigorous definition in subsections (a)
and (c), reflecting the Supreme Court's H.J. Inc. approach.378
Sound arguments can be made, on the other hand, that Congress
should not further define "pattern." Like the concept of "fraud" itself,
"pattern" might be left flexible so it can be used in a variety of situa-
tions.3 79 RICO's sister provision, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
Act, is not difficult to administer.38 0 RICO should not be more difficult.
375. Compare United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (common
scheme), aft'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976) with United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 (5th Cir.) (not to each other, but to enterprise), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
953 (1978).
376. See United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that it "effec-
tive[ly] eliminate[s] this provision"); Paul S. Mullin & Assocs. v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532, 541 (D.
Del. 1986) (holding that it would require multiple takeovers).
377. See, e.g., A.L. Williams Corp. v. Faircloth, 652 F. Supp. 51, 55 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
378. It also would make sense to eliminate the "collection of unlawful debt" language in
subsections (a) and (c) and make the "collection of unlawful debt" a "racketeering activity." This
step would tighten up those subsections.
379. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.) (stating that "[tihe law
does not define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human
ingenuity"), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 186, at 212 (4th ed. 1846) (noting that "[i]t is not
easy to give a definition of fraud . . .; and it has been said, that these Courts . . . very wisely,
never laid down, as a general proposition, what shall constitute fraud. . . lest. . . means of avoid-
ing the Equity of the Courts should be found out").
380. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988); see Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985) (describing
it as a "carefully crafted prohibition"); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979). The Ninth Circuit held that the "continuing series" lan-
guage was not unconstitutionally vague and that the "phrases [in the Continuing Criminal Enter-
prise Act] cannot properly be considered in the abstract. They draw meaning both from each other





Unlike the antitrust statute, RICO does not provide for parens pa-
triae suits by state attorneys general.38' Such suits should be author-
ized.3 82 Their authorization would strengthen the statute in its impact
on both white-collar and organized crime. The experience with state at-
torneys general in the antitrust area demonstrates that such power will
not be abused.
U. Prejudgment Interest
Currently, courts are split on whether a party can recover prejudg-
ment interest under RICO.3"' Prejudgment interest is provided for
under the antitrust statutes. Congress should add a similar provision to
RICO, particularly if it reduces recovery to actual damages.384
V. Resolution or Clarification of Issues in Conflict
Any reform legislation should resolve or clarify major issues under
RICO that are in conflict among the courts. Congress should include a
provision which would provide that: (1) an enterprise may be a defend-
ant, if it is a perpetrator; (2) violations under the statute may have oc-
curred, even though the defendants did not act from a financial motive;
(3) associations-in-fact must be structured groups; (4) the personal act
rule is eliminated; and (5) state of mind is required.
First, Congress should set aside the result of the line of cases which
hold that, without regard to the circumstances, a person may not be a
defendant and an enterprise in criminal or civil RICO indictments or
complaints.388 The Eleventh Circuit properly rejected this rule in
United States v. Hartley.386 The defendant-enterprise rule reflects a
381. Illinois v. Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 1986).
382. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, tit. III,
90 Stat. 1383, 1394. See also App. E, infra pp. 1078-82.
383. Compare Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1988) (allowing the
recovery of prejudgment interest, but only to compensate) with Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781, 810-11 (E.D. La. 1986) (not allowing recovery).
384. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, supra note 382, tit. III, 90
Stat. at 1394. See also App. E, infra p. 1082.
385. The cases are collected in Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 314-15 (2d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986).
386. 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). See generally
Note, Innocence by Association, supra note 1. The reluctance of courts not to follow this rule set
forth in Hartley because of a concern with a "victim" enterprise moved the ABA's Civil RICO
Task Force, usually no friend to civil RICO, to comment: "[T]his hardly seems a reason to fashion
a general rule that applies even when the enterprise is not the victim, but is instead the perpetra-
tor." ABA RICO REPORT, supra note 70, at 375 n.607 (emphasis in original). In fact, the Task
Force recommended that the enterprise should be treated as a defendant under appropriate cir-
cumstances. The Task Force offered the following rationale for its position:
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technical reading of section 1962(c) which suggests that an enterprise
cannot be "employed by or associated" with itself. The rule also is
rooted in an unease at holding an entity, which is an enterprise, liable
when it is the "victim" of the pattern of unlawful conduct engaged in
[Sluppose the Board of Directors of a corporation commits multiple mail frauds in its opera-
tion of the company. Surely each participating member of the Board faces possible RICO
liability. The only policy reason not to hold the company liable as well is to protect corporate
assets owned by innocent shareholders. But this interest may well be outweighed by (1) the
preference of allocating risk of loss to persons who have exercised some choice in corporate
governance or who can otherwise potentially exercise some control over corporate affairs; (2)
the desire to encourage private enforcement actions when a legitimate enterprise is being
turned to corruption; (3) the need to encourage shareholders to insist upon internal audit
procedures to protect against such corporate activities; (4) the aim of ensuring full compensa-
tion of losses suffered by victims; (5) the availability of actions on behalf of the corporation or
shareholders against the Board members; and (6) the appropriateness of holding the corpo-
rate entity liable as a separate person just as many of the advantages of "personhood" inure
to its benefit. Accordingly, under circumstances like these, the policies underlying RICO
would appear to argue in favor of liability of an "enterprise" which also is a "person" pursu-
ing its affairs through racketeering activities.
Id. at 375-76.
It is difficult to evaluate the development and wide-spread acceptance of the enterprise-de-
fendant rule under § 1962(c) in the absence of any defensible rationale for it. To attribute the
rules' judicial development to the same economic-based motivation that lies behind its advocacy
by the Bar Association would be too facile. COORDINATING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 63, at 1-
2; see also id. at 10 (stating that "banks. . . [and] securities brokers. . . would be insulated from
the application of RICO ... ").
The simultaneous development of the rule that does not prohibit an enterprise from being a
defendant, at least in a majority of courts, under § 1962(a) undermines the general inference that
the courts are, as a whole, seeking to insulate corporations and other economic entities from appro-
priate legal accountability. Compare Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d
384, 402 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) with Rush v. Oppenheimer &
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Dean Roscoe Pound rightly offers powerful alterna-
tive explanations related to aspects of legal reasoning not immediately related to economic consid-
erations (force of logic, authority, etc.) of the development and growth of legal concepts, although
he concedes that "it would be grievous error to reject the economic interpretation wholly because
of the extravagances of its advocates [and that] it has an element of truth which we may not ignore
." R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 113 (1923). But see Mi COHEN, LAW AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER 329-30 (1933). Professor Morris R. Cohen stated:
[Pound] seems to argue as if the presence of ethical motives and logical reasons proves that
economic forces were not influential. This is clearly an inadequate view, since logical, ethical
and economic considerations are not mutually exclusive. There is a large mass of evidence to
show that our honest convictions are largely moulded by the interests of the class to which we
belong.
Id.; see also M. COHEN, AMERICAN THOUGHT 161 (1954) (stating that "[iut is clearly a case of what
James and Dewey have called vicious intellectualism to argue as if the presence of a good logical
reason for a rule of law excludes a social or economic motive for it"). The explanation for the
enterprise-defendant rule appears to lie in the force of shallow logic and snowballing precedent.
Once district courts adopted the rule-for the wrong reasons-it seemed to acquire a life of its
own, and it swept through the courts of appeals largely without careful or independent analysis of
its rationale or perverse consequences. Accordingly, it is to be hoped but not expected that the
remaining circuit courts of appeals will decline to adopt the rule, that the Eleventh Circuit will
remain firm in its opposition, and that eventually the Supreme Court will resolve the split by
rejecting the rule, or, that Congress, despite the American Bar Association, will overturn it.
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by a person employed by or associated with it. Neither justification,
however, supports the defendant-enterprise rule. The issue is not
whether the enterprise can be "employed by or associated" with itself,
but whether the conduct of a person, who is employed by or associated
with the enterprise, may be attributed to the enterprise under the usual
criminal rules of agency or respondeat superior. These same rules also
answer the other concern that underlies the defendant-enterprise rule.
When the enterprise is the victim, the conduct of a person employed by
or associated with the enterprise will not be attributed to it because
persons must act not only within the scope of their agency or employ-
ment, but also with intent to benefit their principal or employer.81 In
addition, the rule threatens to frustrate RICO's chief purpose-an at-
tack on organized crime groups-when it is used to strike down indict-
ments framed under a group enterprise theory.3 88 If the rule were
applied to the association-in-fact theory in a prosecution of an organ-
ized crime family, it would abort the prosecution.
Second, Congress should set aside the result of United States v.
Ivic,3 89 in which the Second Circuit reversed a RICO conviction because
no financial motive was shown for the offense. While RICO was in-
tended to attack the infiltration of legitimate business by organized
crime, it was not limited to that purpose; RICO was designed to apply
to any form of sophisticated criminal group engaging in specified kinds
of activities, including violence, without regard to the motive of the per-
petrators. Motive may be relevant, but no showing of a particular kind
of motive ought to be required. Ivic effectively eliminates RICO's appli-
cation to organized crime-related violence that is not specifically tied to
its money making endeavors; it also makes RICO's application problem-
atic to other violence-based conspiracies, including international terror-
ist organizations and domestic anti-Semitic or white hate groups. 90
387. See, e.g., United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 332 n.30,
337 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267, 284 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); see
also United States v. Spitler, 800 F.2d 1267, 1275-79 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a passive, but
not an active victim is excluded from criminal liability under Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S.
112 (1932)).
388. Compare United States v. Standard Drywall Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1283, 1292-94
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that a defendant cannot be one of a group constituting an enterprise)
with Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1074, 1075-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding
that a defendant can be one of a group constituting an enterprise).
389. 700 F.2d 51, 59-65 (2d Cir. 1983).
390. Terrorism, foreign or domestic, is an ugly fact in the modern world. In 1988 worldwide
international terrorist activity was almost unchanged, rising by three percent, with 856 incidents
compared with 832 for 1987. See GLOBAL TERRORISM, supra note 282, at 1.
Terrorists were responsible for three "spectaculars" in 1988-the hijacking of a Kuwaiti air-
liner in April, the attack of a Greek day-excursion ship in July, and the bombing of Pan Am Flight
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Third, Congress should set aside the result of the line of cases
103 in December. Id. From 1970 through 1985, some 24,722 foreign and domestic violent incidents
occurred, resulting in more than 45,000 deaths and 27,000 injuries. See generally CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERv., TERRORIST INCIDENTS INVOLVING U.S. CITIZENS OR PROPERTY 1981-1989: A CHRO-
NOLOGY (CRS Issue Brief IB86096 1990).
Domestic terrorism and similar types of violence are also present. Sadly, but increasingly, it is
a bad time to be a member of a minority group. If your name if Mulugeta Seraw and you live in
Portland, Oregon, it is not a good idea to stand on the public streets, at least when Skinhead-
connected people are around with baseball bats. You can get beaten to death. See Neo-Nazi Gets
Life Sentence for Beating Black to Death, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1989, at A21, col. 1. This violence
also can happen if you are a Jewish couple (with a 2-week-old infant), and even if a Black man
attempts to intervene. 4 Charged with Racial Attack in California, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1989, at
A19, col. 3. Skinheads do not like Blacks or Jews. See generally Barrett, Hate Crimes Increase
and Become More Violent; U.S. Prosecutors Focus on "Skinhead" Movement, Wall St. J., July 14,
1989, at A12, col. 1 (stating that hate crimes are increasing and that the Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith reports 3000 skinheads belong to explicitly racist organizations in 31 states). It is
not a good time either to be a federal judge on the Eleventh Circuit or a leader of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. See Page, Haters and Bigots Endanger Us
All, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 24, 1989, at 3C, col. 1. (reporting that the bombings of federal judge
and civil rights lawyer are thought to be racially motivated).
Domestic terrorist groups, which include neo-Nazi, Ku Klux Klan, and other violent racist and
anti-Semitic organizations, commit crimes including armed robbery, synagogue bombings, murder,
and arson. See generally ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, YOUNG AND VIOLENT. THE
GROWING MENACE OF AMERICA'S NEo-NAzI SKINHEADS (ADL Special Report 1988); CIVIL RIGHTS
Div,, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, THE HATE MOVEMENT TODAY: A CHRONICLE OF
VIOLENCE AND DISARRAY (1987) (reporting that criminal RICO prosecutions and civil suits substan-
tially undermining neo-Nazi, Ku Klux Klan and other violent racist and anti-Semitic groups).
Criminally, RICO is used effectively against a wide range of terrorist type activity in the
United States. See, e.g., Berger,,Report on Hate Groups Says They're Weaker, N.Y. Times, June
11, 1987, at A22, col. 4 (reporting that a study by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
concludes that federal prosecutions, including RICO, have "depleted the leadership" of several
groups). RICO is, as yet, largely unimplemented civilly against violent crime groups. Substantial
evidence supports the belief, however, that terrorist organizations engage in fraud to raise funds to
support their violent activities. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and in particular its
most violent subgroup, The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), for example, is
widely involved in a variety of fraudulent fund-raising activities in the United States. The PLO
and its related subgroup are implicated in food stamp fraud, arson, insurance fraud, auto insurance
fraud, and securities/bond fraud. In 1980 federal investigators uncovered a food stamp ring oper-
ated by 47 Palestinians in New York, Denver, Chicago, and San Francisco. Landauer, An "Ab-
scam" Evolves with Actual Arabs, in Grocery Business, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1980, at 1, col. 4. The
$400,000 profits reaped from this fraud were alleged to have been donated to the PLO. Although
the Department of Agriculture officials denied the operation was centrally controlled, Representa-
tives William Wampler (R-Va.), Marvin Mathis (D-Ga.), and Steven Symms (R-Idaho) pointed to
PLO involvement. Both police informants and an arrested Jordanian told police that the rash of
New York City grocery store fires in the late 1970s was the product of arson perpetrated for the
purpose of acquiring insurance proceeds for the PLO. See Lathem & Smith, The Arab Arson Con-
nection, Passaic Morning News, Dec. 14, 1979, at 1, col. 4; Egan, PLO Terrorists Cash in on City
Arson Racket, N.Y. Post, July 30, 1979, at 13, col. 2. More than 100 PLO sympathizers also organ-
ized an automobile insurance fraud scheme in the late 1970s in California. Auto Insurance Fraud
Is Believed to Aid PLO, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1977, at A24, col. 2. Two members of the group
admitted the money obtained by the fraud was funneled to the PLO. This scheme, in which multi-
ple-insurance autos were destroyed by the owners, apparently netted nearly $5 million. Lindsey,
Insurance Frauds by Arab Students Said to Aid P.L.O., N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
Recently, PLO advisor Hassan Zubaidi was implicated in selling forged and valueless Indonesian
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holding that the existence of an enterprise may be demonstrated merely
by showing a pattern of predicate offenses. A person who is attempting
to demonstrate the existence of an enterprise should be required to
show the existence of a distinct structure beyond that which is merely
required for the commission of the predicate offenses.39' If this rule is
not adopted, the concept of "enterprise," which is a distinct element of
the offense relating to the existence of an entity, would be reduced to a
mere conspiracy or merged with the concept of a "pattern" of predicate
offenses, which is a separate and distinct element of the offense relating
to the commission of individual offenses. 2
Fourth, Congress should set aside the result of the line of cases
which requires that each person named as a defendant in an indictment
or complaint personally committed, or agreed to commit, the minimum
number of acts required to constitute a pattern. This rule originated in
dictum in United States v. Elliott,s39 in which the Fifth Circuit used it
as a rule of evidence, that is, an agreement to commit the number of
acts required to constitute a pattern could be inferred from the actual
commission of the required number of acts. The Fifth Circuit, however,
bonds to undercover agents. Zubaidi is said to have diverted the profits of the enterprise to PLO
terrorists. Morais, The Assad Connection, FORBES, June 15, 1987, at 32. Arab-Americans also have
purchased a considerable number of "mom and pop" food stores, including over 700 in the San
Francisco area, in recent years. Allegations indicate that these store owners are being "assessed"
payments by the PLO. Landauer, supra, at 1, col. 1. These payments are said to be funded
through various fraudulent activities, including coupon fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Fakhoury,
819 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1987). Recently, a Southern Florida United States Postal Service prosecu-
tion of 70 defendants for coupon fraud connected many of the defendants with PLO activities.
Glabman, PLO Coupon Clip: Millions of Dollars Reportedly Diverted, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 9,
1987, at 1. A primary defendant admitted ties to the PLO, and authorities believe that profits from
the clipping operation were funneled to the PLO.
Not only do the PLO and its subgroups operate widely in the United States, but many of its
assets are invested in this country. The modification of RICO to provide "a much-needed civil
remedy to the victims of violence by domestic extremist groups . . . and various forms of violence
commonly practiced by international terrorist organizations" is supported by the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith. H.R. 1046 Hearings, supra note 48 (statement of the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith). The "civil rights statutes are not drafted to reach organizations which
engage in patterns of racial or political violence." Id. RICO would facilitate such litigation, because
"a civil action could be predicated simply upon a pattern of violent behavior." Id. See generally
134 CONG. REc. S2770 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (statement of Rep. John Conyers) (discussing hate
crimes and RICO reform); Nathan & Justen, Law Enforcement Against International Terrorists:
Use of RICO Statute, 60 COLO. L. REv. 553 (1985).
391. Compare United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 659-65 (8th Cir.) (requiring a "dis-
tinct" structure), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 1040 (1982) and United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214,
223-24 (3d Cir.) (following Bledsoe), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983) with United States v. Maz-
zei, 700 F.2d 85, 87-90 (2d Cir.) (rejecting Bledsoe), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983) and United
States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915, 921 (11th Cir.) (rejecting Bledsoe), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856
(1983).
392. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
393. 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
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treated the rule of evidence as a rule of law in United States v. Mar-
tino,394 and held that responsibility could not be established under
RICO unless a party could show the personal commission of the re-
quired number of predicate offenses, or an agreement to commit them
personally. The personal act rule then was adopted by other courts. 95
It was rejected by other courts.3 96 Ironically, the Fifth Circuit no longer
follows the rule.3 97
The personal act rule should be set aside. It is inconsistent with
traditional jurisprudence, which recognizes aiding and abetting or con-
s liracy theories of responsibility without a requirement that the aider,
aoettor, or coconspirator personally engage in the substantive of-
fenses.3 8 Under the personal act rule, a leader of an organized crime
family, like a Luciano, who keeps his hands "clean" by merely directing
others will not be criminally or civilly responsible for a RICO conspir-
acy or for violating RICO substantively by aiding and abetting. Such a
result is indefensible.
Fifth, Congress should set aside the result of the line of cases which
holds that RICO is a strict liability offense, that is, because no state of
mind element is set out expressly on the face of the statute, no state of
mind is required for a violation of RICO other than that required for
the commission of the predicate offense.3 99 The rule is not generally ac-
cepted4 0 The Fifth Circuit followed the better rule in United States v.
Elliott,40 1 in which it held that Elliott could not be convicted of RICO,
even though he engaged in drug offenses, unless he was aware of the
other essential element of the RICO violation. The usual rules for read-
ing into statutes a state of mind element should apply under RICO.
:394. 648 F.2d 367, 394 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds on reh'g, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc), rev'd and aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16
(1983).
395. See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981).
396. See United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1115-16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 906
(1985); United States v. Alonso, 740 F.2d 862, 870-72 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1166
(1985); United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 619-20 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Carter, 721
F.2d 1514, 1528-32 (11th Cir. 1984).
397. See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1339 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1984).
398. See, e.g., People v. Luciano, 277 N.Y. 348, 361, 14 N.E.2d 433, 446 (holding that
Luciano, a founder of organized crime, did not take an active part in the management of daily
operation of a prostitution business, "but he cannot escape his criminal responsibility as the leader
and principal"), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 620 (1938).
399. See, e.g., United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 961 (1981).
400. See, e.g., United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 661 (8th Cir.) ("express[ing] grave
doubts as to the propriety of these holdings"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982).
401. 571 F.2d 880, 903-04 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
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State of mind is a question of legislative intent.4°2 State of mind gener-
ally will be read into common law, but not regulatory offenses.4 3 RICO
is not a regulatory offense: it is more analogous to a common-law of-
fense. As such, the defendant's conduct should be held to be "know-
ing," while any surrounding circumstances and the result of that
conduct should be held to be "reckless." No state of mind should be
required for elements of the offense-value or use of an instrument of
commerce-that are only of grading or jurisdictional significance.04 No
persuasive reason can be offered for treating RICO as if it were not like
other similar offenses requiring an appropriate showing of state of mind
for each essential element. Given its seriousness, it is anomalous to
treat RICO as a strict liability offense.
W. Discovery and Findings in Arbitration
Currently, RICO claims for relief are subject to voluntary agree-
ments to arbitrate. 05 Any reform legislation should include a provision
402. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406-09 (1980).
403. Compare United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922) (regulatory) with Moris-
sette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52 (1952) (common law).
404. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 n.9 (1975). See App. E, infra pp. 1086-87.
405. Shearson-American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). Doubtlessly, Shear-
son-American Express reflects flawless legal reasoning; it also makes good sense from a perspective
of crowded court dockets. Nevertheless, it may mean something else altogether to living people.
Consider for example:
In the summer of 1987, Patricia Chegut of Englewood, N.J., received $51,751 as the set-
tlement of a dispute involving her ex-husband's business. Mrs. Chegut, a single parent living
"from paycheck to paycheck" on her teacher's salary, saw the money as a security blanket for
herself and a ticket to college for her 9-year-old son, Derek.
On the advice of her accountant, she says, she invested the funds with an old friend of
his, a broker at Shearson Lehman Hutton in New York, and empowered the two of them to
make her investments.
No one familiar with the gritty edges of Wall Street will be too surprised at what hap-
pened next. Mrs. Chegut's funds were invested in stock index options, a risky gambit usually
used by very wealthy speculators. Her account was traded so energetically that brokerage
commissions ate up $10,000 of her money in less than three months. Even before the October
1987 market crash, Derek's college funds were gone and Mrs. Chegut's home had become
dangerously mortgaged. Her accountant, she says, persuaded her to take out a home equity
loan for $45,000 to add "a cash cushion" to her account. After the crash, she faced a sea of
debts, including a bill from Shearson for $56,000 to cover losses run up on her behalf.
When she consulted a lawyer, Mrs. Chegut discovered that, like a substantial number of
American investors, she had signed papers to open her account requiring her to submit any
dispute with Shearson to a brokerage-industry arbitration panel, precluding her from taking
her grievance to court. By February 1988, like thousands of other investors stung by Black
Monday, she had filed an arbitration complaint against her broker and Shearson for misrepre-
sentation. And like scores of others, she found little comfort in the outcome. Not only did
Mrs. Chegut fail to recover any of her investment, but she has not been able to learn why
arbitrators ruled against her.
Henriques, When Naivete Meets Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
Ms. Chegut may be a victim of her own naivete about investing. She also may be a victim of
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for discovery and findings of fact in arbitration proceedings. The provi-
sion also should exclude from arbitration crimes of violence and provide
that arbitration agreements obtained through adhesion contracts are
not enforceable. To make arbitration effective, Congress also should in-
clude a provision for prearbitration discovery, so that just results may
be obtained; and findings of fact, so that awards will have finality."'
X. Demonstration Related Litigation Abuse
Few can disagree that the aftermath of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services407 promises continued
controversy and public demonstrations involving those who support and
oppose abortion. Recently, the Third Circuit in Northeast Women's
Center, Inc. v. McMonagle40 8 upheld the use of civil RICO in the con-
text of antiabortion demonstrations at an abortion clinic. The potential
for litigation abuse in this area is manifest, and its impact could chill
proabortion or antiabortion demonstrations. In fact, up to 30,000 indi-
viduals were arrested throughout the Nation in approximately 380 pro-
tests over the past year in connection with such demonstrations. 40 9 If all
of these individuals become embroiled in RICO litigation in the federal
courts (thirty to a suit), it will increase the number of RICO cases by a
factor of three. The suits, too, would be complex conspiracy' litigation.
Such suits are being filed.410 Nevertheless, the danger of litigation abuse
what is a deeply flawed process for settling grievances on Wall Street: a mandatory arbitration
system that is blatantly biased, that is inadequate, and that undermines the investor protection
provided under the Nation's 1933 and 1934 securities laws. Id.
The complaints against the current system are many. The system, critics say, never was
designed to cope with the volume or complexity of the cases it now handles. Id. at 6, col. 1. Arbi-
trators are selected by the exchanges and associations that are beholden to their members, not
customers. Id. A need exists for stating reasons and findings to back up decisions. Id. The overall
data on results are not comforting. The results produced give little indication to disbelieve the
critics: about half of investors win something, but seldom more than 21% of what they sought. Id.
Thus, minimum reforms, if only in basic fairness, are necessary. See also Robb, Massachusetts
Sets Change in Settling Investor Disputes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1988, at 33, col. 5 (reporting that
Massachusetts plans to be the first state to ban mandatory arbitration agreements by brokerage
firms, that 16 other states are poised to consider similar action, and that the SEC siaff proposed
such a rule, but in the face of strong industry pressure, the Commission voted to improve
procedures).
406. See C.D. Anderson & Co. v. Lemos, 832 F.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding
preclusion between arbitration and court); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1282.6-1283.1 (West 1982) (au-
thorizing discovery in arbitration). See also App. E, infra pp. 1067, 1074-76.
407. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
408. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 261 (1989). One of our number, Profes-
sor G. Robert Blakey, was a counsel of record in the petition for certiorari in McMonagle.
409. Johnson, Connecticut Abortion Protesters Clog Jails, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1989, at B1,
col. 2.
410. See Town of Brookline v. Operation Rescue, Inc., No. 89-0805-T (D. Mass. filed Apr. 13,
1989) (suit by municipality under, inter alia, RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988), and the Hobbs
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and of a chill on first amendment rights in the federal courts is not
RICO-specific. The original claim for relief in McMonagle included, for
example, counts for antitrust, trespass, intentional interference with
contractual relation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault,
battery, libel, and slander.411 Similar demonstrations take place in
peace rallies, at nuclear facilities, and at research hospitals that use ani-
mals. The Supreme Court guidelines for civil litigation in the area of
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988), against prolife protestors to recover the costs incurred by the munici-
pality to arrest protestors who participated in sit-ins at Brookline, Massachusetts abortion clinics);
Allegheny Women's Center v. Operation Rescue, Inc., No. 89-0792 (W.D. Pa. filed Apr. 10, 1989)
(alleging RICO violation based upon allegation that picketing and sporadic blocking of doors, with-
out any entry into clinic, constituted Hobbs Act extortion); Roe v. Operation Rescue, Inc., No. 88-
5157 (E.D. Pa. filed June 29, 1988); National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, No. 86-C-7888 (N.D. Ill.
filed Feb. 2, 1986) (alleging violation of RICO as a result of defendants' alleged conspiracy to steal
the bodies of aborted babies from garbage disposals in the Chicago area and transport them across
state lines for burial); North Highland Bldg. Corp. v. Operation Rescue, Inc., No. 88-2121 (W.D.
Pa. filed Sept. 30, 1988) (suit by owner of building that leases space to abortion clinic alleging
RICO violation based upon allegation that picketing and sporadic blocking of doors, without entry
into clinic, constitutes Hobbs Act extortion). Those intimately involved in this litigation, at least
on the defendants' side, are virtually unanimous in their expression of belief and frustration that
the federal courts are being used to suppress antiabortion demonstrations contrary to the first
amendment and the unequivocal teaching of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886
(1981). These parties are bringing actions in federal courts under a variety of theories, including
RICO, antitrust, civil rights, and interference with contract. Standard RICO complaints are circu-
lated by groups such as the National Abortion Federation, a trade organization for the abortion
industry. See LEGAL CLEARINGHOUSE, NAT'L ABORTION FED'N, GOING TO COURT AGAINST ANTIABOR-
TION ACTION: A MODEL PLEADINGS BOOK (1987). Incredibly, the American Civil Liberties Union,
while decrying RICO, is advocating its use in abortion demonstrations. Compare Glasser, RICO
Chickens Come Home to Roost, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1989, at A14, col. 3 (reporting that in 1988,
"RICO began to be used systematically to threaten First Amendment rights . . .") with ACLU,
PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE: How TO DEAL WITH DISRUPTION AT AN ABORTION CLINIC ch. 6
(1987) (providing instruction on the filing of RICO suits against prolife protesters). The litigation
is being used to harass antiabortion demonstrators by including people in the complaints who are
not even remotely involved in any unlawful activity, but who are merely sympathetic to the an-
tiabortion movement, by making sweeping discovery requests for confidential materials (including
membership lists, appointment books, and telephone records), and scheduling extensive deposi-
tions at widely separated times and places. Neither district courts nor magistrates are showing
vigilance in policing these blatant abuses of the litigation process. Soundly based motions to dis-
miss and motions for summary judgment are being denied routinely, forcing innocent persons to
stand costly and time-consuming mass trials. Juries are being asked to return general verdicts with
only vague guidance, when Supreme Court jurisprudence mandates far more discriminating proce-
dures, including special instructions and special verdicts. Astronomical sums are being spent on
attorney's fees to obtain paltry, if any, damages awards and to impose similar costs on defendants
of modest means. The principal purpose and calculated effect of these litigation tactics are to chill
the exercise of constitutional rights in the antiabortion movement. See generally Melley, The
Stretching of Civil RICO: Pro-Life Demonstrators Are Racketeers?, 56 UMKC L. REV. 287, 309-12
(1988); Hentoff, The RICO Dragnet, Wash. Post, May 13, 1989, at A19, col. 1; Mario Cuomo,
Racketeer? (editorial), Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1989, at A16, col. 1. See also Califa, ACLU: RICO Chil-
ling Effect "Enormous," NAT'L L.J., June 5, 1989, at 72; Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43
VAND. L. REV. 805 (1990).
411. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1347.
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free speech are fairly specific, if not apparently widely known.412 Con-
gress should codify these guidelines, strengthen them, provide for dis-
covery and evidentiary limitations, and provide related provisions that
will make possible early vindication of litigant and lower court abuse in
first amendment litigation. RICO reform legislation provides an appro-
priate vehicle for making those general changes.
Y, Necessities and Forfeiture
In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States413 and its com-
panion decision United States v. Monsanto,"' the Supreme Court held
that assets subject to forfeiture under the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act of 1984415 include assets that were to be used to pay bona fide legal
fees and that such a forfeiture was consistent with the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel and due process under the fifth amendment.
These decisions settle the constitutionality of such forfeitures. Their
wisdom, however, remains a matter for congressional debate.'16
While few would argue with the proposition that a "robbery sus-
pect ...has no Sixth Amendment right to use funds he has stolen
from a bank to retain an attorney to defend him if he is appre-
hended,"' 7 the interests implicated are somewhat more complicated." 8
Four situations may be broadly distinguished: (1) wholly innocent
defendants (sufficient "clean" funds will probably be relatively easy to
identify); (2) white-collar defendants, innocent or not (sufficient "clean"
funds will probably be relatively easy to identify); (3) professional or
organized crime defendants, innocent or not ("clean" funds, if any, may
well be intertwined with "tainted" funds, an insufficient amount of
which may be not more than five years old); and (4) indigent defend-
ants, innocent or not (no funds of any kind). Forfeiture issues are cru-
cial only in the category of the professional or organized crime offender;
they focus on the process of disentanglement and the ultimate proof of
separation of "clean" and "tainted" assets. They are not limited to for-
412. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1981).
413. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
414. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
415. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2044.
416. Justice Harry Blackmun's dissent in the decisions, for himself and Justices William
Brennan, Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens, may be read, not only as constitutional, but
also as policy arguments. See Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2678 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that
the fact "[t]hat a majority of this Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Act . . .will not
deter Congress . . . from amending the Act to make clear that Congress did not intend" to seri-
ously undermine the basic fairness of our criminal justice system).
417. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2652.




feiture of legal fees, but extend to all "necessities," including food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care. The basic problem with such forfeit-
ures is that they threaten to render defendants in RICO and similar
prosecutions "legally indigent" before trial and conviction.
Four interests may be distinguished in the forfeiture context. First,
victims of crime are interested in preventing the use of "their" funds to
defend "perpetrators." Second, another class, which is comprised of
suspects, defendants, and offenders, is concerned with having "its"
funds available to be used for fair trial, counsel, and other "necessities."
A third interest is represented by third parties, who want to have the
ability to deal in arms length transactions with those suspected or in-
dicted without fear of losing consideration extended in good faith.
Fourth, society is involved in each of these interests combined, and, just
as importantly, it possesses an interest in maintaining an economically
viable defense bar in complex criminal proceedings. The reconciliation
of these conflicting interests is not beyond the wit of fair minded peo-
ple. A court ought to have the discretion to set aside a reasonable sum
for necessities, except when an identifiable victim's property is at issue.
"Untainted" funds should be used first. The government should not
seek revenue enhancement but merely the sterilization of illicit funds.
Otherwise, it ought to be viewed as a trustee of the funds for the benefit
of innocent persons.
Z. Labor Disputes
A central purpose of RICO is to vindicate the rights of victims of
corruption in the labor-management area.4 19 Nevertheless, RICO was
not designed to be used as a negotiating tool in the standard collective
bargaining context. Litigation in this area, however, is being instituted.
Fortunately, district courts act to sanction its most abusive manifesta-
tions.420 One of the least justifiable suits filed in this area is Texas Air
Corp. v. Air Line Pilots, Association International.42 1 Little or no dis-
cretion was exercised in joining parties even remotely related to the un-
ions now so deeply involved in the struggle, not yet settled, over the
future of Eastern Airlines. Congress should enact a specific amendment
that will make clear its intent to leave the parties to resolve their dis-
419. See generally S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969); Blakey & Goldstock, "On
The Waterfront": RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 Am. Cam. L. REV. 341 (1980). For a proposal,
see App. E, infra p. 1067.
420. See, e.g., WSB Elec. Co. v. Rank & File Comm. to Stop the 2-Gate Sys., 103 F.R.D. 417
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (applying rule 11 sanctions to the use of RICO in a labor dispute).
421. Civ. No. 88-804 (S.D. Fla. 1989). The embattled unions have counterclaimed with their
own civil RICO suit. Texas Air Corp, Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1989, at A4, col. 3. That any substance
exists in either suit is questionable.
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putes at the bargaining table. This form of litigation abuse ought to be
curtailed.
IV. CONCLUSION
On February 1, 1990, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved an
amended version of Senate Bill 438.4"2 The New York Times editorial-
ized against the Bill to no avail.423 The vote was twelve to two.42 4 Floor
opposition to the measure, however, is assured,425 and the ultimate out-
come is uncertain, as the controversy is hardly settled.426 House Bill
422. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDING THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS ACT, S. REP. No. 101-269, 101ST Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990) [hereinafter S. REP.]; S.
438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (amended version). Brushing aside complaints from consumer
groups, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. observed, "Broad language that may be appropriate against
the Mafia can be abused when used in garden-variety fraud cases." Revamping Racketeering Law
(editorial), N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1990, at A12, col. 5.
423. The New York Times has editorialized:
The Senate Judiciary Committee's vote on a bill masquerading as a "reform" of RICO,
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, could provide the year's first indica-
tion of Congressional seriousness about ethics and public justice. The bill would remove or
weaken the strong civil remedies now available to victims of commercial fraud perpetrated
either by mobsters or white-collar professionals who behave like mobsters.
The 1970 RICO law could use some improvement, such as denying plaintiffs the right to
label defendants as "racketeers" when they sue for fraud unaccompanied by typical mob vio-
lence. Otherwise it's a splendid Federal civil fraud law especially suited to 1990. It gets re-
dress from the perpetrators of fraud, not just from the Federal Treasury. And it helps victims
by letting them sue privately on their own behalf whether or not the Government prosecutes
the perpetrators.
"RICO reform" has been kicking around so long that lawmakers may not have the nerve
to vote for it with a straight face.
RICO Racket in the Senate (editorial), N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1990, at A14, col. 1.
424. S. REP. supra note 422, at 10.
425. Biskupic, An Edgy Senate Committee OKs Relaxation of RICO, CONG. Q., Feb. 3, 1990,
at 329 (reporting that Sen. Alan Cranston announced his opposition after meeting with constitu-
ents trying to recover through RICO litigation money invested in worthless bonds sold by Lincoln
Savings). Sen. Cranston said: "Civil RICO suits are one of the most effective ways that individuals
who have been defrauded by sophisticated financial schemes can recover their losses. . . . We
should be strengthening not weakening, the penalties for consumer fraud." Id. "We* see the tide
turning," said Pamela Gilbert, a consumer lobbyist. "We hope to beat the bill on the Senate floor."
Hagedorn & Marcus, Law: Senate Judiciary Committee Approves RICO Reform Bill, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 2, 1990, at B6, col. 2.
426. See Biskupic, supra note 425, at 330. Richard Moe, lobbyist for the American Institute
of Public Accountants, argued: "The consumer's lobby and plaintiffs' lawyers don't want a change.
. . . They get tremendous leverage out of treble damages, attorneys fees, and calling the defendant
a racketeer. . . . They are now trying to politicize this by linking it to the savings and loan crises."
Id. Public Citizen and United States Public Interest Research Group stated: "This nation is suf-
fering through a white-collar crime wave, from insider trading on Wall street to S&L fraud on
Main street; from commodities fraud in Chicago to telemarketing fraud in California. It would be
fitting cause for citizen outrage if Congress' responses to this avalanche of sleaze is to weaken the
laws against fraud." Id.
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1046 is not moving in the House Judiciary Committee.427 Instead, Rep-
resentative William Hughes is continuing to develop the "gatekeeper"
approach he espoused in this Symposium.
428
The principal changes in the reported version of Senate Bill 438
would clarify the ability of state insurance commissioners to recover for
injury to state guarantee funds,429 clarify the ability of federal insurance
agencies to recover for money paid out in connection with financial
losses,4 30 authorize suits by Indian tribes within the government suit
427. Id. at 330 (reporting that House Judiciary Committee members are taking a different
track, which would complicate efforts to agree on a single RICO overhaul); Hagedorn & Marcus,
supra note 425, at B6, col. 2 (reporting that the House Judiciary Committee is drafting a different
approach).
428. See Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much is Needed?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 639 (1990). But see
Abrams, A New Proposal for Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA L. REv. 1, 27 (1989) (sug-
gesting that the Department of Justice approve all private civil RICO suits, because it is "appro-
priate for the office of prosecution to be selected as the screening agency"). For a proposal based
on the principles of federal prosecution of the Department of Justice, see App. E, infra pp. 1063-
84. See also Civiletti, U.S. Department of Justice Principles of Federal Prosecution, 27 CR!M. L.
REP. (BNA) 3277 (Aug. 6, 1980).
429. Section 5, which amends 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), is amended to add in (c)(1)(A) after
"injured":
or a Department of insurance of a State which controls distribution of a fund generated
by the regulation of the business of insurance, for injury to the fund in connection with the
insolvency or liquidation of an entity engaged in the business of insurance,
It also is amended to add in (c)(1)(B) a new paragraph:
(iv) a Commissioner of insurance of a State if authorized by state law to sue, or by certifi-
cation of the State Attorney General if required by State law, who has been appointed liqui-
dator or rehabilitator of an entity regulated by such Commissioner, if the injury is to the fund
controlled by the department of insurance and is in connection with the insolvency or liquida-
tion of an entity engaged in the business of insurance.
These amendments to S. 438 were added to clarify the authorization of insurance commissions to
sue for injury to state insurance funds. S. REP., supra note 422, at 18. The amendments would set
aside the result in Corcoran v. American Plan Corp., 886 F.2d 16, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding
that the superintendent of insurance lacked standing to sue for injury to a fund when fraud was
directed toward insurance company). These provisions move in the right direction. They generally
leave unremedied under RICO's treble damages provisions, however, fraud against insurance com-
panies themselves, even when they are taken over for insolvency by state commissioners. Treble
damages recovery is limited to damage to the fund, not the insolvent entity. In the absence of a
record of misuse of RICO by public officials, this narrowing of the statute is unjustified.
430. Section 5, which amends 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), is amended to add in (c)(1)(A) after
"United States": "including monies paid out by a governmental corporation by operation of stat-
ute requiring compensation of persons for financial loss." This amendment to S. 438 was added to
clarify the authorization "of Federal governmental corporations to sue under RICO for damages
arising out of the savings and loan and financial crisis. . . ." S. REP. supra note 422, at 18; see
supra note 91 and accompanying text. It moves in the right direction, but it does not go far
enough. Left generally unremedied under RICO's treble damages provisions are injuries to the
financial institutions themselves. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. In the absence of a
record of misuse of RICO by public officials, this narrowing of the statute is unjustified. Finally,
the right of the Securities Investor Protection Corp. to sue remains unclarified. See supra note 221
and accompanying text.
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category,43 1 authorize the recovery of attorney's fees,4 32 circumscribe the
use of RICO in certain first amendment areas,433 and limit the retroac-
tive features in the original draft. 4 A bad bill made better, however,
431. Section 5, which amends 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), is amended in (c)(1)(B) to add:
(iii) the chief legal officers, or other legal officer authorized to sue, of an Indian tribe as
defined by 25 U.S.C. § 450(b), if the injury is to the business or property of the Indian tribe,
or
This amendment is a welcome addition. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. Unfortu-
nately, a parallel amendment was not made to the definition of "government entity" under para-
graph (10).
432. Section 5, which amends 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), is amended to add in (c)(2)(A) after "civil
action": "and the costs of the civil action including a reasonable attorneys fee." The amendment is
a welcome addition. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, it still leaves open
issues that should have been clarified. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
433. A new § 3 is added:
NON VIOLENT PUBLIC SPEECH
Section 1962 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding the following at the
end thereof:
(e) For purposes of this chapter, the term "racketeering activity" shall not include partic-
ipation in, or the organization or support of, any non-violent demonstration, assembly, pro-
test, rally or similar form of public speech undertaken for reasons other than economic or
commercial gain or advantage, and no action may be maintained under this chapter based on
such activities.
This amendment to S. 438 was added "to prevent the use of RICO actions as a means of sup-
pressing or penalizing the exercise of First Amendment freedoms." S. REsP. No., supra note 422, at
7. The amendment's goals are welcome. See supra note 407 and accompanying text. The means
chosen, however, may not achieve the end. The amendment will apply to criminal and civil pro-
ceedings, as it amends 18 U.S.C. § 1962. The Committee Report, therefore, should have indicated
that it would be improper to raise the first amendment bar in general fraud or other criminal or
civil proceedings. See Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (holding that
"[t]he State may ... prohibit ... speech related to illegal behavior"); Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d
673, 678 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding a civil action under RICO for fraudulent lifetime partnership
in a religious enterprise). Courts may reach this result without clarifying language. It would have
been helpful if the Committee Report had been explicit. No doubt litigation will be made more
difficult because it was not included. The language chosen may not have the effect of making
future abortion related litigation beyond the pale. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1349 (3d Cir.) (holding that jury award was proper, because it was
based on forcible entry that went beyond "mere dissent and publication of ... political views"),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989). In fact, the language may be read more easily to validate
McMonagle type litigation, which is obviously not the Committee's intent. Finally, by including
"other than economic or commercial gain or advantage," the amendment unjustifiably discrimi-
nates against the valid exercise of first amendment freedoms in other contexts. See, e.g., Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (invalidating state antipicketing law under the first amend-
ment in context of a labor dispute).
434. Section 9 is rewritten to read:
EFFECTIVE DATE
This Act and the amendments made to this Act shall apply with respect to civil actions
commenced after the date of the enactment of this act.
The original draft of the effective date provision applied to pending suits. S. REP., supra note
422, at 24; see supra note 331 and accompanying text. Controversy over the application of the
legislation to the failed Lincoln Savings and Loan Association led to the amendment. See supra
note 101 and accompanying text. To underscore the modification in the Judiciary Committee
markup, Senator Dennis DeConcini "waved a large tablet of paper toward reporters and cameras
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remains a bad bill. Unless substantial additional changes are made,
Congress should not pass Senate Bill 438.
In January 1931, Warner Bros.-First National released a film enti-
tled Little Caesar.435 Based on a book by W.R. Burnett,436 the movie
and recited the words on the page: 'The RICO Reform Bill Does Not Apply to the Lawsuit Against
Lincoln.'" Biskupic, supra note 425, at 329.
The New York Times editorially commented:
Initially [S. 438] . . .would have wiped out pending lawsuits like the claim of California
investors against Charles Keating, whose Lincoln Savings and Loan Association sold them
uninsured and now worthless junk bonds. The bill's sponsor, Senator Dennis DeConcini of
Arizona, was shamed into dropping that provision because he is one of the "Keating Five,"
the Senators whom Mr. Keating brazenly enlisted in his attack on Federal regulators.
That leaves at least two major problems. One is that Senator Deconcini's willingness to
preserve lawsuits like the Keating case doesn't bind his Congressional colleagues; other mis-
guided "reformers" may move to restore language that exempts pending cases. Another is
that the bill would eliminate many treble-damages actions in the future. Future Charles Keat-
ings who are powerful or clever enough to escape Federal regulation wouldn't have to fear
treble-damage suits from defrauded customers.
RICO Racket in the Senate (editorial), N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1990, at A14, col. 1.
The editorial writers also might have commented that the bill is still retroactive to conduct
engaged in before its effective date for which a suit is not filed. Approximately 1500 pending civil
RICO suits will not be retroactively affected. See supra note 332. The number of suits that will be
retroactively affected, however, far exceeds 1500. A victim under RICO may bring a claim for relief
within four years. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987). The
period of limitations does not begin to run until the victim knows or should have known of the
claim. See, e.g., Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1484, 1489-90, 1494 (D.C. Cir.
1989). Suit will be possible, therefore, for at least four years after the effective date of the legisla-
tion for conduct that occurred before its effective date. Approximately 1000 suits are filed each
year. See supra note 46. As such, while 1500 suits are saved by the new retroactive provision, as
many as 4000 suits still will be retroactively subject to the new rules. The litigation that will be
affected also may be expected to come from the current savings and loan, securities, commodities,
insurance, and pension fund scandals. It is misleading to suggest, therefore, that the legislation is
no longer retroactive.
435. Little Caesar (Wisconsin/Warner Bros. Screenplay Series 1981) [hereinafter Script].
Little Caesar, which was directed by Mervyn LeRoy, took 31 days to shoot in July and August of
1930. A. GANSBERG, LITTLE CAESAR: A BIOGRAPHY OF EDWARD G. ROBINSON 41 (1983). Warner Bros.,
however, withheld it from release until its January 21, 1931, premiere in New York City, hoping to
get the most mileage out of it. Id. at 42-43. The movie was "an immediate smash hit, surpassing all
box office records of Warner's ... earlier gangster [movies] . . . ." Peary, Introduction: Little
Caesar Takes over the Screen, Script, supra, at 25 [hereinafter Peary Script]; A. GANSBERG,
supra, at 47 (stating that it is "one of the highest grossing films of 1931"). Along with William
Wellman's The Public Enemy (Warner Bros. 1931), which starred James Cagney, and Howard
Hawks's Scarface (United Artists 1931), which starred Paul Muni, it became one of the classic
gangster films of the 1930s. J. GABREE, GANGSTERS: FROM LITTLE CAESAR TO THE GODFATHER 15
(1973); A. KNIGHT, THE LIVELIEST ART 161-62 (1957). In these three films, all of the basic icons of
the genre were established: clothes, as a mark of social standing; cars, as a special tool of violence;
guns, as an instrument of unbridled power; telephones, as an extension of the power to dominate;
women, as either mothers or mistresses; and the city, as the background for the gangster's rise and
fall. Id. at 17-29; see also S. KAMINSKY, AMERICAN FILM GENRES 23-43 (1957). The basic character
of the movie gangster also was established:
The gangster believes that might makes right. He cares nothing for other people's morali-
ties. He lives by a code, but one drawn so narrowly in his own interest that it doesn't act as a
limit on his behavior. His business is crime-bootlegging, gambling, prostitution, drugs. He
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was modeled loosely on the life of Alphonse Capone." 7 The principal
lets nothing stand in his way. His weapons are anything that will do the job. He lives outside
society, preying on it, undermining it; left unchecked he would destroy it.
Politically, the gangster is an anarchist, even though his own institution, the mob, is rig-
idly authoritarian. Wherever he strikes at society he weakens it, destroys its self-respect,
leaves it less able to function and survive. His attitude toward society is reflected in the envi-
ronment he inhabits: he lives in a world of sirens and gunfire, of dark, menacing streets and
threatening shadows. His efforts to "be somebody" are successful only at the expense of other
people, and he spares no one to satisfy his drive to power. He is tough, cold-blooded, ruthless,
brutal, often unbalanced, always as cunning as he is evil.
But he has that other side. If he is the personification of much that is wrong with
America, he is also an expression of American ideals. He achieves many of the goals-power,
money, fame, status-that are held out by society as symbols of success. What is he if not the
rugged individualist, the aggressive entrepreneur. He vanquishes his enemies, overcomes often
incredible odds to come out on top. His energy, dedication, and ingenuity make us admire
him, in some films even love him.
J. GABREE, supra, at 13-14.
436. W. BURNETT, LITTLE CAESAR (1929). During a long and prolific career, Burnett wrote a
number of classics, including High Sierra in 1940 and The Asphalt Jungle in 1949. Peary Script,
supra note 435, at 13. Burnett conceived of the Little Caesar story after reading of the rise and fall
of the Sam Cardinelli gang in Chicago, Illinois. Id. Thus, Rico's story originally was not patterned
after the life of Alphonse Capone.
437. Jack L. Warner says he bought the Burnett novel because he thought Rico "was a thinly
disguised portrait of Al Capone." J. WARNER & D. JENNING, My FIRST HUNDRED YEARS IN
HOLLYWOOD 199 (1964). Robert N. Lee and Francis Edwards Faragoh were assigned to do the
shooting script. Peary Script, supra note 435, at 14. Lee's initial draft retained the elements from
the novel that made Rico resemble Capone (proletariat Italian origins, rabidly ambitious gunman,
fastidious dress, etc.). Lee also transformed Burnett's "Big Boy" into a refined and polished figure,
so that Rico alone would resemble Capone. Diamond Pete Montana was modeled after Diamond
Jim Colosimo, the boss in Chicago when Capone arrived from New York; he based Rico's shooting
of Alvin McClure, the new crime commissioner, on the murder in 1926 of William McSwiggin, an
assistant states attorney of Cook County. Faragoh's final script also added other elements, includ-
ing the funeral scene, which was modeled on the 1924 processional for Dion O'Banion, a Chicago
gangster, and the final scene, which ended with the Mother of Mercy line. See generally id. at 16-
17.
The literature on Capone and his era in Chicago is extensive. One of the best biographies is J.
KOBLER, CAPONE: THE LIFE AND WORLD OF AL CAPONE (1971). Contemporary material is reviewed in
the classic J. LANDESCO, ORGANIZED CRIME IN CHICAGO (1968 reprint). The Special Senate Commit-
tee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver,
also traced the rise and fall of Capone. See THE KEFAUVER REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME 31-42
(Didier ed. undated); E. KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA 53-57 (1951). The story of Capone's downfall
is tole in F. BUscH, ENEMIES OF THE STATE 174-231 (1954) and E. NESS & 0. FRALEY, THE UNTOUCH-
ABLES (1947).
In March 1929 a group of Chicago citizens visited President Herbert Hoover and told him that
their city was ruled by Capone. Hoover then directed the Department of Justice and the Treasury
Department to investigate and prosecute him. H. HOOVER, MEMOIRS: THE CABINET AND THE PRESI-
DENCY, 1920-1933 276-77 (1952). A two-pronged strategy was developed. Frank J. Wilson headed
up a special unit of the Internal Revenue Service that directed its attention to Capone's tax re-
turns. F. BUSCH, supra, at 196. Eliot Ness was in charge of a special unit of the Prohibition Bureau
that directed its attention to Capone's beer empire. See E. NESS & 0. FRALEY, supra. Capone was
charged with and convicted of tax evasion. See Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 286 U.S. 553 (1932). A separate indictment for a violation of the prohibition law was
not tried, because of the sentence on the tax charge, for which he ultimately served 10 years. F.
BUSCH, supra, at 229. While Capone was one of this Nation's most notorious gangsters, Capone
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character in the movie was Caesar Enrico Bandello or "Little Caesar"
or "Rico," played by Edward G. Robinson.43 The movie portrays the
rise and fall of an underworld figure; it tracks his rise from an obscure
gas station robber to a powerful leader in organized crime, who ulti-
mately meets a tragic end, hiding out in a flop house, being shot in an
alley by police bullets, and gasping incredulously, "Mother of Mercy-is
this the end of Rico? 439 Robinson's characterization of Rico became
the prototype of the film gangster, and the end line of the movie is one
of the most famous in film history.
Less well remembered is the portrayal by veteran character actor
Sidney Blackman of "Big Boy," the upperworld figure behind the rack-
ets. Big Boy was not brought to justice in the movie, either by police
bullets or by prosecution.44 0
himself may have summed up most aptly the public's ambivalent attitude toward him: "[T]hey
called Capone a bootlegger .... What's Al done? He's supplied a legitimate demand.. .. Some
call it racketeering. I call it a business." J. KOBLER, supra, at 313.
438. Like all great casting stories, the role of Rico did not just fall into Robinson's lap. See
generally A. GANSBERG, supra note 435, at 40. Mervyn LeRoy had seen Robinson in The Racket, a
successful Broadway theater production, when it played in Los Angeles. Warner, however, wanted
Clark Gable for the part; Gable was tested, but he did not get it, because Warner thought his ears
were too big and his features too wide-eyed. J. WARNER, supra note 437, at 200. Today Little
Caesar is remembered largely for the image of Robinson snarling, "Yeah, yeah." In fact, these lines
were not in the original script. Peary Script, supra note 435, at 169-72. LeRoy added a final scene
in which Rico, down and out in the flophouse, overhears two bums reading a newspaper that con-
tains a put-down on Rico, who then calls Flaherty, a policeman, and challenges him in a conversa-
tion, in which the "Yeah, yeah" lines appear; they became Robinson's trademark. A. GANSBERG,
supra note 435, at 42.
439. The last line in Burnett's novel is: "'Mother of God,' he said, 'is this the end of Rico?'"
BURNETT, supra note 436, at 158. In the late 1920s, however, the Motion Picture Producers and
Distributers of America, which was organized in 1922 in the wake of a series of scandals in the
movie industry, advised members "just how far they dared go." A. KNIGHT, supra note 435, at 112.
The rules were quaintly Victorian: "if virtue were always rewarded and sin punished, if good even-
tually triumphed and evil doers perished miserably, the law of God, man and drama would be
simultaneously satisfied." Id. Nevertheless some films were censored. "Mother of God" became,
therefore, "Mother of Mercy." M. FREEDLAND, THE WARNER BROTHERS 55 (1983). Duly edited, the
question will be "remembered ... as long as there are pictures." Id.; see also A. GANSBERG, supra
note 435, at 42.
440. Peary's essay, otherwise remarkable, does not, for example, even mention "Big Boy" in
its treatment of "The Meaning of Little Caesar." Peary Script, supra note 435, at 17-21. But see S.
KAMINSKY, supra note 435, at 36. Stuart Kaminsky stated:
In the gangster film, the gang is often a loose feudal system with individual war lords
held in two by one strong regent who reports to a mysterious boss or bosses. The bosses
remain above the gang, anonymous, aloof, but in control. When the bosses are revealed, we
find they are "upper class," affluent, influential, wealthy. They may be idle rich (Sidney
Blackmer in Little Caesar), bankers and government officials (Bullets or Ballots), or appar-
ently respectable middle-class businessmen (Jack Elam in Baby Face Nelson and Fred Clark
in White Heat). It is these upper- and middle-class bosses, hiding behind a gang leader of
courage, whom we are taught to hate in the gangster films. They, in the midst of the Depres-
sion we know exists in the films of the 1930s (but which we seldom see), are accumulating
wealth, taking what there is of available money, wearing tuxedos, and living off the labor of
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It is suggested that RICO the federal statute at least was titled
after Rico the film character. 4 ' Be that as it may,442 the statute in fact
was designed to change the ending of the movie. Racketeers-like
Rico-should not be shot by the police. They are entitled to due pro-
cess. Big Boys-racketeers as much as their underworld counter-
parts-should not be above the law. 4 3 They, too, deserve due process as
ambitious gangsters who have risen from the working classes. We see the gangster take the
risks, hold the small gang bosses in line, protect his own position, exact tribute from the
workers who don't have enough for themselves, and finally, inevitably, fall, only to be re-
placed by another like himself while the bosses continue to be protected. This pattern is
apparent in Little Caesar, in which the Big Boy is not caught or punished, and can be seen,
strikingly, in the quasi-gangster film On the Waterfront, where Lee J. Cobb is the ambitious
gangster who fronts for the bosses.
In contrast to the upper-class manipulators-the social chairmen of the board of
crime-are the workers, the on-the-line gangster. Between these extremes are the tragic
figures of the genre, the Ricos, members of a minority trying to get ahead. The attainable goal
of such men is to replace the man who reports to the bosses, to replace a man who, like
himself, also has risen from a lower class. More recently, in films like The St. Valentine's Day
Massacre, The Godfather, The Valachi Papers, and Honor Thy Father, we see an ironic
twist-the immigrant gangsters as bosses, controlling destinies and dividing spoils at busi-
ness-like meetings of the board.
Id.
441. Judge Milton I. Shadur wondered, "[g]iven... [RICO's] very awkward title and the
convenient acronym it generated . . . [whether] the person who christened the legislation was a
movie buff with a sense of humor. . . [for in] 'Little Caesar,' the first Hollywood gangster movie
of the '30s. . ., Edward G. Robinson played the thinly disguised Al Capone leading role-and was
named 'Rico.'" Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 21 n.1 (N.D. III. 1982).
Judge Shadur's question was first raised by Newsweek reporters, Tony Marro and Elaine Shannon,
in a story on RICO that appeared in Marro & Shannon, Are Prosecutors Going Wild over RICO?,
Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 8, 1979, at 32, col. 1. They reported that G. Robert Blakey, "who had a
major role in drafting the statute . . . will neither admit nor deny that the title was [so] con-
strued." Id. For an alternative, but not necessarily inconsistent, explanation of the development of
RICO's title, see Blakey & Gettings, supra note 1, at 1025.
442. John Ford's The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (Paramount 1962), which starred
James Stewart and John Wayne, makes the point that a legend surrounding an incident may be
more important than the incident. In Ford's classic western, a newspaperman learns that Wayne, a
gunfighter, not Stewart, a rising political figure, who is about to be nominated for Congress, shot
Valance, a notorious gunfighter. When faced with either printing the truth or continuing to pro-
mote a political persona, the newspaperman responds, "This is the West, Sir. When the legend
becomes fact, print the legend," Id.
443. Edmund Burke put it well to his son in 1793: "A very great part of the mischiefs that
vex the world arises from words. People soon forget the meaning, but impression and the passion
remain." E. BURKE, SELECTED WRITING AND SPEECHES 269 (P. Stanlis ed. 1963). Contrary to the
contentions of legislative reformers, "racket" and "racketeer" are not words limited to "organized
crime" in the classic mobster sense. Etymologically, the basic term is probably onomatopoeic. 8
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 94 (2d ed. 1989). Its principal meaning is "noise;" its secondary
meaning is "reveling" or "merrymaking"; and its tertiary meaning is "a fraudulent scheme, enter-
prise or activity." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1871 (1966). Murray I. Gurfein wrote:
Racketeering, a term loosely applied to a variety of criminal schemes has not yet received
exact legal definition. . . . It . . . applies to the operation of an illegal business as well as to
the illegal operation of a legal business ....
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much as they deserve to be brought to justice. If RICO contributes to
The word gained currency in the 1920s, but its origin remains obscure. . . . [T]he most
plausible [theory notes that the] . . . .word racket has long been used to describe a loud
noise and hence a spree or party or "good time." In the 1890s social clubs of young men in
New York City, under the auspices of political leaders, gave affairs called rackets; since
among their number there were members of neighborhood gangs, it was found easy to coerce
local tradesmen to buy tickets.
Gurfein, supra note 316, at 45. Hence, obtaining money by coercion or fraud became racketeering.
Calling business fraud anything else, therefore, is a euphemism. On the role of euphemisms in
encouraging public and official reluctance to enforce the law and providing rationalizations for the
violators themselves in the area of white-collar crime, see TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 82, at
104-08 (stating that "most white collar crime is not at all morally neutral"); D. CRESSEY, supra
note 82, at 102 (noting that the fact that embezzlers rationalize their conduct as different from
theft is an important factor in their behavior pattern).
Objection to RICO's racketeer label, however, may go deeper. Indeed, Professor Harry Elmer
Barnes, one of the Nation's leading sociologists, argued in 1934 that it was in part the failure to
bring white-collar crime to justice that contributed to the developments during Prohibition of or-
ganized crime:
Both crime and racketeering of today have derived their ideals and methods from the busi-
ness and financial practices of the last generation . . . .It is a law of social psychology that
the socially inferior tend to ape the socially superior .... It was inevitable that, sooner or
later, we would succeed in "Americanizing" the "small fry"-especially the foreign small fry.
...All was relatively safe, since the legal profession was already ethically impaired through
its affiliations with the reputable racketeers .. . .The idea that when prohibition is ended
the racketeers . . . will meekly and contritely turn back to blacking shoes . .. is downright
silly. They will apply the technique they have mastered to the dope ring .... They will find
crafty lawyers all too willing to defend them from the "strong arm" of the law for value re-
ceived. . . . So long as the lawless can get protection in return for keeping corrupt politicians
in office, we shall not be free from the crime millstone about our necks.
"Rackets" Hearings, supra note 82, at 710-11 (testimony of Harry Elmer Barnes). The origins of
many modern fortunes are in the conduct of nineteenth century Robber Barons who could just as
easily be referred to as racketeers. Antipathy toward identifying the affinities between unlawful
conduct in the upperworld and the underworld may lie, therefore, not so much in resentment
toward a misplaced comparison, but toward the messenger who speaks the truth. See E. Rosow,
BORN TO LOSE: THE GANGSTER FIrM IN AMICA 11 (1978). Eugene Rosow observes:
The gangster's origins in industrial America can be found in the actions and attitudes of
men like Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jim Fisk, Jay Gould, Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller,
and J.P. Morgan-the captains of capital who dominated America's age of enterprise....
The Robber Barons, the richest and most powerful men in America, were so named by jour-
nalist E.L. Godkin because they behaved like the feudal German noblemen who extorted
money from passersby and acted as a law unto themselves. They were strongly etched in the
public imaginations as models of successful Americans. ..
"'Rico's a smart guy! Everything's going to be all right,' whispers Otero to Tony as Little
Caesar tells the gang his plans for a holdup. 'Well, Sir, he is a smart man,' was the repeated
defense made of the famous persons who had so quickly pre-empted railroads, ore fields and
harbor rights. Jay Gould was universally envied for his smartness and so was Jim Fisk smart;
. . ; the age admired him without stint .... What Fisk did, like other Robber Barons, was
to amass a fortune as quickly and ruthlessly as possible.
Id. Indeed, the gangster in the 1930s movie may be seen as a perverse incarnation in art of the
Horatio Alger hero. A. BERGMAN, WE'RE IN THE MONEY 7-9 (1971); see S. KAMINSKY, supra note 435,
at 24.
The gangster films of the 1930s, of which Little Caesar was the first, were generally semi-
conscious attempts to deal with the Depression and the public's shaken confidence in Ameri-
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equal justice under law, for those in the upperworld as well as for those
in the underworld, its end through so-called reform legislation, designed
by the Big Boys of this world, is not in the public interest.4"
can economics, politics, and myths of the self-made man.. . . Specifically the business milieu
of the gangster film reflects our view of American business enterprise in general, even if we
happen to be part of a business structure which does not conform to this view.
Id. But see A. KNIGHT, supra note 435, at 238 (stating that "[i]f there was any element of escapism
in these films, it lay in their tendency to blame isolated individuals for what were in fact national
problems"); see also Jowett, Bullets, Beer and the Hays Office: Public Enemy (1931) in AMERICAN
HISToRY/AMERICAN FILM: INTERPRETING THE HOLLYWOOD IMAGE 69 (J. O'Connor & M. Jackson eds.
1987). "[Tjhe comparison between the gangster and the grasping, well-organized, business tycoons
* . .must have been obvious [to movie audiences]. The gangster embodied both the best and the
worst elements in the American ideal ... .. Id.; see also Yates, The Godfather Saga: The Death
of the Family, in MoviEs As ARTIFICES: CULTURAL CRITICISM OF POPULAR FILM 198-99 (M. Marsden,
J. Nachbar & S. Grogg eds. 1982). John Yates observes:
The Godfather and its sequel [are about] American corruption .... [Francis Ford] Cop-
pola's mobsters constantly refer to themselves as "businessmen." The meeting of the heads of
the families in Part I mirror the meeting in Part I1 of Michael, Hyman Roth, and Batista
with the heads of the various U.S. corporations. "We're bigger than U.S. Steel," Roth boasts
later to Michael. It is clear that size, and the ruthless will to do anything to achieve that size,
are the only differences between U.S. Steel and the Mafia. The business of America is busi-
ness, as Calvin Coolidge said; it's what the country is all about, and that core is rotten in The
Godfather.
Id. Coppola himself said of the Godfather.
I always wanted to use the Mafia as a metaphor for America. If you look at the film, you
see that it's focused that way. The first line is "I believe in America." I feel that the Mafia is
an incredible metaphor for this country. Both the Mafia and America have roots in Europe.
America is a European phenomenon. Basically, both the Mafia and America feel they are
benevolent organisations (sic). Both the Mafia and America have their hands stained with
blood from what it is necessary to do to protect their power and interests. Both are totally
capitalistic phenomena and basically have a profit motive. But I feel that America does not
take care of its people. America misuses and shortchanges its people; we look to our country
as our protector, and it's fooling us, it's lying to us. And I thought the reason the book was so
popular was that people love to read about an organisation (sic) that's really going to take
care of us. When the courts fail you and the whole American system fails you, you can go to
the Old Man-Don Corleone-and say, "Look what they did to me," and you get justice.
Farber, Coppola and the Godfather, in 41 SIGHT AND SOUND 217, 223 (Autumn 1972) (quoting
Francis Ford Coppola). Some confirmation of Coppola's artistic judgment may be seen in the
award of Oscars to The Godfather in 1972 and The Godfather II in 1974. ALMANAC, supra note 93,
at 357. It also may be seen in that The Godfather ($86,275,000) and The Godfather II
($30,673,000) are among the top money-making films of all time. All-Time Film Rental Champs,
VARIETY, Jan. 20, 1988, at 26, 26-27. Mario Puzo, who wrote the script for the Godfather series with
Coppola, shares Coppola's judgment on the relationship between the Mafia and business. M. Puzo,
THE GODFATHER PAPERS AND OTHER CONFESSIONS 70, 225 (Fawcett Crest) ed. undated. Puzo's best
selling The Godfather (1969) also remains in print in paperback. The fate of RICO may well de-
pend on whether or not life imitates art.
444. After this Article went to print, Michael Milken pleaded guilt. The plea vindicated "the
whole prosecutorial effort" against Milken, according to Attorney General Richard Thornburgh.
See Cohen, Milken Pleads Guilty to Six Felony Counts, Wall St. J., April 25, 1990, at A12, col. 6.
The plea also underscores the need for RICO to remain a strong weapon to battle fraud in this
country. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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CHART COMPARING Rico REFORM ACT OF 1989 AND PRESENT LAW
RICO Reform Act of 1989
Introduction
In 1970 Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act, title
IX of which is known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act or "RICO." 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). RICO prohibits
"enterprise criminality," that is, "patterns" of "racketeering," includ-
ing: (1) violence; (2) the provision of illegal goods and services; (3) cor-
ruption in government, or unions; and (4) criminal fraud; by, through,
or against various kinds of "entities." Licit entities include corpora-
tions, partnerships, unions, and governmental entities. Illicit entities in-
clude organized crime and violent crime groups.
In addition to criminal sanctions, the statute authorizes govern-
mental civil suits and a treble damages claim for relief with attorney's
fees for injury to business or property for victims of RICO violations.
RICO Reform Proposals
Various proposals to reform RICO have been made in the past sev-
eral congressional sessions. Some proposals reflected an effort to
strengthen the statute, but none have altered its core provisions.
S. 1523, sponsored by Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, was reported, as
amended, by the Senate Judiciary Committee to the full Senate on May
24, 1988. See S. REP. No. 458, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). When it was
introduced it was similar to H.R. 2983.
H.R. 4923, sponsored by Rep. Rick Boucher, was introduced on
June 28, 1988. It was identical to S. 1523, as reported by the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
H.R. 4920 was introduced by Rep. John Conyers and Rep. Don Ed-
wards on June 28, 1988. It was similar in structure to S. 1523, as re-
ported, but it also reflects many of the provisions of H.R. 3240.
S. 2793 would have created a new federal anticorruption statute,
applicable to federal, state, and local corruption.
None of this proposed legislation passed in the 100th Congress.
The RICO Reform Act of 1989 was introduced on February 23,
1989, by Sen. Dennis DeConcini and Rep. Rick Boucher. This chart of
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CIVIL RICO CASES FILED Nov. 1985 - DEC. 1986
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Average per month - 82
Pending as of 9/30/89, 1549
Source: Letter of Pamela D. Crawford, Civil Program Analyst, Administrative Office of the United States Court
to G. Robert Blakey (June 16, 1989): Letter of EUyn L. Vail, Chief, Non-Criminal Branch, Administra-
tive Office of the United States Court to G. Robert Blakey (Jan. 18, 1990); Telephone interview with
Ellyn L. Vail (Jan. 31, 1990).
Compare Jost, Racketeering Law Comes Under Attack, 1989 EDITORIAL Rs., REP. 134, 141 (noting the
types of reported civil RICO filings: 37% commercial fraud: 34% securities commodities fraud: 5.3%
profession crime; 4.2% unfair trade practices; 3.6% employment disputes; 1.8% political corruption;
14.1% other) with Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Tech-
nology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62
NOTE DAME L. Rzv. 526, 621 (1987) (52.7% common-law fraud; 32% securities fraud; 29% not stated;
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TAbLE No. 2
Types of RICO Indictments Criminal RICO Indictments 1981-1989*
' '2 ' 8....4 .... 8 . ' ........




'81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89
*The government estimates that 217 indict-
ments were returned between 1970 and
1981.
Source: Telephone interview with Lester M. Joseph, Organized Crime and Racketeer-




DETAILED COMMENT ON "ABUSIVE" CASES
The following fifty-three "abusive" cases include the case name
and citation as included in the Business/Labor Coalition for Civil RICO
Reform Report. Each section labeled "Coalition Comment" is the
description of the case included in the Coalition's Report. The "Analy-
sis" section is a comment on the facts by the Author.'
1. Abernathy v. Erickson2
Coalition Comment
An ex-wife brought a civil RICO action against her former husband
for defrauding her of an interest in real property. The wife complained
that she did not receive certain proceeds from the sale of property, a
hunting lodge.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the case for failure to allege a
"pattern" and for failure to file within the statutory period. These fil-
ings should not continue in the future. If they do continue, the filing
parties should be subject to sanctions.
2. A.L. Lee Corp. v. SRE Carlsbad, Inc.'
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a coal mining equipment manufacturer, brought a
civil RICO action against a business it was acquiring, alleging fraudu-
lent misrepresentations as to the marketability of the acquired busi-
ness's products.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the case for failure to allege a
"pattern." These filings should not continue in the future. If they do
continue, the filing parties should be subject to sanctions.
1. The able assistance of Joseph E. Bauerschmidt (Notre Dame Law School Class of 1991),
Mary K. Hartigan (Notre Dame Law School Class of 1991), and Bernardo M. Garcia (Notre Dame
Law School Class of 1991) in the preparation of this Appendix is acknowledged. The Coalition
Report is a currently unpublished document, available from the Business/Labor Coalition for Civil
RICO Reform and on file with the Author.
2. 657 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (coalition's case number 34). The cases have been rear-
ranged to make them alphabetical.
3. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] RICO Bus. Disputes Guide (CCH) 6903 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(coalition's case number 14).
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This case also suggests that the Coalition did not develop its list of
"abusive cases" through thorough investigation. The "abusive" list in-
cludes ten cases, including A.L. Lee Corp., which appear on pages 7971
through 8054 of the Business Disputes Guide Transfer Binder (1987-
88).
3. American Society of Contemporary Medicine, Surgery & Ophthal-
mology v. Murray Communications, Inc.4
Coalition Comment
Civil RICO action arising from a breach of contract dispute over
the publication rights of two of the Society's medical journals.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed part of a RICO counterclaim.
The counterclaim, however, was partially valid because the plaintiff al-
leged a pattern of fraudulent withholding of monies due. This case is
not abusive.
4. Ark Travel, Inc. v. Travellers International Tour Operators, Inc.'
Coalition Comment
The plaintiffs, individual travel agents, brought a civil RICO action
against several tour packagers over a dispute concerning commissions
owed by the tour packagers to the travel agents.
Analysis
The district court properly upheld the fraud claims of travel
agents, who systematically were swindled out of commissions. The court
also granted the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to allege fraud
with more particularity. The litigation is not abusive.
5. Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London6
Coalition Comment
Lloyd's of London and the Lincoln Insurance Company denied a
claim under a fire insurance policy because they believed the fire had
been set by one of the plaintiffs. The plaintiff brought a civil RICO
action against both companies, alleging that "defendants [through the
4. 547 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (coalition's case number 35).
5. Civ. No. 84-623 (D.N.J. Feb. 12, 1985), reprinted in 2 RICO L. REP. 283 (Aug./Sept. 1985)
(coalition's case number 48).
6. 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (coalition's case number 42).
1022 [Vol. 43:851
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use of the mails] have engaged in a scheme to defraud by fraudulently
refusing to pay claims without valid reasons in order to force persons to
compromise their claim for an amount less than they are entitled to
under the insurance policies."
7
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the case for failure to allege a
"pattern" and for failure to plead fraud with particularity. These filings
should not continue in the future. If they do continue, the filing parties
should be subject to sanctions.
Nevertheless, while one may consider this litigation inappropriate,
it is not beyond the pale to consider that an insurance company could
engage in a pattern of fraud that might be an appropriate subject for
RICO litigation."
6. Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a condominium developer, brought a civil RICO ac-
tion against two purchasers of an office condominium and the two pur-
chasers' wives, alleging the defendants were trying to "extort" an
unreasonably high price from the developer in connection with the de-
veloper's effort to repurchase the property in order to include it in a
block of units the developer wanted to sell to IBM. The district court
dismissed the claim, stating, "If its allegations are true, it might have
an approved claim, but it is at best a garden-variety commercial breach
of contract, perhaps fraud, even perhaps conspiracy.. . . But this is not
what RICO was designed to remedy."'10 The Fourth Circuit overturned
the district court's dismissal, concluding that the allegations might
make out a claim of "extortion" under state law, and therefore ruled
the developer could bring the RICO action.
Analysis
The district court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim for relief, holding that the activities had to be "racketeer" re-
7. Id. at 356.
8. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1245, 244 Cal. Rptr. 540
(1988) (upholding RICO fraud because insurance company fraudulently intended to cancel direc-
tors and officers' liability policy at first sign of hostile takeover and tried to coerce insureds into
accepting a replacement policy with higher deductibles, higher premiums, and exclusion clauses for
acts related to hostile takeovers).
9. 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984) (coalition's case number 44).
10. Id. at 1062-63 (quoting the district court's oral opinion from the bench).
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lated. The Fourth Circuit properly reversed on this issue.
Battlefield Builders, however, no longer states the law. Today, a
court would dismiss this litigation on "pattern" grounds.11 As such, fil-
ings of this type should not continue in the future. If they do continue,
the filing parties should be subject to sanctions.
7. Beauford v. Helmsley
12
Coalition Comment
The plaintiffs, tenants of an apartment building, brought a civil
RICO suit against the developer, the developer's sales agent, and two
engineering firms in connection with the conversion of their apartment
building to a condominium.
Analysis
Although the district court and a panel of the Second Circuit dis-
missed the RICO count for failure to allege a "pattern," on a rehearing
en banc 3 the court held its previous focus on the "continuity of the
enterprise" was amiss:
Since Congress's goal in fashioning its definition of "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity" was to exclude from the reach of RICO criminal acts that were merely "iso-
lated" or "sporadic," we must determine whether two or more acts of racketeering
activity have sufficient interrelationship and whether there is sufficient continuity
or threat of continuity to constitute such a pattern. Accordingly, our analysis of
relatedness and continuity has shifted from the enterprise element to the pattern
element.
14
The court first stressed that the defendants mailed offers to 8286 te-
nants and potential buyers. The defendants also made several amend-
ments to the offering, which included the original misrepresentations.
The court then appropriately concluded that "[t]here [could] be no
question that the thousands of alleged mail frauds . . . had the neces-
sary interrelationship to be considered a pattern."' 5 Finally, due to the
vacancy rate, the court held that "there was reason to believe that simi-
larly fraudulent mailings would be made over an additional period of
years."' 6 As such, Beauford cannot fairly be termed anything but an
example of a systematic fraud properly within RICO.
11. See, e.g., Flip Mortgage Corp. v. McElhone, 841 F.2d 531, 538 (4th Cir. 1988).
12. 843 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1988) (coalition's case number 12).
13. Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 3236
(1989) (in light of H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989)).
14. Id. at 1391.




8. Bingham v. Zolt 17
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, the estate of famed Jamaican reggae performer Bob
Marley, brought a civil RICO action against several of Marley's attor-
neys and accountants alleging fraudulent diversion of Marley's music
companies from the estate.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the case on "pattern"
grounds. These filings should not continue in the future. If they do con-
tinue, the filing parties should be subject to sanctions.
9. Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc.18
Coalition Comment
Plaintiff brought a civil RICO action over a dispute regarding re-
pairs of a commercial fishing boat.
Analysis
The court properly dismissed this litigation based on the plaintiff's
improper categorization of the defendant as an "enterprise." Filings of
this type should not continue in the future. If they do continue, the
filing parties should be subject to sanctions.
10. Brayall v. Dart Industries, Inc. 9
Coalition Comment
Independent distributors of Tupperware products sued the manu-
facturer of Tupperware, Dart Industries, alleging that Dart fraudulently
induced plaintiffs to become Tupperware distributors.
Analysis
This litigation is not abusive. The fraud consisted of "cult-like" in-
doctrination techniques, which misstated the income and business gain
available to distributors. The plaintiffs originally brought the action in
state court, but the defendant removed it to federal district court. The
district court temporarily stayed the RICO claim pending the outcome
17. 683 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (coalition's case number 20).
18. 802 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1986) (coalition's case number 37).
19. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] RICO Bus. Disputes Guide (CCH) 6861 (D. Mass. 1988)
(coalition's case number 8).
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of an injunction request and state law claims, which it had remanded to
state court. The district court, however, observed that "[a]lthough de-
fendants have moved to dismiss the RICO claim, it cannot be said that
the claim 'is "obviously without merit" ...
11. Bruce Church, Inc. v. United Farm Workers2'
Coalition Comment
Agricultural business brought a civil RICO suit against Cesar Cha-
vez, the United Farm Workers Union (UFW), their attorneys, and
strike coordinators, alleging that the UFW, along with the other de-
fendants, had induced the California Agricultural Labor Relations
Board to issue fraudulent complaints against the business.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to
plead fraud with particularity.
12. Christian Populist Party v. Secretary of State2"
Coalition Comment
Plaintiffs brought a civil RICO action against the State of Arkan-
sas, challenging the Arkansas state election statute with regard to its
filing deadlines and petitioning requirements.
Analysis
The plaintiffs, Ralph P. Forbes and the Christian Populist Party,
brought eight different claims against the defendants. The district court
properly dismissed all charges.
Ralph P. Forbes first gained notoriety as a captain in George Lin-
coln Rockwell's American Nazi Party.23 Most recently, he was the cam-
paign manager for David Duke, former Grand Wizard of the Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan, in Louisiana's 1989 House of Representatives elec-
tion. 4 Additionally, in 1986, Mr. Forbes filed a lawsuit on behalf of
Jesus Christ, minor children, and himself against Satan, various govern-
mental units, the Russellville School District, and a state education offi-
20. Id. 1 6861, at 7835.
21. No. CV-F-84-231 REC (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 1986), reprinted in 3 RICO L. REP. 723 (May
1986) (coalition's case number 4).
22. 650 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (coalition's case number 30).
23. Berry, A Master Racist Jumps Parties to Land in the Louisiana Legislature, L.A.
Times, Feb. 26, 1989, § 5, at 3, col. 1.
24. Berry, supra note 23, at 6, col. 1; see also Grogan & Greene, An Ex Klansman Trades
His Robes for a Cloak of Respectability in the Louisiana Legislature, TIME, Mar. 6, 1989, at 215.
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cial, to stop the celebration of Halloween in the schools. That case, too,
was dismissed properly.
2 5
Accordingly, this litigation has little or nothing to do with civil or
criminal RICO. No matter what the law is, however, people like Mr.
Forbes will file frivolous claims for relief. The proposed reform, there-
fore, will do nothing to deter Mr. Forbes from filing another claim
under RICO or any other theory.
13. Church of Scientology v. Armstrong26
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, the Church of Scientology, brought a civil RICO ac-
tion against former church members, alleging they conspired to steal
church scriptures for their personal financial benefit and were "per-
verting" the scriptures' texts.
Analysis
This case is part of the same litigation as Religious Technology
Center v. Wollersheim.27 In Wollersheim defendants stole certain scrip-
tures and higher level materials from church offices in Copenhagen,
Denmark. Danish officials later convicted them of burglary. The Church
of the New Civilization, a splinter group from the Church of
Scientology, acquired the materials and the competing "New Church"
allegedly used them to lure away adherents and to damage the Church
spiritually and financially. Wollersheim denied the Church injunctive
relief under civil RICO. The Church refiled in Religious Technology
Center v. Scott,28 alleging that the scriptures were trade secrets with
economic value. The district court denied the application. The Church
appealed to the Ninth Circuit and properly prevailed. 9
This litigation is not abusive. It strikes at the sort of extensive
fraud RICO was designed to redress. The defendants traveled across
the globe to burglarize the Church. They were convicted of crimes in a
foreign country. They then set up a competing enterprise with the bur-
glarized material seeking fraudulently to induce patrons to seek spiri-
tual guidance at the "New Church" instead of the Church.30
25. Olander, Devil Made Him Do It, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 4, 1987, at 47.
26. D.C. Cal. July 16, 1985 (coalition's case number 39); see Civ. RICO REP., July 24, 1985, at
2.
27. 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987).
28. 660 F. Supp. 515 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
29. 869 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1989).
30. As Joseph Yanny, an attorney in the litigation, aptly observed, it "proves that
Scientology can receive justice in the courts without putting its religious beliefs on trial." Church
of Scientology RICO Suit Against Former Members Upheld by Court, Civ. RICO REP., July 24,
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14. Compton v. Ide3"
Coalition Comment
Plaintiff brought a civil RICO action against the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, individual FBI agents, and others in connection with the
investigation and arrest of the plaintiff which led to his conviction for
illegal possession of a dangerous weapon.
Analysis
Plaintiff filed several federal claims, including a RICO claim. The
district court properly dismissed the RICO claim for failure to file
within the statutory period. The Ninth Circuit disposed of the RICO
charges in only three paragraphs.
The RICO claim also was subject to dismissal on "pattern"
grounds. As such, filings of this type should not continue in the future.
If they do continue, the filing parties should be subject to sanctions.
Further, federal law enforcement officers, acting in an objectively
reasonable fashion, are immune from federal and state criminal prose-
cution.32 Civilly, a court must determine whether federal law enforce-
ment officers are immune on a case by case basis.3 8 When officers act
outside the scope of their immunity, they have no valid objection to
criminal or civil actions against them under RICO or any other statutes
or claims for relief.
3 4
15. Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc. 5
Coalition Comment
Conan Properties brought a civil RICO action against Mattel alleg-
ing copyright infringement by Mattel of its fictitious character "Conan
the Barbarian."
1985, at 2.
31. 732 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984) (coalition's case number 36).
32. See, e.g., Baucom v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that an FBI agent
was not subject to state prosecution for bribery for participation in a sting operation).
33. Compare Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (finding that the President has abso-
lute civil immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts) with Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 504-08 (1978) (holding that the Secretary of Agriculture has qualified immunity for
unconstitutional action arising out of the exercise of discretion).
34. Compare United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding a civil
rights conviction for unlawful burglary of a doctor's office by White House personnel), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1120 (1977) with Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (alleging civil claim
for relief for an unlawful wire tap by government officials).




The district court properly upheld claims and counterclaims for
fraudulent misuse of copyright materials. The court granted leave to
both parties to amend their pleadings. Both parties subsequently aban-
doned their RICO claims, but the other claims remain in court. 6 This
litigation is not abusive.
16. Condict v. Condict37
Coalition Comment
A brother brought a civil RICO action against his mother and
brother alleging that they tried to wrest control of the family's 25,000-
acre Wyoming ranch from him, and deprive him of any of the proceeds
from the ranch's operation.
Analysis
The district court improperly dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the complaint lacked a connection to "organized crime."
The Tenth Circuit, however, decided Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable"8
by the time of the appeal. In Gable the court held that "neither RICO
nor Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA) requires [plain-
tiff] to plead a connection between defendant's activities and organized
crime .... We are persuaded by the opinions which have held that
there is no such requirement in a civil setting."3 9 The court, however,
dismissed the complaint on a different ground: failure to allege a "pat-
tern." Nevertheless, the Gable opinion is not a proper construction of
the RICO statute. Contrary to plaintiff's complaint, which alleged a
claim for relief under section 1962(b),40 the court reached its judgment
under section 1962(c). The court held that no "pattern" was present
because only a single scheme was alleged. This holding largely reads
section 1962(b) out of the statute.4' In fact, the Supreme Court in H.J.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.4 2 rejected the Tenth Circuit's
reading of "pattern." As such, Condict is a better illustration of judicial
abuse of RICO rather than a litigant's abuse of the statute.
36. See Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
37. 815 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1987) (coalition's case number 7).
38. 782 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 885-86.
40. Section 1962(b) prohibits the takeover of an enterprise by a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
41. See United States v. lanniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "requiring
two schemes to establish pattern would effectively eliminate" § 1962(b)), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1006 (1987).
42. 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989).
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The plaintiff, a Chassidic Jewish congregation, filed a civil RICO
suit against other members of the congregation over a dispute concern-
ing the proper succession to the "Skolyer Rebbe," the religious leader-
ship position within the congregation.
Analysis
The district court improperly dismissed the RICO claim on the
grounds of a lack of an "organized crime" allegation.
The district court probably should have dismissed the claim on
first amendment grounds."' It also is doubtful that a "pattern" could be
alleged properly. Filings of this type should not continue in the future.
If they do continue, the filing parties should be subject to sanctions.
18. Cory v. Standard Federal Savings Bank4"
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, an individual bank depositor, brought a civil RICO
action against a bank for the bank's alleged fraudulent underpayment
of interest on the plaintiffs "T-bill Plus" account.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the case because the plaintiff
failed to establish a "pattern." The Fourth Circuit determined that this
appeal was so insignificant that it affirmed the district court's dismissal
without publishing its opinion.46 Filings of this sort should not continue
in the future. If they do continue, the filing parties should be subject to
sanctions.
19. Creative Bath Products v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.4
Coalition Comment
A partnership brought a civil RICO action against Connecticut
General alleging that the insurance company's agent made three false
43. 566 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (coalition's case number 52). The correct spelling of the
plaintiff's name is "Congregation Beth Yitzhok."
44. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
45. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] RICO Bus. Disputes Guide (CCH) 6902 (4th Cir. 1988)
(coalition's case number 13).
46. See Cory v. Lang, 843 F.2d 1386 (4th Cir. 1988).
47. 837 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988) (coalition's case number 9).
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representations in order to induce the partnership to purchase four life
insurance policies for its officers.
Analysis
The Supreme Court denied certiorari.48 The district court properly
dismissed the complaint for failure to allege a "pattern" and the Second
Circuit affirmed. Filings of this type should not continue in the future.
If they do continue, the filing parties should be subject to sanctions.
20. District Telecommunications Development Corp. v. District
Cablevision, Inc."9
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a disappointed bidder of a cable television franchise,
brought a civil RICO action against the successful bidder of the
franchise.
Analysis
The district court improperly dismissed the case because it held
that the plaintiff lacked cognizable injury. This decision represents a
view of RICO that would deny defense contractors standing to sue for a
systematic pattern of obtaining defense contracts through fraud. As
such, it is inconsistent with the better view.50 It is, therefore, a better
illustration of judicial rather than litigant abuse.
21. Erlbaum v. Erlbaum 5'
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a divorced wife, brought a civil RICO action against
her ex-husband because she believed he had not lived up to his part of
the property settlement.
Analysis
The district court dismissed this case because it determined that
the plaintiff was not a "purchaser or seller" under section 10b-5 of the
securities statute. The district court wrongly decided this issue.52 The
48. 109 S. Ct. 3241 (1989).
49. 638 F. Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1985) (coalition's case number 41).
50. See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1067 (3d Cir.
1988).
51. [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 98,772 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (coalition's case
number 43).
52. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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court probably should have dismissed the case on "pattern" grounds.
22. Eveland v. Director of Central Intelligence Agency5"
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, challenging the conduct of the U[nited] S[tates] for-
eign policy in the Middle East, brought a civil RICO action against the
CIA and its director, William Casey, in which various current and for-
mer government officials, including Henry Kissinger, Robert McFar-
lane, Richard Helms, George Schultz, and others were served.
Analysis
The First Circuit properly dismissed the claim for relief. The court
used the case for a clear statement that RICO is not a tool for resolving
"political differences." Future similar cases should result in sanctions.
The sort of litigation abuse illustrated by this case, however, is not
RICO-specific. All legislation is exposed to it. Individuals who believe
that litigation can resolve all of their personal dissatisfactions will seek
to use any legislation on the books. It is doubtful that even the repeal
of RICO would prevent this sort of litigation from being brought in the
future.
23. Flip Mortgage Corp. v. McElhone 4
Coalition Comment
A mortgage company brought a civil RICO action against the of-
ficers and directors of a computer services firm alleging fraudulent
breach of a contractual arrangement to share revenues generated by
firm computerized mortgage-related services.
Analysis
Flip Mortgage Corp. brought civil RICO charges against the direc-
tors of Shamrock* Computer Services alleging multiple counts of fraud
over a seven year span. The district court dismissed the RICO count on
"pattern" grounds. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
This construction of "pattern," however, was incorrect. If multiple
frauds occurred over a substantial period of time, the court should have
found a "pattern."5 This decision is a better illustration of judicial
abuse than litigant abuse."
53. 843 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1988) (coalition's case number 16).
54. 841 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1988) (coalition's case number 10).
55. See, e.g., Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1303-04 (7th Cir. 1987).
56. See, e.g., Eastern Publishing & Advertising v. Chesapeake Publishing & Advertising, 831
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24. Flip Side Productions, Inc. v. Jam Productions, Ltd.57
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a Chicago rock concert promoter, brought a civil
RICO action against another local rock promoter, the Village of
Rosemont, Illinois, and the University of Illinois, alleging a RICO con-
spiracy to exclude the plaintiff from the University of Illinois' arena by
the operation of an exclusive lease for the arena which allegedly oper-
ated to prevent rock performers appearing at the University's arena
from discovering that defendant promoter was charging artificially high
promotional fees.
Analysis
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 8
The court properly dismissed this action on "pattern" grounds, and
it imposed sanctions of 42,496 dollars on the plaintiff. This case illus-
trates the Seventh Circuit's position on abusive RICO claims: such
claims will not be tolerated, and the court will not hesitate to sanction
those bringing abusive actions. This case illustrates how well the pre-
sent system is working; it is not an illustration of litigation abuse that
requires the rewriting of RICO.
25. Hunt v. Weatherbee
5 9
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a female carpenter's apprentice, brought a civil RICO
action against officers of a union local and a superintendent of a con-
struction company alleging a pattern and practice of sex discrimination
and sexual harassment.
Analysis
This case in not abusive. Instead, it illustrates how a plaintiff can
use RICO to redress wrongs that otherwise may be difficult to redress.
Here, the labor union systematically sexually harassed and subjected
Hunt to extortionate behavior until she was compelled to leave her
work. RICO provided an apt remedy to a wronged person.
F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding no pattern), cert. granted and vacated 109 S. Ct. 3234 (1989);
Walk v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 847 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding no pattern), cert. granted
and vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3235 (1989).
57. 843 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1988) (coalition's case number 19).
58. 109 S. Ct. 261 (1988).
59. 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986) (coalition's case number 24).
10331990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
26. International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin60
Coalition Comment
The plaintiffs, outside investors, filed a civil RICO suit against the
owners of a firm for including a fraudulent statement in the stock pro-
spectus for the firm.
Analysis
The court dismissed the case because plaintiffs lacked "standing"
to recover under section 10b-5 of the securities statute. The Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, is incorrect when it applies civil instead of criminal
standing elements to a civil RICO claim."' The court also dismissed the
case for lack of a "pattern." In fact, this second justification for the
court's dismissal rests on better legal ground.
27. Jerome v. SmithKline Beckman Corp.2
Coalition Comment
The plaintiffs brought a civil RICO action against a pharmaceutical
company for damages for alleged personal injuries caused by use of a
drug manufactured by the company.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the RICO count, because per-
sonal injuries do not give rise to a claim for relief under RICO. In addi-
tion, because the plaintiffs did not allege a crime of violence, the
proposed RICO reform legislation, which would authorize recovery for
personal injury in some situations, would not change this result. This
type of litigation should not continue in the future. If it does continue,
the filing parties should be subject to sanctions.
28. King v. Lasher
3
Coalition Comment
The plaintiffs, beneficiaries of an estate and trust, brought a civil
RICO action against the executrix and trustee of the estate over the
administration and distribution of the deceased's estate.
60. 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987) (coalition's case number 53).
61. See, e.g., Warner v. Alexander Grant & Co., 828 F.2d 1528, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15-20 (2d Cir. 1981).
62. 842 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1988) (coalition's case number 11).
63. 572 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (coalition's case number 31).
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Analysis
Mrs. Lasher, the executrix, properly recovered her attorney's fees
from plaintiff's counsel upon dismissal. The court found that the plain-
tiffs brought the action in bad faith and without factual basis. It is pos-
sible that the court could have dismissed the claim on other grounds. 4
29. K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co.65
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff brought a civil RICO action against a large share-
holder to enjoin the shareholder from voting its shares at an annual
meeting and from exercising any control over the plaintiff, alleging that
the shareholder had obtained its common stock of the plaintiff in viola-
tion of RICO.
Analysis
This case dealt with the fraudulent filing of a Schedule 13(d) with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 13(d) requires a
group acquiring more than five percent of the stock in a corporation to
explain the group's intent in acquiring the stock. The court acknowl-
edged that the defendants had intentions beyond what the filed form
indicated, but it found no "pattern." The court, therefore, found that
the claim should not be dismissed and denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment.
30. Kouvakas v. Inland Steel Co."
Coalition Comment
The plaintiffs, a husband and wife, brought a civil RICO action
against Inland Steel Company alleging that Inland officials conducted a
pattern of racketeering by causing fraudulent invoices and other docu-
ments to be mailed to Inland Steel Company customers, and that In-
land's harassment of plaintiff for refusing to participate in the pattern
of racketeering activity caused plaintiff Spiro Kouvakas to become per-
manently disabled and caused plaintiff Judith Kouvakas the loss of
consortium of her husband.
64. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 25, at 143-46 (1983) (discussing the inherent
exceptions to jurisdiction).
65. 607 F. Supp. 756 (D. Colo. 1983) (coalition's case number 51).
66. 646 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (coalition's case number 23).
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Analysis
The district court properly dismissed this case on summary judg-
ment. RICO does not include personal injury claims.
31. Lightner v. Tremont Auto Auction1
7
Coalition Comment
Civil RICO suit brought against FBI agents who orchestrated an
undercover sting operation.
Analysis
Two FBI agents were charged with violating RICO and the civil
rights statute through their scheme of entering disguised stolen vehicles
into the stream of commerce. The agents used the scheme to sting a
ring of interstate auto thieves. Lightner was injured when he purchased
stolen vehicles. The district court did not dismiss the RICO charges on
the defense of qualified immunity, because it would not hold as a mat-
ter of law that defendants had the requisite good faith reasonable belief
in the constitutionality of their scheme.
The FBI agents appealed the issue of qualified immunity in Powers
v. Lightner.8 The Seventh Circuit first held that the district court's
order denying summary judgment was not immediately appealable; the
resolution of the issue of qualified immunity would require a final judg-
ment. In Powers v. Lightner69 the court reversed itself in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell v. Forsyth,70 which held that a
summary judgment order is an appealable final decision. The court fur-
ther held that the FBI agents were entitled to summary judgment on
the grounds that federal agents had qualified immunity against civil
suits that failed to allege criminal intent. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Lightner v. Jones.1 Although the court acknowledged that
"'it would be illogical to extend good faith immunity to a government
official who has intentionally violated an individual's constitutional
rights,' ,,72 the FBI agents did not violate Lightner's rights; it was
merely the "fallout of the sting operation. '7'3 As such, the FBI agents
were vindicated on appeal. Finally, this type of litigation is not RICO-
specific. It properly could reoccur under the civil rights statutes if FBI
67. 564 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (coalition's case number 3).
68. 752 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1985).
69. 820 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1987).
70. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
71. 484 U.S. 1078 (1988).
72. Powers, 820 F.2d at 822 (quoting Perry v. Larson, 794 F.2d 279, 284 n.1 (7th Cir. 1986)).
73. Id.; see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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agents do not act in good faith.
This type of litigation should not reoccur. If it does reoccur, the
ground rules, under which these types of actions are to be resolved, are
settled.
32. Marks v. Pannell Kerr Forster
74
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a former business partner, brought a civil RICO ac-
tion against a former partner and the partnership's accounting firm al-
leging that defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by
mailing false partnership tax returns to him, thus adversely affecting
his tax liability for the year in question.
Analysis
Plaintiff had an expectation of in excess of 8,000,000 dollars that
was invested in various partnership arrangements. The district court
properly dismissed the case on "pattern" grounds. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed. Filings of this type should not occur in the future. If they do
continue, the filing parties should be subject to sanctions.
33. Medallion TV Enterprises v. SelecTV of California75
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a joint venture partner, brought a civil RICO action
against a former joint venture partner to recover losses sustained from
lower than anticipated sales of the broadcast rights to a heavyweight
prize fight between Muhammed Ali and Trevor Berbick.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the case for failure to allege a
"pattern." Filings of this type should not continue in the future. If they
do continue, the filing parties should be subject to sanctions.
34. Medical Emergency Service Associates v. Foulke71
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a corporation providing medical services to hospitals,
brought a civil RICO action against four employee-physicians, alleging
74. 811 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1987) (coalition's case number 28).
75. 627 F. Supp. 1250 (C.D. Cal. 1986), afl'd, 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987) (coalition's case
number 33).
76. 844 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1988) (coalition's case number 18).
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they had fraudulently schemed to replace the corporation as the pro-
vider of emergency room services for a hospital.
Analysis
The court dismissed the plaintiff's RICO claim for failure to allege
a "pattern." The district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiff be-
cause he made inaccurate statements in his attempt to establish a "pat-
tern." The Seventh Circuit affirmed. This case illustrates how well rule
11 is working. It hardly justifies rewriting RICO on other issues.
35. Michaels Building Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A.7
Coalition Comment
The plaintiffs, two commercial bank customers, brought a civil
RICO class action against six different banking groups and fifty individ-
uals employed by or associated with the banks, alleging overcharges in
interest on various prime rate-based loans.
Analysis
This case does not illustrate litigation abuse. The Sixth Circuit
properly acknowledged the dilemma courts face in trying to distinguish
between illegitimate and meritorious claims. The court held that there
is tension between rule 8 (notice pleading) and rule 9(b) (pleading with
particularity) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(b)'s par-
ticularity requirement cannot be viewed to undercut rule 8's "short and
plain statement of a claim" provision. The two rules should be viewed
in harmony. The court, however, found that rule 9(b)'s particularity re-
quirement must be read to give the defendant fair notice of the sub-
stance of the plaintiff's claim so that the defendant can prepare a
responsive pleading.
Bank lending practices, if fraudulent, may be challenged properly
under RICO. 78 Many of the so-called prime-rate cases under RICO,
77. 848 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1988) (coalition's case number 22).
78. See Note, Prime-Rate Fraud Under RICO, 72 GEo. L.J. 1885, 1889-90 (1984). The com-
mentator stated:
Prime-rate discounting is widely practiced by banks that wish to reap the benefits of
lending at high market rates to small businesses, while discounting the rates to large corpo-
rate borrowers in order to retain their valued business. But such bank practices have an in-
herently negative impact on a sensitive economy. As the Committee report on prime-rate
lending noted,
For the public at large, the highly visible prime rate is an important economic indicator,
and artificially high prime rate announcements that are not truly reflective of interest rate
conditions add to inflationary expectations. While the prime rate refers to commercial loans,
there is an indirect effect on other lending activity.
1038 [Vol. 43:851
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however, do not fare well.79
36. Miller v. Moffat County State Bank °
Coalitiodi Comment
The plaintiff, an individual bank customer, brought a civil RICO
action against a state bank alleging fraudulent overcharges in interest
on a series of prime rate-based loans.
Analysis
The district court dismissed this case on "pattern" grounds. The
significant aspect of Miller, however, is the court's statement that the
courtroom is not the proper place for attorneys to learn about RICO;
the court threatened to impose rule 11 sanctions on attorneys in the
future in similar situations.81
37. Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp. 2
Coalition Comment
The plaintiffs, owners of a mortgaged boat, brought a civil RICO
action against the secured lender and the repossession company, alleg-
ing a RICO conspiracy in repossession of the boat.
For example, as long as the prime remains high, local mortgage lenders are unlikely to modify
terms or make new commitments. Although consumer rates are less volatile than other loan rates,
both the cost and the availability of consumer loans are affected by the "trickle-down" from the
perceived prime. Thousands of loan contracts, particularly those entered into by small- and me-
dium-sized businesses, are tied to the prime rate. Moreover, the Small Business Administration
uses the Wall Street Journal's daily prime-rate listing as the official base for its loan programs.
It is clear, therefore, that society is best served when interest rates reflect the true opportunity
cost of borrowing-and in a free market, this would occur. If a major borrower refused to pay the
published prime, interest rates would decline. This natural supply-and-demand effect is vitiated,
however, when banks deceive small-business borrowers. Awarding damages on fraud claims in such
cases would deter the practice of making secret discounts to favored borrowers and issuing loans to
smaller borrowers based on an artificial prime, and will motivate banks to reveal their lowest inter-
est rates in order to avoid lawsuits. This flow of information, in turn, will stimulate interest-rate
competition among banks, leading to the lowest rate the market will bear.
The widespread use and effect of prime-rate discounting thus provide compelling reasons for
seeking nontraditional methods of damage recovery which will simultaneously remedy injuries
caused to a plaintiff and deter future behavior of this kind. The RICO treble-damage provision
provides such a mechanism.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
79. See, e.g., Walters v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A. Memphis, 855 F.2d 267, 273 (6th Cir. 1988)
(directing verdict in favor of bank on issue of intent to defraud when prime rate fraud is alleged).
80. 678 F. Supp. 247 (D. Colo. 1988) (coalition's case number 21).
81. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
82. 818 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1987) (coalition's case number 26).
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Analysis
The court properly dismissed this case on "pattern" grounds. This
type of case should not reoccur. If it does reoccur, the filing party
should be subject to sanctions.
38. Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co.8
Coalition Comment
The plaintiffs, a husband and wife, brought a civil RICO action
against a pharmaceutical company for alleged damages suffered from
ingestion of arthritis medication.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed this case on the grounds that
RICO does not protect against personal injuries.
39. Morosani v. First National Bank"
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, an individual bank customer, brought a civil RICO
action against the bank alleging that the prime rate used in computing
the interest on the customer's loan was not the bank's true prime rate.
Analysis
The Eleventh Circuit properly ruled that the district court incor-
rectly held that the bank's activities have "not traditionally been
treated as criminal in nature." 85 In fact, the bank systematically
charged a particular interest rate to a certain class of customers when it
claimed it was charging a lower rate. The Eleventh Circuit thus rein-
stated the customer's claim, stating that fraud is criminal.8 6
40. Morrison v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc.
8
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff brought a civil RICO action against a manufacturer of
infant milk formula alleging fraudulent advertising.
83. 626 F. Supp. 365 (D. Mass. 1986) (coalition's case number 25).
84. 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 1983) (coalition's case number 47).
85. Id. at 1221.
86. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.




Ms. Morrison had a products liability case pending in the federal
courts for eighteen months before she requested leave to amend her
complaint to include a RICO count. The district court denied the plain-
tiff's request because of her undue delay.
41. Park South Associates v. Fischbein, Oliveri, Rozenholc & Badillo88
Coalition Comment
A New York real estate development partnership headed by Don-
ald Trump brought a civil RICO action against the law firm represent-
ing tenants in an apartment building that were resisting efforts of the
development company to convert the apartment building into a condo-
minium entity by initiating a number of legal proceedings aimed at de-
laying and preventing Trump from undertaking the conversion of the
property.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the RICO allegations as in-
sufficiently plead. The court added: "Since it appears that future plead-
ing would merely waste the time and resources of the litigants as well as
divert scarce judicial resources, we deny plaintiff's motion to re-plead
and dismiss the complaint with prejudice."8
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision without a
published opinion.90 This case illustrates that the system is working
well. Courts do not tolerate flagrantly ill-plead RICO suits.
42. Peckarsky v. American Broadcasting Co."'
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a free-lance journalist and attorney, brought a civil
RICO suit against ABC for its use of an article without giving plaintiff
audio-visual credit during times when broadcast was made of the
article.
Analysis
Mr. Peckarsky filed a multicount suit against ABC alleging,
among other claims, Copyright Act and RICO violations. The district
88. 626 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (coalition's case number 6).
89. Id. at 1115.
90. 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986).
91. 603 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1984) (coalition's case number 32).
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court dismissed the RICO claim for failure to allege a "pattern." In ad-
dition, the court held that the defendant did not commit the alleged
predicate acts with the scienter necessary to complete the crime. This
case again illustrates that the present system is working well.
43. Pit Pros, Inc. v. Wolf9"
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a prospective commercial tenant, brought a civil
RICO action against the landlord for the return of $3000 rental deposit,
alleging misrepresentation as to zoning and covenants running with the
property.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the RICO claim for failure to
allege a "pattern." Filings of this type should not continue in the fu-
ture. If they do continue, the filing parties should be subject to
sanctions.
44. Routh v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd."
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, the lessee of "Stamp Masters," photographic color
separators and plates used for printing postage stamps, brought a civil
RICO action against the lessor of "Stamp Masters," alleging fraudulent
misrepresentation in connection with the lease.
Analysis
Plaintiffs entered into a complicated financial arrangement with
defendant Philatelic to lease printing plates ("Stamp Masters") for
printing local postage stamps bearing the names of small islands just off
the Scottish coast. Philatelic promoted this tax shelter with a national
sales marketing campaign, which involved three to four hundred com-
missioned sales representatives. During 1982 Philatelic sold the rights
to produce over 1600 different designs, with the rights for a typical de-
sign selling for around 15,000 dollars. The plaintiffs' lease was to gener-
ate an investment tax credit, deductions, and other credits, creating a
lucrative tax shelter (up to a four dollar write off for each dollar in-
vested, according to plaintiffs), and allegedly turn a possible profit.
92. 554 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (coalition's case number 38).
93. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] RICO Bus. Disputes Guide (CCH) 6914 (E.D. Wash. 1988)
(coalition's case number 17).
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Nevertheless, the government in United States v. Philatelic Leasing,
Ltd.9 4 sought and obtained an injunction closing down this tax shelter
scheme under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.
The plaintiffs then sued under RICO, alleging securities fraud as one of
the predicate acts. The court dismissed the claim on the bases that the
predicate acts were not pleaded with sufficient specificity and that the
tax shelter was neither an investment contract nor a security.95 This
litigation is neither abusive nor frivolous.
45. Schalz v. Botica98
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a widow, brought a civil RICO action against the ad-
ministrator of her deceased husband's pension fund, alleging that the
administrator refused to award her benefits unless she agreed to have
sex with him and gave him a ten percent kickback of the funds due her.
Analysis
The defendant, Joseph Botica, is the former administrator of the
pension fund of Local 1, Structural Ironworker's Union in Chicago, Illi-
nois. 7 United States District Judge Nicholas J. Bua ordered Botica's
resignation in February 1986, when he was convicted of racketeering,
extortion, and income tax fraud."8 In Botica's indictment, one of the
incidents related to his demand of a ten percent kickback from a 1884
dollar annuity fund death benefit owed to the four children of Robert
Ray. Mr. Ray was Ms. Schalz's ex-husband.9
In this case, Ms. Schalz merely was trying to collect the pitiful sum
due her and her children from a convicted racketeer who, in addition to
demanding a kickback, demanded sexual favors from her before he
would release the funds.
Whatever else this litigation illustrates, it is not illustrative of abu-
sive RICO litigation. Indeed, Ms. Schalz still would be entitled to treble
94. 601 F. Supp. 1554 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 794 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1986).
95. For a better analysis of the same scheme, see Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 888
F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1989). Other litigation involving the fortunes of Philatelic and its principals can
be found at Bausch v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 1201 (D. Md. 1990); Hersch v. United
States, 685 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); and White v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., No. CIV-1-86-508
(E.D. Tenn. Dec. 7, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
96. No. 86-C-20113 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1987) (coalition's case number 27); see Civ. RICO REP.,
Oct. 13, 1987, at 3.
97. Possley, Union Official Ordered to Quit After Conviction, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 20,
1986, § 2, at 3, col. 1.
98. Id.
99. Frantz & Possley, Embezzlement Charge Hits Peter Vrdolyak, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 4,
1985, § 2, at 1, col. 2.
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damages under the proposed reform legislation. It is difficult to under-
stand why the Coalition selected this case as an example of litigant
abuse.
46. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp."'0
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, an office equipment supplier, brought a civil RICO
action against a former employee and a printing company for fraudu-
lently obtaining materials used in its sales catalog for use in the sales
catalog of the former employee's competing business.
Analysis
The district court dismissed one of the RICO claims and allowed
the other to stand. The claim involved a systematic pattern of fraud. It
is not an example of abuse.
47. Sendar Co. v. Megaware, Inc. 1 '
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a distributor of housewares, brought a civil RICO ac-
tion against a glassware importer alleging that the importer paid sales
commissions to the distributor at lower rates than those agreed upon.
Analysis
The district court dismissed the case, pursuant to rules 9(b) and
12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and granted the plain-
tiff leave to amend. The district court, however, dismissed the amended
complaint because plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity. 102
48. Shaw v. Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc.'0 3
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, an importer of watches, brought a civil RICO action
against the Rolex company alleging a RICO conspiracy to submit docu-
ments to the U[nited] S[tates] Customs Service which fraudulently
stated that Rolex U.S.A. was not owned or controlled by the Swiss
100. [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] RICO Bus. Disputes Guide (CCH) 6336 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(coalition's case number 49).
101. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] RICO Bus. Disputes Guide (CCH) 6905 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(coalition's case number 15).
102. Sendar Co., Inc. v. Megaware, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
103. 673 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (coalition's case number 45).
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owner of the Rolex trademark.
Analysis
Shaw was a Rolex dealer, whose inventory was seized by Customs
during shipment after the defendants in fact filed fraudulent claims
with Customs. Plaintiff brought this litigation in federal district court
on an antitrust claim that was separate from the RICO claim. The dis-
trict court's denial of defendant's motions for rule 11 sanctions and dis-
missal of at least one of the RICO counts shows that the litigation was
neither frivolous nor abusive.
49. Sigmond v. Brown"0 4
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a chiropractor, brought a civil RICO action against
the California Chiropractors Association and members of its peer re-
view committee. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants engaged in
various acts of price fixing, kickback schemes, and conspired to reduce
payments to chiropractors.
Analysis
Plaintiff alleged that defendants were deriving unfair benefits from
their membership in a peer review committee. The district court found
that the plaintiff did not establish the alleged predicate acts either fac-
tually or as a matter of law. Based on plaintiff's failure sufficiently to
establish the elements of the predicate acts, the district court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The judgment was af-
firmed on appeal. 105 The Ninth Circuit also suspended plaintiff's attor-
ney from appellate practice for six months for making misstatements in
the pleading.0 6
While this case was pending, the Los Angeles Superior Court or-
dered the plaintiff to undergo regular psychiatric treatment for a
chronic mental illness described as "paranoid personality disorder." 0 7
Plaintiff later shot and wounded a bailiff in court and was himself shot
and killed. °s
Obviously, litigation undertaken by mentally ill plaintiffs and irre-
104. 645 F. Supp. 243 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (coalition's case number 29).
105. 828 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1987).
106. See In re Disciplinary Action Boucher, 837 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.), modified by 850 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1988). The suspension subsequently was revoked, but the censure remained
unchanged.




sponsible attorneys is not RICO-specific. The proposed reform legisla-
tion will not stop this sort of litigation abuse.
50. Taylor v. Mondale1°9
Coalition Comment
Suit filed against former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Dem-
ocratic National Committee (DNC), and several members of the DNC,
alleging they offered to channel political contributions to other Demo-
cratic candidates in exchange for promises not to oppose certain Reagan
Administration policies.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the RICO bribery charges
brought against Mondale, the DNC, and the named individual members
of the DNC, because RICO does not reach violations of 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 203's antibribery provisions.
51. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology"'0
Coalition Comment
The plaintiff, a former member of the Church of Scientology,
brought a civil RICO action claiming she had been defrauded into join-
ing the church and defrauded into purchasing church educational
materials.
Analysis
The district court properly dismissed the RICO claim for failure to
plead fraud with particularity. The court also properly dismissed the
claim because RICO does not cover personal injury.
52. White v. Fosco'1
Coalition Comment
A civil RICO action was brought against the two attorneys who had
represented members of the Mail Handlers Union in a successful class
action against the U[nited] S[tates] Postal Service over the right of the
attorneys to personally retain the award of attorney's fees.
109. No. 84-3149 (D.D.C. 1985) (coalition's case number 2); see Civ. RICO REP., June 5, 1985,
at 6.
110. 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982) (coalition's case number 40).




In fact, members of a mob-controlled union actually brought this
litigation against the controlling figures. This case hardly is abusive.
The Laborer's Union is thought to be "a tool of the crime syndicate" by
the Department of Justice." 2 The President's Commission on Organ-
ized Crime in 1986 reached a similar conclusion." 3
Angelo Fosco, who took over the Union when his father, Peter
Fosco, died in 1975, is thought to take orders from Joseph Aiuppa. Ai-
uppa is the current head of the organized crime family in Chicago.
1' 4
Peter Fosco, in turn, was an associate of Paul Ricca, the former head of
the Chicago family." 5 Angelo Fosco and Anthony Accardo, another
leader from Chicago, were tried in Florida for skimming an alleged two
million dollars from the Union's health and welfare funds."6 An associ-
ate was convicted; Fosco and Accardo were acquitted. 117 A grand jury
now is investigating allegations that the jury was fixed."'
The district court improperly dismissed the RICO claim on the
grounds that no "racketeering injury" occurred. This position was re-
jected in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.1 9 The district court, however,
properly refused to dismiss the claims alleging that the defendant's law-
yers breached their fiduciary responsibility. Whatever else this litiga-
tion illustrates, it does not illustrate litigation abuse under RICO.
53. Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliates Group 20
Coalition Comment
HBO was sued by a group of homeowners, each of whom had been
sent a letter accusing them of illegal reception of HBO programming;
HBO's letter advised the homeowners that they would be included as
defendants in a civil suit unless they stopped illegally receiving HBO's
signal. The plaintiff homeowners alleged that HBO's action in mailing
the letter constituted a pattern of racketeering activity based on
112. Fritz, Union Corruption: Worse Than Ever, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 8, 1980, at
33, 35.
113. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME, BUSINESS, AND
LABOR UNIONS: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 145-66 (1986).
114. Fritz, supra note 112, at 35.
115. Id.
116. U.S. Jury Acquits Reputed Crime Figure in Union Embezzling Trial, N.Y. Times, June
19, 1982, at A8, col. 2.
117. Id.
118. F.B.L Investigation Reported in 3 Racketeering Acquittals, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1982,
at A18, col. 3.
119. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
120. 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1987) (coalition's case number 5).
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Analysis
The court properly dismissed the case as to the lead plaintiff, Zim-
merman, because he could not allege more than mental distress. In ad-










IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(Insert date]
Mr. or Ms. [insert sponsor(s)] introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL
To amend chapter 96 (relating to racketeer
influenced and corrupt organizations) of
title 18, United States Code and for other
purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
2 Representatives of the United States of America
3 in Congress assembled,
4
5 TITLE I - RICO REFORM
6 SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE.
7 This Act may be cited as the "Crime Control
8 Act of 1989."
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2
1 SEC. 102. FINDINGS.
2 Based on published data and its own stud-
3 ies, the Congress finds that--
4 (1) Organized crime, white-collar
5 crime, violent group crime, and other
6 sophisticated forms of criminal conduct
7 unlawfully inflict each year billions of
8 dollars of damage on public and private
9 institutions as well as individuals;
10 (2) Organized crime includes the
11 importation and distribution of narcotics
12 and other illicit drugs, loan sharking,
13 syndicated gambling, theft and fencing,
14 prostitution, extortion, arson for-profit,
15 bankruptcy fraud, conterfeiting, hazardous
16 waste offenses, the infiltration of legiti-
17 mate business and labor organizations, and
18 political and other forms of public corrup-
19 tion;
20 (3) White-collar crime includes
21 contract procurement fraud, credit card
22 fraud, bribery, price-fixing, illicit
23 market allocation, securities and commodi-
24 ties, frauds, tax fraud, medical fraud,
25 bank and thrift fraud, insurance fraud,
26 product counterfeiting and diversion,
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1 coupon fraud, and home improvement fraud;
2 (4) Violent group crime includes
3 murder, kidnapping, robbery, arson, gun-
4 running, and explosive offenses, which are
5 engaged in for a variety of motives,
6 including individual pathology, economic
7 profit, the desire to change governmental
8 structures, and racial, religious and
9 ethnic animosity, none of which is toler-
10 able in a free society;
11 (5) Organized crime, white-collar
12 crime, violent group crime and other
13 sophisticated forms of criminal conduct are
14 not mutually exclusive categories of
15 criminal conduct;
16 (6) Federal, State, local, and for-
17 eign law enforcement agencies have forged
18 increasingly effective partnerships in
19 efforts to curtail organized crime, white-
20 collar crime, violent group crime, and
21 other sophisticated forms of criminal con-
22 duct;
23 (7) The curtailment of organized
24 crime, white-collar crime, violent group
25 crime, and other sophisticated forms of
26 criminal conduct requires extraordinary
1990] RICO MYTHS 1051
4
1 techniques of investigation and prose-
2 cution, as well as special criminal and
3 civil sanctions, which are not always
4 available to State and local law enforce-
5 ment agencies;
6 (8) The existence of an effective
7 private enforcement mechanism is essential
8 to any effort to curtail organized crime,
9 white-collar crime, violent group crime,
10 and other sophisticated forms of criminal
11 conduct;
12 (9) Any private enforcement mechanism
13 must be carefully tailored to maximize the
14 advantage and to minimize the disadvantage
15 to the interest of justice;
16 (10) Because of marketplace and other
17 relative inequalities, a private enforce-
18 ment mechanism, to be effective, must sanc-
19 tion conduct, deter violators, compensate
20 victims for accumulative harm, and encour-
21 age private enforcement by authorizing the
22 recovery of multiple damages and litigation
23 costs, including attorney's fees;
24 (11) To curtail litigation abuse in
25 the administration of the private enforce-
26 ment mechanism, standards must be set for
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1 the bringing of private enforcement actions
2 and proceedings, the use of terms of oppro-
3 brium must be circumscribed, verification
4 must be required in certain litigation, and
5 more particularity in pleading standards
6 involving secondary liability must be
7 enforced; and
8 (12) Divergent court practices and
9 decisions require the clarification of ori-
10 ginal Congressional intent under Title IX
11 of The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
12 (18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.).
13 SEC. 103. PATTERN.
14 (a) Section 1961 of title 18, United
15 States Code, is amended--
16 (1) by striking "or" after "States"
17 in paragraph (D),
18 (2) by inserting after "Reporting
19 Act" in paragraph (E)--
20 ", or (F) the collection of an
21 unlawful debt",
22 (3) by striking "(5)" through "racke-
23 teering activity" and inserting--
24 "(5) 'pattern of racketeering
25 activity' means
26
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1 (A) at least two acts of
2 racketeering activity (excluding
3 elements of jurisdictional signi-
4 ficance only, including the use
5 of the mails, interstate wires,
6 radio communications, or travel
7 or transportation in interstate
8 or foreign commerce),
9 (B) the last act of racke-
10 teering activity occurred within
11 five years of a prior act of
12 racketeering activity,
13 (C) the acts of racketeer-
14 ing activity were related to each
15 other or to a common external or-
16 ganizing principle, including the
17 affairs of an enterprise, and
18 (D) the acts of racketeer-
19 ing activity continued over a
20 substantial period of time (more
21 than a few weeks or months) or a
22 threat existed that they would
23 continue.
24 For the purpose of paragraph (C), acts
25 of racketeering activity are related if
26 they have the same or similar purposes,
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1 results, participants, victims, or methods
2 of commission, or are otherwise interre-
3 lated by distinguishing characteristics and
4 are not isolated.
5 For the purpose of paragraph (D), acts
6 of racketeering activity are not continuous
7 if they are so closely related to each
8 other and connected in point of time and
9 place that they constitute a single episode
10 of activity so that in reference to the
11 manner of their commission, the purpose for
12 which they were committed, the person who
13 committed them, the enterprise in whose
14 affairs they were committed, or otherwise,
15 they do not give rise to an inference of
16 the possibility of continuing acts of
17 racketeering activity.
18 (b) Section 1962 of title 18, United
19 States Code is amended--
20 (1) in subsection (a) by striking "or
21 through collection of an unlawful debt",
22 (2) in subsection (b) by striking
23 "through a pattern of racketeering activity
24 or through a collection of unlawful debt",
25 (3) in subsection (b) by inserting
26 after "acquire"--
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1 "through racketeering activity",
2 and
3 (4) in subsection (b) by inserting
4 after "maintain"--
5 "through a pattern of racketeer-
6 ing activity".
7 SEC. 104. ADDITION OF PREDICATE OFFENSES.
8 Section 1961(1) of title 18, United States
9 Code, is amended--
10 (1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting
11 "prostitution involving minors," after
12 "extortion,";
13 (2) in subparagraph (B)--
14 (A) by inserting "sections 1111-
15 1117 (relating to homicide), section
16 1203 (relating to hostage taking),"
17 after "gambling information),";
18 (B) by striking out "section
19 1503" and inserting "sections 1501-
20 1506, 1508-1513, and 1515" in lieu
21 thereof;
22 (C) by inserting "section 1992
23 (relating to wrecking trains), sec-
24 tions 2251-2252 and 2256 (relating to
25 sexual exploitation of minors), sec-
26 tion 227 (relating to vessels)," after
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1 "specified unlawful activity),";
2 (D) by inserting "section 2331
3 (relating to terrorists acts)," after
4 "vehicle parts),";
5 (E) by inserting "32 (relating
6 to destruction of aircraft or aircraft
7 facilities), section 81 (relating to
8 arson), section 112 (relating to pro-
9 tection of foreign officials and other
10 persons), but not subsection (b), sec-
11 tion 115 (relating to assaults and
12 other acts against Federal and other
13 persons), section" after ": Section";
14 (F) by inserting "section 373
15 (relating to solicitation to commit a
16 crime of violence)," after "sports
17 bribery),";
18 (G) by inserting "section 510
19 (relating to forging of Treasury or
20 other securities), section 513 (relat-
21 ing to forgery of State and other se-
22 curities)," after "counterfeiting),";
23 (H) by inserting "section 844
24 (relating to explosive materials), but
25 not subsections (b), (c), or (g), sec-
26 tion 875 (relating to interstate com-
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1 munications), but not subsection (d),
2 section 876 (relating to mailing
3 threatening communications), but not
4 the fourth paragraph, section 877 (re-
5 lating to threatening communications
6 from foreign country), but not the
7 fourth paragraph, section 878 (relat-
8 ing to threats and extortion)," after
9 "pension and welfare funds),";
10 (I) by inserting "section 1029
11 (relating to fraud and other activity
12 in connection with access devices),
13 section 1030 (relating to fraud in
14 connection with computers)," after
15 "extortionate credit transactions),";
16 (J) by inserting section 1362
17 (relating to destruction of communica-
18 tion lines), section 1363 (relating to
19 destruction of buildings), section
20 1364 (relating to obstruction of for-
21 eign commerce), section 1366 (relating
22 to destruction of energy facility),"
23 after "(relating to wire fraud),";
24 (K) by inserting ", section
25 1952A (relating to murder for hire),
26 section 1952B (relating to violent
1058 [Vol. 43:851
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1 crime in aid of racketeering)," after
2 "1952 (relating to racketeering)"; and
3 (L) by inserting "section 2318
4 (relating to trafficking in counter-
5 feit labels and audiovisual works),
6 section 2320 (relating to trafficking
7 in counterfeit goods and services),"
8 after "of stolen property),";
9 (3) by striking "or" at the end of
10 subparagraph (D);
11 (4) by striking out the semicolon at
12 the end of subparagraph (F), as relettered
13 by this Act, and inserting in lieu
14 thereof --
15 ', (G) any offense under section
16 134 of the Truth in Lending Act (15
17 U.S.C. 1644), (H) any offense commit-
18 ted by a transporter under section
19 3008(e) of the Resource Conservation
20 and Recovery Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C.
21 6928(e)) or a substantially similar
22 knowing endangerment provision of a
23 State hazardous waste program author-
24 ized by the Administrator of the
25 Environmental Protection Agency under
26 section 3006 of the Resource Conser-
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1 vation and Recovery Act of 1976 (42
2 U.S.C. 6926), but only if such trans-
3 porter's conduct manifested an unjus-
4 tified and inexcusable disregard for
5 human life or an extreme indifference
6 for human life, or (I) section 5861 of
7 the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (re-
8 lating to firearm control) (26 U.S.C.
9 5861);" and
10 (5) in subparagraph (D), by striking
11 out "fraud in the sale of securities," and
12 inserting in lieu thereof--
13 "any offense under the Securities
14 Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77x), the
15 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
16 U.S.C. 78ff), the Public Utility
17 Holding Company Act of 1935 (15 U.S.C.
18 79z-3), the Trust Indenture Act of
19 1939 (15 U.S.C. 77yyy), the Investment
20 Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-49
21 and 80b-17), or the Commodity Exchange
22 Act (7 U.S.C. 13),".
23 SEC. 105. CIVIL RECOVERY.
24 Section 1964 of title 18, United States




1 "1964. Civil remedies
2 "(a) In any civil action or proceeding
3 instituted under this section, the district
4 courts of the United States shall have,
5 except as provided in subsection (j) of
6 this section, exclusive jurisdiction to
7 prevent, restrain, or remedy violations of
8 section 1962 of this chapter by rendering
9 an appropriate judgment or decree, includ-
10 ing--
11 "(1) ordering any person to
12 divest himself of any interest, direct
13 or indirect, in any enterprise;
14 "(2) imposing reasonable restric-
15 tions on the future activities or
16 investments of any person, including
17 prohibiting any person from engaging
18 in the same type of endeavor as the
19 enterprise engaged in or the activi-
20 ties of which affect interstate or
21 foreign commerce;
22 "(3) ordering dissolution or re-
23 organization of any enterprise, making
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1 "(4) imposing damages and assess-
2 ing costs, including attorney's fees,
3 as provided in this section, or
4 "(5) taking such other action as
5 may be in the interest of justice.
6 "(b)(1) The Attorney General, or
7 other legal officer authorized to sue if a
8 department or agency of the United States
9 is involved, may institute a proceeding
10 under this section.
11 "(2) Pending final determination of a
12 proceeding instituted by the Attorney
13 General or other legal officer under this
14 section, the court may at any time enter
15 such restraining orders or prohibitions, or
16 take such other actions, including the
17 acceptance of satisfactory performance
18 bonds, as might be just.
19 "(3) Whenever the United States, or
20 department or agency of the United States,
21 is, directly or indirectly, injured in its
22 business or property by a violation of
23 section 1962 of this chapter, the Attorney
24 General, or other legal officer authorized
25 to sue, if a department or agency of the
26 United States is involved, may institute a
15
1 civil action under this section in an
2 appropriate United States district court
3 and shall recover threefold the actual
4 damages (but recovery against a State or an
5 agency of a State shall be actual damages),
6 upon a preponderance of evidence, caused by
7 such violation under circumstances where
8 injury of that kind was reasonably fore-
9 seeable, and if the United States, or
10 department or agency of the United States,
11 substantially prevails, the costs of the
12 action, including the cost of investigation
13 and litigation.
14 "(e)(1) Any person may institute a
15 civil action or proceeding under this sec-
16 tion if it meets the litigation standards
17 of this subsection. The litigation stan-
18 dards of this subsection are that the civil
19 action or proceeding of the plaintiff must
20 be based, in whole or in part, upon conduct
21 of the defendant--
22 "(A) for which the defendant (or
23 a co-conspirator or accomplice in such
24 conduct) was convicted for a Federal,
25 State, or foreign offense that re-
26 quired a showing of a state of mind as
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1 a material element of the offense and
2 that was punishable by death or im-
3 prisonment for a term exceeding one
4 year,
5 "(B) which is substantially
6 comparable to the conduct of another,
7 "(i) for which a convic-
8 tion was obtained in prior crim-
9 inal litigation under this
10 Chapter, or
11 "(ii) which met the liti-
12 gation standards of this subsec-
13 tion in prior civil litigation
14 under this Chapter, or
15 "(C) which requires the remedies
16 of this section adequately--
17 "(i) to sanction the
18 defendant's conduct,
19 "(ii) to deter him or
20 another from engaging in similar
21 conduct in the future,
22 "(iii) to compensate the
23 plaintiff for accumulative harm,
24 or
25 "(iv) to provide an
26 incentive to the plaintiff to
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1 engage in private enforcement.
2 For the purpose of paragraph (C), the fol-
3 lowing are to be given due consideration in
4 articulating and applying the litigation
5 standards of this subsection for civil
6 actions or proceedings to remedy conduct
7 for which the defendant is responsible--
8 "(i) the number and character
9 (including the age, health, or other
10 indicia of special vulnerability, the
11 non-profit status, or the relative
12 size of the business or activities) of
13 the victims of the conduct for which
14 the defendant is responsible,
15 "(ii) the seriousness and
16 impact of the conduct for which the
17 defendant is responsible, including
18 the individual or aggregate damage
19 (physical, economic, or peace of mind)
20 done or contemplated, or if minor, the
21 impact the conduct might have, if
22 widespread,
23 "(iii) the geographical extent
24 of the conduct for which the defendant
25 is responsible within a State, between
26 States, or internationally,
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1 "(iv) the diversified character
2 of the offenses that compose the
3 conduct for which the defendant is
4 responsible and the enterprise, if
5 any, in whose affairs they were
6 conducted,
7 "(v) the difficulty (incurred or
8 estimated) of the investigation and
9 litigation factually and legally and
10 the expertise of the attorney for the
11 plaintiff in bringing complex
12 litigation,
13 "(vi) the status of the
14 defendant and his relation to others
15 relative to the seriousness and impact
16 of his offense, his culpability
17 (including his position of trust or
18 responsibility), and his history of
19 similar conduct (including when it
20 occurred, its relation, if any, to the
21 conduct for which the defendant is
22 responsible, and its disposition),
23 "(vii) the national investiga-
24 tive and prosecutive priorities of the
25 Department of Justice for offenses,
26 and
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1 "(viii) any other factor appro-
2 priate in the interest of justice.
3 Civil actions or proceedings under this section
4 shall be instituted with restraint (not against
5 marginal, inconsequential, or technical viola-
6 tors or violations) and uniformly within the
7 general framework of the litigation standards
8 of this subsection. Civil actions or proceed-
9 ings may not be instituted under this subsec-
10 tion--
11 "(i) to coerce unjust settlements in
12 mere commercial or labor disputes,
13 "(ii) to chill the protected exer-
14 cise of freedom of religion, speech, press
15 or peaceable assembly, or petition of
16 government for redress of grievance, or
17 "(iii) to discriminate against a
18 person because of race, religion, sex,
19 national origin, or political beliefs,
20 associations, or activities.
21 "(2) Upon the institution of a civil action
22 or proceeding under this subsection by com-
23 plaint, counterclaim, or otherwise, the court
24 may, on its own motion or the motion of a
25 defendant, require the filing, under seal or




1 standards statement by the plaintiff, an answer
2 by the defendant, and a response to the answer
3 by the plaintiff. A litigation standards
4 statement, answer, and response may be accom-
5 panied by affidavits, exhibits, or other rele-
6 vant material and shall establish or controvert
7 reasonable grounds to belief that the action or
8 proceeding, based on its character (known or
9 which may reasonably be expected to become
10 known after discovery), meets the litigation
11 standards of this subsection. A motion to
12 file, or the consideration of, a litigation
13 standards statement, answer, or response shall
14 not deprive the court of its power to take any
15 other action in the interest of justice. The
16 court may postpone, in whole or in part, dis-
17 covery during the filing of, or its considera-
18 tion of, a litigation standards statement,
19 answer, or response. The court may hold a
20 hearing to consider testimony or arguments on a
21 litigation standard statement, answer, or
22 response. The court may receive and evaluate
23 in a litigation standards statement, answer, or
24 response and consider and evaluate at any hear-
25 ing on them evidence or information that would
26 be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evi-
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1 dence. After the court's consideration of the
2 litigation standards statement, answer, and
3 response and the hearing and arguments, if any,
4 the court shall enter an appropriate order per-
5 mitting the civil action or proceeding to con-
6 tinue, dismissing it, or taking any other
7 action that is in the interest of justice.
8 "(3) An order permitting a civil action or
9 proceeding under this section to continue or
10 dismissing it as consistent or inconsistent
11 with the litigation standards of this subsec-
12 tion shall be treated as an interlocutory order
13 granting or refusing to grant an injunction
14 under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1), but the standard
15 of review on appeal shall be plenary.
16 "(4)(i) In any proceeding instituted
17 by any person under subsection (a) of this
18 section, injunctive relief shall be granted
19 in conformity with the principles that
20 govern the granting of such relief from
21 threatened loss or damage in other cases,
22 including the possibility that any judgment
23 for money damages might be difficult to
24 execute (including secreting and dissipat-
25 ing assets or other similar conduct that
26 might defeat a judgment for money damages),
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1 but no showing of special or irreparable
2 injury shall have to be made.
3 "(ii) Upon the execution, in the
4 discretion of the court, of a proper bond
5 against damages for an injunction improvi-
6 dently granted, a temporary restraining
7 order or a preliminary injunction may be
8 issued in any proceeding under this section
9 before a final determination of it upon its
10 merits. Such undertaking shall not be
11 required when the applicant is a State.
12 "(iii) If the person who institutes
13 a proceeding under this section for injuncZ
14 tive relief substantially prevails, his
15 recovery shall include the costs of the
16 action, including a reasonable attorney's
17 fee in the trial and appellate courts.
18 "(5)(i) Any person, other than the
19 United States or a department or agency of
20 the United States, who is, directly or in-
21 directly, injured by a violation of section
22 1962 of this chapter may institute a civil
23 action under this section in an appropriate
24 United States district court and shall
25 recover threefold the actual damages (but
26 recovery against the United States, or a
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1 department or an agency of the United
2 States, or a State, or department or an
3 agency of a State, shall be actual dama-
4 ges), upon a preponderance of evidence,
5 caused by such violation under circum-
6 stances where injury of that kind was
7 reasonably foreseeable, and if the person
8 substantially prevails, the costs of the
9 action, including a reasonable attorney's
10 fee in the trial and appellate courts.
11 "(ii) It shall be an affirmative
12 defense that precludes recovery of more
13 than actual damages and costs, including a
14 reasonable attorney's fee, to be plead,
15 insofar as praticable, with particularity
16 in his answer and established by the defen-
17 dant, upon preponderance of the evidence,
18 where responsibility rest solely on respon-
19 deat superior, that he did not authorize,
20 request, commence, ratify, or recklessly
21 tolerate the violation of another either
22 himself or by a high managerial agent or
23 employee acting on his behalf and within
24 the scope of his authority or employment.
25
26
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1 "(d) Damages recovered under this sec-
2 tion shall not be limited to competitive or
3 distinct injury.
4 "(e) If the court determines that the
5 filing of any pleading, motion, or other
6 paper under subsection (c) of this section
7 was frivolous or that any civil action or
8 proceeding was brought or continued under
9 subsection (c) of this section in bad
10 faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for an
11 improper or oppressive reason, it shall
12 award a proper sanction to deter such con-
13 duct in the future, including the costs of
14 the civil action or proceeding (including
15 the costs of investigation and a reasonable
16 attorney's fee in the trial and appellate
17 courts), unless the court finds that spe-
18 cial circumstances, including the relative
19 disparate economic position of the parties,
20 make such an award unjust.
21 "(f) Upon the institution of a civil
22 action or proceeding under subsection (c)
23 of this section, the person instituting the
24 action or proceeding shall immediately
25 notify the Attorney General in such manner
26 as the Attorney General shall direct by
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1 regulations. The Attorney General may,
2 upon timely application, intervene in any
3 civil action or proceeding brought under
4 subsection (c) of this section, if the
5 proceeding is of general public import-
6 ance. In such action or proceeding, the
7 Attorney General shall be entitled to the
8 same relief as if he had instituted the
9 civil action or proceeding. In any event,
10 the court may, at any time, request the
11 Attorney General to comment on the applica-
12 tion of the litigation standards of subsec-
13 tion (c) of this section to the civil
14 action or proceeding.
15 "(g)(1) Except as provided in para-
16 graph (2) of this subsection, a civil
17 action or proceeding under subsection (c)
18 of this section shall be barred unless it
19 is instituted within five years after the
20 unlawful conduct terminates or the cause of
21 action otherwise accrues, whichever is
22 later.
23 "(2) A civil action of proceeding
24 instituted by the Attorney General, or a
25 legal officer authorized to sue of a de-
26 partment or an agency of the United States,
26
1 a State, or a department or an agency of a
2 State under subsection (c) of this section,
3 shall be barred unless it is instituted
4 within six years after the unlawful conduct
5 terminates or the cause of action otherwise
6 accrues, whichever is later.
7 "(3) Whenever any criminal action or
8 civil action or proceeding is instituted or
9 intervented in by the Attorney General to
10 punish, prevent, restrain, or remedy any
11 violation of section 1962 of this chapter,
12 the running of the period of limitations
13 provided in this subsection with respect to
14 any cause of action, arising under subsec-
15 tion (c) of this section, which is based,
16 in whole or in part, on any matter com-
17 plained of in such action or proceeding by
18 the Attorney General shall be suspended
19 during the pendency of such action or pro-
20 ceeding by the Attorney General and for two
21 years after the pendency of such action or
22 proceeding.
23 "(h)(1) A civil cause of action or
24 proceeding under this section not based, in
25 whole or in part, on a crime of violence as
26 a racketeering act shall be subject to the
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1 procedures of chapter 1 of title 9 (relat-
2 ing to arbitration) of the United States
3 Code.
4 "(2) No agreement to arbitrate any
5 dispute that is an adhesion contract shall
6 preclude the bringing of a civil action or
7 proceeding under this section.
8 "(3) If the parties to a dispute under
9 this section submit any dispute to arbitra-
10 tion, the arbitrator shall--
11 "(A) order on behalf of each
12 party appropriate discovery from other
13 parties or persons of the sort permit-
14 ted in civil actions or proceedings in
15 district courts of the United States,
16 and
17 "(B) render any award in writing
18 with findings of fact and conclusions
19 of law, if so requested by any party.
20 "(4) If any person fails to comply
21 with discovery ordered under this subsec-
22 tion, an interested person may bring a
23 civil action or proceeding in an appro-
24 priate United States district court and
25 obtain enforcement of that order.
26
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1 "(5) For the purpose of this sub-
2 section, 'adhesion contract' means an
3 agreement, standardized in form, over which
4 one party does not have a meaningful oppor-
5 tunity to bargain either because its impli-
6 cations are not explicitly set out or
7 because of the degree of disparity in the
8 bargaining positions of the parties, or
9 both.
10 "(i)(1) Notwithstanding any other provi-
11 sion of law, any complaint, counterclaim, an
12 answer, or any litigation standards statement,
13 answer, or response, filed by a person in con-
14 nection with a civil action or proceeding under
15 subsection (c) of this section shall be veri-
16 fied by at least one party or his attorney.
17 Where the person is represented by an attorney,
18 any pleading, motion or other paper shall be
19 signed by at least one attorney of record in
20 his individual name, whose address shall be
21 stated.
22 "(2) The verification by a person or his
23 attorney and the signature by an attorney
24 required by this subsection shall constitute a
25 certification by the person or attorney that he
26 has carefully read the pleading, motion, or
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1 other paper and, based on a reasonable inquiry,
2 believes that--
3 "(A) it is well grounded in fact;
4 "(B) it is warranted by existing law,
5 or a good faith argument for the extension,
6 modification, or reversal of existing law;
7 and
8 "(C) it is not made for any bad faith,
9 vexatious, wanton, improper or oppressive
10 reason, including to harass, to cause
11 unnecessary delay, to impose a needless
12 increase in the cost of litigation, or to
13 force an unjust settlement through the
14 serious character of the averment.
15 "(3) If a pleading, motion, or other paper
16 is verified or signed in violation of the cer-
17 tification provisions of this subsection, the
18 court, on its own motion or the motion of the
19 other party, shall, after a hearing and appro-
20 priate findings of fact, impose upon the person
21 who verified it or the attorney who signed it,
22 or both, a proper sanction to deter such con-
23 duct in the future, including the costs of the
24 proceeding under subsection (h) of this
25 section, unless the court finds that special
26 circumstances, including the relative disparate
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1 economic position of the parties, make such an
2 award unjust.
3 "(4) Where such pleading, motion, or other
4 paper includes an averment of fraud, coercion,
5 agency, respondent superior, accomplice, or
6 conspiratorial liability, it shall state, inso-
7 far as practicable, such circumstances with
8 particularity.
9 "(j)(1) The attorney general of a State
10 may bring a civil action or proceeding under
11 subsection (c) of this section in the name of
12 the State, as parens patriae, on behalf of
13 individuals residing in the State, in any
14 appropriate United States district court or any
15 appropriate court of the State. The court
16 shall exclude from the amount of monetary
17 relief awarded in the action or proceeding any
18 amount of monetary relief--
19 "(A) that duplicates amounts that have
20 been awarded for the same claim; or
21 "(B) that is properly allocable to
22 natural persons who have excluded their
23 claims pursuant to this subsection and any
24 commercial entity.
25 "(2)(A) In any civil action or proceeding
26 brought under this subsection, the attorney
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1 general of a State shall, at such times, in
2 such manner, and with such content as the court
3 may direct, cause notice of it to be given by
4 publication. If the court finds that notice
5 given solely by publication would deny due pro-
6 cess of law to any person, the court may direct
7 further notice to such person according to the
8 circumstances of the case.
9 "(B) Any person on whose behalf of action
10 or proceeding is brought under this subsection
11 may elect to exclude from adjudication the por-
12 tion of the State claim for monetary or other
13 relief attributable to him by filing notice of
14 such time as specified in the notice given
15 under this subsection.
16 "(C) Any final judgment or decree in any
17 civil action or proceeding under this subsec-
18 tion shall preclude any issue or claim under
19 subsection (c) of this section by any person on
20 behalf of whom such action was brought and who
21 fails to give such notice within the period
22 specified in the notice given under this sub-
23 section.
24 "(3) Any civil action or proceeding under
25 this subsection shall not be dismissed or com-
26 promised without the approval of the court, and
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1 notice of any proposed dismissal or compromise
2 shall be given in such manner as the court
3 directs.
4 "(4) In any civil action or proceeding
5 under this subsection--
6 "(A) the amount of the plaintiffs'
7 attorney's fee, if any, shall be determined
8 by the court; and
9 "(B) the court may, in its discretion,
10 award a reasonable attorney's fee to a pre-
11 vailing defendant upon a find that the
12 attorney general of the State has acted in
13 bad faith, frivolously, vexatiously, wan-
14 tonly, or for an improper or oppressive
15 reason.
16 "(5) For purposes of this subsection,
17 'attorney general of a State' means the
18 chief legal officer of a State, or any
19 other person authorized by State law to
20 bring actions under subsection (c) of this
21 section, including the Corporation Counsel
22 of the District of Columbia, except that
23 such term does not include any person
24 employed or retained on--
25 "(A) a contingency fee based on a per-
26 centage of the monetary relief awarded
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1 under this subsection; and
2 "(B) any other contingency fee basis,
3 unless the amount of the award of a reason-
4 able attorney's fee to a prevailing plain-
5 tiff is determined by the court under this
6 subsection.
7 "(k) A final judgment or decree ren-
8 dered in favor of the United States in any
9 criminal action or civil action or proceed-
10 ing in favor of the United States or any
11 plaintiff or a defendant in any civil
12 action or proceeding shall preclude the
13 plaintiff or defendant in any subsequent
14 civil action or proceeding as to all issues
15 or claims respecting which the judgment or
16 decree would preclude an issue or claim
17 between the parties to it.
18 "(i)(i) The court may award under
19 this section, upon the motion made after
20 verdict, simple interest on actual damages
21 for the period beginning on the date of
22 service of the pleading setting forth a
23 cause of action under this section and
24 ending on the date of verdict, or for any
25 shorter period, if the court finds that the
26 award of interest for the period is in the
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1 interest of justice.
2 "(2) In determining whether an award
3 of interest under this section for any per-
4 iod is in the interest of justice the court
5 shall give due consideration to that--
6 "(A) the opposing party, or
7 either party's representative, filed
8 pleadings, made motions, or filed
9 other papers so lacking in merit as to
10 show that such party or representative
11 acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wan-
12 tonly, or for an improper or oppres-
13 sive reason;
14 "(B) in the course of the pro-
15 ceeding or action involved, the oppos-
16 ing party, or either party's represen-
17 tative, violated any applicable rule,
18 statute, or court order providing for
19 sanctions for dilatory behavior or
20 otherwise providing for expeditious
21 proceedings;
22 "(C) the opposing party, or
23 either party's representative engaged
24 in conduct primarily for the purpose
25 of delaying the litigation or increas-
26 ing the cost of the litigation; and
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1 "(D) the award of such interest
2 is necessary to compensate the oppos-
3 ing party for the injury sustained by
4 him.
5 "(m)(1) A civil action or proceeding
6 under this section shall not abate on the
7 death of the plaintiff or defendant, but
8 shall survive and be enforceable by and
9 against his estate and by and against a
10 surviving plaintiff or defendant.
11 "(2) A civil action or proceeding
12 under this section shall survive and be en-
13 forceable against a receiver in bankruptcy,
14 but only to the extent of actual damages or
15 other relief.
16 "(3) In any civil action of proceeding
17 under this subsection in which the plead-
18 ing, motion, or other paper does not allege
19 a crime of violence as a racketeering act--
20 "(A) 'racketeer' or 'organized
21 crime' shall not be used in referring
22 to any person; and
23 "(B) the terms used to refer to
24 conduct in violation of section 1962
25 of this chapter shall be as follows:
26
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"(i) 'racketeering activ-
ity' as defined in section
1961(1) of this chapter, shall be
referred to as 'unlawful activ-
ity'; and
"(ii) 'pattern of racke-
teering activity,' as defined in
section 1961(5) of chapter, shall
be referred to as 'pattern of un-
lawful activity.'
SEC. 106. VENUE AND PROCESS AND JURISDICTION.
(a) Section 1965 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended--
"(1) in subsection (b), by striking
"residing in any other district";
"(2) in subsection (b), by striking
"in any judicial district of the United
States by the marshall thereof." and
inserting "anywhere the party may be
found.";
"(3) in subsection (c), by striking
"in any other judicial district" and
inserting "anywhere the witness is found";
"(4) in subsection (c), by striking
"in another district"; and
51
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1 "(5) in subsection (d), by striking
2 "in any judicial district in which" and
3 inserting "where".
4 (b) Section 1962 of title 18, United
5 States Code, is amended by adding at the end--
6 "(e) There is extraterritorial juris-
7 diction over the conduct prohibited by this
8 section."
9 SEC. 107. COSTS OF PROSECUTION AND INVESTIGA-
TION.
10
Section 1918 of title 28, United States
11
Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof
12
the following new subsection:
13
"(c)(1) Upon conviction in a court
14
of the United States for an offense in
15
chapter 96 of title 18, the court may order
16
the defendant pay the costs of investiga-
17
tion and prosecution. Amounts collected
18
under the preceding sentence shall be for-
19
warded to the Treasurer of the United
20
States for deposit in accordance with
21
section 524(c) of title 28.
22
"(2) For the purposes of this sub-
23







1 "(A) attorney, investigator, and
2 auditor salaries and expenses;
3 "(B) special contract costs and
4 special purchases;
5 "(C) travel costs and witness
6 fees; and
7 "(D) grand jury fees and other
8 related costs of investigation".
9 SEC. 108. CONSTRUCTION DIRECTIVES.
10 Chapter 96 of title 19, United States Code,
11 shall not be construed--
12 (1) to prohibit a person from consti-
13 tuting an enterprise, or a part thereof,
14 and a defendant in the same count of an
15 indictment or a complaint;
16 (2) to require in a criminal or civil
17 action or proceeding the showing of econo-
18 mically motivated conduct or a mercenary
19 motive;
20 (3) to permit the showing of an
21 enterprise by no more than a showing of a
22 pattern of racketeering activity;
23 (4) to require a showing that each
24 person named as a defendant in a criminal
25 or civil action or proceeding commit, or
26 agree to commit, personally the minimum
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1 number racketeering acts required to con-
2 stitute a pattern; or
3 (5) to permit a showing of criminal
4 responsibility or civil liability without a
5 showing of a state of mind other than that
6 required for the racketeering acts included
7 in the pattern of racketeering.
8 SEC. 109. CONFORMING AMENDMENT.
9 The analysis of chapter 96 of title 18,
10 United States Code, is amended by striking out
11 the item for section 1962 and inserting in lieu
12 thereof--
13 "1962. Prohibited activities.".
14
15 TITLE II - FORFEITURE REFORM
16 SEC. 201. FORFEITURE AND NECESSITIES.
17 (a) Part II - Criminal Procedure of title
18 18, United States Code, is amended by adding a
19 new chapter immediately after Chapter 232A--
20 "Chapter 232B - FORFEITURE AND NECES-
21 SITIES
22 "Sec. 3685 Right to Reasonable Neces-
23 sities.
24 "(a) With respect to any property of a
25 defendant or other person subject to a




1 other action designed to assure its availa-
2 bility for forfeiture under any provision
3 of law, the defendant or other person may
4 petition the United States District Court
5 or other judicial officer to set aside
6 designated portions of the property for
7 reasonable necessities.
8 "(b) The petition filed by the defen-
9 dant or other person as provided in subsec-
10 tion (b) shall be accompanied by a showing
11 under oath supporting the request for a set
12 aside for reasonable necessities that esta-
13 blishes--
14 "(i) why property owned by the
15 defendant or other person that is not
16 subject to an order, injunction, bond,
17 or other action is insufficient to
18 maintain a reasonable lifestyle;
19 "(ii) the amounts needed by the
20 defendant or other person to maintain
21 a reasonable lifestyle; and
22 "(iii) the interest that any
23 third party may have in property to be
24 subject or subject to an order, in-
25 junction, bond, or other action that
26 the defendant or other person seeks to
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1 have set aside for necessities.
2 "(c) Upon petition of a defendant or
3 person, as provided in subsection (b), the
4 United States District Court or other judi-
5 cial office shall, after given notice to
6 the United States and to any person appear-
7 ing to have an interest in any property
8 that the defendant or other person seeks to
9 have set aside, grant a set aside if the
10 court or officer determines by a preponder-
11 ance of the evidence that the property
12 subject to the set aside--
13 "(i) is needed by the defendant
14 or other person for reasonable neces-
15 sities; and
16 "(ii) may not be property un-
17 lawfully obtained from another person
18 with rights of damages, restitution,
19 or other relief.
20 "(d) Any hearing held under this sec-
21 tion shall, at the request of any party, be
22 held in camera.
23 "(e) No information presented by any
24 person in support of a request for a set
25 aside for reasonable necessities in a hear-
26 ing held under this section (or any infor-
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1 mation directly or indirectly derived from
2 such information) may be used against such
3 person in any criminal case, except a pro-
4 secution for perjury or giving a false
5 statement.
6 "(f) Any property set aside for rea-
7 sonable necessities under this section that
8 cannot be located upon the exercise of due
9 diligence, is transferred or sold to or
10 deposited with a third party, is placed
11 beyond the jurisdiction of the court, is
12 substantially diminished in value, or is
13 combined with other property that cannot be
14 divided without difficulty, but is subse-
15 quently forfeited under any provision of
16 law shall be restored by the defendant or
17 other person in an amount up to the value
18 of such property and such amount shall be
19 forfeited in substitution of such property.
20 "(g) For the purpose of this section,
21 'necessities' includes food, clothing,
22 shelter, transportation, medical care, and
23 professional fees.".
24 (b) The Table of Chapter Headings at the
25 beginning of Part II - Criminal Procedure of
26 Title 18, United States Code, is amended by
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1 inserting immediately after the entry for
2 chapter 232A--
3 "232B - FORFEITURE AND NECESSITIES"
4 SEC. 202. THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
5 (a)(1) Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d)
6 of section 2409a of title 28, United States
7 Code, are amended to read--
8 "(a) The United States may be named as
9 a party defendant in a civil action under
10 this section to adjudicate a disputed title
11 to real personal or other property of any
12 kind in which the United States claims an
13 interest, including a criminal or civil
14 forfeiture, other than a security interest
15 or water rights. This section does not
16 apply to trust or restricted Indian lands,
17 nor does it apply to or affect actions
18 which may be or could have been brought
19 under section 1346, 1347i 1491, or 2410 of
20 this title, section 7424, 7425, or 7426 of
21 the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
22 amended (26 U.S.C. 7424, 7425, and 7426),
23 or section 208 of the Act of July 10, 1952
24 (43 U.S.C. 666).
25
26
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1 "(b) The United States shall not be
2 disturbed in possession or control of any
3 real personal or other property of any kind
4 involved in any action under this section
5 pending a final judgment or decree, the
6 conclusion of any appeal therefrom, and
7 sixty days; and if the final determination
8 shall be adverse to the United States, the
9 United States nevertheless may retain such
10 possession or control of the real personal
11 or other property of any kind or of any
12 part thereof as it may elect, upon payment
13 to the person determined to be entitled
14 thereto of an amount which upon such elec-
15 tion the district court in the same action
16 shall determine to be just compensation for
17 such possession or control.
18 "(c) The complaint shall set forth
19 with particularity the nature of the right,
20 title, or interest which the plaintiff
21 claims in the real personal or other pro-
22 perty of any kind or interest therein
23 adverse to the plaintiff at any time prior
24 to the actual commencement of the trial,
25 which disclaimer is confirmed by order of
26 the court, the jurisdiction of the district
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1 court shall cease unless it has jurisdic-
2 tion of the civil action or suit on ground
3 other than and independent of the authority
4 conferred by section 1346(f) of this title.
5 "(d) If the United States disclaims
6 all interest in the real personal or other
7 property of any kind or interest therein
8 adverse to the plaintiff at any time prior
9 to the actual commencement of the trial,
10 which disclaimer is confirmed by order of
11 the court, the jurisdiction of the district
12 court shall cease unless it has jurisdic-
13 tion of the civil action or suit on ground
14 other than and independent of the authority
15 conferred by section 1346(f) of this
16 title.".
17 (2)(A) Section 2409a of title 28, United
18 States Code, is amended by striking out the
19 caption and inserting--
20 "2409a. Property quiet title
21 actions".
22 (B) The item relating to section 2409a in
23 the chapter analysis of chapter 161 of title
24 28, United States Code, is amended to read--
25 "2409a. Property quiet title
26 actions.".
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1 (b) Subsection (p) of section 1346 of
2 title 28, United States Code is amended
3 by--
4 (1) inserting "personal or
5 other" before "property"; and
6 (2) inserting "of any kind"
7 between "property" and "in".
8 (c) Section 1347 of title 28, United
9 States Code, is amended by inserting "or
10 other property of any kind" between "lands"
11 and "where".
12 SEC. 203. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
13 Section 3282 of title 18, United States
14 Code, is amended by
15 (1) inserting "(a)" before "Except",
16 and
17 (2) adding at the end
18 "(b) No property may be crimin-
19 ally forfeited by reason of a viola-
20 tion of an offense unless an indict-
21 ment is found or information is insti-
22 tuted within five years after the act
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1 TITLE III - DEMONSTRATION LITIGATION REFORM
2 SEC. 301. FIRST AMENDMENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND
RELATED LITIGATION LIMITATIONS.
3
(a) Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil
4
Procedure is amended by adding at the end--
5
"(h) Constitutionally Protected Con-
6
duct. In any civil action or proceeding
7
involving conduct that includes the pro-
8
tected exercise of freedom of religion,9
speech, press, peaceable assembly, or
10
petition of government for redress of
11
grievance, any averment of unprotected
12
conduct of any natural person, its proxi-13
mate consequences, the association, if any,14
of any natural person with another, the
15
unlawful objective, if any, of the associa-
16
tion, the state of mind of any natural
17
person with regard to an unlawful objective
18
of the association, and the evidence on
19
which the averment of state of mind is
20




(b) Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
23
Procedure is amended by adding at the end--
24
"(h) Discovery may not be obtained
25




1 of freedom of religion, speech, press, or
2 peaceable assembly, or petition of govern-
3 ment for redress of grievance."
4 (c) Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
5 dence is amended by--
6 (1) inserting before "Although"--
7 "(a)", and
8 (2) adding at the end--
9 "(b) Evidence may not be admitted
10 that would try the protected exercise
11 of freedom of religion, speech, press,
12 or peaceable assembly, or petition of
13 government for redress of grievance.".
14 (d) Section 1292(a) of title 28, United
15 States Code, is amended--
16 (1) by striking the "." at the end of
17 paragraph (4) and inserting--
18 of;"" and
19 (2) by adding after paragraph (4)--
20 "(5) Interlocutory orders of the
21 district courts of the United States
22 granting or enforcing discovery or
23 admitting evidence that is claimed to
24 interfere with or try the protected
25 exercise of freedom of religion,
26 speech, press, or peaceable assembly,
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1 or petition of government for redress
2 of grievance.".
3 SEC. 302.
4 (a) Part VI. Particular Proceedings of
5 title 28, United States Code, is amended by
6 inserting at the end thereof the following new
7 chapter--
8 "Chapter 178. First Amendment Demon-
9 strations and Related Litigation.
10 "Section 3001. First Amendment Demon-
11 strations and Related Litigation.
12 "S 3001. First Amendment Demon-
13 strations and Related Litigation
14 "(a) in any civil action or pro-
15 ceeding that involves conduct consist-
16 ing of the protected exercise of free-
17 dom of religion, speech, press, or
18 peaceable assembly, or petition of
19 government for redress of grievance--
20 "(1) no natural person may
21 be held liable in damages or for
22 other relief--
23 "(i) for the conse-
24 quences of his protected
25 conduct, or
26
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1 "(ii) for the conse-
2 quences of his unprotected
3 conduct,
4 except for those consequences es-
5 tablished by clear and convincing
6 evidence to be proximately caused
7 by his unprotected conduct,
8 "(2) no natural person may
9 be held liable in damages or for
10 other relief solely because of
11 his associations with another
12 where another engages in unlawful
13 conduct, unless it is established
14 by clear and convincing evidence
15 that the natural person intended,
16 through his associations with the
17 other, or otherwise, proximately
18 to cause or further the unlawful
19 conduct;
20 "(3) no natural person may
21 be held liable in damages or for
22 other relief based on the conduct
23 of another, unless the fact-
24 finder finds by clear and con-
25 vincing evidence that the natural
26 person authorized, requested,
51
1 commanded, ratified, or reckless-
2 ly tolerated the unlawful conduct
3 of the other;
4 "(4) no natural person may
5 be held liable in damages or for
6 other relief, unless the fact-
7 finder makes particularized find-
8 ings sufficient to permit full
9 and complete review of the
10 record, if any, of the conduct of
11 the natural person; and
12 "(5) notwithstanding any
13 other provision of law authoriz-
14 ing the recovery of costs, in-
15 cluding attorney fees, the court
16 may not award costs, including
17 attorney fees, if such award
18 would be unjust because of spe-
19 cial circumstances, including the
20 relevant disparate economic posi-
21 tion of the parties or the dis-
22 proportionate amount of the
23 costs, including attorney fees,
24 to the nature of the damage or
25 other relief obtained.
26
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1 "(b) For the purpose of this
2 section, a natural person acts reck-
3 lessly when he consciously disregards
4 a substantial and unjustifiable risk,
5 where his conduct is a gross deviation
6 from the standard of conduct that a
7 law-abiding natural person would
8 observe in the situation of the
9 natural person.".
10 (2) The Table of Chapter Headings and the
11 beginning of title 28, United States Code, is
12 amended by inserting immediately after the
13 entry for chapter 175--
14 "178. First Amendment Demonstrations
15 and Related Litigation."
16
17 TITLE IV - GENERAL PROVISIONS
18 SEC. 401. SEPARABILITY.
19 If the provisions of any part of this Act,
20 or the application thereof to any person or
21 circumstances be held invalid, the provisions
22 of the other parts and their application to






1 SEC. 402. EFFECTIVE DATE.
2 This Act shall be effective on enactment,
3 but its provisions shall not apply to any crim-
4 inal or civil action or proceeding instituted
5 before its enactment.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
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22
23
24
25
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